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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on one year of ethnographic fieldwork in Tokyo, this thesis explores 
the ‘economies’ of organ transplants in, and from, Japan.  
In Japan, the national debate over brain death has resulted in an impasse 
regarding transplantation medicine that still places the country at the very 
bottom of international statistics for organ donation. While previous research 
has investigated in detail the Japanese controversy over brain death, this thesis 
investigates the so far largely overlooked problem of organ shortage.  
Taking up the narratives of transplant recipients who pursued care 
overseas, and their families, I analyse the phenomenon of travel for 
transplantation purposes from Japan to North America, casting light on a form 
of patients’ mobility that remains poorly addressed within the growing debate on 
so-called ‘transplant tourism’.  
Drawing on extended life narratives and participant observation, I discuss 
what it means to be a ‘transplanted person’ (ishokusha) in Japan. I discuss how 
Japanese patients pursue care and ponder delicate clinical decisions, how they 
navigate their life after the operation, and how they became key policy actors 
lobbying for reform of the national law on transplants.  
Further, I explore how the policy on brain death and transplants is applied 
in clinical practice, highlighting the question of how to better reconcile possible 
solutions to the problem of organ shortage, which transplant advocates 
successfully made the subject of national debate, and the long-enduring 
controversy over the definition of death. 
Compounding the analysis of local and global political economies of care 
with the personal experience of patients and their families, I introduce the 
mediators of local economies of organs, and describe the networks of social 
and moral obligations in the exchange of human body parts. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Do You Know about the Wada Transplant?”  
 
Japan is one of the few countries where brain death is not fully recognised as 
human death and is treated instead as a terminal condition, so that the problem 
of reconciling the care of the dying person with the need to procure organs 
remains an open question and profoundly shapes contemporary politics of life 
and death.  
On the 8th of August 1968, at the hospital of the University of Sapporo in 
the northern island of Japan, Dr. Jirō Wada transplanted the heart of a young 
man into an eighteen-year-old patient. The operation was the first of its kind in 
Japan and the thirtieth in history, coming only a few months after Christian 
Barnard’s famous heart transplant made the headlines worldwide. The 
Japanese case attracted no less attention. The Japanese media followed it 
passionately and reported in detail the recovery of the young recipient, 
Miyazaki-kun, as he uttered his first words after surgery and became able to sit 
up in bed and eat (Yomiuri 1968a, 1968c). Dr. Wada, the surgeon trained in 
America who regarded Japanese medicine as a small “island within the island 
country” (Yomiuri 1968b), became a sort of Japanese counterpart to the 
medical celebrity Christiaan Barnard. In Japan as elsewhere, organ 
transplantation caught the imagination of the general public more than any 
other event in medical research or practice had done before, coming to 
represent the epitome of the groundbreaking power of modern science and 
technology. The sensation was huge, but as short as Miyazaki-kun’s recovery.  
Less than three months after the operation, the first Japanese heart 
recipient died. The tragic outcome of what had been depicted as a medical 
 11 
success brought new attention to the case, and the circumstances of the Wada 
transplant came under close public scrutiny. The medical experts who 
conducted the post-mortem suggested that the recipient’s condition was not so 
severe as to require such an invasive intervention, hinting that the real reason 
for the operation being carried out was in fact Dr. Wada’s ambition to join the 
race to fame. Dreadful suspicions arose over the events that led to the death of 
the 'donor', which had been determined by Dr. Wada himself. Charges against 
the surgeon were eventually dropped, but the judgment remains open as to 
whether the Wada transplant was a gruesome human experiment, intentionally 
carried out against the ethics of the medical profession, or a decision taken 
without following established codes of practice. Whichever is the case, the 
public controversy developed into one of the most heated debates in the history 
of Japanese bioethics: the so-called “brain death problem” (nōshi mondai) 
(Namihira 1984; Tachibana 1986; Morioka 1989; Ohnuki-Tierney 1994; 
Feldman 2000; Lock 2002; Long 2005). 
Brain death is a neurological condition defined as the irreversible loss of 
brain function in the entire brain, including the brain stem, resulting in cardio-
circulatory arrest. It is on the grounds of the irreversibility and certainty of this 
prognosis that brain death is equated with human death under the majority of 
clinical protocols and/or legal systems throughout the world. The redefinition of 
death as brain death, which historically dates back to the second half of the 
1960s, has been an essential step in the development of transplantation 
medicine, enabling the lawful pronouncement of a person’s death even though 
the heart is still beating, thereby making it possible to procure fresh organs from 
the dead. In Japan, the public debate that raged in the wake of the Wada 
transplant brought to the fore the problematic nature of redefining death on 
neurological criteria in relation to transplantation, and even though the polemic 
on the Wada transplant eventually petered out the “brain death problem” 
became one of the longest enduring controversies involving medical ethics in 
Japan (Namihira 1984; Tachibana 1986; Morioka 1989; Ohnuki-Tierney 1994; 
Lock 2002; Long 2005; Aita 2011). In the absence of consensus on the problem 
of whether brain death is human death, transplantation medicine came to an 
almost complete standstill, and for thirty years after the Wada scandal no 
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second heart transplant was performed in the country. In 1997, a law was 
approved which enabled transplantation medicine by authorising lawful organ 
donation from the brain dead. However, the very strict policy it set up, coupled 
with the enduring problem of brain death, made organ procurement possible, 
but resulted in a chronically low donation rate. Thirty years after the Wada case, 
the law was intended to bring an end to the brain death problem; in fact, the 
enduring legacy of the controversy over the definition of death is that, to date, 
Japan has the lowest number of cadaveric organ donations and the longest 
waiting lists for transplants amongst modern industrialised nations.  
 
"Thirty years is a long time. In those thirty years, other countries have 
made big progress, while Japan hasn’t. And that’s a problem now"  
(Kitanaka-sensei). 
 
This thesis looks at this problem, exploring the phenomena of the scarcity 
of organs, how this came about, how people live with it, and how they seek 
outside what is in shortage at home. It investigates how the shortage is 
produced, how it is framed as a problem, and how, in turn, this interweaves with 
the changing politics of (brain) death.  
 
 
The Enduring Legacy of the Brain Death Problem 
 
To begin with a history of transplantation in Japan is no more appropriate (or 
original) than many other possible openings; nonetheless, it seems 
compelling to approach the topic by first considering the notorious brain 
death problem. The ways in which brain death became a matter of 
controversy in Japan are the subject of more detailed discussion below; first, 
however, I want to discuss how the brain death problem continues to exert 
an overwhelming and enduring legacy not only on the practical conditions of 
organ procurement in Japan, but also on the way that transplantation is 
talked about in the public discourse and academic literature.  
My own engagement with the problem of transplantation stems 
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primarily from an academic interest in the issue of brain death. I am lucky 
enough to be able to say that no one in my family or amongst my friends has 
died in circumstances that required me to consider organ donation; neither 
did I know, before going to Japan, anyone who was on a waiting list for a 
transplant. Like many, I had never registered as a donor, despite the 
conviction that, had I found myself in such a situation, I would have wanted 
my family to consent to my organs being donated. I had a rather superficial 
knowledge of transplantation, and remember knowing nothing about the 
difference between cardiac arrest and brain death before reading about the 
Japanese case. The way I became interested in this project was because of 
my familiarity with Japan, and through the anthropological literature on the 
brain death problem.  
In Japan, the controversy surrounding brain death has grown into a 
“national obsession” (Feldman 2000: 51). Without resorting to hyperbole, I 
can say that Japanese publications on the brain death problem are 
innumerable. Legal scholar Bai Kōichi (1980), bioethicists and philosophers 
Morioka Masahiro (1989), anthropologist Namihira Emiko (1988), 
sociologists Nudeshima Jirō (1991) and Aita Karuoko (2011; 2012), and 
journalist Tachibana Takashi (1986) are only the best known authors to 
have tackled an issue which enjoys ever-lasting popularity across the 
disciplines. As is often the case in the Japanese publishing world, specialist 
works have reached a wide readership, well beyond academia, and can 
commonly be found in bookshops alongside popular literature, which 
includes titles by patients’ families and organisations. 
Outside of Japan, the controversy over brain death has become a 
matter of interest and curiosity, with the international media picking up on 
the problem (New York Times 1987, 1997), and scholars in the field of 
bioethics commenting on the Japanese way of handling the new definition of 
death (Bagheri 2007). Anthropologists based in North America have notably 
provided insightful analyses into the debate (Ohnuki-Tierny 1994; Lock 
2002; Long 2005). Long’s work provides an insightful analysis of the wider 
problem of end-of-life care in Japan and America, tackling a problem of 
great social relevance and yet scarcely investigated in anthropology (2005). 
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Her work is very helpful in understanding the cultural worlds in which end-of-
life decisions are negotiated, better understood if combined with a closer 
analysis of how social institutions and structural conditions in health-care 
provision shape people’s choices (cf. Kaufman 2006; Aita 2012). Ohnuki-
Tierney and Lock have looked more specifically at brain death, and the 
different reactions it arouses on opposite sides of the Pacific. Ohnuki-Tierny 
focuses on cultural differences, reproducing dogmatic and rigid opposition 
between Japan and the West, explaining the Japanese debate as culturally 
informed rejection of medical ‘rationality’ and leaving the analysis short of 
insight into the wider condition (1994). Lock’s argument, on the other hand, 
is much more nuanced and therefore powerful (2002). Like Feldman (2000), 
Lock draws on a variety of Japanese sources to combine a cultural critique 
of brain death with an attentive analysis of the role of political institutions, 
medical professionals, and the media. Her brilliant argument on the social 
construction of death in Japan and America is a classic in the ethnographic 
repertoire on Japan and medical technology. Indeed, it has been so 
influential that it has become 'fact'. Instead of opening the way to 
anthropological enquiry into organ transplantation in Japan as a potentially 
rich and worthy subject of investigation, her compelling analysis of brain 
death seems to have exhausted the discussion.  
In a similar fashion, the dispute about brain death among the Japanese 
public has, arguably, framed the general perception, professional attitudes, 
and political discussion on organ donation and transplantation, making the 
question of defining death the kernel of the problem. Very differently from 
most other countries, where brain death is only mentioned in passing, if at 
all, and the dispute on the philosophical coherence, clinical accuracy, and 
legal implications of the concept has remained an issue for a small group of 
experts to dissect, in Japan the question of whether brain death is human 
death continues to be of public interest. The result is that the brain death 
problem seems to be the necessary point of entry and the paradigmatic 
framework of any discussion on organ transplantation in general. 
The first corollary of this is that while the public debate on organ 
donation and transplant has been rich in Japan, almost nothing has been 
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said about the experience of the people who actually participate, and invest 
their hopes, in this technology, and whose lives are shaped by it. Compared 
to the ethnographic analyses of the experience of transplant recipients in 
other countries (Sharp 1995, 1999, 2006; Siminoff and Chillag 1999; 
Crowley-Matoka 2005; Maynard 2006), a similar discussion with reference 
to Japan is conspicuous by its absence from anthropological literature. 
Tomomatsu (2013) and Yamazaki (2007, 2009, 2011a, 2011b) are two rare 
exceptions. Tomomatsu’s work is an in-depth exploration of the experience 
of Japanese heart transplant recipients that focuses on the patient’s 
negotiation of risks, expectations, and the significance of the operation with 
respect to local notions of the gift and the body (Tomomatsu 2013). 
Yamazaki has also tackled the issue of patients’ experience, including the 
topic of medical travel (2007), and has published theoretical contributions to 
the idea of body economy (2009a, 2011b, 2011b; cf. Waldby and Mitchell 
2006) as well as the recent debate on the legal rendition of brain death 
(2013). In my work, I draw on these two authors, linking the patients’ 
experience, which is Tomomatsu’s (2013) focus, to the broader analysis of 
the economies of organs. In this, I adopt an approach similar to Yamazaki’s 
theorisation of body economies (2009, 2011a, 2011b) to describe how 
transplant patients’ experience, and the problem of defining death, 
interweave, detailing the ethnographic aspects of the problem, which would 
otherwise remain unseen. 
A review of the two authors who write about Japanese organ recipients 
leads to a further consideration of how the issue of brain death has 
functioned as a gatekeeper of the discussion about transplantation in Japan; 
namely, the fact that, in tandem with the scarcity of data about patients’ 
experience, there is a lack of analysis of the broader networks in which 
organ transplant are caught up. By this, I refer to the logistical, legal and 
technical apparatuses informing the practice of organ sharing, as well as the 
moral dilemmas in which these transactions are tangled. While the problem 
of scarcity might be particularly acute in Japan, organ transplants are 
routinely carried out, including, since 1997, all types of solid organ 
transplants. How then, are cases of donations managed, and how do 
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potential donations go missing? What are the ethical and legal frameworks 
that constrain or facilitate organ donation? What social institutions and 
practices shape the way in which people seek access to care in a regime of 
scarcity, and with what consequences? Similar questions have been left out 
of the scope of anthropological investigation, ignoring how the technology of 
transplant is managed, and not just contested, in Japan. One striking 
example of this narrowness of focus is that despite the growing interest in 
transplant mobility and the great relevance of anthropological participation in 
such a debate (Scheper Hughes 2000, 2001, 2005; Cohen 2001, 2003, 
2005), Japan remains effectively off the map of the global movement of 
organs and patients regardless of its role as the major “organ importing 
country in the world” (Shimazono 2007).  
One final consideration follows closely from this. If a contribution to the   
anthropological analysis of brain death in Japan is to reflect back on such a 
concept from a cross-cultural perspective, the focus on cultural differences 
could very easily be narrowed to reductionist interpretations and 
representations. Put simply, when the whole debate on transplantation in 
Japan is reduced to just the brain death problem, the idea is reproduced that 
the Japanese might have it right, but they still have it differently. Alongside 
Japan's invisibility on the global map of transplant mobility lies its isolation 
and self-containment from the debate on brain death. This way of looking at 
the problem reproduces a gap between Japan and the rest/West, one that 
can, at best, be filled by sensitive cultural translations (of which the 
anthropologist is the ultimate gatekeeper), or, at worst, be taken as 
synonymous with irreconcilable differences that have long rendered sterile 
any productive analysis of Japan as a field in anthropology (see more 
below). In this sense, until competing and varied perspectives on the 
problem of organ donation and transplant in Japan are fully explored, the 
very contribution of even the most insightful analyses on brain death risks 
falling prey to the same cultural reductionism they challenge. Almost twenty 
years after organ transplants from brain dead donors have become a reality 
in Japan, filling the gaps in the anthropological analysis of this technology is 
both timely and relevant. 
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Organ Transplantation in Japan  
 
The idea from which this project stems, was to look at the other side of the 
story: the experiences, claims and views of transplant candidates/recipients, 
their families and the organisations that support them. In a regime of severe 
and chronic shortage, how do people whose life, and quality of life, depend 
on the possibility of getting a transplant, seek access to treatment? What are 
the moral horizons within which these delicate decisions are taken? How do 
patients and their families negotiate their treatment choice in a society 
where resources are scare and the question of brain death lingers heavily in 
the public debate on transplant? How do their illnesses and therapeutic 
experiences shape the ways in which patients negotiate their relationship 
with treatment, both in their personal life and with respect to the public 
controversy over this technology? And what do these experiences tell us 
about the current situation of transplantation in Japan and its on-going 
transformations? 
One of the first things one learns about Japanese transplant recipients 
is that many do not stay in Japan. Given the high quality of the national 
health care system, which translates into the possibility of receiving timely 
diagnoses and life-support treatment for advanced organ failure, and 
considering the relative wealth of middle and upper class Japanese citizens, 
it is perhaps no surprise that one result of the long waiting times at home is 
the consistent flow of patients to overseas medical facilities. Lesser known is 
that alongside this organ 'black market', which has been brought to public 
attention in somewhat sensational ways, there also exist forms of 
international mobility for transplantation purposes that do not involve 
trafficking, coercion or the buying and selling of organs. It is in fact on such 
forms of transplant mobility to North America, Europe and Australia, that 
many Japanese patients have increasingly come to rely over the years,  in 
order to pursue treatment scarcely available at home. 
On the other hand, given the particular history of transplantation in 
Japan, recipients are crucial subjects in the “promotion of transplantation” 
(ishoku wo suishin suru) at home. Becoming an organ recipient means 
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entering dense networks of relationships with fellow patients, medical 
doctors, professionals in the field of transplantation and patients’ support 
organisations. Japanese patients strategically draw on these connections for 
navigating their therapeutic experiences both before and after the transplant. 
Patients’ stories are traded in the public discourse on the technology of 
transplantation, validating the efficacy and value of the treatment, and 
recipients themselves become actively involved in promoting social 
awareness about organ donation as a way to pay back the 'gift of life' they 
have received. In a country like Japan where the transplant technology has 
long been gauged through the lens of the brain death problem, recipients 
have come to play a key role in making this treatment accessible and 
desirable to fellow patients, in shaping the public discourse and debate on 
the technology, and ultimately in informing government policy on donation 
and transplant. In doing so, they have mobilised and publicly validated 
representations and expectations about this technology that had long 
remained shadowed by the contestation of brain death.  
The first event I attended in the field was the so-called Ginza Parade, a 
public demonstration that recipients’ groups organise annually to promote social 
sensibility about organ donation and to call on the government to support 
transplant through favourable policies and with adequate funding. The 2011 
event I attended was the last traditional Ginza Parade, which had run 
consecutively for the previous fifteen years. The year before, a new public 
policy had been enforced that, for the first time since the legalisation of organ 
donation in 1997, intervened in the structural conditions informing the 
transplantation system in the country with the aim of alleviating the chronic 
shortage of organs. Passed on the wave of recipients’ public mobilisation, the 
reform of the policy on brain death and transplantation was regarded by 
transplant advocates as the ultimate achievement in their effort to contribute to 
the promotion of transplantation in the country.  
The reform of the law represented a symbolic moment of change and 
materialised transformations that had built up for years, but whether, and how, it 
will have an impact on the situation of organ transplantation in the country 
depends on a wide range of interrelated factors. In this sense, my fieldwork took 
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place during a phase of transition in the politics of transplantation, at least one 
explicitly perceived as such, when important transformations had occurred 
whose practical effects remained to be seen. 
The donation rate in Japan has been constantly, but slowly, on the rise 
since the legalisation of cadaveric organ donation in 1997, and the reformed 
policy enforced in 2010 proved effective in producing a further increase in organ 
donors (see Appendix 1). People in the field, whether patients or professionals, 
were generally optimistic that, with time, organ donation would become routine 
in Japan, filling in the gap between the desperate demand for organs and the 
national shortage of these precious resources. For this to happen, however, 
much remains to be done, and while the reform of policy represented a visible 
achievement in the attempt to set up an efficient system for organ procurement 
in the country, the way things have worked out in practice is a very complex and 
multi-faceted issue. A closer look at the data on organ donation, for example, 
reveals that the impact of the revised regulation is not a uniform one. The 
majority of new donation cases are in fact performed after the patient’s cardiac 
arrest, and not in a condition of brain death, meaning that only kidneys and not 
other solid organs can be procured. Furthermore, brain death in children 
continues to remain a sensitive issue, and paediatric organ donation is 
particularly rare, even compared to the national rate of organ procurement from 
adult patients. In this sense, the situation following the reform reveals that 
scarcity is constantly mutating but is rarely ever solved, so that whether the gap 
between Japan and other countries, and the one between demand and supply, 
will change, or whether any given solution will work, remain questionable.  
The reform of the policy on donation coincided with an increase in 
government funding to the Japan Organ Transplantation Network, the public 
agency in charge of organ procurement and allocation for the country. 
According to professionals in the field, expanding the agency and fostering the 
creation of a system for organ sharing was the next step once bureaucratic 
impediments had been removed by pubic policy. Hiring new coordinators and 
training in-house medical staff to operate as facilitators between the JOTNW 
and medical doctors is of paramount importance in order to produce favourable 
conditions for organ procurement on the ground. Fostering cooperation 
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between the various intensive care specialists arguably remains the sticking 
point, considering that this sector of the medical world in Japan is traditionally 
sceptical about organ donation and particularly conservative with respect to the 
issue of withdrawing life-support from terminal patients.  
Concurrently with the promotion of professional cooperation, public 
awareness is another aspect in which the JOTNW is investing. Publicity and 
media campaigns seem to be regarded as particularly important in overcoming 
social sensibility about organ donation and the efficacy of such a contested 
treatment. Adverts about organ donation are fairly common on the 
underground, on the streets and in the media, and the JOTNW seems to be 
launching new events every year, from pop concerts dedicated to organ 
transplants, to celebratory initiatives like the lighting-up of public buildings in 
green, the symbolic colour of organ donation. More than emphasising the needs 
of recipients, these campaigns commemorate the social significance of 
transplantation and construct positive images of organ donation. In particular, 
they urge people to consider donation regardless of their decision about end-of-
life care, and to use donor cards to express their will. In this way, they 
reproduce a distinctive view of organ donation, consequent upon the debate 
over brain death, as a question pertaining to the end-of-life more than to one’s 
legacy after death.  
While the public discourse on donation and transplants has largely been 
framed through the lens of brain death, recipients’ personal testimonies and 
stories have contributed to bringing forth new perspectives on the problem. 
Many of the people who participated in my research, for example, cooperated 
with organisations promoting transplantation and were used to giving speeches 
at public events and seminars, and lectures in schools. Many of them also 
released interviews on the media, featured in various TV specials, and 
published their own memoirs about the experience of becoming a recipient or of 
losing a loved one because of the shortage of organs. By sharing their stories, 
they have contributed to articulating new, positive images of the social worth of 
transplantation, as well as identifying problems other than that of brain death.  
This is not to say that brain death is no longer a matter of concern, quite 
the contrary. During my time in Japan I attended a meeting at the Parliament 
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organised by MPs from left wing parties opposing brain death in collaboration 
with the Network for the Revision of the Law on Transplants (zōki ishoku ni 
kansuru hōritsu), confusedly named after the reform of the same law that 
transplant activists too lobbied to revise, but in fact advocating an amendment 
in the opposite direction. The association was formed by opponents of brain 
death, such as groups supporting the rights of disabled people, terminal 
patients, and car accident victims. One of the speakers invited to that meeting 
was the mother of a teenage girl who committed suicide after being bullied at 
school. The woman had since campaigned against ijime (school bullying) 
calling for a redefinition of cases like the death of her daughter from suicide to 
homicide. In her view, suicide is only the trigger (kikkake) for these deaths, the 
real cause (genri) being peer violence at school. The same logic, she argued, 
applied to the new policy for organ donation that currently allows organ 
procurement with family’s consent only, even though the patient is not 
registered as a donor. Under such conditions brain death becomes just a trigger 
to facilitate organ procurement instead of representing the patient’s will.  
The episode well illustrates that not only hasn't the firm objection to brain 
death disappeared, but also that the issue is so pervasive and has become so 
deeply embedded in the public debate about the end of life and patients’ rights, 
that it functions as an outlet for articulating wider social concerns. The media 
frenzy over brain death seemed be to rekindled on the occasion of the political 
debate on the reform of the policy on organ donation in 2009, but attention to 
the problem is always high, with every case of donation from brain dead 
patients reported on the national news (less so when organs are procured from 
non-heart-beating donors). Halfway through my fieldwork, the first case of 
paediatric donation happened, involving a brain dead boy under the age of six. 
Journalists crowded outside the hospital where the baby boy died and for 
several days reported the unfolding of the event: from the pronunciation of 
death of the patient, to the procurement and dispatch of the organs, the 
selection of recipients, and the outcome of the transplants. As was routine, the 
JOTNW held a press conference to give general information about the case and 
avoid further intrusion form the media, but, exceptionally, a statement by the 
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patient’s family was released the generic contents of which were widely 
reported on the news. 
Brain death, it seems, never ceases to be a matter of public interest, nor 
stops being an issue of particular relevance in the field of professional bioethics. 
The topic figures regularly in the contents of specialist journals and 
conferences, usually discussed in association with organ transplantation but 
also, quite differently from other countries, with relevance to end-of-life care. In 
clinical practice, brain death presents considerably fewer dilemmas than 
conditions with uncertain prognoses, such as persistent vegetative states, and 
despite the relative simplicity of the therapeutic options it presents, brain death 
is practically synonymous with the broader debate on treatment 
withdrawal/withholding (Aita 2011). In fact, as the problem of death with dignity 
seems to become an increasingly relevant one in medical circles and the public 
arena, the case of brain death represents a precedent by which to gauge other 
issues, while the dilemma of how to care for brain dead patients (including 
potential organ donors) appears all the more relevant.  
As this brief description of the situation in the field suggests, to look at the 
other side of the story does not mean ignoring brain death, but does 
acknowledge the existence of voices, experiences and claims that the 
intellectual conundrum of defining death doesn’t account for. It means, in fact, 
to tell a whole different story, one that explores how the problem of defining 
death as a techno-biological process mutually shapes and shines a light on the 
medically informed enterprise of ‘saving lives’. Before looking at what this 
means in practice, however, a clarification is needed in order to limit the field of 
this study, starting from the question of whether organ transplants can ever be 
‘Japanese’. 
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The Anthropology of Japan 
 
Organ transplantation is an example of what Ong and Collier (2005) famously 
called “global assemblages”: trans-national forms characterised by, and 
dependent upon, their distinctive capacity for moving across different cultural 
and social settings, decontextualising and reassimilating to new environments 
and local conditions. Global assemblages appear to be universal phenomena, 
in the sense that their existence doesn’t depend, and rather glosses over, local 
cultural and social behaviours shared by a specific group (ibid.). They are, in 
the words of Ong and Collier, “limited or delimited by specific technical 
infrastructures, administrative apparatuses, or value regimes, not by the 
vagaries of a social or cultural field” (ibid.: 11).  
In this sense, it seems untenable to speak of ‘Japanese’ organ 
transplants. Transplantation is a movable technology and apparatus of 
knowledge. Although it is often depicted as a technology ‘imported’ from the 
West, it is no more Western than Japanese. Certainly, it stemmed from 
culturally specific conceptualisations of the body and disease, and from 
historically contingent developments in Western biomedicine, but it is equally 
informed by biopolitics, economic logics, and social institutions that can hardly 
be said to have no place in Japanese society (Chapter 1). Furthermore, the 
transplants I discuss here don’t always take place, geographically in Japan, 
they take shape across national and jurisdictional boundaries, in ways that are 
shaped by transportable technologies and apparatuses of knowledge, and by 
the global junctions between local infrastructures of health-care provision, 
national policies, social institutions, grass-roots organisations, and local 
networks of moral obligations. The meanings and practices underscoring the 
workings of transplantation are always negotiated on the ground in ways that 
intersect, collide and conjure the goals and values built into the technology. In 
this sense, they are indicative and revealing of how transplantation works in the 
specific context of Japan, not of a larger ‘Japanese’ society into which a foreign 
technology is introduced.  
Taking these forms of problems, which I referred to through the concept of 
global assemblages, as a domain of anthropological investigation, raises the 
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question of how to avoid two opposite methodological biases. The first is 
assuming that by virtue of their transportability and applicability in various local 
settings, global assemblages respond to a universal logic that is independent of 
social conditions, human labour, creation and negotiation, and is therefore a 
self-explanatory description of ‘natural facts’. The implication of this line of 
reasoning, the second bias, is to reify the social domain as that which lies 
outside, or even in opposition to, medical science and technology. The two 
approaches are like two sides of the same coin (Latour 1993). For clarity of 
analysis I am going to discuss them separately, staring with the second, which 
in this case means asking what is ‘Japanese’.  
The question is a vexed one in this anthropological field, and must be 
considered within the broader intellectual history of the relationships of modern 
Japan with the West, especially America. For a long time, Japan remained 
effectively outside the scope of interest of anthropology, and for even longer it 
remained a field of scarce relevance within the discipline, or in the social 
sciences more generally, despite occupying a prominent space in public 
discourse. Popular representations and images of practically every aspects of 
Japanese social and cultural life abound, testifying to a Western infatuation with 
the country, that seems to have been going on, albeit in changing forms, at 
least since the late nineteenth century.  
In 1868, Japan ‘opened’ to the West, initiating a process of rapid political, 
economic, and social transformations aimed at the creation of a modern nation 
state attended by changed and closer relationships with European and North 
American countries (Hall 1970). As Martinez argues, changing social institutions 
was, overall, the simplest task in the process of rapid and contested 
transformation that accompanied the formation of the Japanese nation-state 
throughout the Meiji (1868-1912), Taisho (1912-1926) and much of the early 
Showa (1926-1989) eras. More complex was the creation of a shared Japanese 
identity in place of the smaller regional political units that made up the feudal 
country (2007). Culture emerged as the key domain underscoring the creation 
of modern Japan, which has always been defined by its cultural politics as 
much as by its geographical isolation (Gluck 1985). The idea that national 
culture plays a crucial role in the making of places, is anthropological common 
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sense, and is something that Japan shares with all nations (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1982). This, however, does not negate the process of the invention of 
Japanese culture that happened in specific ways, at a historical juncture when 
the country was asserting its role against Western colonial powers, while also 
undertaking a process of modernisation to which science and technology were 
deemed crucial (Low 2005). Japanese culture, thus, came to be defined in 
opposition to the West/rest, and to the technology that came from there.  
The idea of the Japanese seeking Western technology while still retaining 
the uncontaminated cultural tradition refined in centuries of isolation, didn’t only 
work to promote modernisation at home, it also caught the attention of a 
Western audience, intrigued by an aesthetic fascination with the far away 
country and eager for some “glimpses of the unfamiliar Japan” (Hearn 1901). 
Coupled with the country’s place outside the Western colonial project, early 
portraits of the Japanese as naïve, childish and bizarre creatures contributed to 
keep Japan off the mainstream anthropological map, so that, as Ryang 
ironically puts it, it is no coincidence that Japan “is the only real country that 
Gulliver, not the anthropologist, travelled to” (2004: 7). In fact, trained 
anthropologist John Embree did travel to Japan in the 1930s, where he 
conducted fieldwork in the Suye Mura (Suye village) that gives its name to his 
monograph (1939). This, however, remained largely overshadowed by a very 
different approach.  
Japan forcibly entered anthropology with WWII, when the cultural 
idiosyncrasies that had made it intriguing suddenly became synonymous with 
inhumanity and the threat of the imperial army. Ethnographic knowledge 
became a weapon to be deployed in service of the American war effort (Price 
2008). The notorious result of this anthropological study, the celebrated and 
contested The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Benedict 1946), would become 
the progenitor of all anthropology of Japan, in that it created a largely 
successful representation of who ‘the Japanese’ are. As Robertson illustrates, 
the influence of Benedict’s monograph, in contrast to Embree’s ethnography, 
speaks volumes in its capacity to offer an “easy and monolithic knowability of 
Japan” and its people (Robertson 1998: 303). Consistent with its political 
agenda and its methodological focus on patterns of culture, the 
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Chrysanthemum provided a comprehensive and timeless picture of Japan 
through which foreigners could claim knowledge of its people, while also 
mirroring the U.S.A. in the process of describing the exotic other (cf. Geertz 
1974). In this sense, through Benedict's book, Japan became quite literally “a 
thing”, and it was this thing that anthropologists came to study in the following 
decades and that the Japanese themselves fully embraced and made their 
own. 
Indeed, the Japanese themselves have largely contributed to the 
circulation of essentialising representations of their own culture and society. 
While Japanese anthropology, whose tradition dates back to the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, initially concerned itself mostly with the study of colonial 
subjects (Yamashita 2004), the gap of countering Western representation of 
Japan has been filled by the native ‘theory on Japaneseness’ (Nihonjiron), a 
genre preoccupying itself with understanding what makes Japan unique. The 
rise in popularity of Nihonjiron can be seen as a reaction to the success of The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, which put Japan, the former coloniser, in the 
new position of the intellectually colonised (Mathews 2004). In this sense, 
Nihonjiron brought Japan back to the Japanese by strongly asserting the idea of 
a culture so unique and different to anything else that only the Japanese can 
really understand it (ibid.). Through this intellectual move, the genre reifies the 
identification of the nation with its (supposedly ethnically homogeneous) people, 
on the grounds of a shared culture (Befu 2001).  
Assumptions of homogeneity have functioned as powerful gatekeepers of 
the ways in which Japan is apprehended and represented, continuing to inform 
research in anthropology and social sciences generally, that multiplied after 
WWII. The post-war period, up to the present day, has seen rapid 
transformation in the relationship between Japan and the West. The former 
enemy became a precious political ally of the ‘free world’ and a major trading 
partner. Japan’s rapid growth into one of the world’s leading economies 
aroused the puzzled interest of the West in the ‘Japanese miracle’ (Vogel 
1979). When recession hit, Japan kept its cool. The rebranding of the country 
as ‘Cool Japan’, with the government investing in, and the West falling in love 
with, local fashions, movies, games, the music industry, manga and anime, 
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historical heritage and culinary traditions, has ensured the country a firm place 
in the international arena, continuing to attracting foreign investment, tourists, 
and scholars alike (Condry 2011). 
 The decades after the war brought profound internal transformations, but 
as Sugimoto (2003) describes, social analyses have remained especially 
insensitive to variations within Japan. As they transformed concordantly with the 
changing political and economic relationships of with the West, studies of Japan 
oscillated between the opposite poles of either conflating the Japanese 
experience with Western models of analysis, or reproducing the idea of a 
“uniquely unique” Japan irreconcilably different to the rest of the world  (ibid.). 
While the first approach remains insensible to local concepts and social 
conditions, the second reiterates the image of a society whose members 
uniformly share behaviours and values that are taken to be distinctively 
‘Japanese’. Both are deaf to the variety of human experience that is the primary 
interest and ultimate goal of anthropological investigation. In this way, despite 
the blooming of the anthropology of Japan after the war, this paradigmatic 
framework of analysis contributed to the marginality of the field within the larger 
disciplinary debate. As Roberston argues, for a long time Japan, as an 
anthropological field, was deemed as either too similar to Western complex 
societies, or too different to anywhere else; too much like ‘us’ to be of 
theoretical interest to a discipline that trades in the unfamiliar, or too ‘other’ to 
be of any relevance to the wider debate (Robertson 2005; cf. Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). 
Classical anthropological descriptions of Japan greatly contributed to this 
paradigmatic framework of analysis through the dogma of Japanese 
homogeneity. In this sense, Nakane’s influence was second only to Benedict’s: 
her totalising portrayl of Japanese society as hierarchically structured, group-
oriented and inherently harmonious, set the terms of engagement with Japan in 
anthropology and beyond, by laying down very clear parameters that define ‘the 
Japanese’ (1970). One of the most influential ways in which Nakane’s work 
framed the understanding of Japanese society was by pinning down its 
distinctive characteristics to dynamics of social interactions that define the 
relationship between the individual and the group to which one belongs (Kelly 
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1991). This became a privileged domain of investigation, explored from a 
variety of perspectives: normative ‘patterns of behaviour’ (Lebra 1976), 
processes socialisation (Hendry 1986), local cosmologies (Smith 1974), work 
(Clark 1979), constructs of self and personhood (Kondo 1990), and the emic 
concept of relatedness, most famously the idea of amae put forth by the 
psychologist Doi (1973). These works remain important in their regards, for they 
offer in-depth descriptions of significant aspects of social life in Japan, and 
provide important insights into the dynamics of interaction, belonging and 
rationality. However, they often lay down very rigid frameworks of social action 
and rely on too neat oppositions, such as in describing relations of 
indebtedness and the distinction between uchi and soto (see, for example, 
Hendry 1987). Further, these analytical categories are seldom put to the test 
looking at less conventional social fields.  
Organ transplantation challenges notions of relatedness, reciprocity and 
exchange, as is often pointed out in the English literature on donation (see 
below). The ethnographic description of how these transactions are negotiated 
presents a relevant case study to investigate ideas of indebtedness and 
relatedness, which have been widely discussed with regards to Japan, and with 
regards to gift practices (Rupp 2003; Befu 1968), by taking a look at less usual 
contexts (see Chapters 4 and 5 in particular). This, in turn, offers precious 
insights that complicate the similarly rigid concepts of gifts and commodities that 
are often employed in Western literature.  
Recent ethnographic trends have articulated a powerful critique of the tired 
image of Japanese society as homogeneous, static and self-contained. A 
burgeoning body of literature has highlighted variances and differences, by 
shedding a light on traditionally ignored social groups, such as women and 
gender (Martinez 2014), the working class (Roberts 1994), youth and urban 
subcultures (Kinsella 2014), disabled people (Nakamura 2006), and issues 
such as gender (Martinez 2014) and sexuality (Nakamura 2014). The theme of 
globalisation, with the increasing mobility of Japanese overseas and the 
growing number of immigrants at home, has also received particular attention 
as fertile ground to challenge notions of Japanese uniqueness based on ethnic 
homogeneity (Goodman 2002a; Suzuki 2010). Anthropologists have highlighted 
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changes in key institutions traditionally described as the foundation of Japanese 
society, accounting for the crumbling of the lifelong employment system and 
Japanese masculinity (Cook 2009), new religions (Reader 2000) and 
transforming practices of death from ancestor worship to the commercialisation 
of funerals (Suzuki 2000, 2013). Official politics and civil society have also 
emerged as a terrain where special attention is paid to the dynamics of social 
change and civic participation, thus shaking the assumptions that Japanese 
society is governed by hierarchical interactions, unquestioned loyalty to 
superiors and mutual consensus (Fisker-Nielsen 2012). 
Despite evident thematic differences, this ethnography is situated in many 
respects at the intersection of various concepts that these studies highlight. 
Firstly, it considers Japan on the global scene, looking at nationality not through 
the lens of ethnicity but from the perspective of medical citizenship (cf. Nguyen 
2005), seeing the nation state from a somehow different perspective: that of the 
trans-national politics of health care. Moreover, it looks at two themes, patients’ 
groups and health related activism, that remain poorly investigated in Japan, 
despite the relevance of the few existing studies (George 2001; Hirano 2008; 
Nakamura 2006) and the growing theoretical interest in Western literature 
(Novas 2006; Rabinow 2005; Rose 2007). 
Illness experiences, medical practices and the body entered the scope of 
investigation of ethnographers of Japan quite early, considering the fairly short 
history of anthropology in this field. One of the reasons is arguably because the 
Japanese medical pluralism, combining Chinese medicine and biomedicine, 
offered fertile terrain for the study of local notions of illness and concepts of the 
body (Ohnuki-Thierney et al. 1994; Norbeck and Lock 1987). In this regard, 
historical analyses of the introduction of biomedicine in Japan have offered 
theoretically insightful perspectives on the relationship between modernity and 
medical science and technologies, as well as the body’s symbolic role in the 
political project of building contemporary Japan  (Yoshikuni 2000; Robertson 
2002; Frühstück 2003). Anthropologists of Japan have paid great attention to 
practices and dimensions of embodiment in the most disparate venues: from 
traditional religious practices of self-mummification (Raveri 1992), to gender 
(Spielvogel 2003), beauty (Miller 2006), everyday habits and self-presentation 
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(Kondo 1990). Surprisingly (or maybe not, see below), considerably less 
attention has been given to the body as an object of biomedical intervention. It 
is no coincidence that menopause (Lock 1993), aging (Traphagan 2000), 
disability (Nakamura 2006), hikikomori, or syndrome from social withdrawal 
(Horiguchi 2011), psychotherapy (Reynolds 1980) and depression (Kitanaka 
2012), have attracted the interest of anthropologists, as they are conditions and 
practices where the influences of the “vagaries of the (Japanese) social or 
cultural field” appear manifestly. Similarly, pregnancy (Ivry 2010) and 
reproductive technologies (Kato and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2011) have received 
particular attention, reflecting the attentiveness to local conceptions of 
motherhood and gender. Norgren brilliantly discusses contraception and 
abortion, questioning how to account for the ways in which they are dealt with 
so differently than in the West (2001). Brain death has, notably, raised similar 
dilemmas (Lock 2002).  
It seems that biomedical science and technology appear to be worth 
studying only insofar as they are entrenched within socially contingent issues 
(gender, social stigma, notions of body capability, etc.), or when they are 
assumed or known to collide with local discourses and practices. I acknowledge 
that I am overlooking the complexities of many of these works, which indeed 
provide brilliant critiques of the biomedical model on the ground of sophisticated 
ethnographic analyses of medicine’s workings. Precisely because of the 
influential and inspirational insights they offer, however, the paucity of studies 
on medical technologies in Japan is even more sticking. First, it is a major 
disservice to the anthropology of the field, given that the country is a world-
renowned research hub, and that biomedicine is arguably the dominant 
framework within which people manage death and navigate crucial episodes of 
illness. Equally importantly, it is a missed chance to understand the workings of 
medical practices thorough the study of clinical medicine and the social 
practices that bring technology to life. From this perspective, this ethnography 
adds to the studies mentioned of medical practice and technology in Japan, as 
well as to the ethnographic repertoire on organ transplantation in various 
societies (Hogle 1999; Sharp 2006; Hamdy 2012), in an attempt to offer novel 
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insights that go beyond the tired opposition between the ‘Japanese’ moral world 
and Western bioethics (Hoshino 1997). 
 
 
The Anthropology of Biomedicine and Biotechnologies 
 
Perhaps it's no surprise that when anthropologists first took up investigating 
medicine as a field of study in its own right, they focused initially on ethno-
medicines, psychology and psychiatry, or on ethnic minorities’ use and 
understanding of biomedicine (Young 1982). While relevant in their own 
regards, these approaches either depict medicine as a mere mirror of external 
social structures and relationships, such as kinship or religion, or focus on 
psychological and psychiatric states as non-organic or at best psycho-somatic 
disorders, or confine themselves to people’s experience of illness as marginal, 
non-compliant and ultimately different from biological knowledge. By doing so, 
they effectively bracket off biology from the realm of anthropological enquiry, so 
that, as Young (1982) famously argued, the body remains a “black box” that 
tells anthropologists nothing and about which anthropologists have nothing to 
say, with the result that the epistemological scrutiny to which other medicines 
have been subject was suspended in the case of biomedicine.  
Leaving the body un-problematised had enormous methodological 
consequences, in that anthropologists relied uncritically on the biomedical 
model of knowledge and adopted its epistemological premises and assumptions 
as their own (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987). Biology remained both a mode 
of knowledge and the very object of that knowledge, cast out from the realm of 
human labour and therefore of anthropological investigation; by its very 
condition it was taken as a given (Franklin 1997). Conflated with nature, biology 
was regarded as opposed to the social domain, and as the first was conceived 
of as a matter of fact, so the second was relativised and rendered synonymous 
with “otherness”; other from nature and consequently other from “our culture” 
and thus based on science (Latour 1993, 2007). Ironically, by reproducing the 
distinction between nature and culture, anthropology reified the foundation of an 
epistemological divide that trivialised it as the “marginal discipline of the 
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margins” (Latour 1993: 101). Self-limited to descriptions of what is different to 
“true” scientific knowledge, the anthropology of medicine could at best be co-
opted as the handmaiden of clinical compliance. 
The growing anthropological interest in the body contributed to a 
methodologically productive crisis of this model (Csordas 1990; Martin 1992), 
as recent research on biotechnology has become one of the most fertile sites of 
anthropological investigation. Contemporary biotechnologies explicitly exhibit 
the capacity of breaching boundaries once taken as given. What more, they do 
so in often sensational and controversial ways, to the point that the argument 
about the unprecedented impact on nature of human interventions has become 
almost a rhetorical device to discuss these technologies in the public discourse. 
While they prompt the reconfiguration of the very distinctions they threaten, 
from an anthropological perspective biotechnologies have contributed to 
revealing how so-called “natural facts” are actually domains of human creation, 
choice, aesthetics, power, and moral dilemmas - in short, socially fabricated 
fields.  
Interventions at the beginning and end of life make it particularly clear how 
biotechnologies are techniques of fabrication of what it means to be human 
(Kaufman and Morgan 2005). Reproductive technologies and prenatal testing, 
for example, have brought into being new forms of life that previously did not 
exist on their own, such as the embryo and the foetus (Martin 1984, Strathern 
1998). If these technologies have brought conception into the domain of human 
intervention and inverted the epistemological relationship between nature and 
culture (Strathern 1992, Franklin 1997), research on stem cells and genetics 
has opened up the possibility of shaping life itself at its most infinitesimal level 
(Rose 2007).  
By reconfiguring the building blocks of life itself these techniques allow us 
to disentangle life from organisms and persons, making them immortal (Skloot 
2011) and turning them into “things” of dubious legal, moral and economic 
value, indeed of uncertain ontological status (Pottage 1998). In this sense, 
stem-cell research and genetics resemble organ transfer, for they reveal how 
attending to the disassembling of the body is also the process of redefining the 
relationship between the body (parts) and the person (cf. Strathern 2004) by 
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preserving or terminating life. As the controversies surrounding treatment 
withdrawal, death with dignity and end-of-life care make painfully evident, these 
are processes of defining the very parameters of life itself. In a historical 
moment when political rights and ethical choices seem increasingly inscribed in 
and negotiated through one’s biological existence (Fassin 2005; Rose 2007), 
the capacity of life-support and resuscitative technologies to prolong organic life 
has prompted the most controversial reflections on what it means to be human 
(Agamben 1998). 
More recently, science and medical technologies have attracted renewed 
scholarly interest in anthropology and related discipline as social scientists have 
increasingly turned their attention to the study of Science, Technology and 
Society (STS). Their contributions have illuminated the material and social 
processes of the construction of scientific knowledge (Latour 1988), redefining 
material technologies from inert objects that are actep upon into actors that help 
creating the social worlds they ihabit (Latour 2005) and the very ontologies of 
the human body (Mol 2003).  
The ethnography below describes problems that are enabled, constrained 
and at times even forced into existence by the technology of organ transplants, 
and for metholdogical reasons (see more below) takes humans as its privileged 
subjects. I ask the question of how the global technology of organ transplant 
was reassembled in Japan, focusing on the shifting understandings of life and 
death that shape the negotiation between the medically driven quest for organs 
and the enduring problem surrounding the process of dying. In doing so, I adopt 
the analytical framework of economies to describe the circulations of material 
and non material things through which people manage the procurement and 
allocation of organs as therapeutic resources. Followig is a more detailed 
discussion of how this approach is situated within the anthropological literature 
on the problem of organ donation and transplants and how it contributes to it.  
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The Moral, Political and Informal Economies of Organ 
Transplants 
 
Theoretical directions in the anthropology of organ transplants 
 
Organ transplantation has been one of the first fields of social investigation into 
high-end medical technologies with the pioneering work of American 
sociologists Renèe Fox and Judith Swezey, among the first social scientists to 
undertake extensive fieldwork in clinical settings. Between the late 1960s and 
1970s, Fox and Swazey worked with transplant surgeons, dialysis patients, 
organ recipients and their families, producing a pioneering account of organ 
transplants (1978). The then experimental technology offered the perfect case 
study for investigating the ethical dilemmas raised by the new branch of techno-
scientific medicine. Organ transplant was a widely publicised, experimental 
procedure that involved high costs, severe risks and uncertain benefits. It 
mobilised previously unimaginable financial and technological resources, 
bidding on the lives of patients who had nothing to loose.  
The ethics of clinical decisions emerged clearly as a main area of interest for 
social scientists. At a time when organ transplants were carried out in only a few 
medical centres and no ethical or regulatory framework existed, the allocation of 
limited resources (including both organs and funds to develop highly expensive 
transplant programs) represented a problematic question to settle if the new 
technology were ever to be implemented. Equally, the selection of donors and 
recipients and the evaluation of risks and benefits for patients had to be gauged 
in the absence of data on survival rate and rejection problems. As Fox and 
Swazey (1978) described, such sensitive decisions were negotiated case by 
case and within highly hierarchical and patronising doctor-patient relationships. 
Against such a background, Fox and Swazey’s famously described the ethos of 
transplant medicine in terms of ‘the courage to fail’ (1978), highlighting that 
development of the new technology appeared to be driven a moral economy 
that prised faith in progress, professional ambition and risk-taking, even in the 
face of poor outcomes for patients.  
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Along with providing key insights on how clinical decisions were negotiated in 
practice, Fox and Swazey also focused on the symbolic representation of organ 
transfer and the relationships they informed. Drawing on Mauss’s classical 
theorisation of the gift (1970), the two sociologists described how the 
obligations to give, receive and return the ‘gift of life’ were important factors 
informing the decisions that living related donors and recipients were confronted 
with (1978). In partciualr, their analysis highlights that this web of moral 
obligations placed a particular burden on recipients, producing a feeling of 
indebtedness that could never be fully paid back (ibidem; cf. Shimazono 2008).  
Fox and Swazey’s research was one of the first attempts to analyse the 
consequences of biotechnologies’ power to disassemble and mobilise human 
body parts, and the rich array of symbolical imageries and networks of 
exchange that took shape around it. ‘The Courage to Fail’ thus dentified lines of 
enquiry that would prove incredibly fruitful in the anthropological literature on 
organ transplantation, and would evolve with the development of transplantation 
technology into a routine, globally available clinical procedure7.  
With the systematization of large-scale networks for organ sharing, the ethical 
dilemmas at the centre of Fox and Swazey’s ethnography in the hospital ward 
took on a new, broader dimension. Questions on organ procurement and 
allocation that were previously negotiated between doctors and patients’ 
families became the matter of concern for national parliaments, ethical 
committee and the general public, and anthropologists and social scientists 
increasingly shifted their focus of attention from the clinical encounter to the 
public debate. Some of the most insightful ethnographies on organ transplants 
thus look at how these decisions concerning collective life have been taken up 
and discussed in cross-cultural contexts.  
Along with the already discussed case of Japan, Ikels has documented the 
case of kidney transplantation in China, where local conceptions about the 
functions of this particular organ, coupled with the resistance toards brain death 
                                                7	Fox	 and	 Swazey	 themselves	 returned	 on	 the	 topic	 almost	 twenty	 years	 later	 (1992),	 only	 to	abandon	 it	 in	 dismay	 with	 the	 latest	 developments	 in	 the	 field,	 particularly	 the	 mve	 towards	financial	incentives	towards	donation	and	the	excessive	and	increasingly	indiscriminate	use	of	the	technology.	
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and cadaveric organ procurement had created a particularly acute organ 
shortage (2012).  
Hogle (1999) has provided a rich account of the controversies surrounding 
organ procurement in Germany at the time when the national parliament was 
debating on the law on organ donation. Drawing on first-hand ethnography and 
historical analysis, she illustrates how organ transplantation encountered a 
difficult public acceptance in Germany and raised questions at the core of 
modern biopolitics (ibidem). Hogle argues that using a person’s body to 
someone else’s benefit and contemplating the idea of redefining death to 
enable large-scale organ harvesting revived the national traumas of Nazi 
eugenics and East Germany totalitarianism, and that the development of 
transplants in the country rendered necessary a profound renegotiation of the 
relationships between citizenship and biopolitics (see more below).  
More recently, Hamdy (2012) has documented ethnographically the 
consequences of the debate on brain death and organ donation in Egypt, a 
country that has been at the forefront in the race to transplants, and yet has 
witnessed harsh resistance to the passing of a national law on cadaveric organ 
procurement. Hamdy maps the evolving of the debate on transplantation over 
the last three decades, in the midts of the religious opposition to brain death, 
the deepening of social inequalities and growing civil unrest (ibidem). Against 
this background, she discusses how ambitious and internationally connected 
medical professionals and patients in need of an organ negotiate decisions over 
the use of a technology that is not just morally problematic, but also deeply 
imbricated with social injustice, as the poor are forced to sell kidneys for a living 
and only the privileged can access care. Recasting the focus from the cultural 
analysis on the contestation to brain death, Hamdy argues that the debate in 
Egypt has never been about religion and local traditions vis-à-vis “Western 
technologies”, and points out instead how Egypt offers a case to rethink of 
bioethics as problem of politics rather than philosophical principles (ibidem). 
While the redefinition of brain death and its practical implications for organ 
procurement has thus emerged as a key area of concern in various contexts, 
anthropologists have been mostly silent on how the matter has been dealt with 
in North America. Filed as a settled question in the 1970s, the question of brain 
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death re-emerged as a controversial topic in the American bioethical debate 
since the late 1980s-early 1990s (see Chapter 1). However, with the exception 
of Lock (1999), anthropologists have shown scarce interest in the problem, 
partly reflecting how the issue never raised to wider public attention in the 
media and public debate in North America. Leaving it to sociologists (Fox 
1993), philosphers (Gervais 1986), and medical professionals (Shewmon 
1998a, 1998b) to analyse the cultural assumptions underscoring brain death 
and its place in North America legal system and clinical practice, 
anthropologists turned instead to themes more akin to the traditional concerns 
and methods of the discipline.  
Anthropologists working on organ transplants in North American have thus 
mostly focussed on the experience of patients, the symbolic meanings and 
public representation of organ donation. Among of the most prolific and 
influential scholars in the field, Sharp has famously contributed one of the 
richest ethnographic explorations of organ recipients’ experience in North 
America and on patients’ subjectivity more in general (2006). Her work has the 
undoubted merit of illuminating the complexity of the lived experience of 
treatment, often overshadowed by rhetorical discourses on organ donation, 
revealing its many problematic implications for individual health, subjectivity and 
embodiment, as well as social acceptance, stigma and symbolic 
representations (ibidem).  
Following on Sharp, the experience of transplant recipients has become an 
important area of investigation in the anthropological literature on organ 
transplants. Gordon, for example, have analysed patients’ subjective 
experience of treatment choice (2001), while also drawing attention to the 
sociocultural factors that influence the selection of candidates at a pre-operative 
stage (2000). Also writing about the American context, Maynard has drawn 
attention to the ways in which elective and high-risk double-lung transplant is 
experienced within a sociocultural context that denies death and disability in 
favour of the effort of saving life at any costs (2006). Describing very different 
problems, Crowley-Matoka has illustrated the struggles of Mexican recipients 
faced with post-oprative complications and prohibitively expensive medication 
(2005). Looking at the case of Japan, Tomomatsu (2011) has focused on 
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patients’ experience of stigma and subjectivity, while Yamazaki (2011b) has 
described how Japanese organ recipiets conceive the relationship with the 
organ and the donor through the metaphor of the gift.    
Along with patients’ experience, anthropologists have also paid a special 
attention to the web of symbolic meanings and metaphorical imageries that 
surround organ transplants. As mentioned above, Fox and Swazey already 
discussed the significance of the gift metaphor, and later studies have further 
investigated how this shape recipients’ subjectivity. At the same time, with the 
development of transplant medicine on a large scale, anthropologists have also 
analysed how the trope of the gift informs the political economy of donation and 
the public perception of the technology (see more below).  
A field of enquiry where these problems have emerged as particularly relevant 
is the problem of organ traffic. With the development of organ transplants 
worldwide, the buying and selling of body spare parts across legal and national 
boundaries has become as a pressing issues on anthropologists’ research 
agenda (Scheper-Hughes 2000, 2001, 2005; Cohen 2001, 2003, 2005). 
Besides casting light on the previously overseen phenomenon of transplant 
tourism, the anthropological investigation into the black markets of organs has 
greatly enriched the disciplinary debate on transplants and biotechnologies 
more in general. The ethnographies of organ traffic articulate an analysis in 
which the body is no longer a black box around which social and cultural 
representations are constructed, but is treated as the living embodiment of 
power relations and economic structures. Ethnographies of organ traffic thus 
integrate key anthropological insights on structural violence and the effect of 
global inequalities in the analysis of biotechnologies that so far predominantly 
looked at nationally bounded realities (cf. Marshall 1992). 
Furthermore, the anthropological denounce of organ traffic has contributed to 
generate significant public interest on the problem, bringing it at the centre of 
the bioethical debate worldwide. As a perhaps unexpected consequence of the 
public and scholarly interest on the problem, the debate on the ethics of organ 
buying and selling seems to have extended from the black market to the 
domain of legal donation as well. Arguments in favour of regulated markets in 
human organs that never previously entered the bioethical debate are 
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nowadays normally discussed in the general media and in academic 
scholarship (Radcliffe-Richards 1998). Soolars, particularly economitss, have 
argued that the legalisation of an organ market, or at least of forms of financial 
incentives to organ donation, would reduce the risks of exploitation and provide 
an effective way to target the problem of shortage (Stacey 2005;). Public 
acceptance of the argument seems yet far to reach, and in general discourse 
free donation still seems to be invested with cherished values of human dignity 
and fairness. What is sure is that the meanings and implications of construing 
organ transfer in terms of gift giving are at the core of the debate on organ 
transplants.  
 
The gift 
 
The trope of the gift is a constant theme running through the literature on organ 
transplants and has often functioned as a paradigmatic framework of analysis in 
anthropology and closely related disciplines. This might not come as surprise 
given the special place that the gift has occupied in anthropological and social 
science literature (see Osteen 2002). As seen with Fox and Swazey’s analysis, 
the legacy of Mauss’s landmark theorisation is evident since the very earliest 
investigation of organ transplant as a social field. Later works have largely 
drawn on Mauss’s argument of the gift as a total social fact, and its corollary 
implication that our understanding of the gift as a selfless, altruistic act is 
contextual to the centrality of the commodity in capitalist societies (Parry 1986), 
to unravel the symbolic meanings and social relationships embedded in organ 
donation. 
Strathern (2004), for example, points out that the practice of construing body 
parts for medical use as free gifts is deeply rooted in the Western distinction 
between persons and things. She argues that the legal prohibition of buying and 
selling persons is grounded in our way of construing things as commodities, 
whose value is exchangeable for money because they are interchangeable with 
one another (ibidem). A regime of free donation thus allows using body parts as 
things, while avoid the commodification of the whole body/person and 
transgressing ideals of human dignity (ibidem). In fact, in her ethnography 
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discussed above, Hogle (1999) illustrates that the main problem underscoring 
popular uneasiness with organ transplants in Germany was the concern over 
body commodification and human rights. Against this, writes Hogle, the 
paradigm of free donation, and the ideals of mutual solidarity and altruism it is 
associated with, contributed to re-imagine body politics as a site of national 
reconciliation and a means to heal the relationships between citizens and the 
state (ibidem). 
As ethnographies on non-western societies remind us, however, such notion of 
the gift is far from universal. One of the most recurrent explanations for the 
scarce popularity of organ and tissues donation in Japan, for example, is that 
the ideal of anonymous donation associated with the gift of life contrasts with 
local practices and notions of gift-giving (Lock 2002; Sasaki 2008; Tomomatsu 
2011). Japan is a country with a flourished gift economy, and the exchange of 
gifts plays an integral role in commemorating key moments’ in people’s life and 
special occurrences. The gift of money and objects normally accompanies life-
cycles events such as weddings, births, and funerals, as well as traditional 
festivities like Girl’s and Boy’s Days8 and the Shichi-Go-San Festival9. Gifting 
objects is also common practice on more mundane occasions, and the 
Japanese have specific categories to distinguish for example the gifts to be 
exchanged upon returning from trips (omiyage), when visiting someone’s house 
(temiyage) and at cyclical times during the year (oseibo) (Daniels 2009).  
Along with these, Western-inspired festivities have also become well-
established occasions to exchange gifts among friends (birthdays), lovers 
(Christmas) and co-workers (St. Valentine’s Day and White Day). 10 
Furthermore, gifts were also commonly shared with the household dead as 
people presented them in front of the butsudan, along with the offers of food 
and incense that the living normally make to the ancestors (Smith 1974, see 
also Daniels 2009). On these occasions, gifts are either exchanged or 
made/received in the anticipation that they will be repaid with appropriate 
counter gifts (Befu 1968). In this manner, gift exchange is used to mark and 
                                                8	Annual	festivities	celebrated	in	March	and	May.	9	Traditional	festivity	celebrating	the	third,	fith,	and	seventh	years	of	age.	10	On	 St.	 Valentine,	 female	 co-workers	 gift	 small	 present	 of	 chocolate	 and	 sweets	 to	 their	 male	colleages,	who	reciprocate	on	White	Day.	
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reproduce both social relationships and cosmic orders (Befu 1968; Rupp 2003; 
Daniels 2009).  
Anthropologists have thus highlighted that the principle of anonymous, selfless 
donation advocated by the ‘gift of life’ fits unwell in a context like Japan where 
gift-giving is a practice that places the person’s within his/her significant 
networks of social relationships (Lock 2002; Sasaki 2008; Tomomatsu 2011). 
People in my field were sometimes keen to specify that this well-known 
argument doesn’t imply that “the Japanese are not generous”. The reason 
behind the scarce acceptance of the metaphor of the gift, their comments 
suggest, is not the unwillingness to give to strangers. Rather, as discussed in 
relation to brain death, the problem is in the moral obligations towards one’s 
significant others, particularly the ancestors, and the fact that that they run 
contra the ideal of donating to anonymous strangers.  
Sasaki thus explains that at the inception of organ transplant in Japan in the 
late 1990s, after the legalisation of brain death, professionals in the field of 
transplantation tended to avoid the Western trope of the ‘gift of life’ (2008). 
Instead, the metaphor of the ‘relay of life’ seemed to hold sway in media and 
popular accounts of the first case of organ donation from brain dead in the 
country in 1999 (ibidem). Sasaki argues that the image of the ‘reply of life’, 
which accompanied the pictures in the news of the organs being shipped to 
different parts of Japan in record-time, conveniently glossed over the 
procurement of organs from the dead drawing attention on the technological 
innovations that enabled life to be transferred and resuscitated (ibidem).  
The imagery of the ‘rely of life’ had not fallen in disuse at the time of my 
fieldwork, especially among patients of an older generation, but other 
languages and metaphors were also popular. The phrase ‘zōki teikyō’ (organ 
donation) was used in the medical jargon, scholarly literature, professional 
jurnals and media reports, as the most neutral, and rhetoric-free expression to 
describe organ procurement. The metaphor of the ‘gift of life’ was also 
commonly used, either in its Japanese version, ‘inochi no okurimono’, or in 
directly borrowed from English as ‘gifuto ofu raifu’. Distinguishably associated 
with a pro-donation discourse, it was normally found in promotional campaigns 
and educational materials from the Japan Organ Transplantation Network and 
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other patients’ groups. Particularly notable compared to the situation described 
by Sasaki was language and contents of media reports. Despite the strict 
privacy that surrounds donor families in Japan, their testimonies about 
confronting the dead of a loved one and opting in for organ donation no longer 
seemed to be considered too sensitive, problematic or disturbing. In fact, the 
JOTNW and recipients’ groups were all but shy in collecting the experiences of 
donor families, and these also appeared in the general media framed in a way 
that unmistakably associated them with a positive discourse on organ donation. 
In describing their decisions, Japanese donor families often resorted to the 
same imageries associated with the ‘gift of life’: the will of helping others (yaku 
ni tatsu), and the hope that the donor will live on (ikitsudukeru). 
Writing about North America, where these imageries originated, anthropologists 
have noted that the promise of achieving transcendence through donating 
oneself (Joralemon 1995) and ‘recycling’ life itself (Sharp 2006) is amply used 
to promote organ donation. There imageries, in turn, are heavily drawn upon by 
donor families. For them, the hope that their beloved will live on through the 
donated organs constitutes a key motivation to decide to donate (Sharp 2006), 
along with the will to construct meaning out of a tragic death by turning it into a 
last occasion for the deceased to be of help to someone else (cf. Lock 2002). 
 The anthropological analysis of the ‘gift of life’ has drawn attention to the 
ideological uses of these clichés to promote organ donation among the public. 
Anthropologists have highlighting how the rhetoric of the gift capitalises on 
people’s emotional investments while actually mystifying the reality behind 
organ donation: the intrusiveness of organ procurement surgery (Sharp 2006), 
the intense harvesting of organs (Hogle 1995), the attending reification of the 
donor’s body (Scheper-Hughes 2005), and the obliteration of the donor’s 
identity by means of anti-rejection drugs (Joralemon 1995). 
Furthermore, anthropologists have highlighted the paradoxes and 
inconstistencies of the gift metaphor. Sharp (2006), for example, describes how 
donor families are encouraged to imagine that their gift will help someone in 
need, while on the other hand recipients are advised to think about the new 
organ in de-personalised and almost mechanistic way to avoid identifying with 
or feeling indebted to the donor. She thus criticised the imagery of solidarity 
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associated with the metaphor of the gift, pointing out how in fact donor families 
and recipients are prevented from sharing anything more than anonymous 
letters, as organ donation is managed confidentially from third-party 
gatekeepers like transplant coordinators and medical professionals, and further 
argues that the paradigm of anonymous donation doesn’t leave space for 
individually commemorating the donors (2006). The gift metaphor, Sahrp points 
out, conceals individual stories behind generic ideals of solidarity, which too 
easily overshadows the sacrifice and suffering of donors and their families (cf. 
Scheper-Hughes 2000).  
As her critique suggests, the donor’s identity is a delicate question with regard 
to the use of body spare parts. Differently to other body tissues, such as sperm 
or eggs, organs are non-reproducible, unique body parts. They are vital, and 
often procured from people who suffered a tragic death. Unlike blood and 
plasma, they cannot be separated or processed into sub-components, and are 
used for the only purpose of being allocated to individual patients whose luck to 
receive one depends on a good match with the donor. While the donation might 
be anonymous, the organs carry with them a lot of the (real and imagined) 
identity and personal story of the donor.  
Anthropologists have thus variously noted that despite the rhetoric of selfless 
gifts, in fact, organ donation is often perceived and experienced as a highly 
personalised relationship between the donor and the recipient. Sharp (2006), 
for example, describes how both recipients and donor families fantasises about 
the age, gender and background of the person who donated/received the 
organs. Some recipients even report changes in tastes and personality after the 
transplant and view these as been passed on from the donor (Sharp 1995, 
Tomomatsu 2011, Yamazaki 2011b). As my interviews confirmed, Yamazaki 
(2011b) notes that Japanese recipients often talk of the donor as a presence 
who is always by their side, to whom they owe a special gratitude and whom 
they think of when they struggle to cope with the harsh regime of anti-rejection 
drugs, the side effects of medication and the health problems that often 
characterise the post-transplant life (see also Tomomatsu 2011).  
Ethnographies of the transplant community in North America highlight how 
these experiences are often silenced in the public account of organ 
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transplantation (Sharp 2006; Siminoff 1999). At the same time, patients are 
educated to feel grateful and people can feel pressured to get involved with 
promoting organ donation out of a sense of indebtedness (ibidem). 
Anthropologists have thus illuminated that, differently to the rhetoric of selfless 
donation, organs are gifts that bind, and this characteristic is too often exploited 
to redirect moral obligations not to altruistic donors but to self-interested medical 
professionals (Ben-David 2005).  
From the ‘burden of gift’ to the problem of body reification, the anthropological 
literature on the gift has illuminated many important aspects of the workings of 
transplant technology. The concept of the gift has served to map how symbolic 
representations have enabled the development of organ transplants and how 
they are appropriated and elaborated upon by the people more closely involved 
in it. Through such contributions, the literature on the gift has elucidated how 
the technology of transplantation has shaped new forms of subjectivity, social 
relationships and conceptualisations of the body and personhood. Maybe the 
most significant contribution on the theme of the gift, if not for its relevance to 
social theory for its influence on public opinion, is its application to the analysis 
of the political economy of body parts.  
Titmuss’s ‘The Gift Relationship’ (1970) has become a paradigmatic reference 
in the debate on organ and tissue donation. Titmuss’s landmark research 
compared the UK regime of free blood donation and the USA procurement 
system, which operated through both voluntary donation and different forms of 
financial incentives and commercial remuneration (1970). Analysing the 
composition of the donor pool, the motivations of donors and data about the 
quantity and quality of the blood collected, Titmuss strongly argued for the 
financial, medical and moral superiority of the gift over the market (ibidem). He 
showed that systems relying on financial rewards spend more on blood 
collection and are more prone to shortage, whereas a regime of free donation 
guarantees a better supply at a lower cost (ibidem). Moreover, Titmuss argued 
that financial incentives attract at-risk donors in need of money, resulting in 
higher chances of blood infection and disease spreading –a point tragically 
proven right by the blood tainted AIDS scandals in the 1980. Finally, drawing on 
Mauss’s argument, Titmuss argued that the gift relationship is constitutive of 
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social bonds, and warned that the introduction of a market economy in a social 
sphere thus far domain of gift-exchange would corrupt these relationships 
(ibidem).   
Titmuss’ book proved an incredibly influential. Not only his view of free donation 
vis-à-vis the market extended from blood to organ and other tissues donation, 
but it also crystallised in the general discourse and the scholarly debate. His 
argument hasn’t been immune from critiques, and economists in particular have 
devoted no small effort to attack Titmuss’ argument against the inefficiency of 
the market.11 While probing Titmuss’ argument, however, these critiques do not 
really challenge the basic assumptions at the core of his work: the distinction 
between free gift and the market. Social scientists and anthropologists, on the 
other hand, have recently taken on the problem work from a different angle, 
arguing that Titmuss’ most significant contribution -that modes of exchange 
created social orders and forms of polity- was lost as its argument enjoyed such 
popularity that it became normative. 
 
The gift-commodity framework: a critique 
 
The gift-commodity dichotomy has attracted increasing interest in anthropology 
in recent years, as a growing number of scholars have questioned the value of 
relying on pre-defining analytical categories of inalienable, personal gifts and 
impersonal, interchangeable commodities (Osteen 2002). Integrating these 
insights in the debate of organ and tissue donation, scholars have highlighted 
the theoretical limitations of applying the gift-commodity framework to the 
analysis of the circulation of human body parts (Walbdy and Mitchell 2006; 
Yamazaki 2009, 2011a).  
Key in revisiting the gift-commodity dichotomy is the well-established 
anthropological argument that such distinction is not built into things themselves 
as the same object can change status throughout its life (Appadurai 1986). 
Japan offers a case in point. In Japan, money is one of the most common forms 
of gifts (Rupp 2003), and objects exchanged in traditional gift occasions are 
commodities purchased with cash and chosen for their value as goods for 
                                                11	See	McLean	(1986)	for	a	review.	
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consumption, such as food and household goods (Daniels 2009). Daniels 
(2009) argues that these Japanese gifts challenge the notion of the inalienable 
gift that retains the spirit of the giver. These gifts are stripped off the exclusive 
link with the giver and their value is in the utilitarian consumption by the 
recipient, who is not supposed to keep them as a token of the donor but to use 
them up (ibidem). At the same time, however, gifts always demand counter-gifts 
and reciprocity is essential in gift-exchange in Japan (Befu 1986). The 
Japanese gifts thus complicate the classical assumption that commodities are 
not construed in view of the social relationships they embed, showing instead 
that even though they are alienated from the giver, commodities can create 
social relationships when they are part of networks of obligations and reciprocity 
(Daniels 2009). 
Drawing on this point, social scientists have argued for the need to investigate 
not only how organs and tissues are construed at the level of symbolic 
representations, but also how they embody and are invested with meanings 
through the networks of exchange and circulations that they are caught up with 
(Weldby and Mitchell 2005). For example, through describing how organs and 
blood are sourced, processed and distributed by USA procurement agencies, 
Haley (2006) has shown that personalised gifts imbued with the spirit of the 
donor are part of an economy in which body parts are managed through a logic 
of rationality and efficiency that effectively turns them into interchangeable, 
uniform goods.  
A crucial implication of rethinking the distinction between gift and commodity is 
therefore the need to revisite the moral connotation associated with these 
categories. Titmuss’s strong argument that the market economy is disruptive of 
social relationships indeed informed much the anthropological denounce of 
illegal organ trade, as anthropologists have shed light on how the 
commodification and fetishisation of the flesh exposed sellers to incalculable 
violence, suffering and shame (Scheper-Hughes 2005). At the same time, 
however, ethnographic insights show that the de-humanising practice of kidney 
selling is also a practice through which people reassert social relationships and 
their place within them in contexts of extreme indebtedness (Cohen 2003). 
Cohen has thus illustrated that for people who resort to selling one kidney to try 
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and repay debts, exchanging one’s body part for money is sacrifice to protect 
their families, and retaining their role in relation to significant networks of 
relationship (ibidem). On another axis of analysis, however, the same 
transaction also means obliterating the seller’s social persona and turning it into 
bare flesh (ibidem). Cohen thus questions standard bioethical arguments in 
favour or against organ selling for not considering relevant information, such as 
data on health complications for both sellers and buyers, the impact that the 
money people can earn from selling kidney has on their financial situation in the 
long run, the structural conditions of their indebtedness (ibidem), and argues 
that bioethical reasoning should look beyond the moment of exchange itself to 
include the broader conditions in which it takes place (ibidem). 
As his argument suggests, the circulations of human organs are part of complex 
networks that the gift-commodity framework is poorly equipped to describe. In 
particular, social scientists have drawn attention to the need of rethinking the 
gift-commodity distinction in relation to the increasingly globalised reality of 
today’s public health (Waldby and Mitchell 2005). From the growing 
investments in public health development programs among vulnerable 
populations, to the expanding phenomenon of wealthy patients seeking better 
care overseas, problems that concern individual and collective health are often 
negotiated on a transnational scale where altruistic donation and the logic of the 
market are entangled with each other. The stories presented below about 
families raising money to pay for a transplant overseas, for example, are one 
instance of increasingly common charitable initiatives launched to support 
patients that turn to treatment abroad to bypass national scarcity and/ore 
regulations. Where Titmuss’s gift relationship was conceived along the lines of 
national communities and welfare systems, these forms of charitable donation 
present a very different scenario. The communities created around these 
donations are those of patients and their caregivers, who often support each 
other in organising and managing the fundraising; while for donors the lack of 
identification with the recipients (whose story and needs are extreme and rare) 
is the drive to help. Donors and recipients do not necessarily use the gift to 
cement mutual obligations, and certainly do not act collectively toards the state 
as a health care provider. Quite at the contrary, while inspired by ideals of 
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justice and fairness, in reality these forms of solidarity are aimed at helping 
some to access treatment options that often unavailable to most people. As 
these cases show, the logics of altruistic donation and the market are not 
mutually exclusive and do not occupy separate social spheres. 
 
The Moral, Political and Informal Economies of Japanese Organ Transplants 
 
The critique of the gift-commodity indicates clearly that the spheres of the 
‘social’ and the ‘economic’, treated as alternative and even opposite in 
Titmuss’s classical theorisation, are in fact not separate, and that the ‘economic’ 
itself is instead a realm of social investigation. A well-established argument in 
anthropological theory, the point is still largely ignored in the classical bioethical 
discussion on the contemporary uses of body parts for medical research and 
practice. Incorporating these insights in the analysis of organ and tissue 
donation, scholars have thus proposed to move away from the gift-commodity 
and adopting the concept of economies as better theoretical concept (Waldby 
and Mitchell 2005, Yamazaki 2011a).  
 
Drawing on these recent developments, I chose the concept of economies as a 
framework through which to analyse my ethnographic data. From this 
perspective, I describe how the global technology of organ transplants was 
reassembled in Japan by mapping the circulations in which organs are caught 
up. I do not focus on organs only, but look more broadly at the dissemination of 
discourses, the sharing of resources, the mobilisation of feelings. For this 
reason, while the chapters don’t necessarily deal with these concepts 
separately, for clarity of analysis I talk of moral, political and informal economies 
to identify interrelated but different aspect of the problem. 
 The concept of informal economy, by which I refer to health-oriented economic 
transactions that take place outside of the framework of institutionalised 
systems of care provision, serves me to draw attention to the role of financial 
resources in accessing care. An important part of this thesis is the analysis of 
the phenomenon of the transplant overseas (tokō ishoku). These transplants 
blur the distinctions between altruistic donation and self-interest market 
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transactions, presenting a case where gifts can be accessed only through 
money and money itself become a donation to express solidarity. In analysing 
the problem of tokō ishoku, I thus start from describing the informal economies 
behind this quest for care, as I observed it during my experience of participating 
to patients’ fundraising in Tokyo.  
As the ethnography shows, affective resources are as key as financial ones to 
these fundraising. Throughout the thesis, I thus use the concept of moral 
economy to look at the “the production, distribution, circulation and utilisation of 
moral sentiments, emotions and values, norms and obligations” and how they 
shape the relationships between people and the technology (Fassin 2005). 
Challenging the idea of the technology as value-free and self-explanatory, I 
tease out the moral values that are built into it, and show how they shape 
people’s experience of illness and treatment. I discuss how people’s mutual 
obligations orient clinical decisions that concern one’s significant others, and 
how they shape the broader public discourse on donation and transplants. I 
thus tease out how mutual obligations have been negotiated in Japan where, as 
seen, the reciprocity of the gift emerged as a crucial problem. From this 
perspective, I look at how people harness social relations of indebptedness to 
access limited resources and to create new arenas for civic engagement and 
democratic debate.  
Lastly, I talk of the political economies of organ transplants in referring to the 
legal, ethical and medical systems for managing, sourcing, and allocating 
organs. I follow in particular the evolving of the Japanese debate on brain death 
in relationship to emergent forms of patients’ sociality and claims for care. I 
interrogate the consequences of local political economies of organ donation and 
transplants for individual and collective health, their implications for social 
justice and individual subjectivity and their role in shaping imagined 
communities.  
 
I am interest in how people negotiate individual and collective decisions on life 
and death through the way they circulate material, symbolic and emotional 
resources. Throughout the ethnography I thus ask who people share with, to 
what extent the obligation to give goes, whose interests in someone’s life are 
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recognised. Through attempting an answer to these questions, the thesis wants 
to contribute to the current bioethical debates on organ transplants by showing 
how people in Japan have negotiated the emergent quest for organs with the 
long-lasting dilemmas surrounding the definition of death. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Working with Biosocial groups 
 
To explore ethnographically such a vast topic as the situation of organ 
transplants in contemporary Japan, I begun with looking at the experience of 
recipients and their families. My preliminary research for this project focused 
almost exclusively on the question of patients’ experience and the investigation 
of patients’ groups in Japan, and before starting fieldwork I had also took 
contacts with a Tokyo-based group (JASOT)12 to explore the possibility of 
joining them as a volunteer and develop an extended case study around their 
work. As fieldwork unfolded, the experience of transplant patients I begun to 
collect became the point of entry into a wider investigation that came to involve 
patients’ families and clinicians as well. The life histories and experiences of 
patients remain at the core of this thesis, albeit they presented research 
questions I had not anticipated before fieldwork.  
One of the first episodes that happened during my fieldwork was the traditional 
Ginza parade. Conveniently scheduled only a few weeks after my arrival in 
Tokyo, the traditional public event by the Japanese Transplant Patients’ 
Association presented the ideal occasion to be introduced to the scene of 
transplant patients’ groups. The organisers of the event belonged to different 
patients’ organisations and were all associated with the Network of Transplant 
Patients’ Groups, or ZōiRen (from Zōki Ishoku Kanja Dantai Renkaku Kai). The 
Network was an umbrella organisation funded more than thirty years earlier as 
a point of coordination among different, smaller associations involved in the 
lobby for the legalisation of brain death and organ donation in the country. After 
                                                
12 All names of people and organisations are anonymised. 
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playing a decisive role in the 2009 reform of the Act on Organ Transplants, the 
organisation no longer hold regular meetings and the Ginza Parade was to be 
last of their annual events.  
The logistic organisation of the Ginza Parade was for the best part the 
responsibility of the Japanese Organ Transplant Recipients Association 
(JOTRA). The group was the largest in the country and one of the first to be 
established in the early 1990s, when cadaveric donation was not yet legalised 
in the country and only transplants from living related donors were possible. 
Some three decades later, as the number of transplant recipients in Japan had 
grown and information on treatment was more easily available through fellow 
patients, the internet an educational campaigns by the JOTNW, formally joining 
a patients’ group was no longer the privileged way for candidates, recipients 
and their caregivers to receive counsel and support, and JOTRA mostly 
comprised middle-aged people from the first generation of organ recipients. The 
association, however, was still one of the most active subjects in the scene of 
patients’ organisations, running seminars and public events to raise awareness 
on organ donation and transplants.  
Other organisations involved in this sort of activities included groups of sufferers 
of a particular disease. The Association for Children with Cardiac Disease, the 
Association of Children with Bilary Distresia and the National Association of 
Kidney Recipients were all associated with the issue of organ donation and 
transplantation, even though, in the words of one of my informants, this was not 
their priority. Organisations of these sorts offered support to people suffering 
from diseases that could present varied degrees of severity and chronicity, and 
for which a transplant was not necessarily the only treatment available. The 
groups associated with tokō ishoku patients, on the other hand, worked with 
people for whom transplant was the last and only chance.  
Along with the single fundraising groups that family set up to collect money for 
the operations, two associations existed that specialised in offering support to 
parents of young patients who decide to travel overseas for a transplant: the 
Japanese Association in Support of Organ Transplants (JASOT) and the 
Network for International Transplants (NIT) Japan. The families I worked with 
had been involved with both organisations. One of my interlocutors, who was 
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still very close to people at NIT, firstly introduced to the group’s leader, with 
whom I conducted interviews about his experience of transplant advocacy 
dating back to the early 1990s. I also followed a fundraising that organised by 
JASOT, and participated as volunteer to various events run by the organization 
during my time in Japan.  
Most of the recipients and families I met at the Ginza parade were not formally 
affiliated with any particular organisations, event though they took part to 
various initiatives promoted by different groups. Rather than focusing on one 
single group in particular, I thus followed patients’ individual cases in depth. The 
Ginza Parade offered in this sense an important occasion to recruit participants 
for this project, because it enabled me to get in touch with patients and their 
families directly without having to relying on gatekeepers such as medical 
doctors, transplant coordinators or even patients’ groups leaders.  
I anticipated that asking medical doctors or even leaders of patients groups to 
introduce me to transplant recipients could significantly influence how people 
would see me and even whether I would have been able to meet some patients 
at all (Hirano 2008). In particular, I wanted to avoid sourcing participants 
through transplant programs, as I expected that in a context like Japan, where 
the doctor-patient relationship is particularly authoritarian and patronising, 
relying on gatekeepers would greatly condition my interactions with possible 
participants. More generally, I did not want people to feel pressured into 
participating in the project out of a sense of obligation towards third parties.  
While I expected that pastoral figures like medical professional might have a 
very protective and even patronising attitude towards patients, I also had my 
own fair share of concerns about the potential intrusiveness of my research. 
Given the ethically sensitive nature of the project, I anticipated that people could 
have considerable reservations about disclosing personal information 
concerning their health and medical history. In Japan, people are reluctant 
about revealing one’s medical condition and talking openly about chronic and 
severe illness. Disability can be strongly stigmatised, and people are 
comprehensibly cautious about disclosing details about health and treatment. In 
the case of organ transplant in particular, the problem of privacy is further 
exacerbated by the controversial public debate on this technology and by the 
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intense media exposure that accompany the fundraising campaigns. As 
confirmed by some of my interlocutors, the decision of listing for an elective and 
highly contested treatment like transplant can attract unwanted judgement and 
scrutiny from strangers, meaning that some people are all but keen on sharing 
their medical history.  
Questions of representation were also closely related to ethics of sourcing 
informants. As the ethnography below will make clear, negotiating health is an 
important aspect of the experience of becoming a transplant recipient. While 
recipients are tied to medication and follow-up visits for the whole of their post-
operative life, many of them do not self-identify as patients for the negative 
connotations that the term implies. I thus expected that people would have a 
variety of different understandings of what it means to be a transplant recipient, 
and that to some this might not be a distinctive or important part of their 
persona. Thus, I wanted to work with people who were not only confortable in 
sharing their experiences with me, but also self-identify as transplant recipients. 
I did not want to super-impose on people labels they dismissed or even 
rejected. Equally, I did not want to be intrusive or confront people with question 
concerning their medical history if disengaging from it was a way for them to 
negotiate notions of health and normality.  
For these reasons, the Ginza parade offered the perfect occasions to meet 
people who self-identified as transplant recipients and were willing to go public 
about their experience. In fact, many of the people I met that day were not 
organ recipients themselves, but parents of young children who had applied for 
or received a transplant overseas. For the reasons just discussed, I decided 
from the very early stages of my fieldwork not to involve young patients directly. 
Even though people never explicitly objected to the possibility, it was clear from 
their recommendations to me as well as from the way they talked to each other 
in the presence of children that they were particularly careful to avoid children 
were directly confronted with discussion that could evoke traumatic events or 
making them aware of potentially problematic implications of their condition. I 
respected these boundaries and conducted interviews only with parents. This, 
in turn, provided insights to rethink who we are talking about when we talk 
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about transplant recipients and whose lives and relationships are at stake in the 
process of becoming an ishokusha. 
I knew before starting fieldwork that doing research on organ transplant can 
strip the ethnographer of her best-established tools of investigation, for there 
are quite obvious limits to participant observation. As I found out, working with 
biosocial groups also presented distinctive challenges. In my case, having 
direct access to people during the pre-operative phase proved unfeasible. For 
paediatric patients in need of a heart transplant and their families, the months 
leading to the decisions of listing for the operation are often extremely critical. 
The child is often hospitalised in severe conditions and quite understandably 
both medical professionals and other patients are very protective of the family’s 
privacy at this stage.  
It is only when the family decides to pursue the transplant overseas that the 
fundraising forces them to go public. During the time of my fieldwork, I was able 
to follow two cases of fundraising. In one instance, I was able to participate to 
the campaign myself and had closer access to the family, which allowed me to 
also visit them at the hospital. In the other case, instead, access to the family 
was mediated by the organisation that was helping them in running the 
fundraising. For this reason, as well as for the particularly critical condition of 
the patient, meeting them or visiting at the hospital proved unworkable.  
Even with my main informants, who applied for the transplant years earlier and 
had all returned to a quitter life, daily interaction was not always possible. These 
dynamics, on the other hand, reflected the nature of the group of people I 
worked with. My interlocutors identified themselves as belonging to what could 
be called a biosocial group, by which I mean a group of people who share a 
common medical history/condition and who participated in forms of sociality 
informed by this aspect of their lives. People did not belong to a geographically 
bound community that could be clearly accessed, nor they engaged in daily 
activities together that I could participate to. These factors greatly influenced the 
methods I adopted as well as my positionality in the field. Before dealing more 
in details with these questions, however, a note is due to introduce the main 
participants to this project.  
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The main interlocutors 
 
The Ishokusha 
 
The people I met at the Ginza Parade became some of my main interlocutors. 
Overall, I interviewed more than fifteen among transplant recipients and their 
families, including families of young children who had applied for the transplant 
in recent years and patients who belonged to an earlier generation of organ 
recipients and, in many cases, had been involved in the issue of transplant 
advocacy for more than two decaded.  
Within this last group, two of my closest inerlocutors were Nakamichi-san and 
Komeno-san. Nakamichi-san was an organ recipient himself and at the time of 
my fieldwork he had been serving as head of the JOTNW for two years, after 
stepping down as leader of the JOTRA, which he had chaired for more than 
twenty years. An old friend of his, Komeno-san also had a decades-long history 
of transplant advocacy. He joined a transplant patients’ groups in the 1990s, 
after his son had become one of the first Japanese children to receive a heart 
transplant in the U.S, and at the time of my research he served as an external 
member of the Ministry of Health and Welfare special committee on organ 
donation and transplantation.   
The two men were among the best-known figures in the movement for the 
legalisation organ donation from brain death. I met with them several times 
during my fieldwork, for individual interviews and on the occasion of informal 
gathering with other patients. Through them, I was also introduced to other 
people, both organ recipients and medical professionals, who joined the 
movement for the legalisation and promotion of organ donation in Japan. Their 
long-term engagements with the issue of organ donation and transplantation 
offered me a privileged perspective into the theme of transplant advocacy, while 
also providing valuable insights into the experiences of early patients and the 
similarities and differences with the stories of patients from a later generation. 
The people I worked mostly with were the families of young children who had 
applied for/received a transplant overseas in recent years, in particular five 
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families who travelled to North America between 2006 and 2009, when their 
children were between one and nine years old.  
The Satos and the Arais were from Tokyo. Sato Sayaka and her husband 
Juntarō both worked in the media industry, and their daughter was in her 
teenage years at the time of my fieldwork. Arai Yoshinori, a salaryman in his 
forties, and his wife, a professional housewife, had two children. Nakajima 
Mariko was a single mother of three, and lived with her family in an inner 
province of Japan some two hours by train from Tokyo. Kumano Natsuko and 
her husband Keisuke lived in Yokohama, the major town neighbouring the 
capital. A young salaryman and a nurse, they had travelled to America to get 
their first child on the list for a heart transplant when he was only one. Ota Yuka 
raised her only child without his father. She was from a wealthy family from 
central Japan, and run her own business between the capital and her 
hometown.  
Despite living in the Tokyo area, the Satos and the Kumanos referred to a 
transplant program in Osaka, while the other families were based at a medical 
centre in the capital. Osaka and Tokyo are the two cities in Japan where 
transplant programs are based that have the highest concentration of patients, 
and the majority of patients who receive a transplant overseas refer to 
physicians and surgeons from these centres. Accessing care depends on the 
possibility of being referred to these medical facilities, but the composition of 
tokō ishoku patients is not at all limited to families living in large urban centres. 
Fundraising campaigns are run also in more remote provinces and patients 
from all different geographical provenience travel overseas. What determines 
people’s capacity to purse care in a foreign country, however, is the possibility 
of being referred to medical professionals in Japan who have the right 
professional connections abroad.  
Another major factor that determines people’s possibility to receive care 
overseas is the burden of the after-care. While the costs of the operation are for 
the best part met through the fundraising, the follow up care can be very 
challenging for families. The costs of anti-rejection drugs are partly covered by 
insurance programs, but the financial burden remain challenging for many 
people. In addition to that, the after-care can present a series of complications. 
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Families for example have to be able to afford regular leaves from work to 
accompany children to periodical follow-up visits at the major transplant centres 
in Tokyo and Osaka. When people have more than one child, they must be able 
to rely on solid family and social networks to assist the young patient during the 
time s/he is hospitalised while also ensuring care to his/her siblings. The sample 
of people who participated to this study suggests that the option of the 
transplant overseas in Japan is not necessarily for the extremely wealthy; 
nevertheless, tokō ishoku does remain an elective treatment, which is feasible 
only when families can afford to pull out considerable social and financial 
resources.  
For these reasons, the life trajectories of the people who participated to this 
research are not to be intended as sociologically representative of how the 
average Japanese citizen would access treatment. Neither they want to be fully 
representative of the more general experience of becoming an organ recipient, 
as the cases of paediatric tokō ishoku are very specific and different to other 
types of transplants.  
Thus, the case studies discussed, both those of transplant activists and tokō 
ishoku families, are in no way representative in a sociological sense of the 
experience of Japanese organ recipients at large. They are, nevertheless, 
telling of how this experience is lived and embodied, as well as narrated and 
made sense some of. As it draws on the experiences of a peculiar sample of 
people within the wider group of organ recipients, the ethnography below is 
indicative of problems that are specific but also of broader relevance.  
First of all, it provides insights on the experience of people who self-identify as 
ishokusha and whose life trajectories got significantly entangled with the 
problem of organ donation and transplants in Japan. While certainly not all 
organ recipients share this view or dedicate their free time to transplant 
advocacy, the stories of the people who have done so shed some light on the 
emergence of new forms of health-related subjectivity in Japan and on the ways 
in which people’s civic engagement on these matters contributed to reshape 
notions of life and death in relation to transplantation.  
Further, while different to other types of transplants, the case of paediatric tokō 
ishoku presents an extreme instantiation of issues of larger significance. The 
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young age of the patients, the severity of the condition and the exceptionality of 
treatment contribute to make the stories of paediatric tokō ishoku particularly 
critical cases. These very factors that cast them apart from other types of 
transplant, however, are also those that best tease out the moral predicaments 
built into organ transplantation, in particular the denial of mortality and the 
imperative of saving lives at any costs.  The emotionally tense and dramatic 
stories of tokō ishoku families, therefore, speak of how these problems 
articulated in Japan, revealing the tensions between the ever-enduring legacy 
of the brain death problem and the increasingly pressing problem of organ 
shortage.  
 
 
The Clinicians 
 
While I initially intended to focus exclusively on transplant recipients and their 
families, which has been largely overshadowed by the interest in the brain 
death problem, halfway through my fieldwork I realised that the issue of death 
and organ donation was a necessary part of the story I wanted to tell. The 
tensions between the dilemmas surrounding death and the imperative to save 
life that the stories of my interlocutors revealed were far from settled at the time 
of my fieldwork. Almost two years after the enforcement of the new law on brain 
death that my informants had been advocating for, everybody’s attention was 
on whether the new policy would have had an impact on increasing the national 
donation rate and to what extent. The much debated issue of brain death, which 
I had resolved not to go back to, kept on coming back in how people framed the 
problem as one that still needed to be worked on.  
In tackling this problem, I started by conducting research on the literature 
available in Japanese language (Aita 2012; Uryuhara 2012), and started to 
recruit potential informants among clinicians working in intensive and 
emergency care. Personal connections proved extremely useful in this case, as 
in most cases I couldn’t contact medical doctors directly. Through one of my 
interlocutors, I managed to contact Dr Kitanaka, whom I met at one meeting on 
organ donation at the very beginning of my fieldwork. Through him, I also 
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managed to have the contacts of other clinicians he suggested might be worth 
interviewing. Further, I searched on medical journals for authors who seemed to 
publish on the question of brain death and organ donation, and asked 
informants in the JOTNW to introduce me to clinicians who were collaborating 
with them.  
I thus managed to interview seven among neurosurgeons and neurologists 
working in intensive care units across the country. Again, the sample of 
interlocutors doesn’t want to be sociologically representative of clinical practice 
more in general. Quite at the opposite, the people sampled are a minority of 
medical professionals actively involved in the debate on brain death, end of life 
care and organ donation. While the prominence of brain death in the public 
debate means that the majority of Japanese physicians are reluctant to openly 
disclose the condition to families and discuss organ donation, the clinicians 
interviewed for this study were selected because they proactively support organ 
donation (two out of seven interviewees) and/or advocated for full disclosure of 
information to patients’ families, including in cases of brain death.  
Given the strict policies protecting patients’ privacy and the limited time of my 
fieldwork, it was not possible to negotiate access to the clinical ward, let alone 
witness a case of organ donation, which cannot be scheduled. The experience 
of patients’ families is therefore not part of the ethnography, and would have 
required a completely different research. The interviews presented are not to be 
intended as a comprehensive description of what goes on in the clinical setting. 
Instead, they want to elucidate how medical categories are constructed as 
people negotiate the meanings and uses of the diagnosis. 
The reluctance of medical professionals to discuss the prognosis of brain dead 
patients and broach the issue of donating organs with the next of kin has been 
traditionally indicated as one of the main causes behind the chronic shortage of 
organs in Japan. The interviews thus want to represent a very specific position 
within the general landscape of Japanese clinical practice concerning end-of-life 
care, one that illuminates the ways in which people negotiate the tensions 
between the problem of brain death and the mounting pressure to organ 
procurement on the clinical setting.  
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…and Myself 
 
During the time of my fieldwork, between September 2011 and November 2012, 
I was based in Tokyo as an exchange researcher at Waseda Graduate School 
of Asia-Pacific Studies. It was not my first time in Japan. Previous to my 
fieldwork I had lived for a few months in Kyoto and spent one year in Tokyo. I 
knew the city well, but also knew that Tokyo is hardly representative of the rest 
of Japan. 
As anthropologists and sociologists have noted, standardised, homogenous 
representations of Japan tend to overshadow the great variety of regional 
differences that exist within the archipelago and focus predominantly on the 
country’s major urban centres, particularly Tokyo and Osaka (Sugimoto 2003). 
These representations reproduce a hierarchical opposition between the urban 
core and what the Japanese call inaka, which literally means ‘rural’ but in fact 
encompasses everything that lies outside the large metropolitan areas in the 
Kanto and Kansai areas.13  
Through my research, I met patients from all over the country. To some, living in 
peripheral towns, commonly portrayed as less progressive than the city, was a 
source of potential concern for they feared being stigmatised for their condition. 
More significantly, the interviews clearly indicated that the two major cities of 
Tokyo and Osaka, were not just the cultural, political and economic centres of 
the country, but also the focal points of the world of transplant medicine, where 
the major patients’ organisations, transplant programs and medical 
professionals were based. Similar networks of medical doctors and patients 
activists existed in more peripheral centres as well (Sapporo, for example, was 
such a case), but were more for the best part centred in major cities and 
consequently people’s possibiliy to receive treatment often depended on them 
having the resources and connections to access these city-based transplant 
centres. 
As an anthropologist based in one these large urban cities, living in Tokyo 
shaped the daily practicalities of my fieldwork in ways that reflected in the 
production of this ethnography. The circumstances of working with biosocial 
                                                
13 The regions where Tokyo and Osaka are located. 
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groups were further exacerbated by the dispersive and fragmented 
characteristic of urban life (cf. Bestor 2003). While daily and prolonged 
interactions with my interlocutors were not always possible, I couldn’t count on 
other strong social networks in the local community where I was living. Many of 
the people I met on a regular basis, both Japanese and foreign friends, were 
not related to the topic of my research. Even my Japanese friends, who knew 
about the problem of brain death and organ transplants through the media, 
viewed me as the expert. They often asked curious questions and occasionally 
showed surprise at the fact that I might know more than they did about a 
problem that in so many ways was seen as specific to Japan. To them, I was 
clearly an ‘insider’ of the world of organ donation and transplant patients’ group 
that I was often struggling to access.  
In many other ways, however, I was clearly an outsider, as my nationality and 
ethnicity clearly defined me as a ‘gaijin’ (foreigner). As such, I was often given 
standard narratives that reproduced both stereotyped ideas about the 
differences between Japan and other countries, as well as the assumption that 
as a non-Japanese I must had little clue about the society and culture of the 
country I was temporarily living in. For example, people were often keen in 
explaining me why the Japanese didn’t accept organ transplants the way 
‘westerns’ do. Quite a few times I heard that “the Japanese don’t like to talk 
about death” and see the dead body as having a special value to the bereaved 
family, as if these behaviours special to Japanese culture alone. Nevertheless, I 
rarely encounter these standard narratives in the conversations with my 
interlocutors, especially after our first, explorative meetings.  
Most of these follow-up interviews happened with women. While I met in 
different occasions with groups of families, I usually had individual interviews 
with the mothers of young patients. As a woman, I had easier access to them 
and they, in turn, usually had more time to spend with me because they were 
working shorter hours than their spouses. This influenced significantly the kind 
of narratives I had access to. The mother-child bond is an important part of the 
construction of women’s identity and subjectivity in Japan, and women are 
those who usually stay at the hospital with the patient while the husband takes 
care of the fundraising. These mothers’ narratives thus offer key insights into 
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the strong bond between the sufferer and his/her caregivers and the experience 
of losing a person who is part of oneself.  
I became very familiar with this group of interlocutors. Personally, I found myself 
at ease in collecting their stories, and at times I felt that our meetings were 
almost cathartic for some interviewees, especially for the mothers who had lost 
a child. Despite the proximity and the familiarity, however, I always remained 
distant from their stories. As much as I empathised with their stories, I knew 
their loss and suffer was not something I had direct access to having not 
experienced it myself. In fact, at least during fieldwork, I found that cultivating 
some emotionaldetachment was key to be able to carry on doing research on a 
problem that constantly confronted me with experiences of death.  
Paradoxically, I felt more an insider to the clinicians’ world, despite the fact that 
our interactions were sporadic, brief and much more formal than those with 
transplant patients and their families. Working with clinicians meant having to 
book appointments for interviews through personal assistants, filling in forms on 
ethics and information disclosure, and showing off all my knowledge of 
Japanese honorific forms. Despite the circumstances, and the clear divide in 
expertise that separated me from my neurologists-interviewees, I never felt as a 
complete outsider to their world, for even across our different expertise I was 
able to argue back and probe them on the topic of our conversation.  
Similarly to what Kaufman (2006) notes about her ethnography with medical 
professionals and patients in American intensive care units, one of the most 
striking characteristic of my fieldwork was that it constantly faced me with 
situations that constantly shifted the boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders, between uchi-soto, as one would say in Japanese. I was an outsider 
to the society I lived in, but I was also studying a problem that is not culturally 
bounded in a traditional sense. I inhabited a reality that was distant from the 
supposedly ‘authentic’, ‘traditional’ Japan of the countryside (furusato) –the 
Japan that people back home often asked me about as an anthropologist who 
had worked in the field. I lived in a city where many are, like I was, away from 
the networks of family relationships (uchi), and had to gradually negotiated my 
role as an insider in the world of organ donation and transplants in Japan by 
navigating its standard narratives and communal events. My positionality in the 
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field shaped the ethnography below, as it influenced the methods that were 
available to me, and in turn reflects in the way the material is (re)presented.  
 
 
Data collection and Writing Up 
 
Interviews and Narratives 
 
As just discussed, many of the situations I encountered in the field didn’t allow 
me to conduct prolonged participant observation. In dealing with this condition, I 
worked out strategies similar to those that Steinhoff (2003) describes in her 
study with anti-state groups in Japan. I followed individual cases through 
collecting life histories and conducting in-depth interviews, and I conducted 
intermittent participant observation during key events.  
The life histories of tokō ishoku families guided me through my investigation of 
the problem of organ transplants in Japan. I collected their stories through 
repeated interviews. With rare exceptions,14 the interviews were conducted in 
Japanese, a language that I was quite confortable with having studied it for five 
years in Europe and having already lived for a long period in Japan. I always 
recorded the interviews and transcribed them in two separate phases. First, 
during my fieldwork, I wrote down extended summaries of the conversation in 
English. Later on in the process of writing up the thesis, I then translated literally 
key passages, including all the quotations in the text.  
In translating them, I remained as close as possible to the original phrasing and 
structure. Omissions are always indicated in the text. All passages quoted 
together are extracted from the same interview and reported in the original 
order. When terms are translated that can have multiple meanings in Japanese, 
the original is given in parenthesis. All terms reported in Japanese are from 
recorded or printed materials; other phrases and words are reported as 
quotations only if they appeared in Japanese in my notes. To facilitate the 
                                                
14 One of my informants occasionally preferred to use in English, a language she had learned 
through studying abroad.   
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reading, repetitions have been edited in the translation when they reflect 
syntactical differences between Japanese and English.  
The reader might still feel that the extracts from the interviews reported are at 
times almost too polished and ‘constructed’ to be ‘raw material’. This is due to 
the nature of the material presented. The interviews with patients’s families 
normally took the shape of long, unstructured conversations. I found that my 
initial questions usually served to give the space to my interlocutor to articulate 
long narratives structured in very similar ways to revisit key moments in the 
experience of becoming organ recipients. Thus, I did not use the interviews to 
probe subjects or ask specific questions, but to enable people elaborating and 
presenting their narratives. These were narratives that my interlocutors had 
gone through many times before, alone, with family and friends and even with 
strangers and journalists. Their accounts present little inconsistencies, and read 
instead as very structured and almost rehearsed. In this sense, the narratives 
are not meant to be read as ‘matter-of-facts’ accounts, but are used to to tease 
out how people make sense in their own terms of the experience of becoming 
organ recipients.  
In analysing the material, I found that the way people talk of their experience 
and organise their stories highlight certain crucial nodes of meanings, which I 
use to identify the issues that people place significance upon (cf. Franklin 
1997). I thus unpacked these nodes of meanings to see how people elaborate 
on aspects that are considered particularly relevant or problematic, such as 
reciprocity (ongaeshi), burden (meiwaku), hope and effort (ganbaru), 
normality/health (atarimae/kenkō). Further, I paid particular attention to the way 
in which people construct the narratives and how they situate events within 
broader life trajectories. Through this approach, I used the narratives to 
elucidate how people organise their accounts of traumatic episodes of illness 
and death as a way to construct meaning out of them and reconcile with the 
outcomes of these events (Kleinman 1988).   
From this perspective, the narratives shed light on how people negotiate 
important aspects of their experience, revealing how they gauge delicate clinical 
decisions and navigate the post-operative life. Further, the narratives are 
indicative not just of individual experiences, but also of how these experiences 
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are collectively negotiated within the broader discourse on organ donation and 
transplantation in Japan. They are indicative people’s self-awareness and 
reflexivity on these problems, and reflect how sharing and circulating narratives 
among patients and with the public is part of the eways in which people 
contribute to the social discourses and representations on organ donation and 
transplants. 
Very differently to this, I used the interviews with clinicians to probe them on the 
discrepancies between the official protocol on brain death and donation that 
they all say to abide by and the way in which they actually put it to work in 
practice. The interviews with this group of informants were usually more 
structured than those with transplant recipients and framed to test specific 
hypotheses. All the interviews with clinicians were recorded and fully 
transcribed in Japanese. In analysing the material, I paid special attention to the 
choice of terminology, focusing on the different attributes that people attach to 
the categories brain death and how these determine changes with regards to 
clinical practice and patients’ treatment. The interviews are thus used to 
highlight the divergences between the rationality underpinning the construction 
of brain death as a medical category, and the logic that informs the many 
possible ways in which brain death is managed in clinical practice.  
 
Participant Observation 
 
Picking up on the interviews with my interlocutors, I scaled up and traced the 
networks of patients’ support groups, medical doctors and transplant 
professionals through which people navigate their way to treatment and on 
which they rely on during the post-operative life. Patients’ groups and informal 
networks of mutual support have traditionally plaid an important role in Japan, 
where institutional support to the development of this field of medicine has been 
traditionally poor and this treatment option was viewed with scepticism even 
among medical professionals. In particular, patients who seek treatment 
abroad, have to rely on informal networks of patients and doctors to even know 
about the possibility of the transplant overseas.. Participating to public events 
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run by patients’ groups and fundraisings for tokō ishoku patients was thus an 
important part of my fieldwork.  
Two fundraisings campaigns were going on during the time I was in Tokyo, both 
running at the same time and lasting for a few weeks/month. In one case, I had 
the possibility to follow the case through the entire fundraising and after the 
operation, and also helped in running the campaign. In the other case, I had 
only limited direct contact with the patient’s family and followed their campaign 
through participating to the public events run by JASOT, which helped the 
family organising the fundraising. These two different case studies enabled me 
to observe the fundraising within the broader networks of medical doctors and 
patients’ groups that families navigate as their organise the campaign, while 
also participating directly to an experience that patients’ families describe as 
particularly emotionally charged.  
During my fieldwork, I also took part to various periodical events that 
characterise the local transplant community, including informal get-togethers, 
educational seminars and conferences, annual meetings of patients’ groups, 
and the traditional Transplant Games and Running Festival organised by the 
JOTNW. These events bring together patients and their caregivers, medical 
doctors, transplant professionals and, occasionally, donor families from all over 
the country. They are key events through which people participate in the public 
discourse on organ donation and transplant in Japan, as they function to 
promote a positive image of the treatment and commemorate its social worth. 
They are also events that contribute to shape people’s identity as ishokusha, by 
fostering social bounds among fellow patients and with pastoral figures like 
transplant surgeons. Taking part to these public events and joining my 
interlocutors during private get-togethers and hospital visits provided me with 
important insights into how people negotiate forms of sociality around their 
shared medical history, how they reflect on their condition by sharing private 
concerns and rehearsed narratives with each others, and how this aspects of 
their expeience inform their public engagement with organ donation and 
transplants.  
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ONE 
 
Scarcity 
 
Organ Transplantation as an Anthropological 
Problem 
 
 
 
 
 
There is one picture that systematically features in conferences presentations, 
educational material, and news about organ transplantation in Japan. It is a 
graph showing the international rates of cadaveric organ donation. It starts with 
Spain, the country with the highest ratio of organ donors per population, 
followed by America, the real cultural term of comparison, and at the far right it 
ends with a column that looks more like an under-bar. With a percentage of the 
order of zero point something, Japan closes the line-up of international organ 
donation, as the industrialised nation with the lowest rate of cadaveric organ 
donors.  
 
Fig. 1 : From Abadie and Gay (2006). 
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For thirty years after the Wada transplant, organ procurement from brain 
dead donors was effectively impracticable in Japan, and the transplant of solid 
organs other than kidneys and livers, which can be procured from living-related 
or non-heart beating donors, remained impossible. Brain death organ donation 
was legalised in 1997, but it was only in 1999 that organs, including a beating 
heart, were first procured from a brain dead patient. Since then, brain death 
donations have been constantly on the rise, but data show that in the majority of 
cases people consent to donation only after cardio-circulatory failure (NHBD), 
when organs like the heart are irretrievable for transplant purposes (see 
Appendix 1). The statistics on transplants performed, patients on waiting lists, 
and average waiting times, only amplify the effect of this scarcity by quantifying 
its human cost, whereas the omnipresent graph powerfully suggests that such 
scarcity is in great part man-made.  
The development of transplantation (ishoku iryō wo suishin suru) was the 
way in which people most frequently framed the situation. It draws a trajectory 
of a quantifiable progress, and mobilises the idea that developing this 
technology in practice is a perfectible enterprise. Scarcity, framed in terms of an 
unequal relationship between demand and supply, becomes, from this 
perspective, the margin of technology's malfunctioning, the gap to close, or at 
least to fill, in order to develop transplantation.  
In this chapter, I unpack this conceptual link between scarcity and the 
development of transplantation. Moving between the global context to the 
specific case of Japan, I trace the development of transplantation and describe 
how I see this as a modern anthropological problem. Here, I refer to a domain in 
which “forms and values of individual and collective existence are 
problematised or at stake, in the sense that they are subject to technological, 
political and ethical reflection” (Ong and Collier 2005). Instead of moving from 
the assumption that behind the development of transplantation there lies self-
explanatory scientific progress, I map how the development of transplantation –
both as a historical process and as the goal of organ sharing programmes– 
entails a redefinition of relevant anthropological questions. From this 
perspective, the chapter proposes a different look at the core problem at the 
heart of the enterprise of organ donation and transplant: scarcity.  
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Contingent Beginnings 
 
Before becoming technically possible, organ transplant had to be conceivable. 
Until the seventeenth century, disease was understood in Western medicine as 
the result of an imbalance in the whole organism (Porter 2006). This model was 
radically transformed by changes in medical practice and knowledge. The 
development of anaesthesia and antiseptic from the late 1860s paved the way 
for the development of modern surgery, contributing to a renewed interest in 
anatomy by making internal organs accessible, observable and manipulable 
(Schlich 2010). On the other hand, the institutionalisation of laboratory 
medicine, a new way of looking at the body, began to emerge, which focused 
not on the structure but the physiological function of organs (ibid.). As Schlich 
illustrates, these factors produced a major epistemological shift in the 
conceptualisation of disease and body systems. It was this logic, which 
individuates pathology in the failure of a single organ that was necessary for the 
invention of organ transplantation between the 1880s and 1930s (ibid).  
The concept of organ replacement as a therapeutic technique would 
become so powerful as to entirely reconfigure the field of surgery around the 
method the new treatment required, which necessitated an unprecedented 
degree of surgical precision and biological knowledge, as well as a “systematic 
approach to diagnostic, treatment, risk and outcome assessment, often blurring 
the traditional frontiers between surgery and other disciplines, medical and 
beyond” (Trohler 1993: 985). It would take several decades, however, for this to 
happen. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Alexis Carrel, who would go 
on to receive the Nobel Prize for his research, developed pioneering techniques 
in organ maintenance and vascular surgery, making it possible to preserve 
organs outside of the body and restore their function after the transplant (Hakim 
and Papalois 2003; Hamilton 2012). Carrel’s work addressed the major 
technical obstacles to organ replacement, and at the beginning of the twentieth 
century the first successful surgical transplants were reported (Schlich 2010). 
Even so, the interventions inevitably resulted in clinical failures. 
Revascularisation allowed the functioning of the organs to be restored only 
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briefly and the grafts eventually died. No link, however, was established or 
investigated between the observed failures in organ grafts and the mechanisms 
of histocompatibility, even though these were already known at the time 
(Hamilton 2012; Schlich 2010). By the turn of the twentieth century, all the 
factors that would make transplant possible were in place, but in the face of 
systematic graft rejection the concept of organ replacement had lost its cachet 
in the research community and was eventually abandoned until after WWII  
(Schlich 2010). 
In the mid-twentieth century, with the development of techno-medicine, the 
invention of dialysis, and the renewed interest in immunology, transplantation 
again became the subject of intense research and experimentation. Officially 
histories usually report 1954 as the date of the first clinically successful organ 
transplant. The intervention was performed in Boston by a team led by Joseph 
Murray, later awarded a Nobel Prize for what the media called “the ultimate 
operation” (Lederer 2008). Donor and recipient were identical twins, and the 
organ in question was a kidney. The combination was a common one, and for 
good reasons. The kidney is the ideal prototype for organ transplant, because 
the technicalities of the operation are simpler than with other organs. It is easily 
procurable from living-related donors, improving the chances of a good tissue 
match even in the absence of sound immunological knowledge and effective 
immunosuppressant drugs, neither of which were available when the first 
modern transplants were performed.  
Immunological rejection remained the obstacle to work around if transplant 
was to develop into a fully therapeutic treatment on a large scale. Usually less 
considered is a second major problem, ischemia time. Ischemia is the process 
of tissues deterioration that occurs when blood supply is cut off. Ischemia time 
refers to the time the tissues of a single organ can survive without blood 
perfusion before they become unusable for transplantation. This time dictates 
the practical conditions of transplantation and would exert a major impact on 
this field of medicine, and beyond. Studies of organ maintenance had already 
showed, in the early nineteenth century, the possibility of retarding the process 
of tissue deterioration outside of the body. The implementation of new technical 
solutions for organ preservation and the development of communication and 
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transportation systems to dispatch them across long distances in a short time 
made it possible to develop transplantation in a systematic way. Even so, the 
problem of so-called warm ischemia remained, that is the deterioration of 
tissues while organs are still inside the body. If not perfused with blood, the 
organ dies; but to retrieve them before circulation is cut off would mean 
procuring organs from a patient who is still alive. Warm-ischemia thus posed a 
major challenge not just to the logistics and technicality of organ transplants, 
but to the ethics of medical practice as well. While the problem was easily 
manageable with kidneys, it became inescapable when surgeons set out to 
transplant the heart.  
By the mid-1960s, teams of surgeons across North America and Europe 
had been planning the intervention in what was described as a silent 
competition to breach the ultimate medical record: transplant a human heart. In 
1967, cardiac surgeon Christiaan Barnard caught the world by surprise by 
announcing the first heart recipient was recovering from a successful operation 
at Cape Town Hospital in South Africa. On December the second, a young 
woman was hit by a car, transported to the nearby hospital and brought to the 
intensive care unit where a neurosurgeon declared her dead. The following day, 
the woman was moved to the cardiothoracic unit of the same hospital, where 
Barnard and his team started the procedure for organ procurement. The patient 
was brought to the OT, and only then did Barnard himself switch off the 
ventilator and initiate cardiopulmonary support to restore the blood flow in the 
body as he extracted the heart (Hakim and Papalois 2003; Hamilton 2012). At 
what point did the patient really die? This was the question Barnard was 
confronted with by his critics.15 The answer lies in how the complex array of 
resuscitative technologies, from artificial ventilation to cardiopulmonary support, 
was used to enable death to happen in a certain way.  
 
 
 
 
                                                15	From	the	BBC	Tomorrow’s	World	Special	‘Barnard	Faces	His	Critics’	broadcast	in	1968.	
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Organ Transplants and the (Re)Definition of Death 
 
In 1959, two French neurophysiologists, Mollaret and Goulon, published the 
findings of their clinical work with patients on artificial life-support and coined the 
term coma dépassé to refer to a condition that, they stated, had never been 
previously observed. In coma dépassé, literally “beyond coma”, not only are the 
cognitive functions of the person absent, but even their vegetative life functions 
appear to be irremediably lost (1959). It is a state of life beyond life itself. 
Although similar findings had already appeared in medical literature, Mollaret 
and Goulon were the first to clearly identify what was to become known as brain 
death as a distinctive condition different from other comatose states (Widjicks 
2011). Further publications followed the paper by Mollaret and Goulon, and 
through cumulative clinical data, medical experts around the world observed 
consistent symptoms and causes attributable to a precise aetiology. Irreversible 
coma became a new clinical category. It was identified as the loss of function in 
the entire brain, including the brain stem, which is the part of the brain 
responsible for the organism's vegetative functions, including breathing and the 
regulation of blood pressure. When the brain-stem stops functioning, the person 
goes into respiratory arrest, blood pressure drops and the heart consequently 
stops beating. Obviously, people had always been ‘naturally’ dying of brain 
death, but, starting from the late 1950s, the possibility of artificially suspending 
the process was what made brain death a possibility.  
Clinical data about this new class of patient suggested that, even when 
treatment was prolonged, cardiac arrest was both inevitable and imminent. 
Physiological and biological knowledge indicated that the loss of brain-stem 
function inevitably leads to rapid disintegration of the capacity of the organism 
to sustain itself and that life-support can only briefly prolong, but certainly not 
reverse, the process of death of the body that follows the death of the brain. 
The defining of brain death, by which I mean the artificially created possibility of 
‘suspending’ the process of dying by means of artificial life-support, faced 
clinicians with a radical shift in the conceptualisation of the role of medicine 
itself. From the 1950s, the development of intensive care, and in particular the 
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use of mechanical ventilation, made it possible to stabilise critically injured 
patients, who would have otherwise died immediately, and sustain them 
throughout the process to a full recovery. With these advancements in 
resuscitative and life-support techniques, however, came also partial clinical 
successes: conditions suspended between life and death that were beyond the 
point of recovery but could nevertheless be artificially prolonged (Kaufman 
2000). Death, in these cases, would occur only by the active withdrawal of life-
support treatment. Physicians were no longer charged with confirming that the 
person had died, as they are called upon to verify the decease after cardiac 
arrest, but were faced with unprecedented questions about where the line 
should be drawn between letting a person die and killing a patient, and who has 
the right to decide (Namihira 1988). Medicine became the gatekeeper of 
contemporary death, shaping when, where and how people die (Kaufman 
2006). Further, as attested by the on-going debate about the right to die and 
assisted suicide, these clinical decisions increasingly escaped the domain of 
the hospital and came to assume great relevance as problem of wider social 
concern at the interface between medical knowledge and legal regulation 
(Rothman 2003).  
The dilemma over the new condition of brain death was further 
exacerbated by the fact that, with the concomitant development of intensive 
care and transplantation medicine, the new class of patients treated in the ICU 
had become the ideal source of organs for transplants. Brain death produced 
bodies that could be taken as dead persons while still being kept biologically 
alive. Conveniently enough, it offered a safe way out from the ethical impasse 
of how to procure fresh organs from the dead without ‘killing’ the donor. 
Moreover, enabling death to happen in a clinically controlled manner provided 
an outlet for managing organ procurement in a systematised way, allowing time 
to obtain consent from the next of kin, select recipients, and arrange for organ 
retrieval and transplant.  
Regulations were needed. The validation of agreed diagnostic criteria and 
protocols for clinical practice became necessary to provide physicians with clear 
ethical guidelines for end-of-life care, as well as to avoid medical professionals 
who engaged in the practice of organ donation being charged with murder. The 
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first attempt to stipulate such a regulatory framework was the notorious Ad Hoc 
Committee of Harvard Medical School. Formed in 1968, the committee was 
charged with defining the new condition of ‘irreversible coma’ (brain death) and 
indicating solid diagnostic criteria and tests to determine it in practice, in order 
to provide standard guidance to clinicians and avoid ethically sensitive 
decisions being made at the discretion of individual physicians (Belkin 2014). 
After carefully considering the ethical aspects of the case, the committee 
concluded that the diagnosis of brain death was to be taken as a reliable and 
sufficient indicator to discontinue medically futile treatment. In this way, while 
giving a medical definition of the condition of brain death, the committee also 
redefined human death itself (cf. Gervais 1986).  
 
Our primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion 
for death. There are two reasons why there is the need for a 
definition: (1) improvements in resuscitative and supportive 
measures have led to increased efforts to save those who are 
desperately injured. Sometimes these efforts have only partial 
success so that the result is an individual whose heart continued to 
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged. The burden is great on 
patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on 
the hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds occupied by 
these comatose patients. (2) Obsolete criteria for the definition of 
death can lead to controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation.  
(Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School 1968: 85) 
 
Following the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, brain death was taken as a 
new indicator of human death, alternative but equivalent to cardio-circulatory 
arrest, in the legal jurisdictions and/or clinical protocols of the majority of 
countries (Wijdicks 2011), ratifying the position of the WHO which states that: 
 
[Brain death is the] irreversible cessation of cerebral and brain stem 
function; characterized by absence of electrical activity in the brain, 
blood flow to the brain, and brain function as determined by clinical 
assessment of responses. A brain dead person is dead, although his 
or her cardiopulmonary functioning may be artificially maintained for 
some time. 
(WHO, emphasis added).16	
                                                
16 From the WHO Global glossary of terms and definitions on donation and transplantation 
2009: 
http://www.who.int/transplantation/activities/GlobalGlossaryonDonationTransplantation.pdf 
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The Brain Death 'Problem' in Japan 
 
In Japan, brain death became one of the most widely discussed and 
controversial issues of bioethics. In 1968, the infamous Wada case focussed 
the attention of the Japanese public on the delicate ethical questions raised by 
the emergent enterprise of organ transplantation. As discussed in the 
introduction, the death of the young recipient Miyazaki-kun in as little as eighty-
three days after the operation prompted an investigation into Dr. Wada’s 
conduct and made the circumstances of the case the centre of intense public 
scrutiny. Dr. Wada was charged with double murder, accused of having killed 
the 'donor' and procuring his organ without the family’s consent, as well as 
having caused the death of the recipient whose condition allegedly didn’t 
require such an invasive and unsafe intervention (Lock 2002). Disturbing 
evidence emerged suggesting that the case had been a “barbarous piece of 
medical experimentation” (Lock 2002: 133), but the truth is that the tragic 
outcome of the Wada transplant was typical, as had been, in many respects, 
the management of the donor and the recipient.  
At its inception, and for some time after, organ transplantation in general 
and cardiac transplantation in particular were experimental, rather than 
therapeutic, treatments (Fox and Swazey 1978). Survival times were a 
measured in days, weeks or, at best months. They were more akin to palliative 
care than contemporary transplantation outcomes. Driving the enterprise of 
transplantation, in the face of such dreadful clinical results, was what Fox and 
Swazey famously called “the courage to fail” (ibid). In the absence of ethical 
and professional guidelines, surgeons acted as gatekeepers of clinical 
research. They selected recipients, approved of living-related donations, 
operated on donors who had died at the same medical facility and whose 
family’s consent they obtained themselves, as systems of organ sharing didn’t 
yet exist, and they did so guided by a professional ethos that praised risk-taking 
and recourse to extreme measures in the attempt to save patients at immediate 
risk to life (ibid). While the judgment remains open on Dr. Wada’s intentions and 
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conduct, what is generally agreed is that the first heart transplants would not 
have been possible under current ethical guidelines.  
In fact, after 1986 was named the year of heart, the years that followed 
saw the number of operations drastically dropping and cardiac transplantation 
effectively entered a phase of clinical moratorium (Fox and Swazey 1978). 
Questions began to be asked, both by experts and the general public. Is such a 
resource-intensive and clinically unsafe treatment even worth researching? 
Who should regulate the selection of recipients (and how), were the procedure 
to become routinised? Is it ethically acceptable to redefine death for 
transplantation purposes? Is it even possible to define when death truly 
happens, and who has the right to do so?17 
Such questions were not at all unique to Japan. While in other countries 
the polemic gradually settled down to become a matter of technical judgment 
for experts, in Japan the brain death 'problem' developed into a sort of “national 
obsession” (Feldman 2000: 51). The debate encompassed patients’ 
organisations, political, medical and religious institutions, and generated 
thousands of newspaper articles, books and television programmes by public 
commentators and scholars, as well as periodic polls to survey national opinion 
over the vexed question: is brain death human death (nōshi ha hito no shi ka)?  
 
 
From Clinical Judgment to Social Problem 
 
Over the years, medical associations, university ethics committees and ad hoc 
advisory bodies appointed by the Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare 
(MHLW) took up the task of defining diagnostic standards. In 1985, the Brain 
Death Study Group set up by the MHLW issued an official protocol for the 
determination of brain death named after Takeuchi Kazuo, the neurologist, who 
chaired the committee, the Takeuchi Code (Takeuchi kijun) (Feldman 2000; 
Lock 2002). It adopted a conceptual definition of whole brain death as the 
                                                
17 For an example of how similar questions were raised in the media see the editorial of the 
Saturday Evening Post (1968), titled ‘Frankenstein in South Africa’. See Fox and Swazey (1978) 
for a detailed discussion on the debate among medical professionals leading to the moratorium 
on cardiac transplantation. 
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“irreversible loss of brain function in the entire brain, including in the brain stem” 
and prescribes a set of various clinical tests18, to be performed twice over a 
minimum six-hour interval. Still in use today, the Takeuchi Code is in line with 
internationally endorsed diagnostic standards refined over years of clinical 
observation, and, if anything, it can be considered a particularly conservative 
convention. The tests it prescribes have been largely reviewed in the medical 
literature and unanimously considered sensible and reliable diagnostic tools, 
when correctly applied (Wijdicks 2011; Pallis 1996). Clinical data are adamantly 
clear that a sound diagnosis is a sufficient and conservative criterion by which 
to exclude any possibility of recovery and to anticipate cardiocirculatory arrest. 
The Japanese Association of Acute Medicine (JAAM) thus officially endorsed 
the adoption of the brain death criterion. The approval of diagnostic standards, 
however, did not put an end to the dispute. 
The controversy over the redefinition of death was particularly rife among 
Japanese civil society. In the 1960s and 1970s, alongside the rise of social 
movements for the promotion of civil rights in Japan, patients’ rights (kanja no 
kenri), marked the appearance of bioethics (seimei rinri) discourses and 
reasoning as a field of specialisation (Feldman 2000). In a country with a highly 
specialised and relatively equitable health-care system19, the crucial issues at 
stake in discussing health rights concerned the ethics of clinical practice. Under 
the labels of informed consent and patient’s autonomy, grass-roots groups 
denounced the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship and the excessive degree of control granted to medical 
professionals over patients and their families with regards to information 
disclosure and therapeutic choice (Feldman 2000).  
Patients’ groups and grass-roots associations in support of the rights of 
the mentally ill, the disabled, and victims of traffic accidents vehemently 
opposed the redefinition of death by neurological criteria as a new form of 
                                                
18 See Chapter 6.	19	Japan has universal health coverage and an advanced healthcare system providing high 
quality basic and specialised care (for more see Chapter 4). From its effective costs-
management, to its achievements in terms of scientific research and the population’s general 
health (Japan has one of the highest life expectancies in the world), the national medical system 
has attracted the interest of foreign policy-makers and researchers. For an overview of these 
issues see the special issue of the Lancet on the Japanese healthcare system (Reich et al. 
2011).  
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eugenics (Feldman 2000; Lock 2002; Yamaguchi 2011). Their opposition to 
brain death powerfully called upon Japan’s past history of medical atrocities and 
health-related discrimination, from modern eugenic politics, to the infamous 
human experiments of Unit 731 during WWII20. What is more, it worryingly 
evoked contemporary public health tragedies, such as the infamous HIV blood-
tainted scandal (Kingston 2004). In the wake of the polemics around the Wada 
case and following episodes of malpractice in organ procurement and 
transplants, the stance taken by the social movements in defence of disabled 
patients brought to the fore terminal patients' right to self-determination, which 
in other contexts was largely glossed over by the arguments for the withdrawal 
of treatment as a form of “death with dignity”.  
Backing-up their position, the Japanese Bar Association repeatedly issued 
statements against brain death, warning that a statutory redefinition of death as 
brain death in order to authorise lawful organ procurement would have run 
contrary to terminally ill patients', and their relatives’, rights to care (Feldman 
2000).  
By highlighting the legal controversies of the matter, the intervention of 
legal scholars and professionals underlined how the solution to the question of 
whether brain death was human death could not simply ratify the opinion of 
medical experts. As the role of the law acquired an increased relevance in the 
debate, professional politics also split on the brain death problem. Differently to 
North America and Europe, where opposition to the legalisation of treatment 
withdrawal for terminally ill patients came mostly from conservative parties close 
to religious institutions, in Japan both left wing and radical politicians firmly 
campaigned against the recognition of brain death. Siding with the advocates of 
disabled and terminally ill patients, the Japanese Communist Party and eminent 
members of the Social Democratic Party firmly opposed the passing of 
legislation in favour of brain death (Nakayama 2010). They formed a powerful 
interest group that, while giving voice to the claims of patients’ groups, also 
asserted the political influence of medical and other professional organisations, 
such as the Bar Association and the Japanese Paediatric Association, both of 
                                                
20 See for example Frühstück (2003) and Robertson (2002) on modern eugenics; Nie (2010) on 
war crimes and medical abuses; Kingston (2004).		
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which traditionally opposed brain death.  
Effectively cast as an issue of interest and concern for society at large, the 
brain death problem became a favourite in Japanese public and scholarly 
debates. While selected sources are used throughout the thesis when relevant, 
to review the large amount of literature in the Japanese language on the 
problem is beyond the scope of this discussion. What should be stressed, 
however, is the impact that the discussion had in fuelling the public debate and 
imagination. Lock describes how articles, popular and fictional literature, as well 
as TV programs on brain death proliferated throughout the 1980s-90s, which 
alongside repeated surveys effectively kept the issue firmly at the centre of the 
public debate (Lock 2002). Cultural commentator Yanagida Kunio, son of one of 
the most famous Japanese historians, tackled the issues in a book and TV 
specials on the story of his son who had become brain dead (Lock 2002). 
Scholars also publicly intervened in the debate. Morioka Masahiro, philosopher 
and author of a hugely popular book on the topic and notoriously critical of brain 
death, was frequently interviewed in the media, even on the occasion of the 
recent reform of the Act on Organ Transplants in 2009. Anthropologist 
Namihira’s (1988) argument that the Japanese do not regard the dead body as 
a mere thing, as indicated by the fact that people talk of the body of a deceased 
in honorific terms (itai) and consider the generic term corpse (shitai) 
disrespectful (cf. Lock 2002: 215), became common knowledge, and during my 
fieldwork both interlocutors and people completely unrelated to transplantation 
drew upon this point to explain to me the local uneasiness with organ 
transplantation. Maybe one of the best-selling and most influential books on the 
topic was Brain Death a detailed investigation by journalist Tachibana into the 
logic of brain death as a diagnostic concept that in many ways can be 
considered to anticipate the recent debate among North American and 
European neurological experts on the medical flaws of the brain death concept 
(1986).  
What, then, contributed to the wide social interest and concerns around 
brain death in Japan? What actually happened in and around Japanese ICUs? 
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Death in Japan  
 
In her compelling analysis of the brain death problem in Japan, Lock argues 
that ancestors were the unspoken presence behind many of the arguments 
opposing brain death (2002). Ancestor worship in Japan is a socioreligious set 
of practices strictly related to the continuation of the household (ie) system, and 
maybe because of this central role in reproducing social life through mortuary 
rituals, it has come to epitomise more general images and practices 
surrounding death. Lock maintains that people in contemporary Japan engage 
in the funerary and memorial services in a much more varied and less formal 
way than in the past, but she still believes that the spirits of the decreased, as 
well as the practices through which people engage with and care for them, 
continue to profoundly shape the “eternal engagements” between the living and 
the dead that ancestor worship exemplifies (Lock 2002; Smith 1974).  
Traditional mortuary practices in Japan construe the passage to the 
afterworld as an extended process. When a person lies dying, family members 
and people at her bedside perform a ritual of attempted resuscitation (sosho, or 
sosei) to bring back the spirit (tamashii) that leaves the body as the person 
stops breathing (Suzuki 2000). A doctor is then called to determine death, and 
the family contact the Buddhist temple for a priest to be sent to perform the 
recitation of sutras (ibid.). The wake on the night of the death (tsuya), the 
funeral ceremony and the burial, all involve the participation of the community at 
large (ibid.). The body is prepared at home, and laid with the head facing north, 
after being dressed in a white kimono folded right over left (as opposed to left 
over right which is for the living). The coffin is carried out of the house through a 
window and brought in procession to the graveyard. Upon returning, people 
wash their hands and sprinkle salt over their clothes and on the streets to purify 
them. The rituals symbolically revert to the order of everyday life to mark the 
separation of the deceased from the world of the living and therefore protect the 
latter from the impurity (kegare) associated with death (Suzuki 1974; Raveri 
1984). 
The funeral ceremony is followed by a mourning period that can last from 
thirty-three to fifty days and is punctuated by periodical memorial services. 
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These are scheduled to symbolically mirror the rituals of coming of age and 
maturity, and as life-course rituals configure the integration of the living into the 
community, so the memorial services mark the process of uniting the dead with 
the ancestral lineage in the afterlife (Smith 1974). Once the spirit leaves the 
body it sets out on a journey towards becoming a Buddha (jōbutsu) that doesn’t 
depend on the person’s conduct during life but rather on the appropriate 
engagement of the bereaved family in the rituals of death (ibid.). The process of 
becoming a Buddha is one extended in time and that is at risk of failing until it is 
completed, potentially leaving the spirit wandering restlessly and returning to 
haunt the living. Through mourning rituals, the bereaved accompany the spirit of 
the dead and make sure it is safely united with the ancestors that protected the 
household.  
Along with the formalised services, people engage in various practices to 
memorialise and care for the spirits of the deceased. New Year’s Eve, which 
represents an occasion for scattered families to gather together, is also a time 
of remembrance of the dead, as it is O-Bon, one of the major annual festivals in 
Japan when the spirits are collectively memorialised (Smith 1974; Steffánson 
1995). People also engage with the dead in a more intimate way. When visiting 
the grave of a family member, for example, people don’t simply pray to/for the 
deceased, they bring personal objects as well as food and drink that they 
occasionally share with the dead as they talk to them about their and their 
family’s life. It is also common practice to keep a domestic altar (butsudan) 
where offerings of food and incense are made to pictures of the dead. In 
contemporary Japan, death practices, ranging from contemporary funerary 
ceremonies to burial and memorialisation practices, are increasingly configured 
around the remembrance of the individual person rather than the worship of 
household’s ancestors (Suzuki, H. 2000; Suzuki, I. 2011; Smith 1999). Drawing 
on new repertoires and influences, people continue to memorialise and care for 
the dead and to cultivate enduring bonds of mutual solidarity with them.  
Lock argues that it was this local sensibility towards death as a social 
event that underscored the critique of brain death in Japan. Death being social 
is hardly unique to Japan: in every human society, imageries of the afterlife and 
mortuary practices shape local cosmologies and the place the dead inhabit 
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within them. In Japan, this means that the social obligations towards a dead 
family member contribute to the depiction of organ procurement as disrespectful 
and morally problematic –as the famous novelist Endo Shusaku, put it, it was 
“an insult to the dead” (New York Times 1987). From this perspective, the 
Japanese critique shed important light on the historically and culturally 
contingent assumptions underscoring the redefinition of death. First of all, it 
highlighted the problem of conflating the “process of becoming dead” to a single 
moment in time (Lock 1996). Further, it revealed how the concept of brain death 
rested as much on an accurate knowledge of human physiology as on the 
implicit premise that social and cultural notions of death are nothing but mere 
superstructure to such objective knowledge. 
 
The Body: or, What Biological Is It Anyway? 
 
Rituals of death also serve, as mentioned, to protect and purify the living from 
the impurity (kegare) of death. In Shinto, kegare is a taboo condition deriving 
from naturally occurring phenomena, such as death, disease and dirt. Kegare 
possess a polluting quality, it adheres to the person and contaminates the 
surroundings, bringing misfortune and social disruption.21 Handling or coming in 
contact with it must therefore be avoided and/or followed by purification. Kegare 
thus functions as a moral concept in drawing and maintaining boundaries that 
are often inscribed on the body (Raveri 1984). The dead body is a source of 
kegare, and so are bodily substances such as blood, body fluids and 
excrements. Purity, it appears, is maintained through the integrity of body 
boundaries. Using the dead body and cutting into it is abominable, a reason that 
is also associated with the low rate of autopsy in Japan. The concept of kegare 
draws attention to the way in which the body is a key classificatory device within 
local cosmologies and moral orders; it is not just inert flesh, but is mapped, 
used and indeed embodied in culturally and socially specific ways.  
As Lock argues, while biomedical knowledge is the dominant medical 
tradition in contemporary Japan, concepts of the body deriving from Chinese 
medicine make intuitive sense to people and appear to inform body practices 
                                                21	See	Suzuki	(2000)	on	kegare	in	relation	to	the	preparation	of	the	body	for	the	rituals	of	death.		
 83 
(Lock 2002: 226). Ki is a physiologically oriented concept indicating a vital force 
diffused throughout the body and is pervasively drawn upon to express physical 
wellbeing and energy (cf. Ohnuki-Tierny 1984). Along with ki, kokoro (heart) 
also refers to an essence dispersed through the body which is not biologically 
oriented. Like the English equivalent, kokoro is associated with emotions, 
feelings and one’s inner self; it is not biologically located in one organ (the heart 
in an anatomical sense is shinzo) but neither indicates abstract consciousness; 
instead, it points to an idea of incarnate mindfulness (cf. Scheper-Hughes and 
Lock 1987).   
These concepts of the body radically depart from those underlying brain 
death. The concept of brain death maintains that human death can be surmised 
from the loss of function of one single organ, the brain. This position, as Gervais 
pointed out in her critique of brain death, radically departs from previous notions 
of human death, as the traditional criteria of cardiac arrest identifies the end of 
life not with the ending of cardiac activity but with the cessation of vital signs in 
the entire body that is consequent upon it (1986). The rationale of giving 
primacy to the brain as the single organ whose failure is equivalent to death 
even though the rest of the body retains vital functions rests on two distinctive 
arguments. Firstly, the brain is taken as the locus of consciousness, its 
irreversible decay marks the end of what can be considered human life as 
opposed to mere biological existence (Aagamben 1998). Secondly, the loss of 
cerebral function is considered the point of no return in the irreversible process 
encompassing the cessation of animation and the beginning of the body's 
decomposition which constitutes death from an organic perspective by reason 
of taking the brain as the “critical system” that superintends and organises the 
life of the organism as an integrated whole (Bernat 1998; cf. Shewmon 1998, 
2001). While radically different from, and to some logically inconsistent with, 
one another, both these positions maintain a dichotomous view of the brain and 
the body.  
Local notions of the body in Japan complicate this simplistic view, as they 
conceptualise both cognition and organic integration in terms of a unity of the 
body and the mind. Opponents of brain death in Japan therefore explicitly 
contest the neurological criterion for death being a tacit reification of the ethno-
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centric model of Cartesian dualism (Lock 2002). Given this perspective, the 
debate in Japan anticipated the emergence, starting from the 1990s, of 
renewed interest and controversy around brain death in North America and 
Europe. This re-examination of brain death, which produced endless arguments 
and counter-arguments among medical, legal and bioethical experts and even 
prompted a second U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics, highlighted the 
logical and physiological inconsistencies between definition, criteria and tests 
for brain death as constituting the concept of human death. The conundrum of 
whether brain death is human death, which in North America resulted in a 
convoluted back and forth among a few experts, was made public in Japan. The 
debate thus pointed out how the problem was not prognostic but 
epistemological, the question being not what science knows but how it knows it  
(Lock 2002).  
 
Personhood: or, Who Are Your Others? 
 
The critique of the arbitrariness of the concept of brain death often took the form 
of a cultural opposition between Japan and the West. Brain death was 
associated with foreign modernity and depicted as a threat to core cultural 
values, mobilising a century-long reflection on the relationship between 
“Western technology and the Japanese spirit” (wakon yosai).22 As Lock (2002) 
illustrates, one of the most pervasive arguments against the new death was to 
reject the technological intrusion into the ‘natural’ process of death (cf. Long 
2001). Nature (shizen) is conceived here as that which is without artifice, a 
realm of causal necessity that isn’t limited to what lies outside human society 
but points to the unity between the self and the world (Martinez 2005; Berque 
1997).  This ideal of nature is most powerfully represented in the construction of 
the landscape, in which the meticulous human labour of manipulation of the 
environment is ultimately aimed at concealing itself to reproduce the image of 
an unrefined naturalness. These socially constructed images of nature, which in 
fact are not natural at all, emphasise living in harmony with the world as, 
                                                22	See Lock (2002: 44) on how these arguments were drawn upon in the debate over brain 
death in Japan.	
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supposedly, a distinctive characteristic of Japanese traditional culture and 
opposed to the drive of Western civilisation at controlling and using nature to 
man’s advantage. Shizen thus functioned as a powerful moral touchstone 
against the technological manipulation of death (Lock 1997). As Lock rightly 
observes, however, not all technological manipulations of nature are the same; 
some, like abortion or prenatal testing are morally unproblematic, even 
enhancing of nature (Lock 2002, 2001; cf. Norgren 2001). The mobilisation of 
nature as a moral arbitrator against brain death expressed wider social 
anxieties, which are hardly unique to Japan.  
Long shows that death in hospital is as “unnatural” to Americans as it is to 
the Japanese (Long 2001). In both countries, a “good death is that which 
happens surrounded by family in a familiar environment (“laying on the tatami” 
as the Japanese say), and which doesn’t impose any burden on others or 
cause pain to the person (Long 2003). While these concerns are largely trans-
cultural, the ways in which good death is reconfigured in practice are context-
specific, and in an era in which more and more deaths happen in a medical 
setting, the ‘naturalness’ of death comes in fact from the technological 
manipulation of its timing, cause, and modalities (Long 2001; cf. Kaufman 
2006). Long illustrates that, while Americans dread the indefinite ‘lingering’ in 
between, and put emphasis on choice, for the Japanese the most feared 
prospect is dying in a hospital bed while the family waits in the hallway (2002: 
66). If, for Americans, the natural way of dying is one free of artificial 
intervention, for the Japanese natural death is the end of a natural life. 
Emphasis isn’t put on the distinction between the human form other forms of life 
but rather on the participation and involvement of significant others (ibid.).  
Long’s argument comes with a warning against overdrawing these 
differences, yet it provides rich insight into how to understand the cultural 
construction of natural death. In particular, it shines a light on how different 
notions of personhood and relatedness inform the processes of dying. Adhering 
to local conceptions of the body are specific notions of personhood. While 
arguably the self is socially constructed everywhere, in Japan, particular 
emphasis is put on how the self comes to be negotiated through the networks of  
social relationships the person is embedded in, rather than on the ideal of the 
 86 
self as being synonymous with intimate and individual identity (Kondo 1990). 
What makes a body into a person, therefore, is neither consciousness nor the 
persistence of animation alone, but the moral investments that significant others 
have in that body. As Morioka (1989) famously argues, “brain dead bodies” are 
in fact “brain dead persons” made of networks of social relationships.  
This emphasis on relational personhood means that what a person does 
with their body is not exclusively the decision of the individual, but the person’s 
significant others are supposed to have a say in medical decisions (Lock 2000; 
cf. Kato and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2011b). As Lock (2002) notes, this cultural 
sensibility doesn’t exclude arguments of a different sort; if anything, it resonates 
and reinforces wider social concerns. The sociologist Nudeshima (1991), for 
example, argues that the opposition to brain death in relation to transplant in 
Japan was largely influenced by the paternalistic and authoritative character of 
medical practice and policy-making in the country, both of which lack 
appropriate mechanisms for promoting informed and participatory decisions. 
Against this background, as seen, patient-activists and legal experts underlined 
the risk that leaving the determination of  “the invisible death” (Nakajima 1985) 
to physicians alone could open the way to medical abuse and conflicts of 
interest over organ procurement. A similar worry underscored the concern that 
families might feel obliged to consent to donation out of a sense of 
indebtedness towards the physician, highlighting the primacy of the family’s 
obligations towards the deceased over ideals of solidarity towards strangers 
(Lock 2002). Interestingly enough, the 2009 reform of the policy on organ 
donation in Japan reinstated this notion of the collective ownership of the body 
by introducing the clause of so-called “preferred donation” (yūsen teikyō), which 
allows those who register as organ donors to indicate the will that, in case of 
their death, organs are allocated to a family member who is on the lists for a 
transplant.  
As it casts a light on the moral obligations at stake in decisions over the 
body, the Japanese critique of brain death greatly complicated the notion of the 
end of human life as a loss of brain function. From this perspective, to argue 
that brain death stripped death away from the web of social relationships that 
constitute the person would be to miss the point entirely. What the brain death 
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problem shows is that any definition of what counts as death, and therefore of 
what it means to be human, is also a negotiation of the moral and political 
worlds that the body is part of. The question then is, in what social networks 
and political economies of death the body became entangled through the 
development of organ transplantation.  
 
 
Creating Demands, Seeking Supplies 
 
In 1971, one of the preparations screened at the laboratories of Sandoz, a 
subsidiary of multinational drug company Novratis, was found to have strong  
immunosuppressant properties. Transplantation was still largely experimental, 
many centres had put a halt to cardiac transplant, and the lack of a market for 
immunosuppressants didn’t justify significant investment by Sandoz (Stahelin 
1996). It was a causal experiment that gave researchers the cue (swapping 
water with oil as a solvent) to synthesise a drug from the compound, derived 
from a Norwegian fungus and named cyclosporine. Clinical trials, and in 1983 
the commercialisation of cyclosporine, inaugurated a new generation of 
immunosuppressant drugs. This opened the way to a new era in transplantation 
medicine, one characterised by the effective mobilisation of flesh (Cohen 2005). 
Efficacious immunosuppression didn’t only enable the control of rejection 
in recipients, it also widened the pool of potential donors by rendering a perfect 
tissue match unnecessary. As the anthropologist Cohen (2003: 685) illustrates, 
it dramatically transformed the notion of operability in transplantation, meaning 
“the extent to which a person’s body is available to be incorporated into 
something or someone else given the relation between techniques (here, 
surgical and pharmaceutical techniques) and market structures”. Cohen (2001: 
21) argues that contrary to what Haraway describes as a shift from the organic 
life to code, immunosuppression reconfigured the logic of transplantation from 
one based on the recognition of biological difference to an exchange in 
substances where the code is technologically bracketed and body parts are 
made homogeneous and interchangeable with each other. Organs were made 
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detachable not only from bodies but also from persons, and with the 
concomitant development of globalisation, they entered new circuits of 
exchange, largely unregulated and shaped by profound inequalities. 
The phenomenon of organ trafficking and transplant tourism has emerged 
as a new dimension of transplantation medicine and has developed globally. A 
growing number of affluent patients have resorted to the black market to access 
scarcely available and life-saving resources. Easily reachable through the 
internet, brokers offer patients from well-off countries package tours, with 
comprehensive medical and travel expenses, including to China, India, 
Bangladesh and South-East Asia (Scheper-Hughes 2000, 2001, 2005; Cohen 
2001, 2003, 2005; Moniruzzaman 2012). At other times, they arrange for the 
journey of prospective recipients and recruited organ sellers to complicit clinics 
in third countries (Scheper-Hughes 2000, 2001). Transplant surgeons too are 
personally involved in international trafficking and domestic cases exist of 
bribery in which they have authorised living donation from unrelated ‘donors’ 
(ibid.).  
Japan is rumoured to be heavily involved in the phenomenon (Fujita, 
Slingsby and Akabayashi 2010; New York Times 2009a; Matsuno 1998), and is 
listed among the major “organ importing countries in the world” (Shimazono 
2007). The phenomenon, known in Japanese as kaigai tokō ishoku, or simply 
tokō ishoku (literally, ‘transplants overseas’) covers a range of very different 
practices (cf. Yamazaki 2007). Travel for transplantation purposes to North 
America, Europe and Australia, has become increasingly common since the 
early 1990s, and although the data are scattered, the number of reported cases 
is in the hundreds for heart transplants alone.23 Usually sponsored through 
public fundraising, these instances of tokō ishoku are commonly arranged 
between Japanese hospitals and overseas clinics relying on policies enforced 
by national organ sharing networks that regulate the allocation of organs to 
foreign patients (see Chapters 2 and 4). Alongside this practice, instances of 
proper transplant commercialism also exist, particularly between neighbouring 
Asian countries such as the Philippines and China. 
For obvious reasons, the extent of the phenomena are difficult to grasp, 
                                                
23 See Tomomatsu (2013). 
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and different forms of international mobility for transplant purposes hardly match 
neatly defined ethical guidelines, as they often blur the lines between illegal and 
extra-legal practices, exploitation and humanitarianism, body commodification 
and altruistic gifts (Cohen 2005). What is generally agreed is that the 
phenomenon has been constantly on the rise over the last decades, as a result 
of improvements in clinical management of transplants, the growing 
convenience of international travel and communication, and the spread of 
technology to countries such as India and China that specialise in the accepting 
of foreign patients (Nullis-Kapp 2004). 
These phenomena have emerged as the most controversial and visible 
arena of debate concerning the ethics of transplantation, especially after 
international organisations took an official stance on the problem. In 2008, the 
International Transplant Society issued the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ 
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, condemning the phenomenon of ‘transplant 
commercialism’, and the following year the WHO endorsed this position by 
encouraging the passing of favourable legislation to grant patients access to 
care at a local level. Through these moves, organ trafficking and transplant 
tourism, so far poorly known and even dismissed as urban legends, became the 
centre of mounting public and professional concern. The procurement of organs 
from executed prisoners in China, and the black market in kidneys from 
impoverished sellers, often coerced into exchanging an organ for money and 
left with no medical assistance after the operation, have raised troubling 
questions concerning the human rights of the ‘donors’.  
Against the background of the spread of organ trafficking, the debate is 
rife in bioethics and related disciplines about what role, if any, the market can 
be granted in the regulation of organ transplants, and proposals that only a few 
decades ago would have been radical have fully entered the public arena. For 
some, the fact that an organ market is already a reality is symptomatic of the 
urgent need for regulation, rather than prohibition. Proponents of legalised 
organ selling, as is authorised in Iran, maintain that this would be the safest way 
to protect the rights of destitute people who are ready to give away a part of 
their body for money, while it would also positively improve the availability of 
life-saving organs for the many patients in need of these therapeutic resources 
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(Radcliff-Richards et al. 1998). Without going so far, the possibility of financial 
incentives for organ donation, in the form of funeral expenses, medical 
insurance, or other compensation, is regarded as a viable and potentially useful 
strategy to encourage people to sign up as organ donors24. On the other hand, 
horror at the commodification of the body is rooted in a fundamental critique of 
contemporary capitalist society, so that the prospect of a legalised trade in 
human bodies is perceived as dreadful by most for it brings to mind “a literal 
market in the very things that Marx used as metaphors of capitalist excess” 
(Healy 2006: 5). The line of reasoning famously proposed by Titmuss (1970), 
according to which a regime of free donation fosters social solidarity and is 
therefore the fairest and most efficient model of organising exchanges in body 
products, continues to remain firm in both the specialist and popular discourse, 
although with the increased systematisation and spread of organ procurement, 
his argument on the altruistic gift appears increasingly to be an essentialised 
rather than an empirical description of the actual processes through which body 
parts are procured, processed and distributed (Healy 2006; Waldby and Mitchell 
2006; Yamazaki 2011a, 2011b).  
If Titmuss’ argument on the altruistic gift has been one of social sciences’ 
most successful contributions to the public discourse, anthropologists’ analyses 
of transplant tourism and traffic have been no less influential. Scheper-Hughes, 
who most famously called attention to the practice of organ buying and selling 
and collaborated on the drafting of the Declaration of Istanbul, has been 
amongst the most outspoken critics of the logic of body commodification that, 
as she sees it, underscores contemporary transplantation (2005). Scheper-
Hughes maintains that if the majority of arguments advanced in the debate on 
organ transplants draw the line between market relations and free gifts, from an 
anthropological point of view the problem arises when a person identifies in 
another human being a body as a resource for potentially life-saving recourses 
(2005: 161). The development of transplantation, she thus argues, has brought 
about new “medically ‘incited’ tastes for human bodies, living and dead, for the 
                                                
24 Similar proposals are considered, for example, in the report by Nuffield Council on Bioethics  
(2011) ‘Human bodies: donation for medicine and research’ by a team of experts including 
anthropologist Merylin Strathern. The report concluded that financial incentives, such as the 
payment of funeral expenses by the NHS, coud be viable strategies to tackle the current 
shortage of organs for transplants in the UK. 
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skin and bones, flesh and blood, tissues, marrow and genetic material of the 
‘other’” (Shceper Hughes 2001: 54). This, in turn, has reconfigured the very 
relationship with the ‘other’. What Scheper-Hughes calls the “fetishisation of life” 
itself (Scheper Hughes 2000: 2011) narrows down the bioethical focus from the 
consideration of the dignity of the body as a person to a concern on how best to 
procure body parts.  
Hamdy (2012), on the other hand, illustrates through her ethnography of 
transplants in Egypt, that once body parts are effectively circulated as desirable 
things, ethical reasoning can only leave room for the question of what principles 
we can afford, against the complexity of the socio-economic forces and human 
relationships. What is more, these are never defined as fixed categories, as 
Cohen (2005) beautifully illustrates in his ethnography of organ selling in India. 
On the one hand, Cohen argues that the suppression of biological differences 
by means of anti-rejection drugs marks the shift from human life to bare life not 
just by making organs into comparable objects, but in the original sense of 
Agamben’s bare life as that in which death is not recognised as a sacrifice 
(ibid.). It is this logic, Cohen argues, that underscores the preference for 
compensated sellers over the possibility of putting a loved one at risk through 
living-related donation (ibid.). On the other hand, the act of selling a kidney is 
tangled up in a political economy of love in which giving up on a part of oneself 
to financially contribute to the wellbeing of one’s family becomes a way to 
reappropriate one’s role as a social persona in conditions of extreme 
marginality (ibid.).   
These ethnographies show how, even when commodified and reduced to 
bare life, the body is never just a thing (cf. Schepher Hughes 2005). It always 
sits at the nexus of economic forces, and moral obligations and social 
relationships that biotechnological intervention doesn’t stand in opposition to, 
but rather becomes entangled with. It is no surprise that this powerful 
anthropological critique stems from an analysis of the organ market, for this is 
an arena where the reconfiguration of life in relation to transplantation is 
brought into question in particularly problematic ways. However, it is not the 
only one.  
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 A Camel Through the Eye of a Needle 
 
In 1997, the Japanese Diet passed the Act on Organ Transplants (zōki ishoku 
ni kansuru hōritsu) that legalised organ procurement from the brain dead. The 
law came about as a way out of the impasse in which transplantation medicine 
had been caught for almost thirty years since the Wada scandal. As the country 
was grappling with the brain death problem, the development of transplantation 
medicine worldwide made it increasingly compelling to authorise organ donation 
in order to make available this life-saving treatment within the national health-
care system. The question was how to authorise the lawful procurement of 
organs from brain dead patients without giving a statutory definition of death 
that would equate it with such a contested diagnosis.  
The Japanese law stipulated that the diagnosis of brain death was to be 
taken as equivalent to human death only in cases of organ donation. The 
national policy on organ donation and transplants, therefore, set up a so-called 
system of opting in, under which only patients who have explicitly given consent 
for their organs to be procured are eligible as donors.25 Different from the 
equivalent international policies however, the Japanese law prescribed that 
patient’s written consent was mandatory not only to authorise organ donation, 
but also to pronounce the person deceased on the basis of a diagnosis of brain 
death. In this way, upon signing a donor card, patients were given the option of 
choosing their own definition of death, and deciding whether to be taken off 
artificial life support after the neurological diagnosis or following cardiac arrest 
(see Lock 2002: 185-190). Furthermore, the family was given the right to 
overturn the patient’s decision. Under this particularly strict policy, organ 
donation from brain dead patients continued to remain very rare. What is more, 
because the donor card assumed a legal value to determine the person’s will 
concerning end-of-life care, patients younger than fifteen were automatically 
ruled out as potential donors because they were under the age limit to express 
                                                
25 The opposite system of so-called presumed consent, or opt-out, stipulates instead that all 
patients who meet the clinical standard of brain death are potential donors, and family consent 
is sufficient for organ donation. After the reform of the law on transplants in 2009, organ 
donation in Japan is currently regulated according to an opt-out system of consent (see Chapter 
5)  
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valid legal consent. As a consequence of this clause, paediatric transplantation, 
particularly heart transplantation that can be carried out only from brain dead 
donors, became virtually impracticable, as organs procured from adult patients 
cannot be transplanted into children under a certain body weight.  
While in this respect, the Japanese case is singular, scarcity is hardly a 
problem peculiar to Japan. The perfected therapeutic efficacy and increased 
availability of organs consequent upon developments in immunosuppression 
have made them into scarce goods (Koch 2001). The commercialisation of 
cyclosporine brought a phase of unprecedented expansion of transplantation.  
Even though in the public discourse, organ transplantation is still commonly 
depicted as a miracle, it is one routinely happening. Approximately 100,900 
transplants are performed worldwide each year (GODT 2010), not including 
those carried out clandestinely. While it arguably remains a resource-intense 
and clinically uncertain option, transplantation is nowadays commonly on offer 
and amply invested in, at least within healthcare systems oriented towards high-
end technologies. These developments, together with the creation of 
specialised agencies and international cooperation schemes, have resulted in 
an expansion of waiting lists, including new pathologies treatable with a 
transplant and relaxing the criteria for patients’ eligibility (see Scheper-Hughes 
2005). Between 1988 and 1991, for example, the number of patients on the 
waiting list in the U.S.A. grew by 55%, while donations only increased by 16% 
(Arnold and Youngner 1993). The ‘supply’, it seems, has never been able to 
meet the ‘demand’, and scarcity has emerged as the dominating framework in 
which transplant medicine operates. Organs, it seems, became scarce when 
they became available, routinely and effectively procurable.  
Scarcity has thus emerged as a new problem that this field of medicine is 
confronted with, and as the dominant framework of debate within which 
practically every aspect of organ transplantation has been discussed. Alongside 
the already mentioned debate over the effects of the regime of donation vs. 
possible financial incentives on the shortage of organs, clinical practice has 
emerged as the other relevant site of discussion. Much less visible in the public 
arena than the sensational phenomenon of organ trafficking, the legal 
procurement of organs is equally, if not more, controversial. Schemes to 
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promote efficiency in organs procurement, such as the Donor Action 
Programme adopted in Spain, are among the strategies to tackle organ scarcity 
in practice. The prompt identification of potential donors, the effective request of 
consent from the family and clinical protocols especially devised to preserve 
organ functions have guiding principles that transplant coordinators are trained 
in and try to implement on the ground. Without going to the lengths of 
introducing the buying and selling of organs, some argue, the systematisation of 
organ procurement, distribution, and allocation has brought about a shift from 
the cure of the person to the focus on body parts, and already requires and 
involves taking “distinct, particular, incommensurable gifts and processing them 
into general, homogeneous, comparable items” (Healy 2010: 123; Fox and 
Swazey 1992; cf. Hogle 1995). 
At the same time, the definition of death again became a matter of debate. 
In 1993 the Pittsburgh protocol approved non-heart beating donation from 
patients who had died of cardiopulmonary arrest in a medically controlled way. 
Departing from the traditional procedure for kidney and cornea procurement 
from non-heart beating patients, the new protocol required the withdrawal or 
withholding of life-support treatment in the function of organ donation. By 
reducing the time between the moment when the patient is weaned off 
ventilation and the retrieval of organs, and by intervening to pre-treat the donor 
while he/she is still alive (Lock 200), the protocol enables the procurement of 
organs, including the heart, from non-heart beating patients at a time when they 
are still viable for transplantation purposes. Bioethicists and social scientists 
engaged in the debate on transplantation severely criticised the practice, and 
Fox (1993) even called it an “ignoble form of cannibalism”.  As they pointed out, 
the Pittsburgh protocol, and those that followed, authorise organ retrieval at a 
moment when death is still technically reversible and is determined only by the 
decision not to resuscitate. In this way, the ethical principle that the patient must 
be dead at the time of donation is subtly reverted, legitimising the possibility of 
letting the person die for the sake of procuring organs (Arnold and Younger 
1993).26  
                                                
26 The practice is not in use in Japan. Unless differently specified, therefore, any mention of 
non-heart-beating donation in the context of Japan must be intended as referring to the 
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While NHBD raised new polemics, the redefinition of death as brain death, 
which was largely considered a settled question in bioethics, again became a 
matter of controversy. Improved ICU care made it possible to sustain brain dead 
bodies for longer times, while at the same time, further research into the 
physiology of brain death, which ironically enough was aimed at perfecting 
organ preservation, showed that patients who met the clinical standard of brain 
death, in fact retained some brain function. On the basis of these clinical 
findings, Halevy and Brodey (1993) famously contested the redefinition of death 
as brain death, pointing to the logical inconsistency between the underling 
concept of death (that the brain is the integrative centre of the organism and its 
death can therefore be equated with point of no return of organic death), the 
standard of whole brain death (that defines it as the loss of all brain functions), 
and clinical tests to determine the condition. Neurologist and paediatrician 
Shewomon, one of the most vociferous detractors of the concept of brain death, 
made a similar critique. Reviewing data from a number of brain dead patients 
maintained on artificial ventilation, including cases form Japan, he famously 
contested the self-fulfilling character of the diagnosis of brain death (Shewomon 
1998a). While the prognosis of imminent cardiac arrest was built into the 
foundation of the definition of death as human death, Shewomon indicated that 
one of the patients had met this criterion, but, when treatment was continued, 
some had survived for up to one year or more (ibid.). Shewomon went a step 
further in his critique, and argued that the death of the organism that in some 
cases follows the death of the brain is not necessarily attributable to head 
trauma but results from the interrelated effects of brain trauma on multiple 
systems in the body, particularly cardiac function (Shewmon 1998a, 1998b, 
2001). 
The reopening of the controversy even caused a transatlantic split over 
brain death (Widjickis 2012). In America, new clinical findings attesting the 
persistence of brain activity in brain dead patients promoted a refinement of the 
concept of ‘whole brain death’, defined as loss of all functions (Bernat 1998; cf. 
                                                                                                                                          
traditional protocol of organ procurement after cardiac arrest. Under this regulation, an interval 
of several minutes is allowed between the determination of cardiac arrest and the retrieval of 
organs in order to exclude the possibility that heart functions could be recovered if the patient 
was reanimated. The practice, therefore, makes it possible to procure only kidneys and 
corneas.  
 96 
Halevy and Brodey 1993). The UK, on the other hand, abandoned the concept 
of ‘whole brain death’ altogether in favour of the criterion of ‘brain stem death’, 
which stipulates that the loss of brain-stem functions alone are sufficient to 
determine brain death in an anatomically more accurate way (Pallis 1996).27 
 However formulated, the concept of brain death remained confused in 
practice. Years of clinical experience with protocols for the determination of 
brain death and organ procurement revealed that even among medical 
professionals, the new criterion of death was in fact poorly understood on a 
conceptual level and inconsistently applied in practice (Youngner et al. 1989; 
Truog 1997). The debate led many to advocate a new redefinition of death, 
although it was not clear according to which criteria. Some regarded the 
concept of upper brain death (indicative of the permanent loss of 
consciousness) to be logically more consistent (Gervais 1986; Veatch 1989), 
others proposed to return to the traditional criteria of cardio-pulmonary arrest 
and to abandon the dead donor rule, which prescribed that the patient must be 
already dead at the time when organs are procured.28 This, in turn, would have 
enabled the expansion of the pool of potential donors to include, for example, 
patients in a persistent vegetative state and terminal patients who consent to 
treatment withdrawal. In practice, however, concerns remained about the 
possibility that these changes, which in theory would have expanded the 
availability of organs, might turn out to have a negative impact on the enterprise 
of organ procurement, which rests largely on public consensus towards the 
ideal that organs are donated by the dead.  
The rekindling of the debate over brain death revealed how the redefinition 
of human death on neurological criteria, which had first enabled the mobilisation 
of ‘bare life’ in the form of transplantable organs (Agamben 1998), had also 
come to constrain organ procurement on a large scale. The definition of brain 
death as human death, which arguably facilitated the public acceptance and 
professional regulation of organ donation, also enshrined the ‘dead donor rule’ 
in legal jurisdictions and ethical guidelines. As it turned out, however, patients 
                                                27	For a detailed overview of the unfolding debate see Youngner et al. (1999).  
28 See Fox (2003) and other contributions to the special issue of the American Journal of 
Bioethics about the debate over death and the dead donor rule, indicatively titled ‘Can We 
Pause?’	
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who clinically qualify for organ donation and meet the strict standard of 
accepted death are not as many as those on the waiting list for organs. Against 
this background, new strategies to promote efficiency in organ procurement 
seem caught between the opposite needs of pushing further the limits that 
constrain donation, while carefully keeping in place the boundaries that define 
the ethics of the enterprise of organ transplantation.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Like in the motto of ‘ishoku iryō suishin suru’ (developing transplantation medicine), 
the idea of ‘development’ in the field of organ transplants is nowadays commonly 
associated with the effort to move forward in the enterprise of saving lives through this 
technology and reducing the gap between organ demand and supply. Scarcity is, in this 
perspective, the problem to solve, the indication that the technology is not working as 
well as it could.  
The historical development of organ transplants, however, reveals how scarcity is built 
into the way in which the technology has assembled. From this angle, the chapter has 
shown how organ transplants came together as a heterogeneous assemblage of 
contingent but unrelated processes neither of which was entirely casual nor casual 
(Schilch 2010). Underpinning this unstable and contingent assemblage is its strategic 
function in responding to certain urgencies and needs (cf. Agamben 2009). The clinical 
success of modern transplants, on the wave of new immunosuppressant drugs and 
systems for organ sharing, meant that at the very junction when organs became 
systematically and effectively procurable they were turned into scarce resources in short 
supply. Commonly seen as the margin of malfunctioning of transplant medicine, 
scarcity is thus indicative of the rationale that underpins this technology, of the 
relationships that are at work in stabilising this contingent assemblage.   
Cast in this perspective, the case of Japan, the industrialised country with one of the 
lowest rate of cadaveric organ donation, is not an anomaly but an extreme instantiation 
of a problem so intrinsic to this technology. Nowadays, scarcity is the dominant 
framework within which the enterprise of transplantation is conceived and driven. The 
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rationale of organ sharing management is one that places emphasis on the intense 
procurement and efficient distribution of recourses, the containment of waste, and the 
push to near demands that are never fully met. In practice, this means trickle with the 
definitions of life and death as to push forward the boundaries constraining the pool of 
potential donors. Yet at the same time, the drive to procure ever more organs also 
require to safely guard and polish such boundaries in order to avoid breaking the 
consensus towards the social worth of such enterprise.  
At stake in the negotiation of these tensions are questions concerning individual and 
collective life. Whose lives can be let go of and whose need be saved at any costs? 
Whose rights need be prioritised? Who partakes in someone else’s biological life? And 
who get to decide? The following chapters analyse how these questions have been dealt 
with in a context of extreme scarcity as contemporary Japan, and starts with a 
particularly critical manifestation of such scarcity: the experience of patients who found 
themselves needing a transplant that was not available in their country.  
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TWO 
 
Kaigai Tokō Ishoku 
 
Hope and Uncertainty in Clinical Decisions about 
Saving Lives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eventually, we’re all going to die and lose someone we love. I just 
happened to experience it earlier than most people. 
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
 
After discussing the concept of scarcity in the previous chapter, I explore 
here its most immediate and urgent instantiation: the experience of patients and 
their families as they seek care and ponder treatment options. 
As I have illustrated above, since the late 1980s-early 1990s Japan has 
seen the emergence of kaigai tokō ishoku (travels overseas for transplantation 
purposes) as a major route though which transplant candidates pursue 
treatment abroad, either by engaging in organ buying and selling in South East 
Asian countries or by getting on the lists for the operation in North America and 
Europe. In this chapter, I take a closer look at one particular form of this 
phenomenon which has become increasingly popular in Japan: the travels 
overseas for paediatric transplant. 
Frequently reported in Japanese media, the cases of young patients 
seeking care abroad are relatively unknown outside of Japan. The phenomenon 
is conspicuous by its absence in social science, with the only exceptions of 
Yamazaki (2007) and Tomomatsu (2013). Building on their analyses, the 
discussion below maps the yet largely unknown routes of Japanese patients’ 
mobility, while also contributing fresh anthropological insights on the experience 
of the people engaging in it. 
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Through the dilemmas of five families pondering the decision of whether to 
list their children for a transplant, the chapter illustrates the moral economy 
underpinning the heroic use of high-end technology to ‘save life’ on the brink of 
death. Framed as stories that are about choices, the experiences of these 
families sit at the intersection of different technologically informed forces. On the 
one hand, the therapeutic expectations of the transplant push people to invest 
on uncertain promises in the face of high risks. On the other hand, the very 
framework of choice is forced upon people by the technological possibility of 
prolonging and sustaining terminal conditions.   
To explore how people navigate these decisions, I draw on parents’ 
narratives. I weave together the narratives of the five families and complement 
them with excerpts from interviews with other patients to construct a narration 
that reflects the ways people presented their stories to me. The emotionally 
charged style of the narration and the emphasis on seemingly contingent 
events that turned into decisive turning points are the narrative strategies 
through which people highlight key passages in their stories. I construct the 
ethnography around these pivotal moments, where decisions are made and 
events occur that can potentially lead the story down radically different paths, 
and remain close to the style and structure of the narratives as they were 
presented to me. In doing so, I do not use the narratives to question the factual 
truthfulness of events, but draw on them to introduce the reader to the 
overwhelming sense of uncertainty, resolution and hopefulness that they 
convey. The stories illustrate the moral and affective investments that the 
technology engenders and how these define critical cases as lives that need to 
be saved. From this perspective, the chapter can also be read as a counter part 
to Chapter 6.   
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“It Was Not a Common Disease” 
 
One day in October 2008, Arai Yoshinori, a salaryman in his late thirties, took 
his daughter Kaoru for a routine visit to the children's clinic near their home in 
an elegant West Tokyo residential neighbourhood. Listening to the girl’s heart, 
the physician found something strange. “It’s most probably nothing,” he 
reassured them, “but you might want to go and see a specialist at the nearby 
hospital.” They thus drove to Hospital S, a well-known institute for cardiac 
disease some twenty minutes away from their home. There, a paediatric 
cardiologist gave Kaoru a closer examination, including an ECHO test. This 
showed that her heart was over dilated, a condition that was weakening its 
ability to contract and pump blood throughout the body. This is known as 
Dilated Cardiomyopathy (DCM).  
Upon returning home that night, Arai-san told his wife about the diagnosis, 
and together they searched on-line for more information. That first consultation 
with the doctor had left Arai-san with quite a few doubts, but it didn’t take much 
research to understand that DCM “was not a common disease (futsū no byōki ja 
nai): it was not one of those diseases you occasionally hear someone has.” 
Surfing on-line, they read that the prognosis was very poor and until recently 
most patients died within few years of the symptoms' appearance. The 
physician told him that drugs were available to slow down the disease's 
progression, but treatment was merely symptomatic and could not reverse the 
disease process. If this was to progress too far, Arai-san read on-line, a heart 
transplant would be the only treatment option.  
The day after, Arai-san was back at the hospital. “I wanted to ask again, 
one more time. It was all too confusing. Too far from everything we knew.” The 
doctor confirmed what Arai-san had read, and further discussed the information 
about the drug treatment and explained any possibility of stabilising the 
condition really depended on the patient’s responsiveness and varied from case 
to case.  
Kaoru was put on medication and the family returned home. By small 
degrees, the girl’s life began to change. A few weeks into the therapy, she 
started to feel unwell, and was told to limit physical activity; so she had to quit 
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ballet and her parents proposed that she take piano lessons instead, but this 
soon became too physically demanding. At first she skipped PE classes, and 
then started to miss school more and more often, and soon rarely left the 
house. 
A couple of months after their first hospital visit, taking advantage of the 
Christmas break, the family booked some days at a hot springs spa in order to 
spend some time together. One morning, as it was getting late and the kids 
were sleeping in, Arai-san went to wake up Kaoru and her brother. He found the 
girl could barely move, and leaving behind his wife and son, he quickly got on 
the first bullet train to Tokyo and took Kaoru straight to Hospital S. The doctors 
found that the girl’s condition had further deteriorated, but they discharged her 
for the night and told them to return the following day, when their attending 
physician would be on shift. The rest of the family had returned home as well, 
so the day after Arai-san went to work and his wife took Kaoru to the hospital for 
what he thought would be just a visit like the others. This time doctors decided 
instead to hospitalise the girl.  
The physician told the family that Kaoru would probably be able to return 
home in a few weeks time, but by mid-January her condition had further 
deteriorated and it became evident that the drug therapy was proving 
ineffective. The Arais were told it was necessary to change protocol and they 
would be referred to a bigger hospital, and on this occasion they first heard 
about another girl, who had been treated at Hospital S for a similar condition 
and later received a transplant in the U.S.A. Her name was Sato Aya, she lived 
in their neighbourhood, and had been roughly the same age as Kaoru when she 
arrived at Hospital S. 
The story of Aya’s transplant began with a case of pneumonia. In the 
spring of 2006, a few kids from her school fell ill, but Aya seemed to be taking 
too long to recover and so her parents, Sayaka and Junatro, took her to their 
local physician for a visit. The doctor found traces of blood in her urine sample 
and referred the Satos to a hospital for further tests. Sayaka and Junatro 
booked a visit to a medical centre near their place of work, in central Tokyo, 
“without giving it much thought: we just assumed it was nothing.” At the hospital, 
Aya was seen by various specialists, including a cardiologist who detected a 
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problem with her heart. The doctor mentioned a few possible diagnoses, but 
eventually referred them to Hospital S for a more comprehensive examination.  
 “At this stage, I though it must be a misdiagnosis. I though it was just not 
possible.” Bounced from one specialist to the next for further exams, Sayaka 
and Juntaro began to get the feeling the situation was serious. At the time, 
Sayaka said, they were in denial. They looked on-line for information about the 
diseases the doctor had mentioned and a few days later they were at Hospital S 
once again. The physician who saw Aya was unable to give them a diagnosis 
and asked them to return in a few days, when the results of the tests would be 
ready. In hindsight, Sayaka read her meeting with the doctor at Hospital S in a 
way she could have not imagined at the time: “I think the doctor recognised 
soon what it was. But he didn’t want to tell us on that first visit because it’d have 
been too shocking.” 
When the tests were finally ready, they confirmed a diagnosis of 
Restrictive Cardiomyopathy (RCM). Like for DCM, the treatment for RCM can 
only slow down the disease's progress, which in paediatric patients can be 
extremely unpredictable and can rapidly turn from a condition of stability to 
terminal heart failure. The only therapeutic option would have been a cardiac 
transplant, but the Satos were informed that this was not available in Japan. 
Sayaka described how she gradually almost stopped hearing what the doctor 
was saying and she just heard that the only thing left to wonder was how much 
time they had left: “The message I got was that we had no more than six 
months, maybe one year. The only way [to save her] would have been a 
transplant, but they didn’t do it in Japan. The main shock was the prognosis of 
one year.” 
 
 
“We Had to Do it Our Own Way” 
 
When they were finally given the diagnosis, the Satos were told that because of 
the poor donation rate and the legal clause on cadaveric organ donation, heart 
transplantation was not a practicable solution in Japan, although clinically 
speaking it would be the best treatment. If they wanted to go ahead with it, they 
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would have to go abroad, but Hospital S had no connections with overseas 
clinics to refer them to.  
If the Satos wanted to pursue a transplant overseas, they had first to find a 
bridge doctor, someone who has contacts abroad to arrange for the girl to be 
accepted by a transplant programme overseas, a decision that ultimately rested 
on the hospital committee. Secondly, and no less importantly, they had to find 
the money to pay for the medical expenses, as Japanese insurance 
programmes don’t cover the cost of care received abroad. To this, they had to 
add the cost of travel and stay in the country, a total of as much as several 
hundred thousand pounds (GBP). A considerable potion of this, depending on 
the directives of the overseas hospital, had to be paid in advance in order be 
granted a medical visa.  
To Sayaka, who until a few days before had been clinging to the possibility 
of a misdiagnosis, the situation seemed overwhelming. “It was like being 
abandoned. To me, it was like being abandoned.” Not only were they faced with 
the sudden news of their daughter’s life-threatening condition, but for the first 
time they were in a position where they could not rely on the very system that 
was supposed to deliver the care they needed. “There was no real way visible 
to us,” Sayaka told me, “they told us that a transplant was the only solution, but 
we might have to go abroad, as it was not available in Japan, but they didn’t 
even know to which country!” 
While the option of the transplant was broken suddenly to the Satos, in 
contrast it was Nakajima-san herself who proposed it to her physician. Nakajima 
Mariko was in her late thirties when she had her third baby, Takeshi, a son after 
two daughters. After a pregnancy free of complications, at the moment she 
gave birth Mariko, she was told that the baby was unlikely to survive. As it 
turned out, the child suffered from a rare heart condition, known as single 
ventricle (SV). This could have been revealed though a pre-natal test that, 
however, was not routinely performed on low-risk pregnant mothers, and had 
therefore gone undetected until the child was born.  
Soon after the delivery, the doctors told Mariko that the baby had been put 
on life-support and was in immediate danger of dying. Mariko remembered that 
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the doctor began listing a series of complications that the boy had which she 
could hardly count, let alone understand.  
Takeshi was eventually moved to a hospital better equipped to treat his 
condition. At the age of two months, he underwent his first heart surgery and 
spent the next two months in an intensive care unit where Mariko could visit him 
for fifteen minutes per day. His second intervention took place when he was two 
and a half years old. This time, the doctors said it was a success.  
Not too long after the second surgery, Mariko’s father died. At the funeral, 
some family and friends noted that Takeshi didn’t touch any food and looked 
very weak. They thought he might be distressed, but nonetheless spoke to 
Mariko about the child. The day after the funeral, Mariko and Takeshi were at 
the hospital for a post-operative visit that had been scheduled months before; a 
good occasion, Mariko thought, to have Takeshi checked. To the surprise of 
their attending physician, Takeshi’s condition had deteriorated very rapidly and 
the boy had entered the stage of acute heart failure. 
Takeshi was soon hospitalised and put on life-support. “But I didn’t give 
up”, Mariko told me, knowing in hindsight that there was still quite a lot to come. 
It was at this time, she said, that she remembered a fellow patient, a baby girl 
who was also treated for a heart condition at the same hospital. The last time 
they had met, while Takeshi was recovering from his second intervention, the 
girl was about to leave for the U.S.A. for a transplant.  
 
I thought of it myself; it was not the doctors who brought it up. I knew 
this patient; she had written me a letter just a few weeks before 
Takeshi got ill to say she had come back from the States. For her it 
was the first heart surgery, while my son had already had two 
operations, so I was afraid it might not work out well for him. But I 
knew Takeshi wanted to live, so I decided I had to do everything that 
was possible to help him.  
(Nakajima Mariko) 
 
Nakajima-san talked about the transplant with her doctors. The local hospital 
couldn’t arrange to get Takeshi listed for a transplant overseas, but they offered 
to help her make contact with bigger medical centres that could have the right 
connections. This channel gave no results, and so Mariko directly contacted the 
mother of the baby girl, who gave her the name of Maeda-sensei, from Hospital 
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J in Tokyo. Mariko’s physician helped her get in touch and arrange a visit. This 
was September 2007; three months later Mariko and Takeshi left for the U.S.A. 
As for the Satos, after their last visit to Hospital S, they started to look 
outside for help. At first, Juntaro contacted the JOTNW, but it proved a useless 
attempt, as the agency only deals with national transplants and, given the 
conditions, there was no chance Aya could receive a heart in Japan. The Satos 
contacted various patients’ organisations with similar results. Finally, they 
booked an appointment with Ashida-san from the Network of International 
Transplantation (NIT) Japan, an association they first heard about from their 
physician at Hospital S.  
 
And so we went to Ashida-san. At the time we still didn’t know which 
doctor to ask or so. Actually, we didn’t even know that sending these 
kids abroad is the private effort, so to speak, of individual doctors. It 
was when we went to NIT that we were presented with the doctors. 
The choice was basically between Hospital J [with Maeda-sensei] 
and Endo-sensei. Soon after that meeting at NIT, we had the chance 
to know Endo-sensei in person. We also went to Hospital Q. We 
talked to Kitaguchi-sensei too, but we decided not to meet Maeda-
sensei because my husband didn’t want to remain in Japan [while 
Aya and I went to the U.S.A.] and that’s what Maeda-sensei is known 
to advise his patients to do.  
(Sato Sayaka) 
 
Sayaka and Mariko’s stories are revealing of a first important aspect of 
the tokō ishoku: the fact that it is arranged through a “process of 
subsumption to the health care system through derogation from it” 
(Yamazaki 2007: 196; emphasis in the original). Commenting on this, 
Yamazaki argues that candidates have to reassess their role as recipients of 
health care and to resort to autonomously looking for ways to access 
treatments that are not on offer, and therefore highlights the element of 
contingency (gūzen) in the dynamics of seeking care (ibid.). Reynolds Whyte 
et al. (2013) describe similar dynamics in the ways people negotiate access 
to AIDS care in Uganda through networks of personal connections and 
influence, drawing a picture in which contingency becomes almost 
synonymous with precariousness. Certainly, for as many patients who 
manage to get to the U.S.A. and come back with a new organ, there are as 
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many who cannot even make it into Maeda-sensei's consultation room or to 
the office of NIT Japan, and for whom a transplant never even presents itself 
as a possibility. In the case of tokō ishoku, however, contingency can be 
looked at from various angles, and, as I show below, patients’ capacity to 
move between different nation states, jurisdictions, and health care systems 
can maximise their chances of obtaining fast and safe care (cf. Chapter 3). 
In this sense, contingency cannot mask the fact that the networks that 
people rely on in becoming tokō ishoku recipients are in fact highly 
systematised.  
What I want to highlight here, however, is another aspect of the 
problem. As will become clearer through the ethnographic data, the 
contingent nature of the process of treatment seeking is strongly 
emphasised in the patients' narratives. Being admitted to a certain hospital, 
knowing a certain patient, being referred to a certain association, attending 
the right meeting at the right time, are all moments described as both 
accidental and crucial in the realisation of one’s treatment options. From the 
patients’ perspective, at least during the process of seeking care, 
contingency results in a life-threatening precariousness, and further 
exacerbates the already uncertain nature of the clinical path.  
 
 
“The Private Effort of Single Doctors” 
 
It emerges from Mariko and Sayaka's experiences, that it is individual surgeons 
and physicians who negotiate patients’ access to the waiting lists for an 
overseas transplant. They are the key subjects in the tokō ishoku system, and 
several of them worked as mediators in the majority of cases I came to know 
about.  
Kimura-sensei is one of these mediators. He is also an international star 
whose notoriety is telling of the special charisma that surgeons have (and 
transplant surgeons in particular after Barnard) as pioneers at the forefront of 
the enterprise of saving lives (Fox and Swazey 1978). After graduating from 
Osaka medical school, Kimura-sensei moved to the United States on a 
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fellowship in transplantation, and went on to have a brilliant career in some of 
the most renowned centres in the country. As even a quick search on Google 
will reveal, Kimura-sensei is a world-leading figure in liver and intestinal 
transplantation. He has performed never before attempted multiple organ 
transplants and experiments on how to translate transplantation techniques to 
a variety of clinical problems that are not traditionally treated through organ 
transfer.29 His work has earned him worldwide notoriety. He has a Wikipedia30 
page that notes, “he is author or co-author of more than 180 scientific papers”, 
but his popular fame might even outgrow the academic one. From YouTube to 
the New York Times (2009b), from the American television channel ABC to 
Japan’s NHK, the story of this Japanese surgeon has fascinated the 
international media. The most recent case is a manga31 based on a popular 
book he wrote about his job, in which he features as an attractive and idealistic 
young doctor nicknamed “Guy” to refer to the fact that he went abroad (kaigai 
tokō, as in kaigai tokō ishoku).  
Another Japanese surgeon who went abroad is Dr. Kitaguchi. He 
considers himself a self-made man, and his choice to leave Japan fits his 
daring ethos. He told me he had wanted to be a cardiac surgeon since he was 
young and lost his sister to heart disease. Unsatisfied with the nepotistic 
Japanese medical world, he left to try his luck abroad. Soon after graduating he 
moved to Germany for a fellowship and ended up staying more than thirty 
years. He was trained as a cardiac surgeon there, married a German woman, 
and spent most of his career at a well-known university hospital. Their 
transplant programme dates back to the 1980s, when only very few centres 
worldwide were performing such interventions, and over the years it developed 
a high volume of patients from various countries. Thanks to Kitaguchi-sensei 
and his contacts in Japan, such as Ashida-san, many Japanese patients have 
been treated there too, the last one not long before my fieldwork. 
Meanwhile, in 2005, Kitaguchi-sensei had moved back to Japan with the 
dream of setting up a heart transplant programme at a famous university 
                                                29	One such example involved the en-bloc transplant of organs in order to intervene in tumours 
that would be inoperable within the body. 
30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomoaki_Kato 
31 GUY: 24 hours in the transplant unit (Andō and Kato, 2012). 
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hospital in Tokyo. The project was aborted when, he told me, the dean 
changed. Kitaguchi-sensei privately funded his own association for the 
promotion of transplantation in Japan, through which he regularly organises 
promotional and educational events. He also writes books about his profession, 
and generally seems to enjoy the contact with the public and with the patients 
he took to Germany, who have regularly kept in touch over the years. After the 
missed opportunity with the university hospital, he was appointed as head of 
the cardiovascular centre at an important hospital in an inner region of Japan. 
The hospital, however, is not listed as a transplant centre by the Ministry of 
Health Labour and Welfare (MHLW) and so Kitaguchi-sensei has in fact 
stopped doing transplants since he has  returned to Japan.  
Endo-sensei works instead at one of the Japanese transplant centres 
known to be traditionally more proactive, Hospital H, second in the country for 
the number operations performed. He is one of the best-known figures in the 
field of paediatric cardiology in Japan and, together with Maeda-sensei, is 
considered the contact that can provide the fastest way to get on the American 
waiting lists for a new heart because of his good connections with hospital R in 
the U.S.A., a world leading centre with a pioneering history in infant cardiac 
transplants.  
His interest in transplantation started, he told me, when he was an 
elementary school student and heard about the Wada case in the news. 
Without being able to grasp what he now judges as serious ethical problems, 
he was struck by the news of what seemed almost like sci-fi medicine. In the 
early 1990s, he spent two years at Hospital R specialising in paediatric heart 
transplantation and researching xenotransplantation, which he is convinced 
could spell the end to the problem of organ shortage if only surgeons were free 
to experiment with it more consistently. Endo-sensei is clear, however, about 
the fact that he didn’t go to the States to “learn” transplantation and take it back 
to Japan, his aim instead was developing “transplantation Japanese style.” As 
part of this plan, soon after he returned from the U.S.A. Endo-sensei actively 
engaged in lobbying the government to legalise brain death in the country, but 
this is another story (see Chapter 5). 
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While he was still in the U.S.A. and cardiac transplantation was still 
unavailable in Japan, a patient from his hospital, Hospital H, became the first 
Japanese candidate to travel to America for organs. Once back in Japan, it 
was Dr. Endo himself who started to arrange to send his patients overseas. He 
still remembers the exact date when the first of his tokō ishoku patients 
received his transplant, and after more than ten years it is still a tradition for the 
two of them to compete together at the badminton tournament of the annual 
Transplant Games. 
Maeda-sensei, however, is rarely seen at such events. He is famous for 
being quite a reserved man, even a little strict, and even the patients who have 
been under his care for years speak of him with a mixture of affection and 
reverence. Every year, he runs a public transplantation seminar, which has 
become a traditional occasion for his patients to meet up.  
 Maeda-sensei is not a surgeon but a physician. He is based at Hospital 
J, in Tokyo. In the early 1990s, he had just taken up the position, upon 
returning from a fellowship in the U.S.A., when he met Nagahisa Mika and his 
parents. Mika was treated at Hospital J for DCM, the same disease her older 
brother had died of. She was already in a serious condition when she was 
transferred from her hometown's smaller hospital to Maeda-sensei's centre. 
Even there, however, there was little they could do to help her. Maeda-sensei 
thus brought up the possibility of sending her to America. There had already 
been a couple of patients who had travelled overseas for transplants. Maeda-
sensei, however, had no experience of doing such a thing, and although he 
could count on the support of his boss at Hospital J, he was only at the 
beginning of his career. To make things more complicated, Mika’s condition 
was not promising.  
“My mum and my family asked Maeda-sensei what my chances of 
recovery were if I went to America [and received the transplant]. At that 
question, he just looked down at the floor. He couldn’t reply. He couldn’t even 
advise my parents about how much luggage they needed to prepare.” Mika, 
just seven at the time, was not fully aware of the risks involved. Her parents 
later told her that Maeda-sensei himself couldn’t tell how long they would have 
to stay in the country; months if she was lucky enough to have to go through 
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post-operative rehabilitation, or just a few days if she got worse on the journey 
and a donor didn’t become available soon. “We really fumbled our way through 
until the end (zutto tesagari). Me, my doctor, and all the people involved.” 
This brief introduction to some of the most prominent surgeons and 
physicians in the field of tokō ishoku provides an initial picture of the networks 
that give shape to transplant patients’ mobility across international borders. At 
the same time, the life trajectories of these medical professionals offer 
glimpses of the ethos driving the transplantation enterprise. Besides the 
rhetoric of ambition already mentioned, success and charisma that feed the 
public accounts of their careers, the story of  Maeda-sensei’s first patient's 
experience tells of other aspects of the moral economy that upholds the tokō 
ishoku enterprise. Gordon has analysed for example the dynamics of patients’ 
transplant choices, emphasising the ambiguities and uncertainties medical 
professionals encounter when they list marginally suitable recipients (Gordon 
2000). In contrast to her discussion, the cases of tokō ishoku I encountered 
present instead situations where the balance between the possible risks and 
benefits of the decision to resort to so-called ‘extreme measures’ becomes a 
moral imperative.  
The patients' youth and the immediate threat to their life heavily inform 
these decisions. At the same time, the close relationship between families and 
doctors, forged through prolonged care as in the case of Maeda-sensei and 
Maki, or dependent on the desperate plight of families to whom the individual 
doctor is the last hope, also lingers in the decision. What makes these 
imperative decisions so compelling in the face of uncertain outcomes, is the 
possibility of rubricating the risks at stake as only partially related to the clinical 
assessment of the patient. The outcome of the decision ultimately depends in 
great part on how long parents will need to find money they need for the visa, if 
a donor will become available on time, and if the patients’ condition won’t 
deteriorate too far because of the journey. These are all elements physicians 
and families have no ethical responsibility for. The decision becomes 
imperative, and at the same time requires undertaking high risks in the attempt 
to save life. 
 112 
Saving lives (inochi wo sukuu) is indeed like a mantra in the field of tokō 
ishoku.  It is the motto of associations like NIT Japan, is invoked by patients’ 
families in their narratives and even returns as the slogan of the fundraising 
campaigns parents organise to collect money for the medical expenses. 
Indeed, tokō ishoku is an extreme instantiation of the desperate attempt at 
saving lives that drives transplantation medicine, and heroic medicine more 
generally (cf. Wailoo and Livingstone 2006).  
In Mika’s case, the effort paid off. She received her new heart shortly after 
arriving in the States, and more than twenty years after she was still doing well. 
As the first paediatric patient from Hospital J to receive a transplant in the U.S., 
her experience was somewhat peculiar, but the sense of uncertainty she 
reveals in her narrative (“we fumbled our way through”) is not unique to her 
story. The following sections look at the moral economy of clinical decisions 
that concern a therapeutic path so deeply informed by uncertainty. 
 
 
“If This is the Only Way” 
 
After the meeting at NIT Japan, Sato Juntaro had made up his mind to trust 
their chances to Endo-sensei’s connections with Hospital R. His wife, however, 
was less sure, and while they were already making arrangements with the 
American hospital she still wondered whether there wasn’t another way and 
even consulted a renowned centre of Chinese medicine in Tokyo. The fact her 
husband was very proactive maybe gave her the space to articulate more 
openly what were probably shared concerns about the choice of going ahead 
with the transplant. The more they read about it, the more she got worried 
about what kind of life they were pursuing for their daughter, “both medically, 
and morally.” 
 
Other people’s organs? Is it ok to want to live so much to take other 
people’s organs? […] We read quite a lot of these comments on-line, 
and we started to have doubts. We didn’t know anyone who received 
a transplant or any similar therapy; we really didn’t know anything.  
(Sato Sayaka) 
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Recalling her doubts, Sayaka voiced what seems to be a common 
concern among Japanese potential recipients (see also Tomomatsu 2013). 
Mika too remembered that her case attracted similar critiques: “People 
criticised me because I wanted to live so much I’d go to the lengths of receiving 
another person’s life instead of accepting my own death”. For none of the 
patients I interviewed, evidently, such moral concerns became a reason to opt 
out from the transplant; still, the doubts they told of, the opposition they feared 
from the public or even members of their own family, and the concerns they 
voiced about cadaveric donation are revealing of the ethical landscape they 
moved in. Contrary to the celebratory rhetoric that depicts transplantation as an 
almost miraculous cure, in Japan much of the debate on this technology 
revolved around the issue of brain death. Public propaganda around organ 
donation and transplantation is now part of the public discourse, and indeed in 
the space of just one generation the possibility of a prospective candidate 
accessing information about treatment has tremendously improved (cf. Chapter 
5). On the other hand, the testimony of young patients’ families reveal how the 
brain death controversy still has an enduring legacy in the ethics of 
transplantation in Japan and of how the specific local history of the technology 
can inform treatment decisions (Rapp 2000).  
Other concerns that the patients’ parents express resonate more closely 
with the experiences of prospective recipients from other countries and reflect 
the uncertainties of the clinical path (cf. Maynard 2006). Transplantation is a 
complex treatment characterised by a systematic approach to diagnostic, 
surgery, risk-benefit assessment and post-operative care. To be eligible, 
patients must be ill enough to need it and healthy enough to survive it. Even 
when this is the case, it only means that the surgery was a success; quite 
tellingly, the clinical success of transplantation is measured by survival rate.  
‘Survival rate’ is a phrase that enters the discourse of recipients as soon 
as the option of transplant is first proposed, and to Izumi-san they were the 
most frightening part of her decision to list for the operation. Izumi Midori knew 
from the time she was young that a transplant might eventually be the only 
treatment for the rare liver disease (PFIC) she was born with, but this didn’t 
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prepare her for the decision she had to take when she actually entered the 
stage of organ failure and had to decide whether to list for the operation in 
Australia. 
 
One day, when I had already been transferred to Hospital J [for its 
transplantation program] my physician explained to me about the 
survival rates. I got very anxious thinking what could happen to me.  
He told me that almost 80% of the recipients make a full recovery 
and return to society (shakai fukki) […] [But] it was a shock for me, 
because I had no way to tell which group I’d end up in: those who 
survive or those who die? If you think of it not just in terms of 
numbers, if you really put yourself in the position of being one of 
those numbers, that’s very scary. I had a 50% chance: it could be 
either one or the other […] I was scared by the fact of not knowing. I 
didn’t even know what to fear, what to worry about. All of a sudden it 
was either life or death, and I had no way to tell which one would be 
my fate. I didn’t even know what I should be afraid about, what I 
should be scared of; it was just all encompassing. There were not 
many Japanese recipients [at the time]. It looked almost like a human 
experiment.  
(Izumi Midori) 
 
Significantly, when faced with the 80% survival rate, Izumi-san felt she 
had a 50% chance. Whether positive or negative, possible outcomes were 
absolute. Fear was gripping her in the face of a treatment that, she felt, left no 
space for degrees of success.  
Twenty years on, Midori was in her forties and a housewife. Apart from 
frequent follow-up visits, she was hospitalised several times and her condition 
was no longer as good as in the first years after the operation when, she 
proudly told me, she ran the Transplant Marathon. Whether this was the “full 
recovery” she envisioned I cannot tell, but even though she never put it in 
terms of a regret, I think she somehow resented her health problems, that got 
in the way of having children. However, she was very positive about her life 
after the transplant and the treatment itself. She was clear about the fact the 
transplant didn’t only get her twenty more years, but changed her life for the 
better compared to the discrimination she suffered at a young age because of 
her disease. She was very keen to spread a positive message about the 
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efficacy of the treatment32 as a way to help other patients, as she recounted 
how the lack of such a system of support and the possibility of sharing 
information with other patients made her decision much more difficult.  
Midori’s story deconstructs the uncertainty of clinical choices usually 
framed as a matter of risks vs. benefits. Regardless of the statistics about the 
80% full recovery, she felt like she had 50% chance of not making it, because, 
as she put it, “it could be either one or the other.” Possible outcomes, whether 
positive or negative, appear absolute and sharply polarised, leaving no room 
for degrees of success. At the same time, the ideal of “full recovery” (shakai 
fukki) opens horizons of uncertainty in the long run, calling into question the so-
called problem of patients’ quality of life.  
Such were the fears Sayaka had for her daughter, as they looked more 
deeply into what the transplant practically entailed. As she recalled:  
 
 
We did a lot of research on-line and there was not much positive 
information about transplantation. It didn’t look like a bright way to go 
[…] I was afraid that she might not be able to do this or that; that 
she’d end up in and out of hospitals most of the time […] The thing 
is, there was nothing else we could do.  
(Sato Sayaka) 
 
Her husband, Sayaka told me, was more resolute. “He was quite good at 
deciding. ‘If this the only way’ he said ‘we’re going to do it.’” Without wasting 
too much time he quickly got together a group of friends to help raise money to 
pay the hospital and get a visa. A few weeks after they had the diagnosis, the 
Satos gathered together all their relatives from both sides of the family and 
announced their decision to take Aya to the U.S. for the operation.  
What Sayaka remembered most strikingly about her husband’s 
decisiveness (“if this is the only way, we’re going to do it”) points directly to the 
core of her dilemma: the problem wasn’t that there was nothing else to do, but 
that there was this particular option to pursue. In clinical decisions, the idea of 
risk is used to make sense of this impulse for saving lives: framed as 
                                                
32 She even published a manga about her story to promote organ donation and often 
participated in public events about transplantation. More on this in Chapter 5. 
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calculated risks, clinical decisions are construed as informed consent and as 
an act of agency in asserting one’s capacity to understand and (attempt to) 
control one’s fate. The story of Sayaka somehow complicates this view. It 
shows that risks are such when they can be taken, and when they are the 
uncertain alternative to a certain death. Her story shows how technology itself 
is a generative practice, for its very existence produces the moral imperative of 
exhausting all the possibilities to save life. Consequently, it demands ways to 
organise a moral economy that make sense of the risks it imposes.  
 
 
Treatment of the Last Resort 
 
After Kaoru was hospitalised for what was supposed to be just a couple of 
weeks, her condition worsened further, to the point where she was in severe 
pain. The family was referred to a more specialised facility, and the Arais were 
told they had to change protocol and decide on what clinical path to follow next. 
 
We had to consider treatments of the last resort. The transplant was 
one of the possibilities, but we’d have to go abroad for that. The 
other option was to stay in Japan, as some choose to do […] If we 
stayed, we’d have go on with the [drug] treatment, but we didn’t know 
for how long that would have been possible for the chances to 
stabilise her were really unlikely […] As for the transplant, I didn’t 
even know how long one can survive after it. You get through such a 
difficult operation and then how much time do you have? Six 
months? One year? I had no idea. When I was a child, well it was 
quite a while ago, but I remembered the news of transplant patients 
dying soon after the operation. I had such dreadful thoughts about 
transplant. If it’s just about gaining a few months or years…I mean, is 
it worth spending your last time in a hospital bed? Aren’t there 
options to be better than that? In the end it was also about the quality 
of the last time she had to live. There were treatments to keep her in 
a decent condition, although she’d have not been able to leave the 
hospital. We were also given the option of palliative care, to try and 
alleviate her last months. I then had a look at the statistics about 
transplant: 75% after five years; 50% after ten. But they take into 
account only those who survive; there are also those who die for the 
operation. Looking at the data together, the doctor told me he 
wouldn’t have done it […] Personally, I didn’t know anything about it 
(shiroto).  
(Arai Yoshinori) 
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The Arais’ experience reveals other aspects of the clinical decision. 
Whereas Aya’s disease threatened to suddenly precipitate but remained stable 
until the end, Kaoru’s condition was slowly but irreversibly degenerating. Sato-
san made up his mind about the transplant with his daughter out of hospital and 
in relatively good health, and indeed their fear was that she would not be able to 
return to such a condition after the operation. Arai-san, on the other hand, had 
to decide how to treat a child who was already in pain, unable to drink or eat 
and dependent on life-support. For him, the distinction between quality of life 
and quality of the end of life was much more blurred.  
The Kumanos found themselves in a similar position within a matter of 
months. In June 2008, their only child, Shuichi, a baby boy with deep black 
eyes and plumps cheeks, was diagnosed with DCM and admitted to hospital. 
After that, his parents’ routine revolved around the medical facility. Natsuko was 
a nurse herself. She was on maternity leave when Shu-chan33 fell ill, and she 
spent all her days with him, quickly bonding with the medical staff attending to 
the child. Her husband Keisuke was in his mid-thirties and worked in Tokyo. 
Every evening, after work he made it to the hospital for a visit, and stopped for a 
quick bite at a restaurant next to the hospital on his way home.  
Doctors had told the Kumanos that there was a possibility Shuichi would 
develop heart failure and need a transplant. For their part, the Kumanos thought 
that until the doctors brought up the issue again it meant they were not there 
yet. In the meantime, however, Shuichi was rapidly deteriorating. After a while, 
he was moved from paediatrics to the ICU. He became unable to move, eat or 
drink. In the pictures Natsuko took, he looks skinnier and weaker as the weeks 
passed, until he was attached to the oxygen tube that the nurses had stuck to 
his face with bandage cut into cute shapes of animals to prevent him from 
removing it. Natsuko and Keisuke were clinging to the hope Shu-chan would 
get better.  
One day, a couple of months after Shuichi was admitted to the hospital, a 
nurse approached Natsuko, and with the directness that comes from 
                                                33	-chan is a diminutive suffix that conveys endearing feelings and is normally used for young 
children. 	
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confidentiality she broke the question of the transplant. It was then, Natsuko 
told me, that the impending decision changed their perspective and made it 
clear Shuichi was terminal.  
Compared with the Satos’ experience, the stories of the Arais and the 
Kumanos cast light on the very conceptual frame that organises the therapeutic 
experience around decisions. Writing about this, Mol (2002) argues that the 
language of decisions:  
 
[S]eparates decision-making moments from the series of long-
layered and intertwined histories that produce them, as if somewhere 
normative issues could be isolated and contained within those pivotal 
points. As if they were, indeed, pivotal points. […] Every single 
moment always hides endless contingencies – which, if one looks at 
them carefully, are likely not simply to be contingent. That means 
that most elements relevant to making or unmaking the goods of life 
involved in making a decision escape the moment of that decision.  
(Mol 2002: 170) 
 
From this perspective, the Arais and the Kumanos’ experiences add a 
further, crucial, and yet often overlooked dimension to the discussion developed 
so far. Not only must decisions be understood in the context they are taken, but 
the very possibility and modalities of what can be decided define what is at 
stake. One would think that the ‘treatment of the last resort’ is that which 
becomes necessary when the condition is terminal, but the opposite is also 
true: in people’s lived experience, having to decide is what defines the condition 
as terminal and prepares those involved for what comes next (cf. Chapter 6). 
Closely related to this is the fact that the very possibility of treatment defines the 
condition it targets, from terminal in the sense of hopeless, to terminal as in 
requiring immediate intervention.  
 
 
“No Regrets” 
 
After the talk with the nurse, the Kumanos embarked in a process of further 
consultations with doctors and various specialists about the risks and 
practicalities of tokō ishoku. In hindsight, Natsuko had no space for doubts, but 
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she acknowledged that the lack of better alternatives didn’t make the choice 
any easier.  
 
It is not about the choice in itself; it’s about how you think that choice 
is going to affect the person’s life. The concerns about the 
transplants and the decisions families have to make are very 
significant in these respects. It’s all about what can you do and how 
far you can go, as a parent, for a son who cannot even speak for 
himself. 
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
The cases discussed present especially sensitive bioethical dilemmas 
because these decisions affect people who cannot exercise control over them34. 
While extreme in this regard, these cases are also revealing, through the close 
bond between decision-maker and patient, of more general characteristics of 
clinical negotiations. Clinical decisions are always a process, more than an 
event, managed within a group of people, including the patients, his/her 
significant others, medical practitioners, and social mediators (cf. Chapter 6). In 
theorising diagnosis and therapy as processes negotiated by “treatment 
management groups”, Janzen (1987) explains this perspective enable us to see 
patients’ problems as more gradual and chronic than the occasional encounters 
with medical experts would suggest. The same could be said about the clinical 
decision, which here appears to unfold through a process of lengthy 
negotiations. Furthermore, as Natsuko’s comments suggest, these decisions 
bear implications for the future life of all those involved, as both the patient and 
the family will have to live with the outcome of these choices.  
From this perspective, the ways in which people structured their 
narrations, through well-rehearsed patterns, reflect how they used narratives to 
re-organise significant episodes of illness and reconcile their outcomes (see 
Kleinman 1988). In Arai-san’s account, this aspect emerged particularly from 
the emphatic shift from his initial indecisiveness to his later decisiveness. 
Physicians had told Arai-san that they had to transfer from Hospital S to a 
university hospital that could offer more specialised care and Yoshinori was in 
                                                
34 See for example Davis (2010) for a discussion of the dilemmas of medical choices (in this 
case on genetic testing) when these shape the lives of children, sometimes before they are 
even born.  
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the process of checking various institutions when he met Kanemaru-san. 
Kanemaru-san –or, as Arai-san called her, “the old lady”– was the mother of a 
former patient of Hospital S. Since her daughter was diagnosed with a cardiac 
disorder more than twenty years earlier, she had been volunteering with the 
Association for Children with Heart Disease (ACHD) and became a sort of 
reference point for families considering transplant overseas. When she knew 
that Arai-san, who had attended a couple of meetings of the ACHD, was in the 
process of considering a transplant, she offered to introduce him to “a good 
doctor” and invited him to Maeda-sensei’s seminar, which was conveniently 
scheduled in a few weeks time.  
 
She told me there would be a lot of healthy patients, who had greatly 
benefited from the transplant. Honestly, I didn’t quite believe it. The 
doctor had been so negative about it, and those statistics too [were 
not too encouraging]. Of course, the old lady told me, there are risks 
involved. But she also said that when it goes well, people can 
recover completely, get normal lives, a normal job. So she asked me 
to consider these positive things too, and try for once to look at it 
from a different perspective; like re-setting my mind.  
(Arai Yoshinori) 
 
Arai-san made it very clear that he and his wife were sceptical and even 
slightly suspicious about the old lady’s promises but nevertheless decided to 
go.   
Various patients were present, including Takeshi, who had just returned 
after a successful operation. Arai-san talked with Nakajima-san and other 
families of tokō ishoku children, and listened to their presentation about their 
experiences. Towards the end of the event, the old lady introduced him to 
Maeda-sensei, and Arai-san showed the physician Kaoru’s clinical records that 
he had brought with him. At that point, Arai-san said, the old lady abruptly 
jumped in asking Maeda-sensei if he had read the papers well. Yoshinori 
thought it was very rude to interrupt the doctor like that, but didn’t give it much 
thought. Only later, he said, he understood the old lady must have seen 
enough patients to know Kaoru might not make it for the transplant overseas.  
In three days, the Arais moved to Hospital J under the care of Maeda-
sensei. The girl was serious and needed artificial ventilation. If they opted for 
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the transplant, she would have normally been given a so-called artificial heart, 
a mechanical device used to support patients through the waiting time and 
bridge them safely to the operation. The device, however, was not available in 
Japan35, because heart transplant was not on offer, and this made even more 
urgent the need to quickly arrange for the operation overseas. Maeda-senei 
discussed the situation thoroughly with Yoshinori and his wife and gave them 
one week to decide whether to go ahead with contacting the American hospital.  
 
During that week many people advised me, and I myself did lots of 
research, but in the end it was at the seminar that I really made up 
my mind. It was not something I heard or something I was told, it was 
real facts. And that was a possibility we had. It might be hard, but as 
a parent, if you know you have such a chance, you cannot choose to 
let her die. Seeing those healthy patients at the seminar really 
changed my stance about it, as a parent. It became my motivation 
(dokidsuke). […] It gave me the courage to act. I thought we had to 
do it. 
(Arai Yoshinori) 
 
Only a few months later, Maeda-sensei was advising the Kumanos about 
the risks involved in the transplant overseas. Natsuko and Keisuke had made 
up their mind for the overseas transplant, and their physician put them in touch 
with Endo-sensei, thinking that his good connections with Hospital R, one of the 
major transplant programmes in the U.S.A., was likely to ensure a shorter 
waiting time for them. One day, they received an email from Endo-sensei, who 
offered to introduce them to some his patients so that they could hear about 
tokō ishoku from those who had gone through it themselves.  
A few days later, Natsuko left Shuichi alone at the hospital for the first time 
since he had been hospitalised, and got on a train to Osaka. There, she joined 
Endo-sensei at the Annual Conference of the Japan Transplant Association, 
where the surgeon introduced her to some of his patients and their parents, 
including the Satos. Aya had made a full recovery, to the point that without 
knowing about her story it would have been impossible to tell she had ever 
                                                
35 Paediatric artificial hearts, were not approved for use in Japan until 2009, when organ 
donation was legalised from patients under fifteen. Paradoxically, the machine was even more 
needed when transplantation was not available in the country, as young tokō ishoku patients 
faced increased risks whilst waiting for surgery because of the journey and the unpredictable 
time needed to set up the transfer and the fund-raising. 
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been sick. Natsuko recalled that first meeting with the Satos as the turning point 
in her experience. By the time she was back in Tokyo that night, she said, she 
knew what to do.  
 
Up to that moment, we had heard only very harsh opinions 
about transplant. We didn’t know whether he would survive or not, 
whether we wanted to do it or not. Maeda-sensei had warned us that 
transplant is not something you can make a laugh about. He 
explained it’s not as easy as just receiving and getting healthy. He 
explained to us that he’d need care afterwards, that it can be difficult, 
that there might be complications, and that we had to be up to the 
challenge. But that’s only rational knowledge. We understood. We 
agreed. We were told everything about tokō ishoku. We knew how 
hard it can be for the parents to go through such a psychologically 
demanding process without even being sure the child will survive. I 
couldn’t quite make up my mind on that, but then I saw how good 
transplant can be, and I knew we had to do it. It was like a shock. In 
one second, my view (kachikan), all the things I had been thinking in 
my head, everything changed completely. And that gave me a great 
energy. It was there that I made my decision. And since then, we 
grew firmer and firmer in our feelings. That’s what we were aiming to: 
not reducing the pain, but becoming healthy again, getting back to 
life. 
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both Natsuko and Yoshinori organised their 
narratives so as to emphasise the moment of the final resolution. They both 
presented the meeting with other patients as the turning point in their decision-
making process, and framed this moment as a complete change of mind, 
shifting from the focus on (uncertain) risks-benefits, to the description of their 
driving motivation and the sense of fulfilment they derived from pursuing the 
realisation of their decision. What they are saying is that the decision of listing 
their children for the transplant was not taken only because of the lack of 
statistically safer alternatives in terms of risks-benefits, but because it was the 
right thing to do.  
One idea that returns frequently in the narratives of patients’ families is 
that of ‘holding no regrets’ (kōkai shinai). The trope of ‘holding no regrets’ is 
telling of the moral investment people make in these decisions. As it projects 
the choice into the future and anticipates a possible negative outcome, the 
paradigm of ‘holding no regrets’ speaks of the need to reassert the worth of the 
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decision made and to protect the person from the responsibilities that come with 
it, especially in light of highly uncertain results. Combining the emphatic 
description of their driving and self-fulfilling impulse to act, with the strategic 
negotiations of the results that this initiative brought about, Natsuko and 
Yoshinori’s narratives introduce us to the workings of hope in directing 
decisions where stakes are high and outcomes are sharply polarised.  
 
 
“It’s Like a Hurdle Race” 
 
Just a few days before her trip to Osaka to meet Endo-sensei, Natsuko and her 
husband saw Maeda-sensei for a second opinion. As with Mika’s parents and 
the Arais, Maeda-sensei thoroughly warned the Kumanos about the risks 
involved in the transplant overseas, especially with a condition such as 
Shuichi’s. 
Like Shuichi, many patients are already critical when they set off to the 
U.S.A. By the time families get a diagnosis, find a doctor who can arrange their 
transfer overseas and raise enough money to leave, patients are often at a 
critical stage and some don’t even make it to their destination. All measures are 
taken to make the journey safe, like escorting the child to the airport with an 
ambulance and setting up medical equipment on the airplane; even so, the 
flight can prove to be further destabilising and cases are not rare of children 
dying just a few days after they are admitted to American hospitals. By this time 
many are already high-priority cases; some are put on an artificial heart, but the 
waiting time ultimately depends on the chances of a suitable match.  
Besides the risks strictly relating to the clinical condition of the patient, the 
family has to be prepared to face significant changes in their life. The fund-
raising is very stressful and can expose families to criticism (see more in 
Chapter 4), while the experience of leaving everything for several months to 
travel to a foreign country with a sick child can be upsetting for the couple and 
can be very difficult to manage if there are other children involved. Even when 
all goes well, the post-operative care is very demanding (see Chapter 3). In this 
way, the transplant requires the mobilisation of a vast array of financial, social 
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and emotional resources by those surrounding the recipients (cf. Maynard 
2006). 
After the Kumanos decided, things rapidly escalated and Natsuko was 
caught up in the frenetic preparations for the fund-raising and the transfer to the 
American hospital. Her husband took care of the campaign to raise money 
while she stayed with Shuichi’s at the hospital.  The child was very unstable. He 
had a high temperature, his heart was further deteriorating, and shortly before 
the scheduled departure he suffered bleeding in his brain. In that condition, they 
were not even sure he could get on the waiting list. 
 
Up to the very last week, the very last day, we were told it was an 
extraordinary thing to bring a child in such condition to America…I 
wanted to postpone the time of the departure, but it was my husband 
who decided in the end. He asked the doctor to let us go: in a month 
he could no longer be there, he said. I felt very confident he’d still be 
there in one month; I thought he’d be fine. Thinking back now it was 
very dangerous, but I thought we could to postpone. Everything had 
been done in preparation for that day: we booked the private flight, 
contacted the American hospital, set up a schedule with the doctors. 
They were all waiting for us, and to change the plan, even of just one 
week, would have been problematic. I understood that in my head, 
but emotionally…All I could think was: ‘This is not the best day for 
him. Not now’.  
But it was decided for that day, and so I pulled myself together and I 
did it […] I was almost emotionless, as if nothing would touch me 
(dodemo ii). In my heart I was repeating to myself: ‘Keep clam, keep 
calm. It’s going to be fine, it’s going to be fine. Just another 24 hours, 
another 24 hours…and if he dies?’ I was really scared. It was hard. It 
was hard for him, but it was also hard for me. The day was 
approaching, and we had to prepare. But I didn’t have the time to go 
home and pack our things, Sousuke was very unstable, it was 
difficult to leave him. And still we had so many stupid little things to 
do. Knowing you might be away as long as one year, you would 
normally clean the house, empty the fridge, and we needed to pack 
our stuff. But I couldn’t take care of anything (dodemo ii). 
Anyway, I went home, I did the packing, I took a shower, and I was 
back at the hospital. I stayed there the night before leaving.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
The last passages in Natsuko’s narrative unravel the emotional dynamics 
entangled in a therapeutic path that Mariko described as a “hurdle race”. 
Franklin uses the same metaphor in her ethnography of IVF in the UK to 
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describe the emotionally totalising experience of a treatment course made up of 
different stages, each of which can either bring the couple closer to their goal or 
turn the whole experience into a failure (1997). Similarly, the pathway towards 
the transplant overseas appears to unfold through a series of critical moments: 
the diagnosis, the search for the right doctors, the resolution to go overseas, all 
are presented as key passages in the way events unfold. In the organisation of 
these, each moment is a crucial turning point. Like Natsuko’s last quote 
illustrates, at each of these steps hope builds up, until the experience of 
seeking care leaves no space for anything else, not even fear or relief, and 
seems to become almost self-fulfilling (cf. Franklin 1997). At the same time, 
however, no one step leads necessarily to the next one. The clinical path 
emerges as non-consequential, precarious and fragile. It unleashes intense 
hope, but also requires being carefully managed. As Crapanzano notes, in 
desperate clinical situations, both the medical experts and the patient have to 
avoid paralysing hopelessness while at the same time they are forced to ignore, 
or at least to limit, hope (Crapanzano 2003: 17). The concluding sections below 
present Yuka and Sosuke’s story, which further deconstructs this interplay 
between hope, uncertainty and the emotionally totalising experience of 
treatment.  
 
 
“Gambatte!” 
 
Yuka was from a well off family from central Japan. She moved to Tokyo when 
she got married. Shortly after she gave birth to a baby boy whom she 
propitiously named Sosuke. Soon after being discharged from the hospital, the 
first problems began. Sosuke suffered frequent attacks of vomiting. Because of 
the lack of nutrition, he was weak and in poor health. Yuka embarked on a 
series of consultations with several specialists, until eventually she was given 
the diagnosis of Hirschsprung’s disease, a rare disorder of the gastrointestinal 
system. 
The condition was not operable, and the only solution to keep Sosuke 
alive was artificial feeding. The child was therefore put on total parenteral 
 126 
nutrition (TPN), and the intervention to surgically insert the feeding tube 
marked the beginning of Yuka and Sosuke’s life at the hospital (byōto de no 
seikatsu). TPN presented serious side effects and exposed the child to risk of 
infections from the use of intravenous catheters. Sosuke’s condition was never 
good enough to leave the hospital, and in nine years, she told me, they spent 
only one day at home and free from medical complications. “The hospital had 
become the place where we lived and the place where I had to bring up my 
child.”  
With time, Yuka told me, she grew more aware of her child’s needs, 
becoming less reliant on doctors and more confident in asserting their priorities 
at the cost of arguing with the medical staff. She became quite literate about 
Sosuke’s disease, but she also learned there was more to life than that, even 
in the hospital ward. One episode she particularly liked telling me about 
concerned a specially equipped wheelchair that she managed to get in order to 
carry the TPN machine outside of the hospital and take Sosuke for a walk 
despite the doctors’ advice not to leave the room. 
Yuka often said that living in a hospital room can be gloomy and 
depressing, but that it didn’t spoil Sosuke’s curiosity and brightness. In the 
pictures and videos she showed me of “my Sousuke” (uchi no Sousuke), he is 
often surrounded by toys, books, pens, a laptop and a great number of objects 
that all fit in the space of a bed too big for his tiny body. She went to a great 
lengths to try and make his life as challenging as possible. Food was maybe 
the most important experience Yuka made him have. Since he was put on 
TPN, Sosuke could no longer be fed non-artificial food. As he grew old enough 
to understand, he began asking questions about food and would become upset 
by seeing people eating around him. Yuka came up with a series of games to 
make him experience food: she would let him crumb rice cakes and bread to 
listen to the noise they made, and provide him ingredients to prepare onigiri,36 
which she would then eat. At mealtimes, Sosuke usually chose the menu, and 
Yuka told him what the food tasted like. 
Life in the hospital ward, however, also meant physical pain, loneliness, 
and uncertainty about the future. With time, TPN took a great strain on 
                                                
36 Filled rice balls wrapped in seaweed.  
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Sosuke’s body. Shortly after they initiated treatment, he developed a serious 
infection and entered a coma from which doctors said he was unlikely to return. 
After that first episode, he underwent several further life-threatening crises, and 
survived nine years in a ‘chronically terminal’ condition before listing for a 
transplant. Because TPN is merely a life-prolonging treatment that couldn’t 
address his underlying condition, the decision to initiate it was fated to raise 
serious dilemmas in the long run. As Sosuke overcame various life-
endangering episodes, it became clear that whether and how to let him die 
would have to be a consiocu decision.  
In her memorial, Yuka describes the years at Hospital W and the constant 
entering, and recovering from, life-threatening crises:  
 
In the middle of a crisis I was unable to think, I just focused on being 
there for him, on encouraging him to be strong and to not give up. 
But as soon as the situation stabilised, I was caught back again in 
fear and in the lack of prospects for the future. ‘How long can we go 
on like this? What will come next?’ In the myth of Pandora’s box, 
after all the evils have flown away, it is hope that remains. Even if 
just a little, I wanted some hope (sukoshi demo kibō hoshikatta). 
(Kakumu 2009:65) 
 
Hope eventually came in the charming figure of transplant star Kimura-
sensei. In 2004, the news was reported that a Japanese baby suffering from 
the same disease as Sosuke had successfully received an intestinal transplant 
in America, operated on by Kimura-sensei. Doctors had always ruled out the 
option because the operation would have been too complicated (Sosuke’s 
condition required a multi-organ transplant) and the child was not well enough 
to undergo surgery. The meeting with Kimura-sensei, on one of the surgeon’s 
frequent visits to Japan, opened the way for the first time to the possibility of 
curative treatment. Even though the doctors well knew, as did Yuka and 
Sosuke, that his chances were tiny, they decided to try.  
Yuka said that the decision to try and receive the transplant changed 
Sosuke completely: “he regained his energy and his eyes were sparkling 
again.”  
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We didn’t even know if he could make it, if a donor would become 
available. I hadn’t explained him about these details. But just the 
thought that it could work, that he would be able to eat a hamburger 
[as he always wanted to]. He wanted to get well and be able to eat. 
It’s incredible how people can change just thinking they have a 
chance. We take for granted we’re alive, but it’s not obvious at all 
(atarimae). Even though he never really told me, I think in his heart 
he knew his life was at risk; and I’m so sorry for that […] [The 
preparation] was tough; it was psychologically very hard. I didn’t 
know how to talk about [organ donation] with Sosuke, so I decided to 
explain everything to him only once we would be there, because for 
the time it was already too hard. But even though it was hard, I’d 
have done anything if it meant having a chance to save his life. I 
didn’t care what it took: it was about saving his life. After all what he 
wanted was the most basic thing (atari mae) [to live] and I’d have 
done anything if it could bring us even close to realise his desire. 
(Ono Yuka)  
 
Sosuke and Yuka’s experience reveals the role of hope in orienting 
clinical decisions at the crossing between therapeutic futility and potentially life-
saving treatment. Anthropologists have shown how hope both informs medical 
research on untreatable diseases, and functions as a method of care in 
particularly wretched situations (Delvecchio Good et al. 1990; Livingstone 
2012). In cases like Sosuke and Yuka’s, the faith in techno-scientific 
breakthroughs and hope as a method of living through terminal illness were 
condensed in the pursuit of heroic treatment. In these circumstances, “the 
intense compression of outcomes, different emotional trajectories and moral 
meanings […] the sharp polarities, the highly charged atmosphere, and the 
drama and rapid momentum of transplant” drive people though hanging on 
uncertain chances of success (Wailoo and Livingstone 2006: 134). Such 
notions of hope as optimistic forecast and positive motivation shine through the 
stories presented so far.  
On the other hand, Japanese patients and families rarely talked of hope in 
such a narrow sense; instead they relied widely on the more vague concept of 
gambaru. My interlocutors commonly used this term, for example, to discuss 
how they worked out a way to seek treatment when no option seemed available 
to them. Gambaru was also frequently used in talking of the patient’s own fight 
with the disease. In discussing the toughness of the phases before the 
operation, when the family is on a race against time to raise money as the 
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patient rapidly deteriorates, gambaru was the concept of choice to describe 
both the parents’ proactive effort and the patient’s resilience. The expression 
“yoku gambatta” (literally meaning one has done her best) was used either to 
describe with resignation the final days of one’s illness, or to congratulate for 
his/her recovery. Similarly, the imperative form –“gambatte!” –was used to wish 
someone good luck and encourage him/her not to give up.  
A pervasive concept in the Japanese moral landscape, gambaru means to 
stick at it, to keep at it, to hold in there. As Ben-Ari notes, gambaru conveys an 
idea of persistence that includes volition, as when one makes an effort to 
achieve a result, but is also close to the concept of endurance (Ben-Ari 1996, 
1997). It denotes a positive meaning that one has done one’s best, has fulfilled 
all the possibilities and left nothing unattempted (Hendry 1968), and as such, it 
has moral value in and for itself regardless of the outcome (Kondo 1990). In this 
sense, as the Japanese often say, in the face of uncertain outcomes or 
difficulties, “one can only gambaru” (gambaru shika nai).  
On one occasion during my fieldwork, I met the family of a young patient 
the day before they left to America, and as it later turned out a few days before 
the child died. Despite the fact that the long-waited moment of departure was 
close, the parents of the young boy were anxious and very emotional, probably, 
although I didn’t know at the time, because of his unstable condition. As we 
were about to separate, I meant to wish them good luck when they anticipated 
me, saying they would gambaru in order for my wishes to be realised. Their 
response put what I intended to say (that I wished them all the best and I would 
pray for them) in a different perspective (that they would try their best and 
endure hard).  
Although it can seem far from a European or American notion of hope, 
gambaru conveys a similar idea of a proactive and optimistic stance, which in 
turn upholds the clinical path of the transplant overseas and orients people’s 
decision against adverse odds. At the same time, it also speaks of hope as 
resilience, and of the impossibility of giving up when there are means of 
indefinitely prolonging terminal conditions and treatment of last resort to bet 
one’s chances on.  
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Miyazaki argues that faith doesn’t emerge as a leap of belief in something 
that is beyond people’s capacity to grasp, but as a way to one’s own agency in 
abeyance (2000). In a similar way, it seems to me that while hope or gambaru 
drives people through as a moral imperative to leave nothing unattempted, in a 
way it also relieves people from the burden of the decision by putting a limit on 
one’s capacity to understand and intervene in the course of events.  
Hope, in the context of nearly hopeless clinical medical situations, is 
usually associated with the expectations and investments people place in 
scientific progress, and like the discourse of progress, it speaks of an optimistic 
and active stance towards the future.  “Hope”, writes Novas, “indicates a 
willingness to overcome obstacles, transcend limits and explore new horizons” 
(Novas 2006: 291). The analysis of Japanese patients’ experience doesn’t 
contradict this. At the same time, however, it reveals that hope itself works as a 
limit, of sorts, in the ways in which it orients and sustains people’s decisions 
when ‘natural’ limits, in the form of the course of disease and inevitable deaths, 
can always be pushed one step further.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The narrative above can be read in various ways. One angle from which to look 
at them is by pinning down the points where they intersect with each other. 
Ashida-san’s office, Maeda-sensei’s consultation room, hospital R in California, 
emerge as the key mediators in the networks that shape and enable people’s 
access to care. From this perspective, this chapter provides a first glimpse into 
the political economy of the transplant overseas, showing how people navigated 
critical episodes of illness harnessing various resources around them, including 
medical professionals, personal connections, and formal patients’ 
organisations, in pursuing a non-conventional treatment that was the only way 
to try and rescue their children (see more in Chapter 4). 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, however, patients’ 
narratives are not used here to reconstructed factually accurate events, but to 
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illustrate how people experienced them. Following the way in which 
interlocutors organised their narratives, I structured the chapter around key 
turning points: the diagnosis, the phase of uncertainty, the process of seeking 
help, the moment of resolution. These moments are indicative of the crucial 
nodes of meanings that my interlocutors put emphasis upon, and are indicative 
of how people make sense of critical episodes of illness and treatment. As they 
unfold through these seemingly fortuitous events and coincidences, the stories 
build up a sense of uncertainty that speak of the high risks involved and of the 
fact that they lie beyond one’s capacity to control them. At the same time, the 
narratives also resolved in moments of purposefulness and decisiveness that 
become self-fulfilling and all encompassing (cf. Franklin 1997).  
From this perspective, the stories of these tokō ishoku families elucidate 
how the medical technology compels people to choose. While they seem to 
unravel trough a sequence of choices, the stories show how decisions are 
imposed on people by the technological possibility of sustaining life past the 
point of non-return and by the moral imperative to leave nothing unattempted. 
Exacerbated by the young age of the patients, the rarity of their disease, and 
the unconventional nature of the only treatment available, the life histories of 
these families thus illustrate the moral drive that underpins the use of high-end 
technologies like transplant to save lives (cf. Wailoo, Livingston and Guarnaccia 
2006; Maynard 2006). 
Finally, as they tell about the decisions to save lives, these stories also invite us 
to reflect on who partakes in these choices and, in turn, in these lives. While 
children are the patients at the centre of these decisions, their parents emerge 
as the real protagonists of these stories. The narratives illustrate the role of the 
family in presenting decisions that are made on behalf of underage patients, 
and describing through Yuka’s case how parents -in particular mothers- share 
the experience of illness with the children. The role of the family in clinical 
decisions has been traditionally discussed in relation to brain death to argue 
that the redefinition of death to allow organ procurement fail to consider that the 
person’s significant others are invested in the individual’s death (Lock 2002). 
These stories show that the same argument bears relevance also with regard to 
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the experience of transplant patients, as they illuminate the web of close 
relations and moral obligations in which the decision to ‘save life’ is situated. 
 
 
Coda 
 
Aya was almost a teenager when I met her, and the Satos and the Kumanos 
had become good friends. After their first meeting in Osaka, the two families 
met again in 2009, and bonded over their involvement in the movement for the 
reform of the policy on organ donation (see Chapter 5). 
As Natsuko said in the interview above, in the weeks before their 
departure, Shuichi rapidly worsened, and he died a few days after their arrival 
at Hospital R. When I met them, Natsuko and Keisuke had become parents to a 
second son, and after I left Japan, they had their first daughter.  
Kaoru was almost a teenager at the time of my fieldwork. She managed to 
leave safely and a few days after being admitted, a suitable donor became 
available and she received a new heart. She overcame tough months of 
rehabilitation before returning to Japan, but according to her father she has 
almost no memory of it.  
Arai-san and Nakajima-san had become good friend though their routine 
follow-up visits with Maeda-sensei, and Takeshi was doing very well.  
Sosuke’s operation was a success. He initially showed good signs of 
recovering, gradually started to eat and managed to taste his first hamburger. A 
couple of months after the operation, he had a relapse and was readmitted to 
intensive care. Within a few days he further worsened to the point where there 
was nothing left to do, and Yuka and Kimura-sensei decided to let him go.   
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THREE 
 
After the Transplant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the first day of the 2012 Transplant Games (Ishokusha Supotsukai), 
Ikuko37 and I escorted a group of recipients from South East Asian countries 
who had flown to Japan to attend the event organised by the JOTNW together 
with the Japanese Ishokusha (transplant recipients) Association, the biggest 
patients’ group in the country. It was the beginning of September, the weather 
was sunny, the summer heat had cooled down and the organising committee 
had planned a visit to the aquarium of Kamakura.  
Over the following weekend, more than a hundred recipients’ families 
gathered at the local sports centre for the Games. Many, mostly recipients’ 
families, joined as volunteers to help out with the organisation. There were 
some adult patients, who apparently came every year, like ‘Endo-sensei’s first 
patient’, or ‘the first Japanese heart and lung recipient’. Many knew each other 
personally, and even when they didn’t they knew each other’s medical histories.  
The majority of those attending were young recipients with their parents, 
and among them tokō ishoku families. Some had flown in from various parts of 
the country, partly sponsored by the JIA's organising committee, and they all 
stayed at a hotel near the sport centre. Others popped along at the end of their 
working day, like Hasabe-san, a man in his forties and one the ‘first tokō ishoku 
recipients’, who joined the social dinner to catch up with friends he rarely had 
the chance to see. 
Natsuko also came although it was with her second son. Since she was 
not officially a recipient’s mother she didn’t stay at the hotel with other families 
                                                37	Japanese	research	Ikuko	Tomomatsu.	
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but instead helped out with the volunteers. On that occasion, she also invited 
the family of a potential transplant candidate to come along. The couple had 
just received the diagnosis for their daughter and were in the process of 
considering the transplant; they had contacted Natsuko through her blog to 
consult with her and she had seized the chance of the Games to introduce them 
to other recipients.  
The 2012 Transplant Games I attended were the twenty-first of this 
foundational event of the Japanese transplant community. Together with the 
patients and their families, transplant surgeons, personnel from the JOTWN, 
and activists from patients groups like Ashida-san are brought together at the 
event, and donor families join the social dinner concluding the two days which 
thus provides a rare occasion of exchange between recipients and the donor's 
kin.38 In this fashion, the Games may be the most important occasion for 
gathering together organ recipients and their caregivers and appear to be in 
many respects as instantiation of the post-operative life. 
 
This chapter looks at recipients and families’ life ‘after’ the transplant. 
Following the histories of the people I introduced in the previous chapter, I look 
at the experience and grief narratives of those who have lost their loved ones, 
and discuss how adult patients and young children alike navigate their life as 
transplant recipients (ishokusha).  
Anthropological analyses of the post-transplant life have looked at how 
transplant recipients negotiate their expectations about treatment with the 
clinical complications of their condition, the financial burden of care, and the 
return to or pursuit of a role as fully autonomous and contributing members of 
society (Sharp 1995, 2006; Crowley Matoka 2005; Tomomatsu 2013). In doing 
so, they have provided insightful perspectives into the post-transplant life as a 
                                                38	The Transplant Games are, in fact, one of the very few occasions of exchange between 
recipients and donor kin.  While the memorialisation of organ donors is an important part of the 
cultural work of promotion of this treatment, direct contact between donor families and recipients 
is limited and anonymous. Even when exchange is encouraged, such as with the practice of 
writing ‘thank you letters’ to the donor’s families, transplant coordinators act as gatekeepers of 
these forms of socialisation and make sure these relationships remain anonymous (Sharp 
2006). In Japan, the need to protect anonymity was a reason why encounters between donor 
kin and transplant patients are especially sensitive, because of the low number and high media 
visibility of cases of organ donation would make it easy for the donor family and the recipients to 
identify each other.			
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process of the ‘reconstruction of the self’ (Sharp 1995), focusing in particular on 
the reconciliation of one’s subjectivity with the incorporation of the other –
represented by the organ/donor – elicited through metaphorical imageries of the 
gift.  
Below, I take a slightly different slant on the contributions discussed 
above. Instead of looking at the donor-recipient’s relationship through the trope 
of the gift, I illustrate practices and spaces of what Rabinow (1996) termed 
‘biosociality’, by which he refers to forms of sociality shaped on technological 
modes of intervention on one’s biology. The concept, then, captures emergent 
forms of sociality among people who identify themselves through a shared 
biological condition/medical history, and who organise around “medical 
specialists, laboratories, narratives, traditions, and a heavy panoply of pastoral 
keepers to help them experience, share, intervene and ‘understand’ their fate” 
(ibid.: 102). 
One aspect that is not usually considered when it comes to post-operative-
life, however, is how people experience and understand their fate in the light of 
a negative outcome, the discussion on grief being most commonly confined to 
the experience of donor kin (Sharp 2006). It is from here, then, that I start.  
 
 
Letting Go and Pulling Back: Yuka’s Bereavement 
 
When I first met Yuka, three years had passed since Sosuke’s death. We 
arranged to meet up for a tea on an afternoon in mid-December. Shinjuku was 
lit up with Christmas decorations and the New Year’s break was just a few days 
ahead. She sat down at the table where I was waiting for her, and as a first 
thing she pulled out of her bag the book and manga she had written and 
published about her experience. She put them on the table between us saying 
she had brought them for me to have, and cutting short any preliminary 
conversation she soon started to tell me of her nine years with Sosuke.  
Yuka had a slightly pitched voice and elegant manners. She was 
conversational and charming. She was stubborn and could be very 
straightforward without ever looking pushy or nosy. She was the very image of 
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yasashisa, meaning graceful, kind and gentle; and at times she could look 
slightly aloof.  
On our way back to the station we chatted about our plans for New Year’s 
Eve –the habitual conversation during those weeks of the year, when most 
people return to their native town (jikka) to celebrate with their families. Yuka 
was planning a short trip with a friend. Her sister, she told me, was going back 
to their hometown, where their mother lived alone after their father had passed 
away, but Yuka would rather avoid the family house. New Year’s Eve, she said, 
was a bitter moment for her and her mother; a time when the presence of those 
who are gone (nakunatta hito no sonzai) was felt particularly strongly.  
Sosuke’s presence was surely hardly felt. As she put it on another 
occasion, it was like “the presence of an absence” (inai sonzai ga aru). That 
absence shone through Yuka's every discourse and seemed to weigh heavily 
on her life. Yuka was always very open in sharing her feelings about his loss. 
She was never sentimental but neither was she reserved or shy about 
discussing that part of her life. Only towards the end of my fieldwork did I feel 
comfortable enough asking her direct questions about her life after Sosuke’s 
death. I never wanted to touch on what I considered a delicate and painful 
question, and one that for a long time I saw as somehow away from my 
research question. But there was never an occasion when we didn’t talk of how 
her life was without Sosuke; whether in the way she discussed her grief with 
other mothers, or in the allusions to some details of her everyday life that 
reminded of her loss, Sosuke’s absence always found a way to make itself 
present over and over again. My impression was that lingering on it was both 
painful and comforting for her. She was very open in discussing her feelings 
and she candidly admitted that she has not yet come to terms with her loss. 
Four years after she had to let him go, she said, she was still trying to pull him 
back (hipparu). 
During the time of my fieldwork, Yuka was living between her hometown, 
where she ran her business, and Tokyo, where she still had the flat near the 
hospital. Although she did not need that space anymore, she was not ready to 
move out yet. One day she brought me a bag with several DVDs of the TV 
news and documentaries that had been released about Sosuke’s story, and told 
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me I could keep them as long as I returned them to her before leaving Japan 
because she had never watched them after Sosuke’s death, but she felt one 
day she might want to. The Tokyo flat was the place where Yuka kept Sosuke’s 
things, as she said she didn’t feel like going through old memories by sorting 
them out.  
The flat was a space where she could grieve. When she was feeling low 
she didn’t want to be around people and make family and friends worry, but 
neither did she want to push away the sorrow. She said she often had these 
moments during autumn, when the anniversaries of both Sosuke’s birth and 
death occurred, and on these occasions she stayed on her own and let the 
feelings that had come back so vividly, sink down.   
While in Tokyo, Yuka often went back to Sosuke’s hospital to visit patients 
she had met there. She also attended various public events about 
transplantation, and she was often invited by the JOTNW or organisations that 
worked on transplant advocacy to discuss her experience. When she was not 
busy with her work or with volunteering for transplantation, she hung out with 
friends and family and often took care of her niece. She said her sister had 
created for her an environment where she was needed, “because people need 
to feel needed.”  
Yuka was very well connected and well known in the field of 
transplantation, but she was almost disdainful of this public role, which she 
depicted as mostly insignificant. To make her point she often compared her 
experience to Natsuko’s contribution to AOT's reformation (see Chapter 5). In 
this respect, she stressed that the legacy of Sosuke’s experience was not in 
promoting organ donation for the sake of increasing the chances of patients to 
receive a transplant. Rather, it showed the importance of thinking not just about 
getting healthy but also about the inevitable end of life, “because in the same 
way as you think about how you want to live, so you should think about how you 
want to die.” At the same time, she didn’t seem to take any consolation from 
these activities, and every time she had to prepare a speech and select pictures 
to show to the audience she felt burnt out from going through the memories.  
Yuka seemed to be constantly on the move, travelling around the country 
for the conferences, commuting between Tokyo and her hometown, and 
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keeping busy with her friends and family. At the same time, though, she looked 
stuck; unwilling, or unable to move. 
Her suggestion that her bereavement might need to be as long as the life 
she had shared with Sosuke resonates with traditional imageries of death, and 
indeed time and movement are descriptive of the ways in which death is 
conceived in Japan. As seen, funerary and memorial rituals and imageries of 
the afterlife construct death as a process in time, a journey that mirrors the life 
of the deceased and in which the living accompany the dead (Smith 1974; 
Raveri 1984; Suzuki 2003). As Smith (1974) describes, alongside funerary 
ceremonies, memorial services constitute an essential part of the rituals of 
death: these are held during the 49-day mourning period, and then at 
established yearly intervals from the death, and the periodic anniversary of the 
date of death is also memorialised on a monthly and yearly basis. Through 
these rituals, the living escort the dead through the journey to Buddhahood and 
in the transition to the role of ancestor (ibid.). At the same time, the rituals also 
function to sever the ties with the deceased and to cut off the spirits of the dead 
from the realm of the living (Steffanson 1995; Smith 1974; Raveri 1984).  
The action of 'pulling' Sosuke back seems to play with the codified 
imageries of death, illustrating an unresolved process of grieving. At times, this 
took the form of second thoughts, guilt, or regrets; at other times, manifest 
anger.  
 
We fought together throughout it (isshoni tatakatteita). Then why did 
he leave before me? We endured together (isshoni gambatteita), 
why did he leave me here by myself? 
(Ono Yuka) 
 
From Yuka’s experience of grief as an irreconcilable loss, death emerges 
as a crisis of meaning, an experience that casts into doubt the ways in which 
we construe our presence in the world. Sosuke’s death at the early age of nine, 
to a rare disease, and after an initially successful intervention to save his life, is 
a memento of the precariousness of existence not just in its impermanence and 
fragility but also though the search for meaning that defines it. For Yuka, the 
legacy of Sosuke’s death seemed to be an increased and bitter awareness that 
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the practices though which we ground our presence in the world are meaningful 
only insofar as we attribute meaning to them.  
 
He taught me that the small things of everyday life are not to be 
taken for granted. So sometimes I even feel guilty to live a normal 
life. Now, if I want to do something I just do it by myself, and that’s it. 
And I know there is no way this could be different, but before we did 
everything together. For example, if we wanted to go somewhere it 
would take a lot of time [because] we had to check if there was an 
elevator, and I had to carry him around with the wheelchair. Now I 
just do it, and it’s all so fast, and I can just go up and down the stairs 
normally. And it’s so sad. Just living my everyday life is extremely 
sad. I had to adjust to the fact that all the small things of everyday life 
were not normal (atarimae) for us. It took time to do everything, but 
nonetheless we did it. Now, on the contrary, just being here and have 
a tea and relax…I know these things are not granted (atarimae). I 
was always constrained by time, always in a hurry, and if I just had a 
moment to sit down and rest it felt so good. Now the very moment I 
think something is good I become a little bit sad.  
(Ono Yuka) 
 
 
Natsuko’s Closure 
 
Natsuko’s bereavement at Shuichi’s death looked the farthest it could be from 
that of her friend Yuka. The two women themselves often compared each 
other’s attitude toward the post-transplant life highlighting how Yuka’s tenacious 
refusal to let the memory fade away contrasted with Natsuko’s equally strong 
determination to move on with her life even at the cost of forgetting. Natsuko 
kept a blog during Shuichi’s fund-raising campaign, which she continued to 
update even after their return to Japan. In March 2011, when the country was 
facing the tragedy of the tsunami that hit the North of the Japan and “don’t give 
up” (gambare) became the spirit of the recovery post-disaster, Natsuko wrote 
about her own personal experience of loss and her attempt not to give in to it:  
 
Since Shuichi passed away, I have tried as hard as I could to look 
forward and move on. I have tried to stand firm, the more so the 
harder it was […] I would want to meet Shuichi with all my heart…But 
I know it’s not going to happen, so I’d rather forget about him. (I know 
I can’t but) I will think of him less and less until the memories almost 
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disappear (omidasu kazu ga hetteshimau kurai ni) and I’ll try hard to 
live my life to the fullest. 
 
After the death of Shuichi, the Kumanos became parents to a baby boy. 
Natsuko said that when the baby was born they sent his pictures to the 
American hospital that had treated Shuichi and the doctors remarked upon his 
resemblance to their late patient. As the baby grew older, however, the 
similarities became less apparent and he developed habits and traits peculiar to 
him alone. During my fieldwork the baby turned two, and Natsuko pointed out 
that he had then passed the age his brother was when he died, disclosing how 
seeing her second son growing up must have given her an acute awareness of 
the time passing by. 
Natsuko was still on maternity leave while I was in Japan, and with her 
baby she often attended events like the Transplant Games. The Kumanos had 
kept in touch with lots of the people they had met through the fund-raising and 
the campaign for the law's reform, and every now and then they gathered 
together with other recipients’ families as well as people from the JOTNW. 
Natsuko herself organised an annual reunion for a few tokō ishoku families in 
the Tokyo area, while also trying to foster networks among mothers who had 
lost a child. She regarded these relationships as a way to provide mutual 
support and considered them all most important, given the small number of 
people who had gone through such an experience and the lack of official 
support. At the same time, she was also aware that everyone’s experience is 
unique, and that, especially for those who had lost a loved one, the experience 
of seeing others who have made it can be tough.   
 
In part it becomes a form of support to see that some patients could 
become healthy. But on the other hand, those who have lost their 
child, and I include myself in this, well to be honest, we envy them. 
The process we went through was the same, wasn’t it? We tried hard 
(mezashita) too. We raised the money too. We bowed our heads for 
help, but our child was not helped. I know there’s no way to change 
this (shikata ga nai); it is what it is. Still… when you see these kids 
who recovered after the transplant, you think it’s wonderful and you 
really wish them all the best and pray they can always be in good 
health, but as soon as you leave them you think: ‘that’s not what 
happened to my son though’. Call it jealousy, or envy; in the end it all 
boils down to the fact that Shu-chan couldn’t make it […] It’s amazing 
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to see healthy children and it makes me realise how wonderful 
transplant medicine is and how when it works well it really produces 
incredible results. Still, my child could not benefit from that. So 
there’s always this gap. I don’t know about other families, but I 
always think of that. It’s the regret about my son's life.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
For patients and their families, sharing their experiences with others who 
have gone through similar events is a way to make sense of life after the 
transplant (see below). There are, however, ruptures and discrepancies across 
people’s experiences that make it difficult to share them, and so for Natsuko 
and other mothers it was hard to find a common sensibility with fellow patients’ 
parents, even though she regarded all of them to be part of the same category 
of tokō ishoku families. 
Distances also existed on more intimate levels. As Natsuko once told me, 
even after more than three years since their son’s death she never talked with 
her husband about Shuichi’s illness. She said they never discussed with each 
other the thoughts and memories of that period as they might well be different in 
some respects. The difficulties in sharing one’s impressions about the 
experience of illness, like the distress of seeing healthy recipients, are glimpses 
into a process of mourning where closure seems reachable only by removing 
the memory of what has happened and the thoughts of what could have been. 
Natsuko’s mourning was, in her words, an attempt to put order into her own 
feelings (kanjo wo seiri suru) by avoiding painful thoughts and memories that 
could drag her back into a past. And she was both resolute and torn about it. 
 
Everything happened in just six months, and it passed like a second. 
It was only after [his death] that I became able to remember my 
feelings, to accept how things had gone and to tell myself that there 
was just no way it could have been different (shikata ga nai). What 
scares me now, three or four years after, is the perception that the 
memory is getting thinner. There are such things, aren’t there? It’s 
not that you forget, but your memory is no longer so vivid. There are 
also moments when memories are almost violent, but I know that if I 
think of him I’ll be exhausted and I’ll become very sad. So I have 
been dealing with my life by trying to not remember, neither the good 
moments nor the bad ones […] It scares me when memories re-
emerge and I realise I had forgotten. But if I think of it everyday, I’ll 
get really depressed. And I don’t want to cry. I don’t want to have sad 
 142 
thoughts. I’ve had plenty already. But before, when he was here, I 
had to think and consider what to do. Now it’s different. Now, no 
matter what I think, he won’t come back. I did everything I could and I 
put all of myself into it, so I’ve come to the point where I can only tell 
my self there was no other way and that it just couldn’t be helped 
(shikata ga nai). I know that’s true, but as the memory of that time –
that feeling of being compelled to act in a certain way, of not having a 
choice – is becoming more indefinite, I’ve also started to ask myself 
why. Before there was no space to think: “what if?”. It was just 
impossible; it was all about what we had to do, as if we had no other 
choice. But now I found myself asking: “what if?”. After I pulled 
myself together and the feelings settled down (ochitsuku), I started to 
wonder more and more often why. I should know better, but as the 
memories are fading away, feelings I had long repressed are coming 
back. That scares me. And on the other hand, sadness too is even 
stronger sometimes.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
 
Clinical Failures: A Political Economy of Death 
 
Despite ostensible differences, for both Natsuko and Yuka grieving was an 
unresolved process. Their experience resonates in many respects those 
described by Smith (2013) in his study of Japanese women’s grief and 
mourning at abortion. Smith argues that the death of a child to parents, and 
especially mothers, remains a form of irreparable loss, and because the child is 
regarded as an extension of the parent’s person, death becomes the loss of 
one’s own self (ibid.). In Japan, the cultural ideology of motherhood as the 
centre of women’s sense of self-worth orients affective relationships so that the 
woman is dependent on the child, and not the other way around (Smith 2013; 
cf. Befu 1971). The contemporary trend of low birth rate and the gendered 
division of labour also play into the social strengthening of the mother-child 
bond, for women devote a great part of their daily work to care of one single 
child. Compounding this social construction of motherhood is the role assigned 
in Japanese contemporary society to children, who are highly valued and 
cherished.39 Particularly with the decline of the birth rate and the shift towards 
                                                
39 See Goodman on how recent demographic trends and the ‘discovery’ of social problems like 
child abuse contributed to creating this role for children (cf. Goodman 2000). 	
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nuclear families, children are the centre of the family, and as studies on 
abortion and reproductive treatment show, sometimes they are subjects of 
affection before they are even born (Smith 2013; Ivry 2010; Kato and 
Sleeboom-Faulkner 2011). This strong mother-child bond, then, is expected to 
be both self-fulfilling for women and socially worthy, because it ‘spoils’ the 
children before they have to face the hardships of school and work life (see 
Allison 1991). 
The discussion presented in the previous chapter shows that the 
experience of illness further reinforces the person’s self identification with one’s 
role as mother, for women are those who take over the care of the sick child. 
They move into the hospital, practically carrying out much of the work of care 
along with the nurses, and they almost never leave the child’s bedside so that 
their lives become completely absorbed by their role as caregivers.  
The mother-child relationship, however, is not the only factor shaping the 
grief of women. Indeed, anthropologists have famously shown that mothers’ 
grief is constructed within specific political economies of death of which notions 
of illness are also an integral part (Scheper-Hughes 1992; Einarsdottir 2004). 
In the narratives Yuka and Natsuko offered of their experiences, death follows 
from but almost contradicts the experience of illness. For Yuka, this took the 
form of bitter regret for the outcome of Sosuke’s fight against the disease, for 
Natsuko it was the unresolved questions of “what if?” 
There is, of course, no answer to the question of “what if?” The disease 
was terminal; the decisions made were clinically wise, taken in good faith, 
and, most significantly, within structural conditions that made them 
compelling. What is more, they made them meaningful. As I have described 
above, and as I further illustrate in the description of the fundraising 
(Chapter 4), the phases before the operation are characterised by the 
intense promise of treatment and the proactive effort of trying to realise the 
transplant. These engender a sense of hope/endurance (gambaru) that is 
self-fulfilling and meaningful and gives people a way of coping with the fact 
that both the process and the final result are ultimately beyond their control.  
Like Natsuko and Yuka, who, faced with overwhelming decisions, had no 
room for doubt, it seems that we too are left poorly equipped to accept deaths 
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like those of Sosuke and Shuichi that result from a failed attempt to save life. 
Sadly, though, the stories of transplant patients are often about 'bad' deaths: the 
death of a child for whom the fundraising was not completed quickly enough; 
the untimely loss of a patient who just managed to get abroad and was only one 
step away from the transplant; the rare complications arising after a miraculous 
surgery; or the story of the child suddenly dying once out of the operating 
theatre while her parents had been sent home by the surgeons who declared 
the intervention a success. Death is always the ultimate unfairness, but perhaps 
it is even more so when it comes as the negation of the promise of “killing 
death” (Bauman 1992: 129). In this sense, these fatal outcomes of heroic 
medical intervention stand in contrast not just to the successful experience of 
healthy recipients, but also to other bad deaths, like brain death.  
Long (1999) for example shows that the idea of ‘shikata ga nai’, which 
Natsuko uses to express her resignation, is drawn upon by terminal patients to 
make sense of death. Shikata ga nai or shōganai is a concept used frequently 
in Japanese, which translates as ‘it cannot be helped’. It conveys a meaning 
opposite to hope (gambaru), but also to the idea of ‘holding no regrets’ (kōkai 
shinai) (see Chapter 2). It is not necessarily a negative resignation. For terminal 
patients, Long (1999) argues, it becomes a way to exert a form of control over 
an inevitable death. For Natsuko, quite differently, it expressed the discrepancy 
between treatment expectations and outcome.  
Although highly controversial and disturbingly problematic, medical 
intervention at the end-of-life is openly construed as a matter of concern for 
medicine and society as a whole (Kauffman 2002, 2006). Subsumed within the 
category of end-of-life, states like brain death and other conditions most 
commonly treated in ICU and hospices confront us with the question of how to 
reconcile the mission of medicine to save lives, with the fact that medicine is 
increasingly charged with the task of managing death. Any debate on the end-
of-life is obviously determined by the definition of when life is about to end (cf. 
Chapter 6). The non-consequential and uncertain clinical paths I explored in the 
previous chapter demonstrate how it is particularly difficult to trace such lines 
and open the door to accommodate death within the logic of a high-end curative 
treatment like transplant.  
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While the significance of death in the economy of transplantation medicine 
is usually discussed in relation to brain death and organ donation (Sharp 2006), 
the experiences of Yuka and Natsuko point to an equally important aspect of 
this treatment, especially in light of what is discussed in the previous chapter: 
how to reconcile expectations and outcomes. From this perspective, the 
experiences of grieving parents, while sharply different, resonate with the lives 
of healthy recipients.  
 
 
Takeshi: Coming Back and Following-Up 
 
In sharp contrast to the deaths of Shuichi and Sosuke are the lives of those who 
made it through successfully, although sometimes it took many twists and turns, 
as I will show in this section.  
Nakajima-san and Takeshi stayed in America for the unusually long period 
of ten months. 40  Shortly after the transplant, Takeshi suffered a brain 
haemorrhage and went into a coma from which doctors couldn’t tell whether or 
not he would ever recover, or in what condition. He suffered severe brain 
damage and had to undergo a long period of rehabilitation. During this time, he 
experienced a second life-threatening crisis. It was the night before he was 
supposed to be discharged, when the boy’s new heart suddenly stopped. It was 
a timely moment to go into cardiac arrest, Nakajima-san thought in hindsight, as 
the treatment promptly available at the hospital made it possible to save his life 
yet another time.  
As soon as the child was stable enough to make the journey, Takeshi and 
Mariko returned to Japan. Before going home, however, they spent a further six 
months at Hospital J, because the boy needed close care, and Maeda-sensei 
took over again as Takeshi’s physician. Nakajima-san remembered one of their 
first sessions with the physician. The brain damage had left Takeshi almost 
paralysed in one arm, but other than that he had not suffered permanent 
consequences or cognitive impairments because his young brain was 
                                                40	Compared to the usual two to three months recipients spend overseas before returning home 
where they can rely on insurance coverage for their after care.	
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adaptable enough to compensate for the severe damage. As Maeda-san 
checked his patient’s records from the overseas hospital, he could hardly match 
the picture of the CT scan, half black because of the vast area of tissues that 
had been damaged, with the image of the healthy boy in front of him. “You 
really came back to life (seikan)!” He apparently exclaimed.  
Years later, I joined Mariko and Takeshi on the occasion of another 
appointment with Maeda-sensei. Once every two to four weeks, Nakajima-san 
drove to Tokyo from their hometown, a couple of hours from the capital, for 
Takeshi’s follow-up visit. That day, their appointment was scheduled early in the 
morning.  When I arrived at Hospital J, Nakajima-san and Takeshi had just 
finished and were waiting for other patients to head out to lunch together. Since 
we had some time to kill, we seized the chance to pop down to the paediatric 
unit a couple of floor below to visit Mai, another patient of Maeda-sensei who at 
the time had just come back from the States.41 Nakajima-san got to know Mai 
and her mother after the girl was hospitalised at Maeda-sensei’s unit, and this 
was the first time they had met following the operation.  
When we got to the girl’s room, the nurses at the reception told us that Mai 
was momentarily away for treatment, so we sat down in one of the waiting 
rooms. Shortly after, Ai showed up. Taking advantage of Mai’s clinical routine, 
she had left the hospital to quickly grab some food at the convenience store 
down the road. Without much ceremony, Ai devoured her ready meal raising 
her head from the bentō box only to tell Nakajima-san of how tired she was. 
The operation had gone well, but Mai had suffered some complications and still 
needed to be at the hospital. She was not in danger for her life, but she was 
temporarily on artificial feeding for complications from the surgery. Ai could 
hardly find a moment to have a meal too now that girl couldn’t eat, and so she 
squeezed out of the room when she could to go to the closest store or, at the 
very worst, to the toilets down the corridor where she had hidden a box of 
biscuits.  Ai had hoped that once back from the States she could go home; now 
she was looking forward to being discharged in time for New Year’s Eve.  
Ai was visibly pleased to have someone to talk with, but she was short of 
time to chat and had to rush to shower before Mai’s therapy was over. 
                                                
41 Her story is told in Chapter 4. 
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Nakajima-san offered to look after the girl so that she could take her time. 
Shortly after she returned, Yosuke called and Mariko, Takeshi and I left to have 
lunch.  
Yosuke was a young man in his twenties, who had also received a heart 
transplant in the U.S.A. as a child. Nakajima-san had already introduced us at 
the Transplant Games where they were hanging out with a small group of other 
recipients of different ages from Hospital J. Among them Takeshi, who was not 
yet even ten, very clearly liked to hang around with Yosuke and another young 
man who was also in his early twenties, teasing them, wrestling and playing 
with the older boys.  
Takeshi was in good health, quite a handful to tell the truth, and had never 
had major problems after the transplant. In the family restaurant we headed to 
after the hospital visit, Takeshi and Yosuke were talking animatedly in one 
corner as Nakajima-san and I chatted over lunch. As the mother of a transplant 
recipient, she said she was aware that Takeshi might have problems with his 
health, and then added under her breath that I shouldn’t mention anything to 
him. 
For parents of young recipients, school is the place where these sort of 
concerns are first confronted. Returning to life after the transplant generally 
means going back to school or work, and indeed the very efficacy of 
transplantation is measured up against the ideal of shakai fukki (see Chapter 2). 
For young recipients this return to society primarily means going back to school 
and making friends with other kids. One of the worries recipients’ parents most 
commonly voiced was bullying (ijime), a widespread phenomenon in Japan that 
is related to the conformity and competitiveness of the school system42. Even 
before the operation, Nakajima-san had had trouble with Takeshi’s school. 
Once she was asked to take the boy home if he needed the toilet because he 
could not use the ones provided. Even though after the transplant Takeshi was 
doing fine, she still had to be with him during school trips (and pay her own way 
to do so) because no one would take the responsibility of having a disabled 
child with the group.  
                                                42	See Yoneyama (1999). 
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In Japan, transplant recipients are recognised as disabled (shōgaisha) and 
are entitled to social welfare benefits and financial assistance for the expensive 
post-operative treatment. The system spares them in part the economic 
hardships of care that Sharp documented as bringing many American patients 
to the brink of bankruptcy, making clinical compliance a short-sighted fantasy 
(2006, 1999; Gordon et al. 2008)43. On the other hand, however, ‘coming back 
to life’ only to be disabled is hardly what anyone might hope, especially in a 
highly conformist society where the label of disability is still widely accompanied 
by prejudice. Nakamura illustrates attitudes towards disability (in her case, 
deafness) in Japan, describing the pressure to conform at school, the 
assumption that differently-abled people lack the capacity of being independent 
and contributing members of society, and the prejudice against marrying 
disabled people (especially women) for fear that children would inherit their 
‘impure blood’ (2006). Disability, as Nakamura shows, is traditionally associated 
with impurity (kegare, see Chapter 1), and people suffering from it were 
therefore ostracised from society in a similar way to the burakumin, Japan’s 
largest minority group that has been long discriminated against because it is 
associated with polluting occupations such as undertakers, tanners and others 
(Amos 2011).  
Fearing social stigma, transplant patients of an older generation reported 
concerns that their status as disabled would compromise their chances of 
finding a job, relegating them to occupations within the disabled quota; or that 
their state of health might affect their chances of finding partners and building a 
family (JTRO 1994). For healthy recipients, long-term survival is characterised 
by the risk of rejection and life-long medication with its attendant side effects, so 
that Ikels writes that becoming a recipient means in fact to “exchange one 
illness with another” (2013: 93). The condition of being an ishokusha therefore 
elicits specific strategies of re-moulding patienthood into one’s social persona 
(see Sharp 1995, 2006; Tomomatsu 2013). In this sense, the positive 
acceptance of shakai fukki, as promoted by patients’ groups, can be seen as a 
                                                
43 In fact, insurance coverage doesn’t include the entire costs of treatment, let alone the 
expenses patients’ families incur in attending follow-up visits at medical centres often located far 
away from when they live, so almost everyone complained of the financial burden of the after-
care.	
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crucial part of the cultural work of validating the efficacy of transplantation 
medicine.  
After their return from the States, Takeshi took part in the school sports 
day, a highlight of the Japanese school year, and competed in a race with his 
classmates. Naakajima-san told me that after the game the school head 
approached her and commented on Takeshi’s running style, defining it as 
unpleasant to see (because of his immobile arm). “He never accepted disabled 
children,” said Nakajima-san, “because he thinks they are just a burden and 
that they contribute nothing.” On the other hand, she added, the parents on the 
bleachers cheered Takeshi whole-heartedly regardless of his physical problem, 
or maybe, one could speculate, because of it, since they probably knew very 
well his story through the fundraising campaign. 
Excessive attention is as much a concern as negative prejudice for the 
families who travelled overseas. The fund-raising forces people to go public 
about their disease, which is the reason why Maeda-sensei often warns his 
patients to conduct low-profile campaigns and limit media exposure. For 
Nakajima-san, this led to quite extreme consequences, when she returned to 
her hometown and noticed that Takeshi was stalked by a woman who, it turned 
out, had become obsessed with the child, following his story in the media.  
Although similar cases are rare, the fund-raising arguably puts young 
patients under intense public scrutiny. It attracts overwhelming attention, to the 
point of turning children into subjects of compassion if not pity, and if this 
visibility works well to prompt fast donations during the campaign, it can leave 
people exposed once the whole experience is over and they have to return to 
everyday life (cf. Chapter 4). It also requires families to publicly disclose 
information and details about the patient’s disease, which most people 
described as being highly unpleasant and uncomfortable because disease, like 
disability, is associated with physical and therefore social difference (Ohnuki-
Tierney 1994). From this perspective, Tomomatsu shows how Japanese 
recipients, especially of an older generation, internalise social stigma about 
their condition as well as their medical history (2013). Nakajima-san, for 
example, expressed concern that even though Takeshi was in good health, the 
simple fact of having done the fund-raising and having received a transplant 
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could make him vulnerable to unnecessary pressure: “Like when people ask: 
‘but can you do this?’ or ‘are you able to do that?’” In this sense, the life after 
the transplant at risk of nullifying the very therapeutic effect of ‘returning to a 
normal life’. 
When I met Nakajima-san and Takeshi more than five years had passed 
since the operation. Things were going well and their lives had settled again. 
The journey overseas, the surgery and the following complications seemed a 
dim memory, probably a blurred one for Takeshi who was very young at that 
point. Transplantation, however, was still very much part of their life, in the form 
of occasional events like the Transplant Games, as well as through the monthly 
check-ups with Maeda-sensei and the daily routine of medication.  
The therapeutic experience of transplantation is often construed through 
the trope of ‘returning to life’. As in a comment Maeda-sensei reportedly made 
about Takeshi's recovery, the imagery can convey the powerful idea of an 
almost miraculous technology that “alone can make the impossible achievable” 
(Awa 2009: 96; cf. Sharp 2006). Unsurprisingly, post-transplant life is never 
talked about in terms of survival rates once one starts living it (such statistics 
being mentioned only in relation to treatment choice), and is rather envisioned 
in terms of a return to a life that is both physically and socially fulfilling. Cast in 
this way, transplantation becomes almost a rite of passage from illness to 
health (Crowley-Matoka 2005). The therapeutic experience is fixed to the time 
of the operation and to the period immediately preceding it, and these phases 
are emphatically described as momentous, riddled with uncertainties and 
emotionally overwhelming. As with the tragic deaths discussed, the recoveries 
are often extraordinary, and symbolically represent the conclusion of the phase 
of transition before life can return to what it was, or is supposed to be, without 
the disease.  
The experiences of Nakajima-san and Takeshi thus show that the 
therapeutic experience continues into one’s life after surgery. Miracles are 
made up of precarious ordinariness, and ‘returning to life’ involves the 
continuous labour of following-up. As with Takehsi’s brain after the 
haemorrhage, life readapts to a new state of normality; one, however, where 
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normality is always endangered by clinical complications as well as the 
awareness of one’s history and condition. 
 
 
The Aftercare 
 
Clinical follow-ups, like those Takeshi attends every few weeks at Hospital J, 
are routine for transplant recipients. After the transplant, recipients are 
dependent on a complex regime of medication to keep rejection under control, 
and have to comply with regular monitoring to track the effects of drug therapy 
and to adjust it accordingly. For this specialised post-operative care, people 
continue to refer to the medical centre where they received the operation. Since 
transplantation is an elective and high-end treatment, and a higher volume of 
patients often translate into better clinical outcomes, only selected hospitals run 
transplant programmes, and these become places recipients concentrate 
around. Those who travelled overseas for treatment usually remain under the 
care of the physician who arranged for the operation abroad, meaning that 
many refer for care to hospitals located in cities quite far away from where they 
live, like the Satos who commuted monthly between Tokyo and Osaka for Aya’s 
visits.  
As the number of patients (at least those treated abroad) is quite limited, 
these periodical check-ups are often scheduled on the same day and become 
an occasion for recipients and their kin to meet up with friends and 
acquaintances they would rarely get the chance to see otherwise. Month after 
month, newcomers join as well. Some are in the process of preliminary 
consultations, others are waiting to leave and still others have just begun to 
attend the hospital for their aftercare, if the operation went well. In some cases, 
it is the physician himself who introduces former recipients to new candidates, 
in order to facilitate the exchange of information. Other times, even though the 
doctor might want to protect their patients’ privacy, it is enough to see an 
unfamiliar face in the waiting room to guess the identity and story of the new 
patient, for both fund-raising campaigns to go abroad and the even rarer 
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operations performed in Japan are usually reported in the news and can be 
easily kept track of.  
Directly or through hearsay, patients get to know and follow-up each other, 
and friendships are forged around these periodical meetings. Recipients and 
their caregivers would take advantage of the appointment with the physician to 
visit any hospitalised friends, and sometimes organised the journey to the 
hospital together. They would chat in the waiting room, keeping updated with 
each other’s lives and asking abut those who might have missed a few visits to 
make sure they are doing well. They catch up with those returning from abroad 
during the first critical months after the intervention, often having followed their 
experience through the pre-operative hospitalisation and the fundraising.  
In the long run, and in the absence of professional support from figures 
like social workers or transplant coordinators (these last dealing only with 
recipients treated in Japan), socialisation among fellow patients becomes a 
form of mutual help, both emotional and practical. In their everyday life 
interactions, recipients and their families can be uncomfortable and unwilling to 
disclose too much about their condition, especially if it is problematic. On the 
other hand, the sense of gratitude (kansha) for the life saving gift of an organ 
and for the support received through the fund-raising can translate into a feeling 
of being disenfranchised from openly voicing concerns about life after the 
operation44.  
In contrast, the common routine of care and the occasional meetings 
outside of the hospital, like the gatherings Natsuko was keen to organise, bring 
recipients and their families in touch with people who already know about their 
condition and have gone through similar experiences. A shared medical history 
thus becomes the centre around which solidarity and interpersonal bonding are 
built (cf. Radin 2005). For some people, these interactions are the means 
through which to organise their experience of illness and treatment, while for 
others retreating from such exchanges can be a way to achieve a sense of 
having overcome the disease. In this way, patients’ socialisation becomes a 
                                                44	Fox and Swazey (1978) and Sharp (2006) similarly note how the metaphor of ‘the gift of life’ 
robs people of the possibility of voicing complaints about the post-operative problems and can 
result in a sense of guilt towards the donor in case of rejection or health complications.			
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way to mask or express anxieties about the illness experience, whatever its 
epilogue.  
 
Whether one’s child has died or recovered successfully, we all 
went overseas for the transplant; we all did the fund-raising, and 
that’s a really extreme experience. We’re just a few people in Japan 
[who have gone through this]. For some, I think, it’s hard to go public 
about such an experience: some might have gone through a lot of 
trouble to raise the money, and for all the families who received 
support and comprehension, there are also those who had problems. 
In our case, we had the support of our families and a lot of people 
around us. So in a way it’s hard to complain when so many people 
have helped you; you feel like you can only be grateful. That’s why 
every now and then the few of us who share this experience get 
together. It makes you feel like everyone has endured a lot. It feels 
good for example to meet for the festivities throughout the year: 
during the year there might have been bad things, or maybe there 
was nothing bad at all, but when we get together I feel somehow 
relieved. I feel that we all endured together and we’re still together. It 
kind of gives me the strength to do my best also in the future.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
 
The Networks of Transplant Recipients and their Caregivers 
 
Along with fellow recipients, patients also develop a close relationship with their 
doctor (sensei), one of both confidentiality and dependence (see Tomomatsu 
2013: 135). The transplant overseas builds an intense bond with the physician, 
further reinforced through the regular follow-up care. Recipients and their 
caregivers often identify themselves as patients of one doctor (sensei no kanja) 
or members of the group of another (sensei no gumi). Physicians become 
familiar figures: sometimes they hang out with patients after their visits or on the 
occasion of educational events about transplantation, and they often remain in 
touch also with those whose children couldn’t make it, like Kumano-san. At the 
same time, they act as gatekeepers of patients’ socialisation. They encourage 
their participation in events like the Transplant Games, or limit their interactions 
so as to protect their privacy, taking care so that those who are going through 
hard times or who are facing a difficult recovery don’t feel forced to be around 
healthy recipients. 
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The networks of recipients, their caregivers and medical professionals play 
a crucial role in shaping the experience of treatment. Seeking advice from 
patients and their families enables potential candidates, like the young couple 
who met Kumano-san at the Transplant Games, to envision life after the 
transplant in ways relevant to formulating their choice (see also Chapter 2). But 
the need for mutual support and peer exchange among fellow patients doesn’t 
end with the operation. Sharing information, concerns and advice is a way to 
negotiate the small and large issues of life after the operation for which one 
shouldn’t bother to contact the physician. As with Nakajima-san’s problems with 
Takeshi’s school, most of these issues are in fact better discussed among peers 
rather than with a medical expert, for they escape clinical concern and rather 
have to do with questions of how to balance care with the commitments and 
leisure of everyday life, how to cope with going back to school or work, or how 
to be responsible for the after-care on behalf of underage patients.  
If clinical appointments and informal gatherings are the commonest 
occasions for recipients and their families to meet up, patients’ organisations 
and even individual physicians regularly run public events where patients’ 
participation is key. Both Kitana-sensei and Maeda-sensei, for example, are 
famous for their annual public lectures, like the one Arai-san attended when he 
was considering listing his daughter for the transplant. These seminars, at least 
the ones I took part in, host talks by medical doctors, researchers, and 
transplant coordinators, as well as the testimonies of 'their' patients, who 
sometimes travel from distant provinces to attend. At Maeda-sensei’s seminar, 
for example, a first panel including talks by various professionals in the field of 
transplantation was followed by a session entirely dedicated to recipients and 
their kin. Patients took turns on the stage to briefly talk about their experiences 
(usually pointing out what type of transplant they received and when). After the 
presentations, chairs were pushed against the walls to clear space for a small 
buffet, and the last hours of the day were spent chatting with fellow recipients 
and a few members of the medical staff from Hospital J, the cardiac unit. 
Bringing together recipients’ families, medical experts, volunteers from 
associations like NIT Japan, and occasionally donor kin, these events foster the 
consolidation of what is called the ‘transplant community’ (komyunitii). The idea 
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of a transplant community is not peculiar to Japan, and one can rather guess 
the inspiration comes from overseas. These forms of socialisation are 
intrinsically linked with the nature of the treatment, for patients are dependent 
on and tied to the medical world for the rest of their lives after the operation, if 
nothing but for follow-up care (Siminoff and Chillag 1999). Yet the degree to 
which people might get involved, and the extent to which they feel able to share 
their experiences obviously vary. For each person who attends events like the 
Transplant Games, there are others who avoid these situations because they 
choose to prioritise activities unrelated to transplantation; still others seemed to 
take part only in the seminars organised by the doctor they directly feel linked 
to.  
More than belonging to a community, then, recipients are part of what 
Nakajima-san described as horizontal ‘networks' (nettowaku), as opposed to the 
presumably vertical relationship between patients and doctors. Patients’ 
position within the world of transplantation, with both its institutional 
organisations and its shared imageries and rhetoric, is not a fixed one. They 
move along these networks pulling strategically on their connections as they 
work around and take advantage of their position as recipients of medical care. 
The modes and dynamics of these interactions change, so that comparing for 
example the experiences of the first generation of patients with those of the 
families of young children it appears how the rise in the number of patients and 
the easier accessibility of information on-line have made formal membership in 
patients’ associations less relevant than in the past, where patients’ groups 
acted like the key centre for guidance on treatment and practical support after 
surgery (see also Chapter 5). 
These forms of sociality are therefore crucial for recipients in order to 
make sense of their life after the transplant. On the other hand, however, the 
relationship is mutual and patients are indeed essential – one could argue even 
instrumental (cf. Sharp 2006; cf. Ben-David 2005) – in the clinical success of 
transplantation. The Transplant Games are a case in point. The event is a 
performance of health and fitness, meant to convey the greatness of 
transplantation (ishoku no subarashisa wo tsutaeru). Through these kinds of 
practices and rhetoric, healthy recipients become the living testimonies for the 
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efficacy of transplantation, a role they often take consciously upon themselves 
out of gratitude (Siminoff and Chillag 1999)45. While sharing one’s personal 
experience is a way to make sense of it, life histories are also traded, in the 
sense that they collected and celebrated as evidence of the miracle of 
transplantation medicine. From this perspective, recipients do not simply rely on 
professionals’ expertise and friends’ tips; their lives become a form of 
knowledge in and of themselves, measured in survival rates, shared as advice, 
and memorialised in the form of educational campaigns on organ donation.46   
Writing about America, Sharp (1995, cf. 2006) has amply discussed the 
relationship between recipients, donors, and the medical establishment in the 
field of transplant in relation to what she calls the “ideological underpinnings of 
transplantation”. Sharp notes, for example, that the all but rare complications of 
long-term survival are carefully silenced in recipients’ public accounts of the 
post-operative life, and shows how patients’ real experiences often appear in 
stark contrast to the rhetoric of health which is at the core of the transplant 
ideology. Sharp uses as an example the comparison between HIV/AIDS and 
transplantation, which is strongly discouraged despite the clinical similarities, 
and argues that the emphasis on health that informs the official and public 
representation of the post-transplant life can in fact deprive patients of any 
recognition of their distress. In this sense, Sharp argues, recipients’ suffering, 
like donor kin’s grief, is sanitised so as not to undermine the task of donation 
and the social worth of the transplantation enterprise (2006). Giving voice to 
American recipients’ experiences, Ben-David even argues that patients are left 
at the mercy of doctors’ false promises of immortality, which are ultimately 
driven by the professional ambition of the medical entourage more than by the 
realistic commitment to enhance patient’s health (2005).  
These arguments show how the post-transplant life of recipients (and 
donor kin) is tightly interwoven with the question of transplantation efficacy in 
the public arena. This is particularly true in Japan, where the technology of 
                                                45	One	example	is	the	poster	Sato-san	proposed	with	the	JOTNW,	which	would	feature	pictures	of	various	 transplant	 recipients	 and	was	 to	 be	 used	 in	 promotional	 campaigns	 to	 encourage	 organ	donation	to	show	how	people	can	get	healthy	after	the	treatment.		46 	The	 JOTNW,	 for	 example,	 publishes	 a	 monthly	 newsletter	 called	 Think	 Transplant	 with	recipients’	stories.	
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transplantation has been for a long time vehemently contested. From this 
perspective, the experience of Japanese patients complicates the critique 
advanced by North American anthropologists. In Japan, patients strategically 
harness their connections with the medical establishment in order to pursue 
care (Chapter 2), and while physicians act in many ways as the gatekeepers of 
patients’ socialisation by virtue of their medical authority, recipients and their 
families also seem to cultivate and rely upon informal networks of mutual 
solidarity. Far from being victims of unscrupulously ambitions doctors or passive 
recipients of care, Japanese patients have been actively engaged in the 
creation of the local transplant community and can be said to have played a 
crucial role not only in public promotion but in the legal regulation of this 
medical technology (Chapter 5). In the same way, they are also active subjects 
in the way they negotiate their personal and social experience as transplant 
patients.  
 
 
‘Transplanted Persons’: Overcoming and Performing 
Patienthood 
 
Hasabe-san was in his forties and belonged to the first generation of Japanese 
transplant recipients. He received his heart transplant in the early 1990s in 
America, when in Japan brain dead organ donation was not permitted. At the 
time of the operation, Hasabe-san was in his early twenties; he had been 
diagnosed with DCM a few years before, and since then had been in a routine 
of frequent hospitalisations. His condition degenerated into heart failure and 
without the artificial support that was now available, his physician gave him a 
prognosis of no longer than one year. It was his Japanese doctor, Hasabe-san 
said, who proposed the option of the transplant.  
At the time, Hasabe-san told me, transplantation was a matter of great 
public interest in Japan because of the debate over the law that would authorise 
organ procurement from brain dead patients. In discussing the decision process 
and the consultation with the medical staff, Hasabe-san emphasised the 
negative imageries that surrounded transplantation at the time and that weighed 
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heavily on his choice: besides the notorious contestation of the ethics of organ 
procurement, transplantation was commonly regarded as an unsafe procedure, 
and the life after it was depicted as fraught with clinical complications and 
similar to the badly stigmatised condition of HIV/AIDS. He also thought that one 
of the most evident differences in the staff that assisted him in America was that 
the Japanese coordinator couldn’t provide more than clinical information and 
lacked practical knowledge about recipients’ real lives after the operation, for 
there were almost no heart recipients in the country at the time, and this shaped 
the way in which he approached treatment as a candidate. 
The talks with the Japanese coordinator, however, enabled him to 
overcome his guilt and the fear of negative judgment by re-considering organ 
donation in a positive light, not as a sacrifice but as a gift out of willingness to 
help others. His story resonates with the point anthropologists have made, 
arguing that metaphorical images of organ donation frame the use of the human 
body as a therapeutic resource contributing to the acceptance of organ 
transplant by both recipients and the general public (Hogle 1999; Healy 2006; 
Joralemon 1995). Sharp, for example, analyses the trope of the gift and the 
attending personification of the organ to discuss the recipients’ reconstruction of 
selfhood in the post-transplant life (1994). Yamazaki describes similar dynamics 
in the way Japanese patients make sense of the therapeutic experience by 
imagining a relationship with the person of the donor as embodied in the organ 
(2009). Sasaki (2008) argues that the image of the 'relay of life' apparently took 
over in Japan as an alternative to the 'gift of life' because it offered a culturally 
more attuned way of framing anonymous donation in a society where gift 
exchange is deeply embedded in networks of reciprocity (cf. Rupp 2003). 
Tomomatsu describes that through the metaphor of the ‘relay of life’ Japanese 
recipients ascribe life to the organ and thus overcome the guilt towards the 
sacrifice of the donor by imagining donation as an act through which the donor 
lives on (2013: 169). 
Hasabe-san too relied on this metaphor, but he elaborated on it with his 
own imagery about his relationship with the donor.  
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Transplant is often called the relay of life (inochi no rirei), but I don’t 
think that’s the case. To me it’s more like a three-legged race (ninin 
sankyaku) […] It’s like I’m walking with my donor, not just the organ 
but the donor. It’s not so much a mental image; it’s [how I think of it]. 
In the end it’s my donor who is sustaining me, because without the 
heart I wouldn’t be alive. I mean, body parts are body parts, but it’s 
like through them the donor and I have become one. And to me 
that’s like walking side by side with someone else. But if [the 
transplant] was like a relay race one would be able to move freely. In 
a three-legged race instead you often stumble and fall. As in a three-
legged race, there are those who cannot walk and can only toddle, 
those whose rhythm doesn’t match, those who fall and those who 
can run really fast. If it were a relay, getting the baton would be the 
end of the donor’s [presence]. Instead for me, even after all this time, 
this heart is still not mine. It’s my donor’s. 
(Hasabe-san) 
 
Alongside the issues of death and body ownership, the complex work of 
imagining the relationship with the donor becomes, in the words of Hasabe-san, 
a way to make sense of the responsibility and uncertainty that characterise the 
condition of being an organ recipient.  
More than twenty years after he received the new heart, and after a 
sequence of crises and more stable periods, Hasabe-san was listed for a 
second transplant in Japan when I met him. 
 
One month after the transplant I suffered a severe rejection crisis, 
and then again half a year later [I went into rejection another time]. 
My condition was, how can I say, quite poor (omowashikunai), so at 
the beginning I was very careful to take care of my health (taichō no 
kanri). But as my situation improved I kind of let myself go. Almost 
ten years after the transplant I started to feel I wanted to do 
something with my life. I found a job [as salaryman], and as I started 
to work, work became the most important thing, more important than 
the donor. My employers and colleagues knew about my condition 
and I had informed them that there were things that could be 
physically too hard for me. Still, I didn’t want to be spoiled […] For 
almost ten years since my transplant, I had put in a lot of effort to 
help promote and develop transplantation medicine (ishoku iryō no 
keihatsu to suishin) [by taking part in advocacy initiatives by 
transplant recipients]. I devoted a lot of energy to that, on top of 
having to take care of my physical condition (jibun no taichō kanri). 
So, in a way, my life after the transplant was about nothing else but 
the transplant (ishoku igo no seikatsu ha ishoku shika nai to iu 
seikatsu shiteita). Then at one point I started to question that: what 
was the worth of all the efforts spent to get healthy again (sekkaku 
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genki to natta nanda ka)? One reason why I got to thinking about that 
was that, right at that time, I lost my mother to a disease. I [found 
myself alone and] had to take care of my life. I had to find a job. I 
wanted to build an independent life (jiritsu seikatsu taterō) and do 
well on my work (shigoto ni gambaru). But eventually it took over, or 
maybe I wasn’t able to take care of everything. Anyway, once I 
started working I ended up prioritising that [aspect of my life] and 
wasn’t able to manage well enough [with my medical care]. That’s 
something I’m struggling with now (hansei suru). I feel like I forgot 
about my donor. If you feel grateful toward the donor you have to 
adjust your life, even if busy, so that you don’t forget about 
medication and if you’re overworked you can take time off, and so 
on. I didn’t do it. It was very appealing to be healthy again after 
having done so much to get there, [and I wanted to make the most of 
it]. I wanted to prove I could do everything normal people can do 
(futsū no hito no onaji yōni dekirundatte). But that was a mistake.   
(Hasabe-san) 
 
Hasabe-san’s narration brings to the fore the tensions at the core of the 
post-transplant life. His experience illustrates how completely taking up the 
identity of a transplant recipient can become an obstacle to developing a 
socially and personally fulfilling life, while on the other hand the attempt to 
engage in a supposedly normal lifestyle got in the way of caring about his 
condition. Crowley Matoka finds very similar dynamics in the experience of 
Mexican organ recipients, in this case further aggravated by sharply unequal 
access to care, and describes the condition of being a transplant recipient as 
one of “persistent patienthood” (2005:  828; 827).  
For transplant recipients, the negotiation of patienthood indeed takes the 
form of the refutation of the role of patient.  
 
Even now there are still some doctors who would use the expression 
transplant patients (kanja). But transplant patients are not patients. 
We don’t need to think of ourselves as patients (kanja ishiki de 
nakutemo ii). Obviously we have to take care of ourselves (jikō 
kanri), but we’re not patients. We can do everything that normally-
abled people (kenjōsha) do. So I think that to live as a transplanted 
person (ishokusha) means to live as a healthy, normal person 
(kenjōsha). 
(Nakamichi-san) 
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The very word ishokusha47 was an invention of Nakamichi-san, the former 
leader of the Japan Ishokusha Association and probably the most famous 
transplant advocate in Japan (see Chapter 5). The negation of patienthood, or 
in Nakamichi-san’s terms the act of “getting rid of one’s awareness of being a 
patient” (kanja ishiki wo suteru)48 is a refutation of a condition associated not 
just with physical and social impairment. The efficacy of transplant, therefore, is 
gauged against the expectations of leading a life that conforms with certain 
social expectations. Fitting in at school, finding a good job, and, especially for 
women, getting married and becoming a parent are all widely shared, and 
almost hegemonic assumptions of what a ‘normal’ life is in Japan. Working hard 
and being committed is particularly praised in Japan (Gordon 1996) and, as the 
story of Hasabe-san illustrates, it is in this public arena that the therapeutic 
efficacy of transplant is gauged. In this sense, similar to what Traphagan (2000) 
writes about boke (aging), ishokusha can be viewed as a moral concept tied to 
the social responsibility to be an active and contributing member of society by 
taking care of one’s health and avoiding becoming a burden on others (2000). 
Health, it appears, is defined not by the absence of disease but as a “margin of 
tolerance for the inconsistencies of the environment” (Canguilhem 1991: 197).  
Adding to this, Hasabe-san’s life as a long-term recipient shows that the 
question of how to negotiate the therapeutic efficacy of transplantation is not 
confined to the political agenda of patients’ advocacy, as how to live as a 
transplanted person remains a quandary for any recipient and her caregivers. 
From this perspective, his life after the transplant well illustrates that if health is 
a ‘margin of tolerance’, it is one that has to be constantly conquered and 
policed. Repeated over and again is the idea that transplant recipients have to 
exert control over their life (jikō kanri) because their very life depends on 
compliance with their after care. In a book published by Nakamichi-san’s 
organisation, and collecting the scripts of one of their meetings, the idea of ‘self-
management’ (jikō kanri) is discussed in terms of “responsibility towards life 
itself” (inochi ni taisuru sekinin), meaning the biological life of the organ, and 
                                                47	The word, in fact, is used interchangeably with the terms ‘recipients’ (resipiento) taken from 
the English equivalent, and ‘patient’ (kanja), employed when talking of relationships with the 
medical staff. 
48 Personal communication. 
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therefore of the donor and the recipient alike (JTRO 1994). While health is 
imagined as the overcoming of the consciousness about one’s condition, care 
brings the body back to self-awareness as a subject of conscious, even 
obligatory, intervention. In this way, to define the precariousness of health is not 
its opposite (disease or clinical complications), but its necessary prerequisite: 
care.  
Anthropologists, as I have argued, usually deploy the trope of the gift to 
discuss the post-operative life, analysing clinical compliance in terms of 
gratitude towards the donor, and discussing both the positive and “ideological” 
meanings of the metaphor of the gift in enabling recipients to construe the 
incorporation of a stranger’s organ and/or disenfranchising them from the 
possibility of voicing their concerns and claims. While these analyses are 
insightful in many respects, the concepts of awareness as a recipient (kanja 
ishiki) and responsibility towards life (inochi ni taisuru sekinin), which I borrowed 
from the narratives of the Japanese recipients themselves, offer a more 
challenging angle of analysis, for they bring to the fore the shifting meanings of 
embodiment instead of focusing on symbolic representation. In this way, they 
open some new space to look at transplantation efficacy in relation to our 
conceptual understanding of the body as a subject of therapeutic intervention.     
 
 
Aya’s Care 
 
Over the summer, Kanemaru-san informed me that Endo-sensei and the 
Japanese Ishokusha Association were organising a two-day camp for young 
organ recipients and their families. Knowing they were recruiting staff, I applied 
as a volunteer, specifying my role as a researcher and my connections with 
some of the families under the care of Endo-sensei.  
The reply was immediate, and from Endo-sensei himself. He let me know 
that the deadline for applications was closed but said they could still make an 
exception, considering I had been introduced by Kanemaru-san. He also added 
I would have to organise my journey and stay by myself, but didn’t provide any 
information about where the other attendants/volunteers were booked, neither 
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did he direct me to the organising committee for more details. My guess that I 
was allowed at the camp as an unwelcomed presence only to not disappoint 
Kanemaru-san was confirmed by Endo-sensei’s prohibiting me from asking the 
young recipients and their families any questions about their experience of the 
transplant. Considering that it was an event about transplantation, the request 
was the closest we could get to me not attending at all, and so I didn’t.  
However annoyed I felt at the time, my failure to attend the camp got me 
thinking about the dynamics of patients’ socialisation and how, as Natsuko 
described above, there are gaps and distances across which experiences 
cannot be shared. Even just reminding people that there was such a thing as a 
transplant experience, and that it was something peculiar to them, could be a 
source of distress for the young recipients and their families. As Endo-sensei 
pointed out, it would in fact spoil the spirit of a camp that aimed at providing an 
escape from the worries people already faced in everyday life as an organ 
recipient. In a way, the very idea of the camp was that being cared for should 
also include being allowed not to care. 
I later heard about the camp from Sato-san, who took part with her 
husband and Aya. While the girl was busy with the activities organised for the 
children, the Satos sat in on a few talks for recipients’ kin. Sayaka told me she 
particularly enjoyed the seminars where older patients, who like her daughter 
had received the transplant overseas at a young age, discussed their 
experience of attending school, finding employment and becoming adults as 
organ recipients. The questions discussed at the camp were not just matters for 
an occasional chat but frequently debated issues in the Satos’ household.  
Her husband, Sayaka told me, would have liked Aya to become actively 
involved in promoting organ donation. Sato Keisuke was particularly passionate 
about reading up on transplantation and frequently attended public events 
concerning it, from study groups at the MHLW, to other patients’ fundraising 
campaigns. He used to bring his daughter over when he could, and he wanted 
her to be knowledgeable about the treatment and actively involved in transplant 
advocacy. Sayaka, on the other hand, was more worried that the girl’s condition 
didn’t keep her from focusing on her studies and enjoying time with her friends.  
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Aya was almost a teenager when I met her, and it was now up to her to 
decide whether or not she wanted to participate in the summer camp or the 
Transplant Games. But growing older also meant that the Satos could reveal 
aspects of her medical history that they couldn’t discuss with her before, such 
as the fact that organs are procured from dead patients. Making Aya aware of 
her condition was also of importance for her care, for the girl was increasingly 
responsible for it. Since both Sayaka and Keisuke worked full time and Aya was 
often on her own at school or out with friends, she had to take her medication 
by herself during the day. Educating Aya about her condition and the attention it 
required was thus part of the necessary care that the post-transplant life 
demands, as well as a way to allow her to be more independent. Sayaka judged 
that in these respects parents can easily become overprotective, while for their 
part, they didn’t put limitations on Aya’s physical activity or her social life.  
Behind their attitude, Sayaka pointed out, was the fact it was odd to 
educate Aya to pay special attention to her health because she had no 
understanding of her physical condition being any different than that of friends. 
Aya recovered brilliantly after the operation, and was the typical example of the 
healthy recipients whose recovery illustrates the greatness of transplant. The 
Satos knew that Aya was lucky to have enjoyed such a good recovery, but on 
the other hand she didn’t care, as her mother pointed out.  
 
What’s quite typical about my daughter is that she was never aware 
of her illness. She was told about it, but she’s never been physically 
constricted or anything like that. She was transplanted at an early 
stage [of the disease], and while in a very good physical condition, so 
she was leading a really normal life before the operation. This also 
helped her recover very well: she was in hospital for only six days 
after the transplant. In fact, she has very little experience of hospitals 
at all […] While we were in Japan there was no treatment, no 
machine, no drugs that could help her [so she was never 
hospitalised]. She basically was at the hospital only for the surgery, 
and now for the follow-ups […] She doesn’t think she was ill […] 
She’s always in trouble when people and journalists [at events like 
the Transplant Games] ask her things such as:  
“So how did the transplant change your life? Are you happy now that 
you’re healthy again?”  
I guess they’d like her to reply: “Oh, I’m so happy I can run now!”  
But the truth is she could run even before. So in the end she just 
says she’s got no idea. (Sato Sayaka) 
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Aya might have no experience of her condition as being problematic, but 
her health was regularly checked and discussed between Endo-sensei and her 
parents. During a meeting when we talked about the summer camp, for 
example, Sayaka told me they had recently been to Osaka for their monthly visit 
and that tests had found slight variations in Aya’s values that could require a 
change in the dosage of her immunosuppressant drugs.  
As Sayaka reasoned, health is the silence of the body and the absence of 
an awareness of one’s physical condition (Leder 1990; Murphy 2001). Illness, 
as pain and impairment, breaks this condition and brings the body back to self-
awareness in problematic ways, but pathological conditions are not the only 
modes in which the body raises to consciousness. As Leder argues, clinical 
tests make invisible processes in the body visible, interpreting them in relation 
to normative standards of health, while drugs enable us to indirectly control 
bodily functions that are otherwise beyond wilful intervention and even 
conscious apprehension (1990). In this sense, care itself becomes a “situation 
of non-obviousness in which some aspects of the network of tools we are 
engaged in using is brought forth to visibility” (Martin 1990: 422).  
Martin writes about the imageries used in popular and scientific accounts 
in the field of immunology. It is obviously no surprise, considering the emphasis 
on health that defines life after the transplant, that immunosuppression remains 
invisible in the way transplant is conceived of as a therapeutic experience. 
Immunosuppression is exactly the opposite of restoring or boosting health from 
the outside, it is a process of “dying from within” (1994). Through 
immunosuppression, life itself gets in the treatment's way and the cure 
generates the pathology through the process of keeping life stable, at constant 
risk of 'rejecting' health. On the other hand, metaphors like the ‘gift of life’ and 
the ‘relay of life’ focus on the organ as positive therapeutic object/person. As 
noted above, anthropologists have amply discussed the productive meanings of 
these imageries as well as their detrimental effects and ideological 
underpinnings. In doing so, however, they reproduce a conceptual framework 
that identifies both the disease and the cure with the organ, and have never 
moved beyond the paradigm of therapeutic intervention as a restoration of life 
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by means of substitution of body parts. 49  Taking the after-care into 
consideration, instead, means questioning whether transplantation, or any other 
treatment, can ever be a means to restoration of life or if it isn’t better thought of 
as a practice of engaging with a life that has a capacity for responsiveness in 
itself (Davis 2012: 506).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Becoming a transplant recipient is often depicted as a momentous experience 
that remains limited however to the phases immediately before and after the 
surgery. The stories told here show instead that the experience of becoming a 
recipient continues, in various forms, into the life after the operation and 
appears as an ongoing negotiation of expectations and outcomes.  
For the mothers who lost their children, the life after the transplant was an 
unresolved process of reconciliation with the events that led to the tragic deaths 
of their sons. In a society where the burden of death is mostly carried by the 
elderly, the deaths of these children, especially to such a rare disease, are 
particularly ‘bad deaths’, which seem even more difficult to reconcile in light of 
the desperate effort to save their lives. In this sense, the gap between the 
therapeutic expectations and the clinical failure seemed to further aggravate 
parents’ grief to the irreparable loss of a child. While the promise of the 
transplant prompted intense hopes and emotional investment, its tragic 
outcome seems to leave people without meaningful frameworks to navigate 
their experience of loss, thus prompting existential quandaries such as those 
expressed by Yuka in her constant questioning of even the most ‘normal’ 
(atarimae) things of everyday life. 
Defining normality, on the other hand, is a question that healthy recipients 
too are constantly faced with. The negotiations of this normality, I have shown, 
takes place in a space between seeking the normality of “healthy/normal” 
                                                49	Even	Sharp’s	(1994:	373)	analysis	of	disease	and	health	in	relation	to	body	awareness	remains	on	the	level	of	social	conventions	and	prejudices	about	body	ability/disability	and	doesn’t	question	the	underlying	medical	model	of	therapy	as	a	substitution	of	body	parts.		
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people (kenjōsha) and cultivating relationships of solidarity with those who 
share one’s own condition. One of the most important aspects of patients’ 
experience in their life after the operation is balancing their expectations of their 
hardly regained health with the obligations that care requires, recipients’ mutual 
relationships of solidarity and the networks of patients and their caregivers 
become an important resource to negotiate one’s subjectivity as ishokusha 
against normative assumptions about health, body ability and life course (see 
also Tomomatsu 2013). From this perspective, patients’ sociality is a way to 
create a community for people who belong to a minority group, or like the 
Japanese say, for the “nails that stick out” and that would normally “get 
hammered down”. On the other hand, these are ‘nails’ that need and want to 
stick out. One’s subjectivity as ishokusha, in fact, isn’t inscribed only in the 
person’s physical condition but also in his/her medical history, and in a country 
like Japan, which has long lacked a well-established system of organ 
transplantation, patients’ assertion of their right to care and their deservingness 
as recipients of treatment are especially critical dimensions of what it means to 
be an ishokusha.  
In the next chapters, therefore, I follow on from what has been argued so far 
concerning patient’s personal experience, to interrogate how their therapeutic 
subjectivity is negotiated at the level of the broader moral and political 
economies of care. By illustrating the life after the transplant, I have shown here 
the more ordinary facets of the exceptional pursuit of miraculous care by means 
of high-end technologies. While they remain profoundly different from each 
other, both the existential quandaries of grieving mothers and recipients’ 
constant renegotiation of health and normality appear as ongoing processes of 
engagement with a life that admits no return to normality and that is always 
finite and precarious. Transplant appears, in this light, as a technique by which 
people confront and try to tame mortality. Building on the insight that it is this 
certitude of the finitude of life that informs social life (Bauman 1992; Davis 
2000), the next chapters investigate the fundraising campaigns for tokō ishoku 
(Chapter 4) and at the recent reform of the Act on Organ Transplants (Chapter 
5) as processes to distribute the burden of death that transplantation carries 
with it.  
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FOUR 
 
“You Don’t Buy an Organ, You Buy a 
Transplant” 
 
Therapeutic Citizenship and Tokō Ishoku 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watanabe-san was a colleague of the Satos, and one member of the 
fundraising committee (sukuukai, literally rescue group) that had helped the 
family collect the money for a transplant overseas. When I met her, in October 
2011, she told me about a fundraising campaign that would start shortly in 
central Japan to help a small child receive a transplant in America. “Do people 
still do the fundraising to go abroad (bokin) now that the law changed?” I asked 
naively, to which Watanabe-san simply replied that despite the recent change in 
policy, donations were still too few in Japan.  
In fact, she explained on another occasion, in the aftermath of the policy 
revision, the paediatric transplantation situation and travel overseas were all 
extremely sensitive. The reform of the Act on Organ Transplants in 2009 was 
meant to produce a rise in organ donations and, most crucially, to open the way 
for paediatric transplantation in the country, thus providing potential recipients 
with safer access to care than through tokō ishoku. But while the legal impasse 
on paediatric donation offered a compelling justification for tokō ishoku, some 
feared that paradoxically the new policy might, in the short term, put young 
children in need of a transplant in danger by affecting their chances if getting 
listed overseas while donations in Japan still remained very low.  
At the time of my meeting with Watanabe-san, almost one and a half years 
since the enforcement of the reworked policy on brain death that authorised 
cadaveric organ procurement from paediatric patients, the official count of 
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organ donation, which many of my interlocutors knew by heart, remained 
stagnant for paediatric patients. The first teenage brain dead donor was 
registered in April that year, amongst polemics and accusations directed 
towards the JOTNW, 50  but no others had followed since, and the newly 
approved protocol for the legal determination of brain death in paediatric 
patients (under the age of six)51 still remained unused. 
People in the field agreed it was just a matter of time before the situation 
changed, but at what point, if any, few donations would no longer be too few 
was a much more complex question. In fact, Watanabe-san suggested, the 
more transplantation might become available, the more people would want it so 
that, in the end, it would never be enough and the demand for tokō ishoku 
would never end. Watanabe-san said she was aware of international criticisms 
of the practice of tokō ishoku, and of the decision of countries like Germany to 
tighten the conditions for accepting Japanese patients. Still, she said, for 
patients in urgent need of a heart, it couldn't be helped (shōganai): “You either 
do the bokin or you die.” 
Did it really matter anyway if Japanese children were listed for transplants 
at home or overseas? Tokō ishoku after all doesn’t involve the practice of 
buying and selling of organs, which is prohibited under practically all 
international law. When Japanese patients apply for a transplant in a foreign 
country, they are listed alongside national candidates, and they are allocated up 
to a certain percentage of organs available on the basis of clinical criteria only. 
As Watanabe-san put it: “You don’t buy an organ, you buy a transplant.” 
In this chapter, I look at what it means to buy transplants and not organs. 
Against the background of emerging forms of medical mobility (Connell 2011; 
Kangas 2007; Ormond 2011, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Lunt, Hanefeld and Horsfall 
2014; Naraindas and Bastos 2011; Solomon 2011; Witthaker et al. 2010), and 
in particular of travel for transplants (see also Bagheri 2013; Cohen 2005, 2002, 
1999; Scheper-Hughes 2005, 2002, 2001), I explore how people negotiate 
                                                
50 The circumstances of the death came under scrutiny, with some media speculating that the 
boy had committed suicide by jumping under the train and he was therefore not eligible for 
organ donation for the Japanese policy prohibits the use of organs from people who voluntarily 
take their life.  
51 Fifteen years old was set as the age limit to legally give valid consent for organ donation, but 
clinically speaking different standards apply for the diagnosis of brain death for infant patients 
under the age of six.  
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access to care through unpacking the economies of tokō ishoku. I use here the 
idea of economies as an analytical concept put forward by Waldby and Mitchell 
(2006) and Yamazaki (2011a, 2011b, 2009). The authors point out that the 
legacy of construing organ procurement through the model of donation seems 
to have led to the gifts/commodities dichotomy becoming the predominant 
framework of analysis of both bioethical and anthropological accounts. Building 
on classical anthropological insights (Appadurai 1986), they therefore call for a 
critical appraisal of these categories, and focus on the fact that the regime of 
donation cannot gloss over the actual processes of sourcing, processing and 
distributing body parts (Healy 2006). In other words, the fact that “you don’t buy 
an organ” doesn’t mean that these therapeutic goods aren’t at the centre of 
complex economies.  
In this chapter I discuss the economies that organs are caught up in, 
moving from the assumption that the ways in which we circulate, appropriate, 
distribute and create entitlements to a ‘thing’ are constitutive of social orders 
(Rupp 2003; Hirsch and Strathern 2004). I discuss the process of fundraising 
and the policy on organ allocation to foreigners, and I illustrate how people give 
and receive organs and money, how they trade in feelings of empathy and 
personal stories, how they share diseases and circulate gossip, how they gauge 
waste, worth and burden, and how in doing so they negotiate health ‘rights’. 
 
 
Sukuukai: the Fundraising for the Transplant Overseas 
 
It was a windy Saturday afternoon a few days into spring. I got off my train at a 
railway junction just outside Tokyo, and took the walkway that connects the 
station to the high street shopping malls around the large crossroads in front of 
it. The place was packed with weekend commuters enjoying the cold but sunny 
day. At the busiest spot, right near the gates of the JR line, a group of children 
stood among the crowd handing out leaflets and collecting offers from the 
passers-by. Around them a bunch of people where fixing colourful banners to 
the ground against the wind. A quick look at the slogan on the banners and 
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posters all around confirmed they were the fundraising committee I had come to 
meet.  
A few months after the interview with Watanabe-san, I knew through her 
that a new fundraising campaign was about to start in the Tokyo area to help 
six-year-old Mai-chan receive a heart transplant in the U.S.A. All set to join my 
first campaign, I approached the group of volunteers, handed a 1,000JPYN 
(~£12.50) note to one of the children holding the donation box, and introduced 
myself to one of the women in the group. The woman, who turned out to be the 
group leader (dahyō) welcomed my presence,  was indifferent to the mention of 
my research on tokō ishoku and equally disinterested in my offer to help with 
the fundraising. Uncertain on what to do, I started to walk around observing 
what the other volunteers were doing, and spotted Takeshi among a group of 
other children. Next to him was Nakajima-san, apparently busy talking with a 
journalist. As she recognised me, she immediately came towards me with a pile 
of leaflets and recruited me to join the other volunteers. 
With Mai’s parents and the Nakajimas, was a young couple with their 
young son, who I later found out was another patient of Hospital J. Including 
these, the group of volunteers comprised some ten to fifteen people, including a 
few women apparently in their sixties who were habitual customers at the 
beauty parlour run by Mai’s grandmother.  
The group occupied a small but well-located area on the walkway, 
delimitated by the banners in pink and light blue reading: “Heart Transplant! 
Please help the fundraising for Mai-chan! (Shinzō Ishoku wo suru! Mai-chan wo 
sukuukai! Bokin oroshiku onegai shimasu!).” Mai’s mother was standing on one 
side of the walkway, next to an enlarged reproduction of an article from a local 
newspaper that featured the same picture of Mai in her pink pyjamas, 
presumably at the hospital, which appeared also on the fundraising committee’s 
website. Sato Keisuke, who joined the campaign on several occasions, 
suggested printing another poster, this time without the accompanying article 
and showing only the picture of the girl, and hanging it in a visible spot during 
the street fundraising to show, he said, the real person behind the campaign. 
Against the backdrop of the poster, Mai’s mother was calling for people’s 
attention, asking for their help for the transplant that was the only way to save 
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her child (“inochi wo sukku hōhō ha, shinzō ishoku shika nai!”). Volunteers, 
mostly the children, were collecting money from passers-by, while others 
approached people and handed out leaflets with Mai’s story and the details for 
donations via bank transfer.  
In Japan, a country with universal medical insurance, public fundraising 
like Mai’s have become an increasingly common form of charitable donation for 
causes involving medical expenses. In fact, they have become the standard 
way in cases of paediatric transplant overseas, to the point that they are almost 
synonymous with tokō ishoku. In the past, cases of so-called self-funded (shihi) 
transplant overseas were not uncommon, paid for out of the private savings of 
the patient’s family and through money collected within a small circle of close 
friends and relatives. With tokō ishoku becoming more frequent over the years, 
and with the steady rise in the price charged by American clinics, public 
fundraising has become a standard practice and the modalities of these 
charitable initiatives seem to have become standardised down to the very 
details of each campaign.  
Hamdy (2012) describes that Egypt, like Japan, has been caught in a 
visceral debate on organ transplant due to the contestation of brain death. 
While Egypt is seen as the “pioneering” Arab country in the field of 
transplantation, and local doctors praise themselves on having worked on organ 
transplants since the years when the technology was still at its most 
rudimentary and experimental phase, for more than three decades the debate 
on brain death had rendered passing a law on organ donation impossible (ibid.). 
As organ procurement from the dead was impracticable and the medical and 
technological infrastructures to enable transplant were in place, Egypt 
developed an informal economy of kidneys, where it is not just well off patients 
who buy organs from the poor, but working-class families often scrape all their 
assets together to help the sick person pay for a kidney (ibid.). Strikingly similar 
to the situation in Japan, the Egyptian case is also profoundly different in its 
outcomes. As Hamdy describes in detail, several factors have brought about 
and continue to underpin these Egyptian transplants, including sharp internal 
inequalities, the international role of Egypt as an “organ selling country”, and 
maybe most significantly the way in which the health care system 
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accommodates the renegotiation of ethical and unethical decisions in spite of 
the almost unanimous condemnation that patients, families and doctors express 
regarding the buying and selling of human organs (ibid.).     
In Japan too, transplants from living donors are common. The rate of 
living-related donations from family members is particularly high, both for 
kidneys and livers, and in fact the procedure to use part of the liver in order to 
make transplant possible from living donors was developed in Japan as a 
solution to the chronic shortage of cadaveric organs. Cases of bribery to 
authorise illicit transplants from paid donors, which are prohibited by law, have 
also been reported, and, as mentioned (Chapter 1), Japanese patients are 
heavily implicated in organ buying and selling abroad (Shimazono 2007). 
Alongside this, however, tokō ishoku to North American and European 
countries has emerged in Japan as a fairly popular and highly visible response 
to the local shortage of organs, and while surgeons’ professional connections 
have become the bridge for patients to travel to overseas clinics (see Chapter 
2), public fundraisings campaigns are the common way for people to go about 
collecting the money they need for the operation.  
Running these campaigns are fundraising committees named after the 
child called sukuukai, literally 'rescue group'. They are small groups of usually 
five to ten people, including an official representative or leader (dahyō), who 
carry out the fundraising with and for the patient’s parents. No matter how 
urgent the need to raise money, the formation of the rescue group is essential 
for the campaign to begin. For families who start fundraising, then, the first step 
is to gather together a few close friends and colleagues who will form the group, 
and designate a trusted friend to act as leader. The most visible task of the 
rescue group is to carry out the street fundraising. These are usually organised 
in the area where the family lives, preferably in well-travelled places like train 
stations, shopping malls, stadiums and concert halls, as well as around sites 
such as the patient’s school where people from the local community are more 
likely to met those who know the family personally.  
Each rescue group normally sets up its own website to advertise the dates 
of the street fundraising and report about the on-going campaign. The sites are 
usually quite similar to each other in content and format. They include a blog, 
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kept by the family, to present the story of the patient and update details on her 
condition before and after the operation. They also usually include a statement 
about the rescue group's foundation, which defines itself as a Non Profit 
Organisation (NPO), committed to a transparent and accountable use of the 
money.  A budget is also given, with a breakdown of the costs for the operation, 
travel, and living, alongside the overall target of the fundraising (mokuhyō 
kingaku) and regular updates on incoming donations. Through the website, the 
group advertises the dates of the street fundraising as well as the details of the 
fundraising bank account, for donations from all over the country. Another 
important source of money is the contributions from previous fundraising 
campaigns, in cases where the money remained unused because the cost 
turned out lower than expected or because the patient died before the 
operation.  
 
 
Therapeutic Citizenship  
 
Involving the public is of essential importance for the campaigns to quickly 
attract generous donations, and in this sense visibility is instrumental to reach 
out beyond the small local community targeted through the street fundraising. 
The first act of a fundraising campaign is usually a press conference to publicly 
launch the initiative. These meetings are usually held at the local town hall or, if 
the patient’s family is from the capital like many of my informants were, at the 
iconic buildings of the Tokyo metropolitan government (Tochō) or at the Ministry 
of Health Labour and Welfare. Relying on the press clubs (kisha kurabu) based 
at the city government and the MHLW,52 or on the local branches of news 
corporations, these events are instrumental in order to secure media coverage, 
which is decisive in completing the campaign rapidly.  
At the same time as they seek public attention for the sake of the 
campaign, these public announcements also cast the patient’s case as a matter 
of interest for the community at large, putting the family’s plea right in front of 
the institutions that symbolically represent public life and that, in the case of the 
                                                
52 See more on these in Chapter 5. 
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MHLW, are responsible for citizens’ welfare. Before launching their campaign at 
the Ministry, the Satos had enquired about the possibility of having the 
expenses refunded.  
 
Even though we [tokō ishoku families] are a small minority, if we 
have to go abroad for medical treatment the government should have 
some system to support or refund the costs. There is a norm that 
says that if you receive medical treatment abroad in an emergency, 
you can have the costs refunded, even if national insurance scheme 
doesn’t cover treatment overseas. The thing is, we were going 
abroad on purpose, and so they said we couldn’t have a refund. It’s 
like a blind concession they make [because] they know they can’t do 
anything to stop you going anyway. So they don’t support you, but 
they don’t stop you […] I feel I’ve been treated so unfairly in this 
country. I mean, not by the single doctors, but by the medical 
system. The country is not giving these kids’ a fair chance of living  
by not providing this medical treatment, which is clearly the most 
valid and effective they could have if, for example, they were born in 
the States. To think that, only because they’re born in Japan, they 
have no chance is so unfair.  
(Sato Sayaka) 
 
Public visibility has a strong symbolical impact but, on the other hand, 
often comes at the price of public exposure and can edge into intrusive scrutiny 
and even open criticism. Soon after their fundraising campaign was publicised, 
the Satos became the target of on-line polemics scrutinising their financial 
situation and raising suspicions around the fundraising. With jobs at one of the 
most important broadcasting companies in Japan, and a owning their own home 
in one of the most elegant neighbourhoods in the capital, Sayaka and Keisuke, 
it was alleged, must have had the means to afford the cost of their daughter’s 
care. Gossip and speculation began to appear on the internet and pictures of 
their family home were even published on-line to hint at the fact that the family 
was better-off than their plea for money suggested. As the smear campaign 
gained speed, the Satos were accused of having organised a fraud, and the 
case of Aya’s transplant was called a death scam.  
In the midst of the smear campaign against them, the Satos stepped back 
in order not to further fuel the polemic, but their fundraising committee found 
themselves having to deal with threatening emails and intimidation. The incident 
put the group under much pressure and Sayaka suggested that some of their 
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own volunteers from less advantaged backgrounds seemed to be questioning 
the Satos' financial situation. NIT Japan had advised the Satos on how to run 
the campaign, but increasingly the issue of mutual suspicion and distrust 
between the organisation and some volunteers in the rescue group was 
becoming evident. As the fundraising came under attack tensions were 
exacerbated. At the same time JASOT, an association similar to NIT but 
notoriously on bad terms with it (see more below), stepped in, offering a 
donation from previous campaigns it had supervised. With this, the Satos 
received enough money to leave, closing a campaign that seemed 
characterised by a constant questioning of trust.  
The accusations Sayaka and Keisuke faced were particularly harsh, and I 
didn’t hear of other cases that had become equally violent, but people often 
stressed the fact that the fundraising can attract criticism and put the family 
under considerable pressure. Some of the families, for example, reported being 
questioned about how much of they would cover of the total costs of the 
operation out of their own savings, adding that it wasn't unusual to hear 
comments that suggested that the patient’s parents should try and rely as much 
as they could on their private finances.  The truth is, even in the case of 
relatively well-off households where both parents are in full-time employment 
and have good jobs, couples with small children (usually no older than forty 
themselves and recently married) can hardly afford to pay the equivalent of 
several hundred thousand Dollars or Euros. Neither can they sell or mortgage 
their family’s house, as some were told to do, for they hope to have long years 
of university fees and post-operative care ahead of them. Under the 
circumstances, and considering that money needs to become available in a 
very short time, public fundraising is in practice the only viable option.  
People, however, expressed concerns about this way of seeking care. 
While, apart from the Satos, no other family seemed to have undergone 
particularly problematic situations relating to the fundraising, people 
unanimously put emphasis on depicting how very stressful it was. Whether it 
was years after the campaign or during the process of carrying it out, people 
talked of fundraising with apprehension and nervousness and described it as 
incredibly taihen, meaning hard, troublesome and pretty awful. They usually 
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talked of the hustle and bustle of the preparation, of the fact that they felt 
unprepared and felt pressure to perform well, and obviously of the added stress 
deriving from the child’s disease. Alongside these practical factors, however, I 
believe one source of stress is also the fact that the fundraising campaign 
brings people into the public eye, literally crying out their private plea on the 
street.  
The straightforward assertion of one’s own needs and goals is neither 
encouraged nor common in Japan, and what can seem like an undemanding 
attitude is countered by the positive expectation of the capacity to anticipate 
others’ needs. The idea of being a burden on others (meiwaku wo kakeru) is a 
breach in mutual obligations of reciprocity. In interpersonal relationships, this 
means that people often go about negotiating their requests without ever 
framing them as such, and rely on personal connections (kone) to mobilise 
reciprocal favours. The importance of cultivating relationships of mutual support, 
in turn, is key to how people navigate their life as transplant recipients and how 
they negotiate their therapeutic subjectivity as transplant recipients both in their 
personal lives and in the public arena (Chapters 3 and 5). On a more political-
economic level, however, relying of personal favours is not common practice. 
 When it comes to seeking treatment, even elective treatment, Japanese 
citizens can rely on a health care system that delivers high quality basic and 
advanced care and, at least in principle, guarantees egalitarian access to care 
(Campbell 1998). While sharp differences exist across various insurance plans 
(with employee-based schemes notoriously offering greater benefit than social 
health insurance), Japanese citizens have the constitutional right to universal 
health coverage and the percentage of the population that is uninsured is in fact 
significant (Ikegami et al. 2011). Under these conditions, tokō ishoku puts 
people in the precarious and exceptional position of having to ask for something 
that they are not entitled to.  
In this sense, the general disquiet towards the fundraising that people 
often express is indicative, I believe, of the wider process of negotiating 
networks of mutual obligation and entitlement that are so embedded in 
Japanese notions of reciprocity. Asking for favours that are beyond one’s 
capacity to reciprocate puts a person in the position of becoming a burden 
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(meiwaku) on others, and even receiving aid can be problematic when the 
‘donor’ is not someone who is expected to give. Slater (2011) for example, 
describes how the population of Northern Japan were resistant to receiving the 
help of volunteers who hastened to provide humanitarian relief in the aftermath 
of the tsunami and nuclear disaster that hit the region in March 2011, because 
of the impossibility of reciprocating this favour received from strangers. As 
Slater notes, being indebted is not the problem, the question is with whom 
(ibid.). Indebtedness is indeed a central part of codified practices of giving and 
receiving that reinforce and maintain social relationships (Befu 1968; Rupp 
2003; cf. Chapter 5), but becomes a burden when the debt is contracted with a 
stranger because one might not be able to pay it back and cannot know what 
could be asked in return.  
Tokō ishoku patients and their parents variously commented on this lack 
of reciprocity.  One of the parents whose story I told in Chapter 2, for example, 
said she worried the public attention their case received might lead, one day, to 
people asking for something back, even if just recognition, for their contribution. 
One of the aspects the fundraising patients’ families pay particular attention to 
is that of publicly expressing gratitude (kansha) towards the contributors to the 
campaign, but at the same time they fear that public exposure could affect the 
child herself (see Chapter 3). An older patient who received a heart transplant 
as a child, told me for example how growing up she came to experience all the 
encouragement and support as a source of pressure and an obligation to do 
well in order to return the favour received. Their comments call attention to the 
so-called ‘burden of the gift’, which anthropologists have argued is particularly 
strong for organ recipients, because whether it comes from a deceased 
anonymous donor or from the ‘sacrifice’ of a loved one, the ‘gift of life’ remains 
impossible to reciprocate (Fox and Swazey 1978; Sharp 2006; Siminoff and 
Chillag 1999; Gordon 2001). In these cases, it seems, the ‘burden of the gift’ 
extends to both the patients and their families, because it is the parents who 
decide to have the transplant. Moreover, it appears to be further ‘aggravated’ by 
the fact many more donors are involved in these transplants than just the organ 
donor and his/her family.53  
                                                
53 For a discussion on how people pay off the debts incurred with tokō ishoku see Chapter 5. 
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Direct interpersonal relationships, however, are not the only channel 
through which reciprocity is negotiated. As Slater notes, for example, while 
reluctant to receive aid from strangers, the population of Northern Japan were 
ready to confront representatives of the Japanese government to complain 
about what they judged as an insufficient response from Tokyo and demand the 
state to do more to help them (2011). Reciprocity is negotiated here through 
citizenship (ibid.), and as Sayaka’s comment above suggests, the point applies 
to tokō ishoku as well.  
In fact, Sayaka’s comment, which explicitly calls into question the 
constitutional right to health and wellbeing, was unique, as people didn’t usually 
talk of their experience in the abstract language of health rights and citizenship. 
Nevertheless, the practice of seeking care abroad and raising money at home 
to travel overseas can indeed be seen as the negotiation of a specific form of 
citizenship, which has been defined as ‘therapeutic’ or ‘medical’ citizenship 
(Nguyen 2005, 2010; Wailoo, Livingstone and Guarnaccia 2006). Defined as a 
set of “claims on a global social order on the basis of a therapeutic 
predicament” (Nguyen 2005: 126), therapeutic citizenship identifies a need for 
care, denounces the fact that this is left unmet, and therefore raises the 
question of who should take charge of it and how. As I show in detail below, the 
practice of fundraising becomes the site where these moral obligations and 
entitlements are negotiated. 
 
 
Raising Donations 
 
The first street fundraising campaign for Mai-chan went on for a couple of 
hours. At the end, we collected the banners and posters, emptied the boxes, 
and returned everything to members of the rescue group to return to the 
family’s beauty salon, while a woman was passing around free drinks and 
envelopes containing the petty cash that was supposed to cover the volunteers' 
travel expenses, which most refused. The group packed their things and 
separated, while Mariko and I headed to a small stand serving udon soup with 
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Ai. As we treated ourselves to a hot bowl of soup after having stood in the 
chilling wind, Ai could finally relax.  
She looked overwhelmed by the beginning of the fundraising, the 
generosity of so many people, and the kicking off of the campaign. It had been 
two years, she said, since Mai had been diagnosed and referred to Maeda-
sensei, and at the start some in the family were sceptical about the fundraising 
and the transplant overseas. After they had come to an agreement, they 
registered Mai on the Japanese waiting list through the JOTNW, and at the 
same time they began organising the fundraising to go abroad, as they knew 
the chances of finding a match in the country were extremely unlikely.  
Now that the process was set in motion, Ai was worried problems might 
rise they wouldn't know how to deal with. The family was in touch with 
Kanemaru-san, who had long been advising Maeda-senei’s patients, but 
following the directives of the physician they decided not to contact associations 
like NIT Japan, which specialised in providing assistance with fundraising 
campaigns. Maeda-sensei’s position on this was clear and well known. He 
reportedly advised all his patients to avoid involving associations other than the 
rescue group, a strategy, his patients often said, to further protect the families 
from problems like those of the Satos.  
While rescue groups are in charge of these campaigns, as I have 
mentioned, associations do exist that offer practical assistance with fundraising. 
In Chapter 2, I described how NIT Japan functions as a point of reference for 
families considering tokō ishoku: Ashida-san offered his advice to families who 
suddenly found themselves in the position of having to seek complex and 
unconventional treatment, providing practical guidance on how to do so and 
how to run a fundraising campaign. Together with NIT, JASOT is another 
association dealing with the fundraising for an overseas transplant. Established 
in the late 1990s by Tsuchiya-san, who still runs it, JASOT is a NPO aiming, its 
website reads, to offer assistance to organ recipients and their families, while 
also promoting public awareness of organ donation and transplantation. Much 
like NIT, while aiming to promote organ transplantation in Japan, JASOT has 
come, over the years, to specialise in the more immediate task of helping 
recipients go overseas. It provides much appreciated support to families 
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seeking advice about transplant overseas, and helps out practically with 
organising and running the fund-raising. While Ashida-san was gradually 
retiring at the time of my fieldwork, JASOT was quite active. 
 Another campaign was the fundraising for eleven-year old Makoto-kun, 
which was simultaneously going on in the Tokyo area during Mai’s campaign. 
As part of their campaign, the Makoto-kun rescue group had organised a charity 
concert that they hoped would attract people and help raise money. The event 
was scheduled on the occasion of a summer matsuri (festival) in a city on 
Tokyo's periphery. On the high street lined with stalls selling candy floss and 
takoyaki,54 was the town hall: a bleak building quite imaginatively called the 
Parthenon. Inside the public, who had come for the concert, were being 
entertained by dancers in floral costumes and straw hats clapping their hands to 
the rhythm of Hawaiian music, while they waited. Next to them in the ample hall 
a group of up to twenty rescue group volunteers in bright green T-shirts were 
welcoming guests from behind a reception desk. On display were JASOT 
newsletters, some donor cards to pick up and the usual fundraising promotional 
material: the leaflets with Makoto’s picture and story, the donation boxes, the 
banners decorated with the campaign slogans, this time thanking people for the 
generous support that had allowed them to reach their target in less than one 
month of fundraising. 
The event was a display of JASOT organisational skills at their best. 
People were slowly allowed inside the majestic concert hall. The lights went off 
and the curtains opened on the wide stage. Tsuchiya-san walked in for her 
welcoming speech. On the back of a melodic soundtrack, she thanked 
everyone for supporting the fundraising and reminded us that even though the 
campaign for Makoto-kun was now over, it was still important to spread social 
awareness about the more general problem of organ donation and transplant, 
as the event was intended to do. Tsuchiya-san then quickly left the theatre hall 
to join the people from the rescue group outside, and the presenter in a long 
party dress took the stage and started to introduce the performers: rollerblade 
dancers, pop singers and a chorus from Makoto’s school of which he was a 
                                                
54 Octopus pancake typically served on street stalls at festivals.  
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member. A few rows down from my seat I noticed Makoto-kun's family, who 
were visibly very touched by this last performance.  
Charity concerts were a signature of JASOT’s work. Along with the 
supervision of fundraising campaigns, the main declared goal of JASOT was to 
run educational activities (keihatsu katsudō) about organ donation. These could 
range from lectures in schools and meetings with medical professionals, to 
concerts and wrestling matches. The various things were often combined, and 
all were photographically documented on both JASOT’s website and Tsuchiya-
san’s personal pages on various social networks. Former nurse Tsuchiya-san 
said that entertaining events were a way to reach out to the general public, a 
task she deemed essential to promoting a treatment like organ transplantation 
that depends on people’s awareness and understanding. Others, however, 
were not entirely convinced by JASOT’s approach and saw their activities as 
shallow, at the very best. While Tsuchiya-san’s passion for public relations and 
glamorous events was seen, overall, as innocuous, gossip circulated around 
the associations’ involvement in fundraising campaigns. More than once I heard 
speculations about JASOT using the money from the campaigns to sponsor 
activities such as the annual day-off of patients and rescue groups volunteers; 
and on a couple of occasions, people even brought direct charges against the 
association.  
 
I can’t say it with absolute certainty, but I’ve got the feeling they are 
actually working just for the money. Don’t write this down –I’m 
speaking without proof– but my impression is that they don’t have 
pure (junsui) intentions. For example, they don’t pass on the money 
that remains from closed fundraising to other people in need. I know 
a family who asked them for help and didn’t get any money, and 
eventually the patient died. They could have given it to them; it’s not 
their money after all. They’re only intermediaries to raise the money 
for others. In some cases, when a patient dies, the family cannot 
even use the money from the fundraising for the funeral expenses 
[…] I think in the end [money] is what they’re really after. And what 
do they use it for? If a family is in immediate need, they should give it 
to them. They act as if the money is their own, but it’s not.  
(Anonymous) 
 
The people I interviewed seem to have different opinions about JASOT; 
most were generally indifferent, some were notoriously on bad terms with the 
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group, but never explicitly voiced their criticism to me; no one, it has to be 
noted, testified to instances in which JASOT had appropriated money. The 
charges against the association, in fact, didn’t even classify as proper 
accusations of fraud, but rather pointed to what was perceived as an improper 
use of the money deriving from the fundraising, stressing the fact that JASOT 
allegedly decided how to redistribute the funds remaining from the campaigns it 
supervised.  
Humanitarian work, Bornstein (2012) argues, is evaluated through moral 
discourses, and any suspicion or distrust creates a space for auditing the work 
of the actors involved. The rumours surrounding the credibility and 
accountability of JASOT, like the false accusation of a death scam against the 
Satos, articulate discourses that gauge, contest and validate the worth of 
fundraising for a transplant overseas. As a sort of ‘meta-commentary’ (Bornstein 
2013; cf. Bonhomme 2012) on the transactions at stake, suspicions and 
allegations called into question the use and misuse of money. Money was 
associated with self-interest, and depicted as potentially corruptive and even 
disruptive of social ties (cf. Taussig 1977), asserting by contrast the moral value 
of the ‘pure donation’ to worthy recipients as a form of 'pure gift' (cf. Parry 
1986).  
That the money/gift distinction is socially constructed is anthropological 
common sense (Parry and Bloch 1989), and in fact donations of money are 
usual in Japan (Rupp 2003). Rupp however shows that when money is 
donated, notes are wrapped in particular envelopes to be presented, and even 
though people reciprocate presents on the basis of a financial calculus, the 
price of these elegant gifts purchased in big shopping malls is expressed with a 
special code so as to not to reveal the price of the item in too blatant a way 
(ibid.). The role of the rescue group is precisely to appropriately construe the 
donation of money, and indeed besides the practical help given to the 
campaign, the very reason of the sukuukai is, as I see it, to create 
accountability for how the money is collected and used and thus to validate trust 
and the social worth of the fundraising. 
The reason why this is so important is because public fundraising escapes 
codified circuits of reciprocity. They are a form of secular, contemporary charity 
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that rests on free and voluntary donations from strangers. Friends, families and 
colleagues of the rescue group are only the first link in a process that reaches 
out to a wider public; campaigns like the one for Mai-chan are carried out in 
urban contexts where the very idea of a local community is fragmented and 
fluid, and media reports and bank transfers are often the only mediums that link 
donors and recipients. Trust then ties into the broader politics though which 
people ask for what they cannot reciprocate.  
 
 
Wasted Lives and Shared Diseases 
 
Fundraising for the transplant overseas is a way to call attention to the needs of 
what Duffield call ‘uninsured lives’, that is lives that have no enforceable 
entitlements (2008; quoted in Benthal 2012). As seen above, resting one’s 
quest for care on the voluntaristic support of strangers for their uninsured needs 
puts the families of young organ recipients in a vulnerable position. The 
duration of the campaign and the very possibility of leaving depend on the 
generosity of donors, while at the same time having to appeal to forms of 
support outside of those institutionally recognised, means that families can only 
be passive (and grateful) recipients of aid. For all these reasons, the fundraising 
is also a way to endorse deservedness. In a way similar to that Slater describes 
with regards to how the tsunami victims articulated their claims, the fundraising 
becomes a way to renegotiate some sort of reciprocity by pointing out that the 
people asking for help have given already, for they have suffered enough (cf. 
Slater 2011).  
The people interviewed described the fundraising as the most emotional 
passage in the 'hurdle race' towards the transplant (see Chapter 2). Interwoven 
with the distress and worries about it, were equally overwhelming feelings of 
empowerment and hope.  
 
[The time Shuichi was ill] was the saddest, toughest, most miserable 
time. But on the other hand, it was also the time we fought the 
hardest for his life, the time we got together as a family and we did 
everything that was possible for him to live. It was the time we 
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endured (gambatteita) the most. In another way, though, because we 
pushed ourselves the hardest (ichiban isshōkenmei) we were also 
left completely wrecked because of the actual situation as well as 
because of the complete loss of hope. Of course I’d wish Shuichi 
could have overcome the disease, but if I look back now I think even 
being ill would be fine if we could go back. I’d go back even to that 
time. In the end we were happy just because we could try (gambaru) 
together. But you just don’t realise it when you are in the process.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
As Natsuko’s comment highlights, the fundraising brings to life the 
dynamics tangled up in the idea of gambaru (see Chapter 2). It manifests hope 
in the form of a proactive effort that aims at a very concrete and measurable 
result (raising enough money to leave). At the same time, it brings the family 
closer together in the shared experience of enduring a problematic situation, 
and similarly to what Franklin notes about IVF, it becomes an almost self-
fulfilling experience (1997).  
 
It was hard. I had to set up the group and asked friends to help. Of 
course, no one had any experience of this kind, and we knew we’d 
have to deal with a lot of money. And then people have their own 
lives, and the activities of the group were kind of adding on top of 
that, so it was really hard. On the other hand, you know, there were 
times when one year might pass without me being able to make an 
appointment, or meet my friends, and still when I asked for their help 
everyone was so supportive. I felt extremely grateful (kansha). In 
such a situation it is easy to think you’re alone, but I realised I was 
not alone at all. People were so involved and supportive. It made me 
feel really lucky and grateful (arigatakatta).  
(Ono Yuka) 
 
Emerging from Yuka’s comment is the fact that in many respects the 
fundraising can be a moment of change in the experience of illness, which up to 
that point has been both disorienting and alienating (cf. Chapter 2). When the 
patient is hospitalised in a critical condition, the lives of the parents, especially 
the mothers, can be completely absorbed into caring for their child, confining 
them to her bedside, and largely away from social relations outside of the 
hospital. In contrast to this, the fundraising brings the patient to the centre of a 
collective effort to save her life. I this sense, it doesn’t only provide a practical 
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aim and outlet for action, it also mobilises collective emotional and symbolic 
support. 
Through the rescue group, the fundraising brings to life the humanitarian 
ethos of tokō ishoku as a sentiment of empathy that translates into a gesture 
towards a fellow human who is suffering (Fassin 2007). Fassin argues that 
through this emphatic identification with the subject of aid, humanitarianism 
works as a politics of life, in that it gives specific value and meaning to certain 
forms of life; it identifies lives that need to be rescued, sometimes at the risk of 
putting others at risk (idem). 
 Nowhere could these lives be more powerfully represented than in the 
image of sick and innocent children, who would potentially have access to life-
saving treatment if only they were not in Japan. During my fieldwork I was often 
left wondering about the wide use people made of the images of young tokō 
ishoku patients. These pictures were frequently shown in media reports about, 
as well as in promotional materials for, the campaign, usually representing the 
babies and children on their hospital bed, often with an oxygen tube in their 
nose. While expressing concerns about possible repercussions of this exposure 
after the transplant, parents (as well as adult patients) seemed comfortable in 
disclosing sensitive, and at times visually impressive, aspects of the illness.  
The stories these pictures tell, I believe, represent the children as victims 
(cf. Fassin 2013) in the name of raising money, and are interwoven with an 
assertion of the deservedness of their plea. As they show the most tragic 
aspect of the child’s disease, these pictures offer the opportunity to intervene. 
They announce that such deaths shouldn’t be, not in this way, and not in these 
conditions. Drawing on Fassin’s insight that humanitarianism identifies a ‘waste 
of life’, Davis argues that this waste is what differentiates normal from 
pathological mortality (2012). A ‘waste of life’ is a ‘surplus of mortality’ 
compared to what society can tolerate, and it therefore comes with the moral 
obligation to intervene and do something to remedy it: a ‘waste of life’, Davis 
notes, no longer raises the question of what can be done, but powerfully elicits 
the immediate response that something has to be done (2012: 509). Along with 
the giving and receiving of money, fundraising thus creates a trade in empathy 
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that upholds and validates the families' pursuit of care, and mobilises 
spontaneous support in the form of a moral obligation to help those in need.  
 
 
Systematic Exceptions 
 
In the noisy café near Tokyo station, where we met after her work, Takada-san 
barely had a sip of her tea as she went animatedly through the story of her 
son’s transplant. She was very talkative and seemed to be enjoying the 
conversation and to be in no hurry to return home, although her family was 
probably waiting for her to come and have dinner. After she told me her story in 
captivating detail for about two hours, the conversation began to go astray. 
Maybe she did want to go home for dinner, I thought, as I switched off my IC 
recorder and collected my notebook. At that point, Takada-san quickly resumed 
her narrative, to tell me of when her son received the transplant. In fact, she 
said in a tone both hesitant and severe, he received two. 
 Soon after the surgery, their child suffered a major rejection crisis. He was 
admitted to intensive care and was eventually listed for a second operation. A 
suitable donor became available relatively quickly; the transplant this time was 
a success and the boy was discharged and returned home in a few months. 
The family, however, had run out of money to pay for the extra treatment and 
for the second surgery, whose costs were not calculated in the initial budget. 
While they waited for the second operation, the Takadas had to re-open a 
second fundraising (saibokin), but this time the campaign lacked the momentum 
of the original initiative and they feared that raising the money would be much 
harder. The hospital didn’t refuse care to the family, but it took the Takadas two 
years (compared to the couple of months of the first campaign) to settle their 
debt, which had risen to almost two hundred million JPYN, more than twice the 
target of the first campaign.  
 
It was a huge hospital, a public facility, and that’s one reason, I think, 
why they were not so strict about the payment. But even though it 
was a public facility, as foreigners we had to pay for everything. And 
we were not Mexican immigrants: the Japanese have money, so we 
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had to pay up to the very last penny. Our doctor had been very clear 
about this point. Otherwise, he said, the [American] hospital could 
turn down the next [Japanese] child. 
(Takada-san)  
 
Second transplants are not rare and recipients might need one at some 
point down the line. It can be following years of good health, or immediately 
after the operation. In the case of Suzuki-san, which happened a few years ago, 
a second operation became necessary while they were still in America. Shortly 
after the transplant, Suzuki-san's daughter was discharged and moved in with 
her parents in a flat near the hospital. The family had planned with the 
physicians to save money on the hospitalisation fees in order to make sure they 
could afford to stay in America for a few months after the operation and let the 
girl receive the follow-up care she needed at the local hospital.  
After an initial positive recovery, however, her condition worsened and she 
got to the point where she would need a second transplant. The problem was, 
according to American policy, non-resident patients can be allocated only up to 
a certain share of available organs. The quota is officially set up by the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) as 5%, and is calculated on a hospital by 
hospital basis. The transplant programme the Suzukis had been accepted onto 
was at a relatively small centre, with an overall number of operations of about 
twenty per year. Suzuki-san’s first transplant, it turned out, had already taken up 
the quota destined for foreign patients.  
Sticking to the quota would mean failing the patient and her family. As 
already discussed (see Chapter 2), the dynamics of the patient-doctor 
relationship weigh heavily on clinical decisions concerning these procedures so 
that, whether it is about arranging to send patients overseas from Japan or 
listing a non-resident candidate over-quota, the decision would not be a strictly 
bureaucratic one. As one of my interlocutors put it “it’s people who run 
medicine” (iryō ha ningen ga ugokasu).   
One possibility would have been to list the family at another centre, but the 
medical team reckoned it would be clinically better to avoid the transfer, which 
would also spare the family a further financial burden. The Suzukis were thus 
told that by “stretching the UNOS rules a little bit” (ruuru wo ugokasu) a space 
 189 
was cleared for them. Suzuki-san was hesitant, fearing it might compromise 
their doctor’s position, but after consulting with another member of the medical 
team, he accepted. Years later, he still talked of the experience with a mixture 
of gratefulness and apology (hijō ni kansha shite, mōshi wake nai).  
In telling these stories, I too am bending the rules of privacy and 
confidentiality a little bit, for both Takada-san and Suzuki-san asked me to omit 
these details. The reason why I am including them (omitting any details that 
might make their stories identifiable) is because these second transplants do 
not constitute, in fact, a break of UNOS policy. Below I discuss in more detail 
the American policy on the allocation or organs to alien patients; what I want to 
note here is that the request not to report certain details is indicative, like the 
rumours of which I told above, of the fact that the matter is perceived as a 
sensitive one.  
In both these instances, the decision to list the patient for a second 
transplant was indisputable. Clinical ethics are always about people, not policy; 
and the decision not to treat these patients because of their nationality would 
have been unethical. The reason why these cases were discussed as 
problematic is another one. The campaigns for transplants overseas are 
shaped by a humanitarian ethos that casts every child’s story as an emergency. 
But emergencies are states of exceptions, where rules can be bent because 
immediate solutions need to be found. But what about when exceptions get 
reiterated? These second transplants raise the question of what rules apply 
when exceptions become systematic, as in the phenomenon of tokō ishoku 
taken at large. From this perspective, if the humanitarian spirit of tokō ishoku 
rests on the principle that every life should be saved, policies on the allocation 
of organs are informed by the assumption that organs are scarce resources and 
not every one who needs one can receive it. 
 
 
Calculated Gifts, Self-Sufficient Reciprocity 
 
In a regime of scarcity we are constantly made aware that organs are not only 
altruistic gifts, but also scarce resources. Every day, we are told, patients die 
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while on a waiting list for a transplant, and excessively long waiting times have 
replaced underlying conditions as a cause of death. Fairness in the allocation of 
these limitedly available and potentially life-saving therapeutic goods has been 
one of the critical ethical issues at the core of transplantation since its inception 
(Fox and Swazey 1978; Koch 2001), and continues to remain so although the 
scope of the problem has somehow mutated. Currently, no national programme 
or international cooperation scheme is able to meet the demand for organs by 
prospective recipients; scarcity, we are told, is a global phenomenon, at least in 
countries that run resource-intensive medicine like transplantation. At the same 
time, the phenomenon of travelling to foreign countries for organs which only a 
few years ago was treated as a urban myth (Scheper-Hughes 2001) has 
increasingly become a matter of concern, as raises the issue of fairness in the 
allocation of organs on a global scale.  
In 2008, the Istanbul Declaration on Organ Trafficking and Transplantation 
Tourism was issued to tackle the phenomenon of patients’ mobility across 
borders in pursuit of organs (see Chapter 1). The declaration identifies and 
defines different modes of international mobility related to transplantation55. The 
position adopted by the document is that the movement of organs, donors, 
recipients, and health care professionals is to be considered an ethically 
condemnable practice when it amounts to organ trafficking (which involves 
violence and coercion) and/or transplant commercialism (the practice of 
trafficking, buying, selling or using organs for financial gain), and when the 
allocation of organs and health care resources to foreign patients undermines 
the local population’s access to transplantation. The declaration also 
recommends the development of national policies aimed at providing a 
sufficient number of organs within the country or through cooperation schemes. 
Further endorsement of the principle came in 2009, when the WHO updated its 
guidelines on transplantation urging member states to strive and achieve self-
sufficiency in organ procurement at the national level (Noёl and Martin 2009).56 
Japanese transplant recipients built on the growing international attention to the 
                                                
55 http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/isht/study_group/2010/pdf/DeclarationOfInstanbul.pdf 
56 http://www.transplant-observatory.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/wholegethgp.pdf 	
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problem to successfully lobby for a reform of the law on cadaveric donation (see 
Chapter 5), but even as the effect of the changes in policy were slow to take 
place for adults, paediatric patients still continued to rely largely on travel to 
America. 
America is not the only country providing transplant services to privately 
paying non-resident aliens, including Japanese patients. In the 1980s, the UK 
was the destination of the first tokō ishoku recipients in need of a heart 
transplant they couldn’t get under Japanese law 57 . Australia was also a 
common destination. France and Canada too are reported to have occasionally 
provided transplants for Japanese patients, and until recently Germany was 
second only to America in the number of patients accepted58. Many of these 
countries, gradually closed their doors to Japanese patients as professional 
connections between the countries were broken (as in the case of Kitakana-
sensei who returned to Japan) or because, as some interlocutors suggested, 
the practice became politically sensitive.  
That has so far not been the case in America, which from the 1990s has 
become by far the main receiving country of Japanese tokō ishoku patients. As 
seen through Suzuki-san’s story, UNOS has a specific policy on the inclusion of 
non-US citizens on waiting lists, that sets a 5% cap on organs allocable to 
foreign candidates. Recipients’ selection is subject to the same criteria that 
apply to national patients while acceptance of potential candidates from abroad 
is at the discretion of the transplant programme and is conditional on the 
payment of a first settlement of the overall fees. The so-called 5% rule was 
introduced in the mid-1980s to control access to transplants by privately paying 
foreigners. It is officially justified on the grounds that every year a certain 
number of non-US citizens become organ donors in America, and aims to 
provide indiscriminate care regardless of nationality while also avoiding the 
waste of transplantable organs (Blumstein and Sloan 1989). Since its approval, 
the policy has been debated and revised, and the cap brought down from an 
initial 10% to the current 5%. More recently, UNOS has decided to implement 
stricter controls to facilitate the audit of single transplant centres and collect 
                                                
57 See ‘Stories from Harefield’, published by the patients’ group New Heart Club, for stories of 
the first Japanese heart recipients travelling to the UK.  
58 See MHLW (2006) for a report on the practice of the transplants overseas from Japan.		
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data on recipients’ nationality in order to evaluate the phenomenon of patients 
travelling to the U.S.A. for transplants and increase public transparency.59 Like 
the fundraising, it seems, the allocation of organs to non-resident patients calls 
forth scrutiny and demands accountability60.  
 
 
A Case for Comparison 
 
Wailoo and Livingston (2006) tackle the issue of medical citizenship and the 
allocation of organs to foreigners though the story of Jesica Santillan. Jesica 
was a seventeen-year-old girl who illegally entered the U.S.A. from Mexico in 
the hope of receiving medical care for her heart condition. Jesica’s family 
settled in North Carolina; the girl enrolled at a local school and her mother 
found a job as a cleaner, becoming eligible for medical insurance. As her 
condition worsened, Jesica was diagnosed as being in need of a heart 
transplant. Through the support of her school and local institutions, her plight 
came to the attention of a wealthy entrepreneur who helped the family pay the 
fees for the girl to be accepted at Duke University Hospital. Through a medical 
mistake, however, Jesica received a set of heart and lungs of a different blood 
type, resulting in a violent rejection that almost killed her. While the girl was in a 
deep coma and on life-support, the decision was taken to list her for a second 
operation, even though her chances were slim. Ten days after the first surgery, 
a new donor was found for the second transplant, but Jesica didn’t survive the 
operation. After her death, a harsh debate raged over her case. The clinical 
utility of the second transplant was contested, as was the decision of using yet 
more precious organs for a patient who was unlikely to survive and who was 
illegally in the country in the first place.  
Commenting on the case, Livingston argues that in a regime of shortage 
where organs are perceived as scarce and endowed with almost miraculous 
                                                
59 As from UNOS policy at: 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_290.pdf 
60 The question of whether organs should be allocated to foreigners easily fuels suspicions of 
private patients jumping the queue (Guardian 2009; BBC 2009; New York Times 2011), and is 
further exacerbated by highly visible cases, like the one of the Japanese gangster receiving a 
liver transplant in California (Los Angeles Times 2008).	
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therapeutic power, waste becomes a morally loaded concept. Resonating with 
this argument, Natsuko commented on the fact that since Shuichi had died 
before the operation this, at least, spared the waste (mottainai) of precious 
organs, which she feared would have further aggravated her grief. Similar to the 
concept of burden (meiwaku) discussed above, waste marks the boundary 
between entitlement and the lack thereof, revealing how the negotiation of 
moral obligations involves inclusion and exclusion within circuits of sharing, 
giving and receiving. 
Commenting on the politics of inclusion and exclusion in these networks, 
the authors observe that just as Jesica’s age and gender had played a role in 
casting her as a subject worthy of philanthropic aid, so her nationality and legal 
status as an undocumented immigrant roused the public's outrage at the waste 
of organs after her death (Wailoo et al. 2006). Recasting the controversy over 
Jesica’s second transplant, the authors show that while the organ donation rate 
among Latino immigrants is higher than the national average, as non-US 
citizens, they encounter more difficulties in accessing health care, and are more 
likely to be turned down by hospitals that provide transplant services to 
foreigners because of their irregular visa status. Immigrants, it appears, donate 
more than they receive, reflecting the contribution they make to the society in 
which they live, and their inclusion as appropriate recipients of philanthropic 
policies (be it in the form of organ allocation or financial aid as Jesica received) 
can be considered a form of “justice as reciprocity” (ibid.: 207). Through 
Jesica’s case, the authors convincingly demonstrate how (medical) citizenship 
is not a simple category, but a morally and politically charged one, inviting us to 
think for example about how public perception would have been different had 
the girl been in America on a student visa. 
One might as well ask whether, and how, anything would change if the 
patient in question entered the country as a temporary visitor on a medical visa. 
The first difference in this regard is that, contrary to the public outcry over 
Jesica’s two transplants, no similar critique exists, to my knowledge, about the 
practice of tokō ishoku, so that despite the visibility of the campaigns in Japan, 
the phenomenon seems to pass largely unnoticed by the general public outside 
the country. The steady flow of Japanese recipients to American hospitals 
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doesn’t seem to be perceived as a disturbing factor in a political economy of 
organ allocation that is framed as ‘zero-sum game’ (Wailoo et al 2006: 120).  
Jesica’s case is an interesting contrast to the ethnography of Japanese 
tōko ishoku patients, and the two illuminate as well as complicate each other. 
Representing and defining these networks of moral obligations is, as the 
comparison suggests, a contested process negotiated through categories that 
are as mutable as patients are movable. The way foreign recipients are 
perceived as either a threat or deserving subjects in need, is not inscribed in 
their personal history alone, let alone in their biology, and patients’ therapeutic 
citizenship is deeply informed by the modes of patients’ mobility across national 
and jurisdictional boundaries (cf. Ormond 2011, 2012). This also means, 
however, that there exist structural factors that put individuals in the position of 
becoming caught in or released from networks of reciprocity, of benefitting or 
contributing to them, of being more likely to give or to receive. In her analysis of 
Jesica’s story, King (2006) argues for the need to promote a discussion that can 
move from the scale of the individual “identified life” to that of system-level 
conditions, such as access to and costs of care, which are often ignored. 
 
 
Burden and Belonging 
 
The fact that tokō ishoku doesn’t raise American outrage as Jesica’s case did 
doesn’t mean it is regarded as unproblematic, at least on the Japanese side. In 
a political economy of scarcity that is framed as a zero-sum game, “a Japanese 
going abroad for a transplant is a lost chance for another person in that country 
to be helped” (Komeno-san, personal communication). As many organ 
recipients do, Komeno-san wrote an anonymous letter addressed through 
UNOS to the donor family to express their gratitude. In the testimony he gave 
during a parliamentary hearing on the reform of the policy on paediatric 
donation, Komeno-san declared that his family didn’t feel like disclosing their 
nationality to the American donor's kin.  
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We wrote a letter to express our gratitude. However, in that letter, we 
actually didn’t feel like revealing that we are Japanese. We felt truly 
regretful (mōshiwakenai), and we couldn’t write such information. 
They probably decided to donate wishing that a part of their beloved 
child would live on, but I think they really couldn’t imagine (totemo 
sozō dekinai) that those organs would end up going to a country as 
far off as Japan.61 
 
The gift metaphor plays a crucial role in upholding the enterprise of organ 
procurement and metaphorically endows the act of donation with symbolic 
power, not least that of fostering social solidarity (Titmuss 1970; Hogle 1999; 
Healy 2006; Waldby and Mitchell 2006). Komeno-san’s experience reveals, on 
the other hand, how tokō ishoku challenges these representations as it cuts 
across imagined networks of belonging.  
 
Going abroad is a last resort when nothing more can be done 
(shōganai). In the case of cardiac transplant, for example, you 
cannot know that, on average, when you’re told you need a 
transplant it means you’ve more or less one year [left]. It depends 
from case to case obviously but that’s that’s how much time you’ve 
got to live. Waiting in Japan, where chances are so few, then you’re 
going to die (shinjaikenai). So people [who go abroad] have really no 
other possibility (shōganai). If I were in their position [again] –well, 
you never really know until you are, but– if I happened to be in the 
position [now] I’m pretty sure I’d go. To stay means to die, and if you 
don’t have a chance of surviving, then it’s not even a matter of 
choice: if you’re going to die, there is nothing that can be done 
(shōganai). […] It’s inevitable. The transplants overseas are 
inevitable. If you look at the individual Japanese [patients] one by 
one (kojinn kojinn sureba, nihonjin hitori hitori), the transplants 
overseas cannot cease; they are just inevitable (yamu wo enai). But 
as a country (kuni toshite ha), that is condemnable (yurusarenai). 
That a developed country like Japan continues with such a practice 
needs to be condemned. [When I testified at the Diet] I said that: the 
problem is not about transplantation medicine; it’s about whether or 
not Japan can make it without being a burden on other countries 
(meiwaku wo kakenaide). When it comes to organ transplantation, 
there are always so many issues involved, starting with brain death, 
but the problem was about whether or not Japan, as a country, could 
make it without continuing to be a burden on others. What kind of 
trade (shōbai) is that if not a burden? You receive life from others 
and what do you give back? That’s the worst thing. 
(Komeno-san) 
                                                
61 From Komeno-san’s testimony as at: http: 
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/018716920080603001.htm 
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In Komeno-san’s analysis, burden, like waste, becomes a morally loaded 
concept that defines boundaries of belonging and mutual obligation, or lack 
thereof. Drawing such boundaries along the lines of national identity and 
citizenship, Komeno-san clearly identifies the state as the primary bearer of 
citizens’ health rights, reflecting the way in which the issue of tokō ishoku was 
mobilised to lobby for a reform of the Japanese law on transplants (see 
Chapter 5). On the other hand, however, his reconstruction lays equally strong 
emphasis on the fact that tokō ishoku is driven and justified by the assumption 
that health and life itself are essential human rights.  Tokō ishoku, it seems, 
exists at the intersection between different rationales and apparatuses of 
health-care provision.  
As anthropologist Redfield describes, humanitarianism, which I have 
shown underpins the fundraising campaigns and the acceptance of foreigners 
on the waiting lists, attends to the expectation that every life should be saved 
by deploying strategies of intervention that stretch beyond the bureaucracies of 
the state as the main health-care provider (and sometimes of the promises of 
corporations and civil society as well), and enter another sort of market (2012). 
In this way, while the language of health rights should protect against the 
danger of a neo-liberal approach to health care (represented for example by 
user fees and unequal conditions of access), the opposite can be true as well. 
Reubi (2011) argues that when non-state actors, like private corporations, civil 
society groups, or in this case, charitable foundations and private hospitals, 
become the main health care providers, the promise of health rights can in fact 
become a deception, exacerbating rather than countering trends of market 
fundamentalism.   
 
To tell you the truth, when I was in America I asked my doctor 
whether they’d stop accepting Japanese patients because of Istanbul 
Declaration, but he told me that was not the case. It might sound bad 
put this way, but America is a capitalist society. “As long as you’ve 
got the money (okane sae areba),” he said, “you can have the 
operation.” 
(Morinaga-san) 
Morinaga-san was the mother of a baby girl who died after a transplant in 
America. Like many patients’ families, she was still in touch with the doctor who 
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had treated her daughter, and was overwhelmingly positive about her 
experience abroad. Her comment was not indicative of a critical stance on the 
system of paid transplants as a form of transplant commercialism (see more 
below), but was nevertheless revealing of the problematic nature of money in 
these transactions. In a system where the only condition of access to care (sae) 
is money, that which create no relations62, then no obligation exists. While 
Morinaga-san’s comment suggests that under a profit-oriented management of 
health resources money will always guarantee access to care, the dependence 
on money also reveals that the conditions under which such access is granted 
are inherently unstable.  
In this respect, one of the rumours that circulated around the involvement 
of money in the journeys overseas for transplants concerned the price of the 
operation. Patients’ families and professionals in the field sometimes alluded to 
the fact that Japanese patients were allegedly charged higher fees than those 
the American hospitals would normally charge local patients, and that the price 
was rising rapidly. In 2009, at the peak of the debate on the law reform following 
the publication of the Istanbul Declaration (2009) and the WHO guidelines (see 
Noёl and Martin 2009), the Yomiuri Shinbun, one of the major national 
newspapers, published a report on tokō ishoku alarmingly titled: ‘The truth 
(honne) behind the price rise: excluding the Japanese’ (2009b). In the article, it 
is suggested that the target of fundraising campaigns had risen from an 
average of 65.000.000JPYN (£344,500) in 2002 to 170.000.000JPYN 
(£901,000) in 2008. The investigation revealed that, whereas in the mid-2000s 
the maximum cost of a heart transplant in the U.S.A. (if no post-operative 
intensive care was required) was 70.000.000JPYN (£371,000), all the four 
families who travelled to America in 2008 reportedly paid more than 
80.000.000JPYN (£424,000). Cases were known of patients who were asked 
for up to 200.000.000JPY (£1,060,000), and in one instance a family was 
presented with the request of a 400.000.000JPN (£2,120,000) deposit in order 
to list their daughter for a heart transplant. The picture of the father of the young 
girl in front of the butsudan63 with the picture of his late daughter opened the 
                                                
62 See Simmel (1907), Marx (1867), cf. Maurer (2006). 
63 Home altar to the family’s dead. 
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two-pages report. In the interview he released, the man denounced the 
conditions set up by American hospitals, saying that while he was aware that 
transplants overseas are normally very expensive the request of a 
400.000.000JPYN (£2,120,000) deposit was simply “unreasonable” (hōgai 
sugiru) (Yomiuri 2009b). 
Quoting a Japanese surgeon based in American, the Yomiuri article 
suggests that the rise in price was used as a financial disincentive to limit the 
number of Japanese patients, who in some facilities had allegedly taken up the 
quota of organs available to foreign patients (Yomiuri 2009b). The idea that 
money can work both as a means of access as well as a disincentive brings to 
light its flexibility in negotiating patients’ inclusion and exclusion, revealing how 
such flexibility can easily become synonymous with instability. Arguably, the 
worries and distress the families of young patients express towards fundraising 
highlight the fact that relying on money to obtain care was not perceived as a 
shortcut to receiving safer and faster treatment but rather was experienced as a 
profoundly vulnerable condition to be in.  
The most striking figure in the Yomiuri article, however, refers to another 
issue often mentioned in relation to the economic aspect of tokō ishoku. While 
the costs of a transplant in America was, on average, of 80.000.000JPYN 
(£424,000), the same operation in Germany cost 'just' 40.000.000JPYN 
(£212,000). But like people commonly noted that the waiting times in the two 
countries were quite different.  
 
[Going to Germany] is different. I send some patients to Germany 
because everything is legal, and I mean legal-legal. That is, it’s not 
just legal in Japan; it’s also legal in Germany, it’s common sense. 
They [Germany] have the 5% rule for foreign patients. Then, of 
course, you need money, but it’s exactly the same money German 
patients would spend. That’s the big difference. And the waiting 
times too are the same, so you have to wait one or two years. The 
conditions are the same: the money is the same; the waiting time is 
the same. That’s ok; if you keep within the 5%, it’s ok.  
(Kitanaka-sensei) 
 
Kitanaka-sensei’s emphatic description of the relation between costs and 
waiting times in America and Germany underlines the idea that the concept of 
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fairness (legality, in his terms) is not just a matter of policy. While Japanese 
patients reportedly receive transplants as quickly as a few weeks after their 
arrival in the U.S.A., their experiences appear to contradict the litany of fatally 
long waiting times that we are all too familiar with. As one can easily guess, the 
rapidity of the operation, coupled with the fact that Japanese allegedly pay more 
fees in advance of the operation, easily gives rise to the suspicion of queue 
jumping.  
Most of these rumours about transplant commercialism, however, are 
unverifiable or untrue. Like the surgeon quoted by the Yomiuri Shinbun, some 
speculate about the consistent volume of Japanese patients treated in America. 
Given a lack of information about the nationality of foreign recipients and 
without records from the single transplant centres, these rumours remain 
difficult to assess, and the fact that some medical facilities might present a high 
concentration of candidates of Japanese nationalities is not completely unlikely. 
On the other hand, however, UNOS data show that in none of the organ 
procurement regions into which the country is divided is the quota of the 5% 
met, let alone taken up by patients of any particular nationality. In fact, at least 
at a national level, fewer organs than those potentially available to non-US 
citizens are in fact allocated to foreigners. The life histories collected do indicate 
that patients treated in the U.S.A. do indeed have shorter waiting times 
compared to other places, and that waiting times seem to be sharply different in 
America and Germany. This, however, is no proof of bribery in order to push 
patients up the waiting lists. First of all, the reported gap in waiting times doesn’t 
take into account difference between the German and American systems, which 
are hardly comparable. Further, it reveals nothing about the condition of the 
patient at the moment of being listed, or whether this can affect the choice of 
the family to travel either to the States or to Germany. In fact, as seen in 
Chapter 2, patients are already in a particularly severe condition when they 
leave Japan, and so to think that they are classified as highly urgent priorities is 
not at all unreasonable.  
On the other hand, it is indisputable that the system of tokō ishoku allows 
patients to by-pass and rely on some structural characteristics of both the 
sending and hosting health care systems, and to work around them to their 
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advantage. As I argued, the fundraising for the transplant overseas rest on a 
specific moral economy that focuses on vulnerable and identifiable lives. 
Furthermore, they exist within a local political economy in which the demand for 
resource-intensive and elective treatment can be framed as absolute because 
the scarcity of organs glosses over any other boundary that potentially 
constrains one’s pursuit of health care. On the other hand, Japanese patients 
can rely on international professional connections that allow them strategic 
access to treatment in another system, like the American one, which is ridden 
with inequalities. Most notably, once back home after surgery, Japanese 
patients can rely on insurance coverage for the expensive post-operative care 
that many American recipients struggle with, and that can constitute a major 
impediment for local patients to get listed in the first place (Hoffman 2013)64. 
But the flexibility of the system is also its vulnerability, both at the level of the 
lived experience of individual patients’ families and, as the next chapter shows, 
on a global scale.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The movement of people, money, health resources, and body parts on a global 
scale seems to have become an increasingly common reality as well as a 
question of growing academic and public interest. Against this background, tokō 
ishoku presents itself as a particularly interesting case of medical mobility. The 
phenomenon of transplants overseas from Japan intersects with long-standing 
questions concerning the role of the market and the regime of free donation in 
relation to the procurement and allocation of organs, while at the same time, it 
opens the debate on justice in the distribution of scarce recourses, traditionally 
at the core of transplantation ethics, to new dimensions of public health as an 
increasingly global problem.   
In unravelling how these issues came about and are tackled through the 
phenomenon of tokō ishoku, in this chapter I discussed the political economy of 
                                                
64 See also Sharp (1999, 2006) on the problem of lack of medical insurance and after-care 
compliance among American transplant recipients. 
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transplants overseas by describing the process of fundraising and the American 
policy on allocation of organs to foreign recipients. Throughout my analysis, I 
have shown how the transactions involved in the transplants overseas blur and 
reinforce, draw upon and challenge familiar boundaries. If the anthropological 
argument that gifts and commodities, such as rights, citizenship and justice, are 
not fixed categories inscribed into things themselves is accepted, the case of 
tokō ishoku shows how such distinctions are blurred and reorganised in 
practice. As it does so, tokō ishoku invites us to adopt an analytical gaze that is 
indeed as movable as patients are, one that can adjust to the different scales of 
the problem (from the individual plea for help to global systematic conditions of 
access to care) but also, more critically, try to reconcile them.  
In this sense, tokō ishoku appears more complicated than the immediate 
need to rescue a life in danger or to be presented as percentages in a policy. 
Equally important, the questions attending the phenomenon –how sustainable it 
is, and what place it occupies in the panorama of both Japanese and global 
health care– are open to change as is the situation of transplantation. In looking 
at how people conceive things in practice, the analysis I propose offers a 
complex and dynamic framework through which to understand these issues. 
One last thing, however, has so far remained out of sight. The networks through 
which people give, receive, share, (contain) waste, claim entitlements and 
create belonging, are ultimately ways of distributing what they don’t dare to 
include: death. Just as policies about organ allocation are ways to fairly account 
for death against the life-saving power of organ transplant, so the fundraising is 
a socially orchestrated practice to evade death: to make tolerable when it 
cannot be avoid by mobilising all the available collective efforts.  
While tokō ishoku remains, in practice, the safer way to access care for 
Japanese patients, its inherent vulnerability becomes the lever to promote 
reform of the national policy on cadaveric donation and reignite, after decades, 
the controversy over brain death. Building on the ideas of reciprocity and mutual 
obligations introduced here, the next chapter thus looks at the transplant 
advocates’ lobby for reforming the law on brain death and transplants.  
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FIVE 
 
Giving Back  
 
Patients’ Advocacy  
and the Reform of the Act on Organ Transplants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doing fieldwork on organ transplantation rarely offers the chance of 
attending glamorous events. The night of October 27th 2011 was an exception. 
On the occasion of the Tokyo International Film Festival, the Asian premiere of 
the Power of Two was screening at the fashionable Roppongi Hills complex. 
This American documentary is a biopic of twin sisters Isabel and Anabel 
Stanzel, transplant recipients turned advocates. The screening in Tokyo was a 
particularly important one in the promotional tour. Reflecting the sisters’ 
Japanese-American heritage, the storyline is divided between the two sides of 
the Pacific and shows how, in Japan, the “cultural problem” with brain death has 
long affected the possibilities of patients to receive care. The movie tells the 
stories of some Japanese patients, including the of bereaved family of a tokō 
ishoku child, leading on to the inspirational footage from the vote on the reform 
of the Act on Organ Transplants in 2009, where patients’ families are shown 
wiping their tears as they witness the final deliberation at the Diet. 
At the party that followed the screening, Nakamichi-san, who had 
organised the event with the JOTNW, chaperoned Ana and Isa, as he called 
them familiarly, singing the praises of their commitment to promoting organ 
donation. Several patients and young recipients' families were present, 
including the Kumanos, who also appeared in the documentary. They spent 
most of the evening with the only guest in the room who eclipsed the two 
American sisters, MP Konō Taro, one of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) men 
 203 
behind the law's reform, and with whom Nakamichi-san and the Kumanos had 
worked closely in the negotiations leading up to the vote.  
 
In this chapter I look at those events, and in particular at the patients’ 
lobbying for the reform. Going back to the first instances of mobilisation by 
organ recipients in the 1990s, I discuss the emergence of health advocacy 
among Japanese transplant patients. I this way, I explore a not very well known 
case of patients’ mobilisation in Japan, contributing to the growing debate on 
patients’ advocacy and activism, and to the social analysis of the increasingly 
important role patients and their families play in the regulation and development 
of medical research and practice (Epstein 1995; Novas 2006; Rose 2007).  
Through the life histories of both the first generation of patients and the 
families whose stories I have followed so far, I describe the unravelling of the 
public and political debate on transplant medicine in Japan that reignited the 
discussion on brain death and transplants more than two decades after the 
brain death problem (Lock 2002). The way in which the life trajectories of 
transplant recipients were interwoven with, and shaped, the regulation of this 
biotechnology sheds some new light on the political life and civil society of a 
country often described as static and antithetical to change. At the same time, it 
offers precious insights into the controversial issue of brain death and 
transplant.   
 
 
The First Japanese Transplant Recipients 
 
Transplantation can hardly be called a well-perfected medicine. It 
cannot be denied that, regardless of the development in 
immunosuppression, the spiral of rejection and infection is 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, if one thinks that life itself is the most 
precious thing (hito no inochi ha nani yorimo tōtoi), it is only human 
to want to prolong it just for the sake of being alive, even though one 
cannot recover full health (kanzenna kenkō).  
(Noshi Rinchō 1992: 31) 
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In 1992, the publication of the report of the Provisional Commission for the 
Study of Brain Death and Organ Transplant (Rinji Nōshi Oyobi Zōki Ishoku ni 
Kansuru Chōsakai), known by the acronym Noshi Rinchō, reignited public 
interest in the ‘brain death problem’. After that, various committees tackled the 
issue of defining brain death. The Provisional Commission set up by the MHLW 
was charged to discuss the two related questions of whether brain death could 
be taken as human death, and whether organ procurement could be authorised 
from the brain dead (Noshi Rinchō 1992). The formation of the committee was 
taken as a sign that the government was considering the legalisation of organ 
donation from heart beating patients, and public and media attention was raised 
again around the ‘brain death problem’ (Lock 2002: 167-170). 
"Brain death was everywhere," says Hasabe-san, who at the time was 
considering whether to list for a transplant overseas, despite the fact that the 
dominant opinion about the treatment in Japan was that it was both ethically 
problematic and clinically unsafe. As seen in Chapter 3, Hasabe-san went on to 
receive a transplant in the U.S.A., and once back in Japan became one of the 
few members of We Love Heart (WLH), a group for patients who had received 
heart transplants overseas (New Heart Club 1993). Tokō ishoku was a very 
exceptional practice, and WLH was born to foster peer-exchange among the 
few Japanese patients who had received a heart transplant, most of them in the 
UK, at a time when the operation was still legally impossible Japan. For 
Hasabe-san, WLH gave him the chance to be in touch with the wider 
community of Japanese transplant patients. He rapidly became one of the 
leading figures in the scene of transplant advocacy (Lock 2002: 175), and even 
though he had ‘retired’ from public activity after the passing of the law in 1997 
he is still a well-known presence in the local transplant community.  
His life-trajectory, from the hard-fought decision to list for a transplant 
overseas to the engagement with activism at home, can be taken as an 
instantiation of the emergence of transplant patients’ organisations in Japan. 
After decades of dread clinical results, transplantation medicine had just 
recently entered a new phase of expansion following the development of a new 
generation of immunosuppressant drugs (Chapter 1), and on the back of these 
clinical successes in the field, the demand for organs materialised with 
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unprecedented urgency in Japan. New developments in the field of 
transplantation offered the prospect of a cure to patients, like Hasabe-san, 
suffering from otherwise untreatable diseases, but as his case shows, the 
acceptance of this treatment option was not without conflict. The social and 
clinical worth of transplantation was a controversial matter, and patients’ groups 
became the privileged arena for the public validation of transplantation in the 
midst of the debate on brain death.  
In some instances, transplantation became entrenched with already 
existent forms of patients’ organisations. Associations formed by people 
suffering from kidney failure65, heart conditions66, or rare diseases like biliary 
artesia67, for example, were all groups formed around the ideal of providing 
mutual support and guidance for patients with chronic disorders, and were 
transversally brought together by the shared hope that transplantation could 
offer a cure for a wide spectrum of disorders grouped under the label of organ 
failure. 
In other cases, associations gathered together patients who had already 
received treatment, and were formed around the transplantation programmes in 
Japan that offered treatment through living-related and non-heart-beating 
donation. In an era when transplantation was not a well-established treatment 
and not all medical professionals would direct potential candidates to it, these 
groups functioned as a reference point for potential candidates and recipients. 
They provided guidance about doctors and medical centres that offered 
transplantation, and circulated practical information to advise patients who were 
pondering their treatment choices. These forms of sociality and peer-exchange 
among patients still play a crucial role in the life of recipients and their families 
(see Chapter 3), and at a time when surfing the web in search of information 
was not an option, and public accounts about transplantation rarely included the 
experience of recipients, they were the only reference point for prospective 
candidates and recipients. Patients’ groups thus offered spaces for people to 
share knowledge useful for navigating post-operative life, through discussing 
                                                65	Zenkoku	iinzōbyō	kyōgikai.	66	Zenkoku	shinzōbyō	no	kodomo	wo	mamorukai.	67	Tandōheisashō	no	kodomo	wo	mamorukai.	
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practical issues such as how to balance work life with care, whether or not to 
engage in physical activity as well as to what extent, and how, to manage 
information disclosure about their condition (Japan Transplant Recipients 
Organisation 1994). 
Nakamichi-san joined one such group in the late 1980s, after he received 
a kidney transplant from a family member. A photographer from Osaka, 
Nakamichi-san considered himself lucky for being able to have the operation; 
not only did he have a suitable donor willing to help in his family, but he was 
also in care at one of the medical centres traditionally more proactive about 
transplantation which offered him the option of treatment and supported him 
through the screening process and the selection of the donor. 
After he received the transplant, Nakamichi-san joined the hospital-based 
group for transplant recipients, and eventually took over the role of 
representative through what he described as a series of fortuitous 
circumstances (although knowing his character, I can guess that his 
decisiveness might have well played a role). He used his studio as a basis for 
the activities of the group, and taking advantage of his flexible schedule as a 
free-lancer he volunteered to organise events like the Transplant Games that 
aimed at bringing together a community of patients and healthcare 
professionals outside the closed circles of single transplant programmes. By 
making contact with other recipients’ organisations around the country, 
Nakamichi-san’s group developed into the nationwide association renamed JIA 
(Japan Ishokusha Association).  
While JIA focused on Japanese recipients treated at home, the first 
associations dedicated to tokō ishoku were also formed in those early years. 
Ashida-san, the founder and leader of NIT Japan, lost his teenage daughter to 
biliary artesia in the early 1990s. With his wife, they had been members of a 
patients’ group for families of young patients suffering from the disease, and 
after the loss of their daughter, they decided to fund their own association 
especially devoted to transplantation medicine (TRIO 2009).  
NIT Japan started as the local branch of an international network of organ 
recipients originally established in the U.S.A., and over the years, it became a 
key point of reference for patients pursuing treatment overseas (see Chapters 2 
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and 4). NIT was also among the most active patients’ groups on the transplant 
advocacy scene, promoting activities that brought together medical specialists 
and patients in planning the development of an efficient transplantation system. 
It was also actively involved in the mobilisation for the reform of the law, which 
in a way represented both the peak and the end of transplant advocacy.  
The life trajectories of the people belonging to the first generation of 
Japanese recipients show how, during the years of the brain death problem, the 
first groups of ishokusha were formed to facilitate access to treatment and 
provide support to patients in a period when transplantation was mostly 
unavailable and highly controversial. The organisational goals and activities of 
these groups would become tightly intertwined with what interlocutors called the 
‘promotion of transplantation’ (ishoku wo suishin suru), and through these 
networks patients and their families became closely involved in the public 
dispute on this treatment and with its legal regulation in the country.  
  
 
ZōiRen: Transplant Recipients Mobilise 
 
I had the chance to help my child, but there are a lot of people in 
Japan who can’t receive the same sort of support we got. We were 
lucky, but many are not. Is it ok then to consider ourselves out of it 
just because we were lucky enough to make it through? I was really 
troubled by this. To me, transplantation should be possible in Japan. 
Japan is a developed country (seishinkoku); it should make this 
treatment available to its citizens, and to those of less affluent 
countries as well. When I joined WLH this was my spirit, but I 
realised quite soon that nobody cared too much. The more I attended 
their annual meetings, the more I grew uncomfortable (iwakan): I just 
couldn’t see the point of a group of people, with the same disease, 
getting together once a year without any particular reason. I couldn’t 
help but wonder: how can you be happy if one day you might need a 
second transplant? [Going overseas again] would be incredibly 
expensive, and it’d mean troubling others again (meiwaku). And 
besides that, lots of people die in Japan [because they cannot 
receive a transplant].  
        (Komeno-san) 
 
Komeno-san’s son received a heart transplant in the U.S.A. in the mid-
1990s. A friend introduced him to a family who had just returned from the U.S.A. 
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after an operation. Komeno-san’s wife had seen the case of the young patient 
on TV, and through these connections, the family was put in touch with the 
patient’s parents, who in turn referred them to Maeda-sensei. In a few months, 
Komeno-san raised the money, arranged contacts with the clinic overseas and 
left with his wife and son for the U.S.A. 
After the successful intervention, they quickly returned to Japan, in the 
midst of the debate following the publication of the Nōshi Rinchō. Through a 
friend, Komeno-san joined WLH, but rapidly grew unsatisfied with the lack of 
political engagement of the association and begun to get interested in the 
emergent movement of transplant advocates.  
The publication of Nōshi Rinchō, in 1992, was the catalyst for transplant 
advocacy. Patients of the first generation commonly talked of it as a milestone 
in the history of transplantation medicine in the country. In official accounts, it is 
often emphasised that the Commission failed to reach consensus over the 
question of whether or not brain death is human death, and even though it was 
officially intended to express a unanimous position, its final report appended a 
minority opinion arguing against the recognition of brain death (Lock 2002: 167-
170). On the other hand, transplant patients usually noted that the report 
expressed an overall favourable position regarding the recognition of brain 
death, and lamented instead the conservative character of the ensuing law in 
the face of this initial validation of the new definition of death. 
As I see it, the inconclusive result of the Commission’s work significantly 
shaped the ensuing policy-making process, creating a precedent for legalising 
brain death for its practical functions in organ procurement while leaving it 
unsettled in the question of (re)defining human death (see below). At the same 
time, however, the actual implications of the Nōshi Rinchō went far beyond the 
content of the report. The issuing of the document engendered a sense of 
expectation about the imminent legalisation of organ donation from brain dead 
donors. In fact, in anticipation of the political vote that would finally open the 
way to transplantation medicine, in 1995 the national system of cornea and 
kidney sharing was reorganised into what is the current agency for organ 
procurement and allocation, the JOTNW. The Nōshi Rinchō represented in this 
sense a, thus far, unprecedented endorsement of the aims advocated  by 
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transplant proponents, prompting the emergence of recipients’ public 
mobilisation.   
It is worth recalling here that health rights advocacy and patients’ 
movements have a long history in Japan. In the 1970s, sufferers from the so-
called Minamata disease, named after the town in southern Japan that 
experienced the outbreak, proved that the unknown disease was caused by 
environmental pollution in the area and managed to bring the owners of the 
local chemical factory to justice, obtaining both financial reimbursement and 
public recognition for the victims of the disaster (George 2001). The case set a 
well-known precedent of grass-roots movements in Japan, celebrated for its 
‘democratisation effects in mobilising public support and political protection for 
minority groups (ibid.).  
After Minamata, the tainted blood case involving haemophiliac patients 
was probably the largest and most visible public health scandal in contemporary 
Japan, and this too saw the mobilisation of patients in defence of their rights. 
Haemophiliac patients who had contracted HIV/AIDS from blood tainted 
products formed patients’ associations to provide mutual support to the 
sufferers of such a badly a stigmatised disease (Hirano 2008). Their experience 
grew into a social movement, which brought the leader, Ryūhei Kawada, to 
eventually be elected to parliament (Kingston 2004). The mobilisation of 
haemophiliac patients in the 1990s successfully focused public attention on the 
case and unveiled the complicity of political institutions, winning compensation 
from the government for its responsibility in the scandal (Feldman 2000). During 
the same years as the haemophilic patients’ movement, people with leprosy 
also organised a lobby against the Japanese government, and not only did they 
manage to bring down long-standing discriminatory policies against leprosy 
patients, but they sued the government for financial compensation, obtaining an 
unprecedented legal victory against the state (Kingston 2004). Many features of 
these cases –in particular the strategic mobilisation of the media to attract 
public support, and the direct engagement with state institutions through forms 
of political lobbying– were to reoccur in the experience of transplant patients. 
Notoriously, one of the instances of patients’ mobilisation that intervened 
in an issue of particular public interest was the contestation of brain death by 
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advocates of disabled and neurologically impaired people (Feldman 2000; Lock 
2002; see also Chapter 1). While their arguments against brain death had 
framed the public debate on organ donation for almost three decades since the 
Wada scandal, in the 1990s transplant advocates started to assert their claims 
in a more demanding and visible way, calling public attention to a cause that 
had so far been silenced in the general uproar against brain death.  
In 1994, Liberal Democratic MP Nakayama Tarō submitted a draft of a law 
to legalise organ donation that equated brain death with human death 
(Nakayama 2011). The proposal immediately met strong antagonism in the 
Diet, but the debate on a law to enable organ procurement and transplant was 
effectively set in motion. The same year, JIA, WLH, and other patients’ 
organisations joined efforts to advocate for the legalisation of brain death and 
funded the Network of Transplant Patients’ Groups, or ZōiRen (Zōki Ishoku 
Kanja Dantai Renkaku Kai).68 ZōiRen became the reference point for recipients’ 
activism and for newly forged alliances between patients, medical professionals 
from the Japan Transplant Association and representatives of the political world 
like MP Nakayama Tarō.  
ZōiRen epitomises the emergence of a new, politically charged form of 
mobilisation by transplant recipients. If the development of transplantation had 
always been a self-declared mission of recipients’ groups, the social and 
political climate of the 1990s provided both the aims and language to bring this 
commitment to a whole new level. The political debate on the law raised public 
attention to the problem, while also offering patients a concrete goal to pursue 
in their cause to promote transplantation medicine in the country. Paradoxically, 
as I have discussed, the long awaited vote on such a law in 1997 created an 
impasse in transplantation and brought patients’ mobilisation to a standstill.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                68	See	the	ZōiRen homepage at:	http://www.isyoku.net/profile.html	
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“A Traffic Light without the Road” 
 
The vote on the Act on Organ Transplant (AOT) in 1997 was regarded by the 
people who advocated for it as a missed opportunity; in Ashida-san’s terms as 
“a traffic light without the road.” In the wave of the debate on brain death, the 
Japanese law fully took on the arguments advanced by patients’ rights 
advocates and legal scholars (see Chapter 1). As I have already noted, the law 
rejected the uniform definition of brain death as human death, meaning a 
position that equates the neurological diagnosis with the determination of death 
in all cases, regardless of a patient's or family’s will (Lock 2002: 111-116; 
Gervais 1986: 198-205). Instead, the AOT stipulated that brain death was to be 
considered as equivalent to human death only in cases of organ donation (Lock 
2002: 178-183).  
The problem Japanese legislators were faced with was how to legalise 
brain death organ donation as a form of cadaveric donation while respecting the 
‘dead donor rule’, which dictates that the patient must be deceased at the time 
of organ procurement, without going to the lengths of giving a statutory 
definition of human death as brain death, which would have enabled the lawful 
withdrawal of life-support treatment from patients at physicians’ judgement. In 
other words, how to define brain death as human death without defining human 
death as brain death. Of the various possibilities considered, including that of 
leaving the definition of death to individual choice, and to suspend the legal 
definition of murder in the case of organ procurement, the solution was 
eventually chosen of limiting the legal validity of the neurological criterion of 
human death to cases of donation, when the patients and their family had 
explicitly consented to the person being declared dead in order to procure 
organs  (cf. Nōshi Rinchō 1992: 9). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the corollary of this policy was that patients 
needed be registered as organ donors to be pronounced legally brain dead. 
The use of donor cards thus became a necessary condition to enable organ 
procurement. Further, families were given the right to overturn the patient’s 
decision, practically introducing a double system of consent to organ donation. 
To request families’ consent is, in fact, common practice, under policies that 
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take the patient’s will as sufficient condition for organ donation. In Japan, 
however, since physicians were not bound to demand consent for organ 
donation and usually left the initiative of broaching the issue to the family (Lock 
2002), the next of kin would practically find themselves in the condition of 
having to request, rather than consent to, organ donation (see more in Chapter 
6). Finally, because the donor card became to all intents and purposes a legally 
valid document for deliberate end-of-life decisions, patients under the age limit 
for legal consent were automatically excluded from organ donation, producing 
the impasse for paediatric transplantation the effects of which I have described.  
In this way, the AOT imposed particularly strict regulations on a system 
that was not even in place, while little effort was made to implement an efficient 
system for organ sharing. The newly created JOTNW remained poorly funded, 
and run by bureaucrats that Nakamichi-san described as parachuted in 
(amakudari) from the MHLW. They had no direct interest in the development of 
transplantation, and no knowledge of the critical nodes to solve (diffuse 
presence of coordinators, collaboration with the medical staff, etc.) to create an 
efficient system for organ procurement.  
The law, however, was meant as a temporary solution and was due for 
revision in three years time. Counting on this, recipients’ organisations carried 
on with their public mobilisation aimed at promoting social awareness on organ 
donation and appealing for the reform of the law. They run seminars and public 
events like the traditional Ginza parade that marched through the streets of 
central Tokyo ending with a sit-in in front of the MHLW every year. These 
events also served to distribute donor cards, which were now the very practical 
means to enable organ donation. In fact, refitting the public collection points at 
convenience stores and post offices became almost a symbolic gesture of 
contribution to the cause of transplant advocacy. Patients’ groups also 
organised various petitions to the government, and every year staged a public 
ceremony to officially submit them to the MHLW.  
 
We did these activities, like distributing the cards, but it’s not that the 
more cards we distributed the more donations we had. We also 
collected a lot of signatures on our petitions. We went on for years; I 
think that just my family and I collected alone around 10,000 
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signatures. I even included the petition in my nengajō [New Year’s 
Greetings Card]. People were often responsive. Overall with ZōiRen 
we managed to put together 40,000/50,000 signatures. It’s a lot of 
work. And what was the result? Nothing. At the beginning I thought 
that if we could show all those petitions as a proof of people’s 
support, the government would hear us and do something. But that’s 
not what happened, and I realised that no matter what we did we 
would get nowhere. Every year we attended a meeting, in autumn, at 
the MHLW. They are those who should be interested in organ 
transplantation, but in fact they just follow the policy and don’t 
consider anything outside of it, so obviously they had no interest in 
reforming the law. But that’s what we wanted; that’s what we thought 
was needed: to change that law, to make it similar to international 
policy, to make it in line with the WHO indications. But they had no 
interest in that. I thought the aim of the MHLW was to protect the 
lives of citizens, and that given that lives were put at risk during the 
enterprise of going overseas, they would have shown some concern 
about the problem. But they didn’t feel this was their mission 
(shimeikan). Just to give you an example, [under the old system] if 
people didn’t have a donor card they couldn’t donate, but it’s difficult 
for everyone to get a card. So I proposed that instead of distributing 
cards, it’d be more effective to print the consent form on the back of 
the national insurance card, so that everyone would automatically 
have it […] They told me that the space on the back of the card was 
for everyone to use as they wanted; some people, they said, use it 
for personal pictures. I was so pissed off […] And now you see where 
it is? On the back of the national insurance card. 
(Komeno-san) 
 
The vote on the law had spelled the end of the public debate on brain 
death and transplantation. The effects of the policy remained largely unknown 
to the general public and politicians alike, and, despite its efforts, ZōiRen hardly 
had the means to mobilise a large grass-roots movement or raise public interest 
towards a problem that was considered to have been solved. On the other 
hand, politically influential groups, such as the Paediatric Association and the 
Japan Bar Association, remained firmly against the full legalisation of the new 
criterion of death, and the media were so alert to the problem that every single 
case of organ donation from a brain dead donor was reported in the news. 
Brain death was still a sensitive enough issue that not many politicians wanted 
to tackle it, for fear of compromising their reputation, and given the lack of 
political interest and public pressure, the plan of revising the reform was 
effectively abandoned (Nakayama 2011; see also Lock 2002).  
 214 
The approval of the law created in many ways a situation worse than the 
one it was supposed to solve, while also revealing the shortcomings of patients’ 
advocacy. Patients’ commitment to promoting social awareness, for example by 
distributing donor cards and running public events, had no effective impact on 
the bureaucratic and logistic conditions constraining organ procurement on a 
structural level. At the same time, patients’ request of a revision of the law, in 
the form of public petition, fell on deaf ears.  
 
 
Creating Consensus, Making Problems 
 
A Parliamentary commission was formed to examine the law's 
revision. It seemed that things were moving on a bit, but in fact 
nothing happened. One day, we were called to one of their hearings 
to give evidence on the state of transplantation medicine in the 
country […] During the Q&A session, I took the chance to ask them 
[…] how long would it take to move from the discussion to some 
concrete initiative (jitsugen shiō). MP Nakayama Tarō had listened 
attentively throughout and at that point he intervened: 
"In all honesty," he said "the reform is actually impossible. There’s no 
real chance we can make it." 
When the law was voted on in 1997, he explained, there was a 
massive debate and the so-called brain death problem (nōshi 
mondai) was everywhere on the news. The issue of brain death was 
on everybody’s lips and transplantation was brought to the centre of 
public attention (yō no naka ni chūmoku). A heated debate mounted 
over the topic (sanzanna giron ga moriagatta), so that it was a good 
time to sit down and discuss a solution to the problem. But what 
about, then, in 2003? There was no such debate and the issue was 
no longer of interest to those in political power (seiken no kanshin). 
And as long as it was not on the political agenda, there was little to 
do. 
        (Komeno-san) 
 
Like Komeno-san describes, in the years that led to the vote of the 1997 
law, and in particular after the Nōshi Rinchō, the attention of the general public 
had been constantly alerted to the brain death problem. Whether because of 
the intense media coverage of the problem, or by way of famous intellectuals’ 
intervention on the debate, or again through the wide body of popular literature 
published on the topic, including titles like ‘Brain Death’ by Tachibana Takashi 
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(1986) that sold several millions copies, the average Japanese citizen could 
hardly be oblivious of brain death, and of the fact that it was a ‘problem’ (nōshi 
mondai). 
Especially with the political debate on the law, as the attention shifted from 
the problem to the solution, the dominating framework of interpretation of the 
debate has been that of ‘consensus’. Strictly speaking, the approval of a law 
wasn’t a pre-requisite for authorising transplantation medicine. In the majority of 
countries, the development of transplantation medicine updates the 
promulgation of legal statutes on brain death; in some instances, then, brain 
death is regulated only through medical protocol and was never defined in law, 
as in the UK, which has no statutory definition of death (Widjiks 2011). In Japan 
too, the famous Wada case happened in fact before the enforcement of a legal 
or ethical regulatory framework, and even during the years when the country 
was grappling with the ‘brain death’ problem, cases of organ procurement from 
neurologically injured patients were reported, causing scandal and further 
uproar69. The public controversy over the definition of death made the vote on a 
law necessary, while the increased availability of transplantation medicine 
abroad had made the dilemma impossible to ignore. Before being a solution to 
the problem, then, the law was a way of identifying a specific form of problem; 
one that was explicitly framed as a political issue, in the sense that it bore 
repercussions on both individual and collective forms of life. 
From this perspective, the public relevance of the policy-making process in 
Japan is indicative of the increasingly crucial role that legal institutions play in 
the regulation of medical research, practice, and technology (Jasanoff 1997). 
As biotechnologies open the way to the reconfiguration of boundaries, such as 
those between life and death, which were once at the very foundation of the 
legal discourse, society, it seems, has made explicit to itself the role that the law 
and public policies play as active actors in the fabrication of life itself (Teubner 
1989; Pottage 1998; Pottage and Mundy 2004). The debate on the AOT and its 
                                                69	The	 ‘Handai	case’	remains	particularly	 famous.	 In	1990,	after	the	Japanese	Medical	Association	had	 ratified	 the	 criteria	 for	 the	 determination	 of	 brain	 death	 in	 clinical	 practice,	 surgeons	 of	 the	University	 of	 Osaka	 (known	 as	 Handai	 university),	 traditionally	 very	 proactive	 about	transplantation,	 authorised	 cases	 of	 organ	 procurement	 from	 brain	 dead	 patients.	 A	 police	investigation	was	 launched	 into	 the	 episode,	which	was	 also	widely	 reported	 in	 the	media	 (Lock	2002:	162).	
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reform was, in this sense, a sort of meta-reflection on the process of social 
construction of death in Japan. 
As recommended by the Nōshi Rinchō, the question of whether or not 
brain death is human death couldn’t be solved by ratifying the decision of 
medical experts, but needed to be deliberated through a process that reflected 
‘social consensus’ (shakai gōi) (Nōshi Rinchō 1992). Bai Kōichi put forth a 
similar point in commenting the on the report with which the Japanese Medical 
Association had ratified the criteria of brain death, stressing that these could not 
be applied in practice before society had reached a consensus over the 
definition of death (quoted in Feldman 2000: 96). Lock too, drawing on 
Japanese media, describes the process of deliberation of the law on brain 
death and transplants as one aimed at “reaching public consensus” (2002: 177-
78). Indeed, the trope of consensus became the accepted reading of the 
problem, to the point that MP Nakayama even titled his memorial about the two-
decades long process of political negotiation on brain death ‘Medicine in Search 
of Popular Consensus’ (Kokuminteki Gōi Mezashita Iryō ) (2011). 
Consensus is a value-laden term, especially when it comes to Japan. The 
organisational basis of Japanese society, the argument goes, is the person’s 
role within the collective, rather his/her individual identity (Nakane 1970). 
Decisions, therefore, are deliberated within the group, often through laborious 
and lengthy negotiations, which don’t involve the straightforward assertion of 
individual claims but aim instead at reaching a unanimous resolution that 
everyone has come to agree with (cf. Krauss, Rohlen and Steinhoff 1984). 
Social research on Japan has thus traditionally emphasised that harmony (wa) 
is one of the main pillars of Japanese social life (Nakane 1970). The Japanese 
are said, and sometimes say of themselves, to be particularly loyal to the group 
and acceptant of decisions taken in the interest of the larger collective, an 
attitude that explains the high degree of social stability in the country and even 
its economic productiveness (cf. Vogel 1979). On a political level, this translates 
into the idea of an amicably authoritarian society, where decisions are taken by 
a ruling elite and internalised through mechanisms of social persuasion or 
pressure more than imposed by means of coercion (Sugimoto 2003). Publicly 
questioning authority is regarded as problematic in Japan, for it would put one 
 217 
in a vulnerable and culpable position. The Japanese are therefore represented 
as deferential to power or disinterested in politics, and civic involvement in 
public decision is said to be scarce, with civil society organisations counting on 
a limited grass-roots support (Pekkanen 2006). This, in turn, is reflected in the 
common representation of Japanese professional politics, considered 
authoritarian and conservative. Indeed, while government turnovers are 
frequent in Japan, the national conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(Jimintō) is one of the world’s most consistent political parties and has been in 
power almost continuously since 1955. Furthermore, while the constitution 
formally defines the elected Diet, composed of Upper and Lower Houses, as 
the highest decision-making body, in reality, it is commonly acknowledged that 
power is in the hands of a small elite of Ministry bureaucrats (Mc Veigh 1998). 
The frame of consensus thus depicts Japanese polity, and professional 
politics in particular, as static and refractory to change. Consensus, however, 
exists only insofar as conflict does, as Schwartz argues through the study of 
interest groups’ negotiating in political decisions in Japan (1991). Indeed, as 
Komeno-san’s story suggests, the engine of public decision seems to be not 
social consensus but social conflict.  
Feldman counters the assumption that the scarce recourse to litigation in 
Japan is indicative of the fact that people favour modes of resolution of conflict 
based on mutual consensus over the open contention of individual rights 
(2000). Through cases of public mobilisation of minority groups, including 
patients’ rights activists against brain death, Feldman argues that people make 
different uses of legal institutions to assert their claims and promote their 
interests, and that in these instances social conflict is brought to the forefront 
not by means of litigation in court but through trying to influence policy-making 
(idem). Feldman’s argument thus highlights public policy as a site where conflict 
is identified and strategically managed; the implication of this, as his focus of 
the contestation of brain death shows in light of the present discussion, is that 
policies are also a site of change.  
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“One by One”: the Transplant Recipients’ Lobby 
 
Long story short, at the meeting [with MP Nakayama Tarō] we were 
told that the reform was impossible. And in fact, it seemed hard […] 
We’d been doing the parade, and the petition, and so on; we’d run 
out of options. What was left to try? […] One thing was sure: we’d got 
nowhere going on like that […] Nakayama Tarō said it was 
impossible to change the law because there was no public interest in 
the issue of transplantation, but I thought that if MPs themselves had 
some interest in the first place, then maybe we could have a chance. 
In the end, it’s MPs who reform laws. So I checked things out: there 
are seven hundred and twenty two MPs in the Diet. Not thousands; 
seven hundred and twenty two. I thought I could try and talk to them, 
one by one.  
(Komeno-san) 
 
In 1997, the same year the law on transplants was voted in, Komeno-san 
quit his job at a company based in Tokyo after his department was downsized, 
and started up his own business in his hometown. The business was thriving at 
the beginning, but being self-employed Komeno-san had the flexibility and time 
that few salarymen can enjoy. After the successful campaign for the vote, 
Hasabe-san decided to ‘retire’ from his political activity, Komeno-san took his 
place in the ZōiRen as representative of WLH and began to volunteer with the 
group.  
The AOT was due for revision in 2000, but given the general political 
disinterest, the plan of a reform never took off and the patients’ movement was 
losing its momentum. A sign of change seemed to come in 2003, when the 
problem of transplantation touched the world of professional politics at its 
highest ranks. In 2003, LDP MP Kōno Tarō donated part of his liver to his 
father Konō Yōhei, then chairman of the House of Representatives. The 
episode started the collaboration between the younger Kano and his older 
colleague in the LPD, Nakayama Tarō, the man behind the first bill of law to 
legalise brain death that the Konō had voted down years before (Nakayama 
2011). In 2003, then, MP Konō submitted a bill of reform, named the Konō Bill, 
and this for the first time opened the way to a possible revision of the AOT, but 
the process of deliberation (shingi) was repeatedly delayed and the plan 
seemed to fall through.  
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In the summer of 2004, Komeno-san booked private appointments with 
some MPs to discuss with them the contents of the Kono Bill. During his two-
weeks break from work, he arranged to see as many MPs as he could, and 
reported back to the ZōiRen group to keep them updated about the contents of 
these meetings. While still working on public initiatives to raise awareness of 
organ donation, from the autumn of that year, Komeno-san and others 
concentrated their efforts on the activity of lobbying (roobi katudō) inside the 
Diet.  
The new strategy best suited the political dynamics underpinning the 
problem. Differently from the majority of laws approved in Japan, which are 
initiated by the Cabinet, The Act on Organ Transplant was an Act of Parliament 
(giinrippō). Because laws submitted by the Cabinet are notoriously prioritised 
over giinrippō, keeping the problem on the agenda of individual MPs was 
essential to avoid having the discussion on the reform postponed indefinitely.  
Furthermore, even though ZōiRen could count on influential allies in the 
LPD, which at the time was the majority party in the Diet, political affiliation was 
a poor predictor of the actual support for reform. The approval of the AOT in 
1997 had set the precedent of a conscience vote, and in fact the distribution of 
votes in support of or against the reform was at a tangent to political 
connections and relatively independent of party directives (with the sole 
exception of the Communist Party which strongly opposed brain death).  A few 
were particularly outspoken and had been engaged with the issue for several 
years, like MP Nakayama Tarō or Abe Tomoko, a paediatrician elected as a 
Social Democratic Party member, who had been at the front line of the 
opposition to brain death in the parliamentary commission on health and 
welfare charged with examining the reform. These cases aside, however, the 
majority of the MPs had no clear position on the problem, giving considerable 
leeway to the ZōiRen to win the support of enough members of the Diet to 
reach a majority of votes.  
This strategy, in turn, was well adapted to the composition of the group. 
As an interest group, the ZōiRen lacked the political leverage of big groups that 
traditionally exercised an influential role on the Ministries (Mc Veigh 1998). As 
representative of a minority group with no financial or corporate interests, the 
 220 
ZōiRen could only benefit from a situation that offered them the space to talk to 
individual MPs about their plan “one by one”, for they arguably lacked the 
power of mobilising the MHLW or the Cabinet.    
At the same time, Komeno-san and the others couldn’t count on grass-
roots support either. The group was founded as a platform for devising a 
common agenda and coordinating the organisation of work across six different 
patients’ groups. Every group officially had a spokesperson, who was supposed 
to act as a point of contact between the ZōiRen and its base, but in fact 
information exchange and grassroots participation was always rare. In practice, 
behind the pompous name of ZōiRen were a few middle-aged men and an ‘old 
lady’. Kanemaru-san, officially the representative of an association in support of 
children with heart conditions, had been involved in the issue of transplantation 
for several years, and as seen, she had been a point of reference for many 
families pursuing a transplant overseas (see Chapter 2). Shimada-san came 
from a group for families of children with biliary artesia. The leader of the 
ZōiRen, then, was Nakamichi-san, who over his years with the JIA had made 
useful connections in the political and medical world, particularly with the Japan 
Transplant Association. The alliance with the professional organisation of 
transplant surgeons was used to maximise the political impact of the patients’ 
advocacy, drawing upon the political influence of well-known professors, like 
Endo-sensei, as distinctive members of various constituencies.  
Komeno-san and the others usually met once a month in some cafe in 
Tokyo, when Nakamichi-san was in town to make contacts for the lobbying 
process. For the rest of the time, they mostly kept in touch via email, updating 
each other with feedback from their meetings. They used a chart to keep track 
of the negotiations, in which next to the MPs’ names, they inserted codified 
symbols to mark the politicians’ degree of support for the various plans of 
reform, such as a double circle indicating strong support, a single circle for 
opposition. This system gave them a practical tool to organise their efforts and 
map the on-going changes in the Diet. This new strategy focused on political 
lobbying gave transplant recipients the outlet, goals and means to greatly 
improve the incisiveness of their action, and the ZōiRen effectively reconfigured 
as a new interest group. Illustrating the composition of interest groups in Japan, 
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Sugimoto argues that a new wave of civil organisations have emerged since the 
mid-1990s that press for fresh values of social justice in various sectors, 
including welfare (2003: 286). While traditional interest groups representing 
corporate and professional organisations are known to operate through 
connections with the Ministries, these more recent groups are usually oriented 
towards the Parliament, and in some instances they pursue lobbying activities 
(idem). This was, indeed, the aspect Nakamichi-san and his friends were 
arguably more proud of as they talked of how they managed to bring an issue 
that was of interest only to a minority of people to the attention of the highest 
ranks of professional politics.  
 
 
Transplant Advocacy: Returning and Requesting Favours 
 
The composition of ZōiRen, the scarcity of grassroots involvement, as well as 
the tack they took in lobbying for reform are all are revealing of the social 
dynamics specific to transplant advocacy. In most cases, transplant advocacy is 
not directly related to the hope of improving one’s own condition (cf. Novas 
2006), but rather takes the form of being a legacy of one’s past medical history. 
In the majority of cases, people are drawn to advocacy after they have already 
received a transplant, or assisted a family member in the process. Even when 
advocacy is linked to hope of a future cure, patients normally become involved 
with the issue of transplantation when this concretely materialises as a 
treatment option, but at this stage, when they are eligible for the operation, 
people are often too sick to practically engage in the activities of patients’ 
groups and too concerned with the management of care to even entertain the 
idea of advocating for the promotion of organ donation. In practice, underlying 
transplant advocacy is the hope that others will benefit from it. In this sense, 
people described their commitment to the promotion of transplantation as a 
form of ongaeshi.  
Ongaeshi means to return a favour. As I only touched on in my 
Introduction, transactions of on (debt of gratitude), and the dynamics of 
reciprocity and indebtedness they bring about, have been described as the 
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fundamental moral principles underlying social interactions in Japan (Benedict 
1954; Lebra 1976; Befu 1968; Rupp 2006). On expresses a transaction 
between a favour granted as an act of benevolence, independent of the social 
obligation to give (known as giri/gimu), and the gratitude and indebtedness 
incurred in receiving it. It implies the obligation to reciprocate the favour 
received, and therefore translates into a positive sense of gratitude but also into 
a feeling of indebtedness. Lebra, for example, describes that the recipient of on 
is expected to feel, and does actually feel, grateful for the favour received, 
expressing appreciation, thankfulness (arigatō) and deep gratefulness (kansha) 
for it (1976: 96). At the same time, receiving an on means to contract a debt, 
and the favour imposes a burden on the recipient, which Lebra says is 
expressed by the double idea of arigata-meiwaku (gratitude-imposing nuisance) 
(176: 97).  
English literature about organ and tissue donation often focuses on the 
metaphor of the gift. Usually, North American anthropologists argue that the 
trope of the gift is conceptually ‘fallacious’ and detrimental, because it imposes 
a sense of obligation on patients and their families (Fox and Swazey 1978; 
Siminoff 1999). They have pointed out that the gift conceals the sacrifice of the 
donor (Scheper-Hughes 2000), and therefore ‘mystifies’ the relationship at 
stake (Sharp 1995; 2006) and even functions as a form of ‘ideological 
antirejection’ against the concerns over the use of the human body as a 
therapeutic resource (Joralemon 1995). While highlighting important issues, it 
seems to me that these interpretations reiterate a specific theory of gift-
exchange and reciprocity that is illustrative of the anthropological intellectual 
tradition on the theme (cf. Mauss 1970) more than it is descriptive of people’s 
practice in real life. As Rupp argues of gift-giving in Japan, recent 
anthropological writing explores only a small part of Mauss’ thinking, the idea 
that the gift was part of the donor, has been “blown out of proportion”, and a 
more general line of argument of his work has remained untested:  
 
The action of giving itself is an instantiation not so much of a 
particular person or self, but of the social relationship between giver 
and recipient. It is not primarily that that the gift as an object stands 
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for the giver’s identity. Rather, it is a material embodiment of a social 
and cosmic order  
(2003: 197)  
 
The way in which Japanese recipients spoke of their experience in terms 
of ongaeshi gives a subtle and complex account of the social order that 
transactions in human organs shape. 
Ongaeshi conveys gratitude towards the individual donor, and for 
Japanese patients, similarly to North American recipients, this is often linked to 
the responsibility of being compliant with medical care (see Chapter 3, cf. 
Siminoff 1999). Adult patients, then, described the responsibility of managing 
the post-operative care as a form of ongaeshi towards the donor, construing 
indebtedness in terms of making the most and taking care (taisetsu ni suru) of 
the gift received (Yamazaki 2009). This focus on the positive connotation of 
ongaeshi relieves the recipient of the burden that comes with a gift that is 
impossible to reciprocate (cf. Sharp 2006; Fox and Swazey 1978), redirecting 
the indebtedness of the donor towards the care of oneself. 
 
The presence of the donor was always in my mind. A transplant, 
especially of the heart, means someone had died [for me to receive]. 
I couldn’t help but ask myself why that person is no longer alive 
whereas I am. Does my life have any meaning? Am I person whose 
life has any particular value? Then I started to think about the 
feelings of the [donor’s] family as they lost their loved one. What kind 
of thoughts could they have when they decided to donate? When I 
was in high school, I thought a lot about these things; about how to 
come to terms with the fact that death was part of the life I was given 
to live (jibun ga ikiteiru jujitsu no naka no shi wo dō mukiatte ikeba ii 
no ka). […] Then a friend of mine asked me: “Why don’t you just 
forgive yourself? (yurushiteageru)”. It made a strong impact on me: 
I’d been the one who put such a burden on myself. I never allowed 
myself to just live. I’d taken upon myself all that suffering, and 
questioned the worth of my own life. My mom told me they did it just 
because they wanted to help me; they wanted me to live. It was not 
about causing someone’s else suffering or waiting for someone’s 
else death; they did it because they wanted me to live. But maybe all 
the pressure I put on myself was the other side of this will to live. 
Once I realised this I became very positive towards what I’d been 
given: the time I was given, the life I was given, and obviously the 
heart I was given. I think that’s part of the person I have become, and 
that was my way of giving back (ongaeshi) 
(Nagahisa Midori) 
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In another sense, ongaeshi redirects patients’ gratitude towards others. As 
Natsuko explained to me, ongaeshi is the moral obligation to give back to 
someone one has received a favour from, but since this direct reciprocity is not 
possible in the case of transplant, one has to give back to others. People thus 
framed advocacy through the idea of ongaeshi, arguing that transplant 
recipients have a special moral obligation to give back to society. This 
conception of ongaeshi, as the responsibility of taking care of oneself and giving 
back to others, is tightly intertwined with the idea that being a transplant 
recipient (ishokusha) entails the responsibility of being compliant with care but 
also of leading an active and independent life as a contributing member of 
society, and it is indicative of the forms of sociality through which people 
negotiate their subjectivity as ishokusha (see Chapter 3) are also considered 
occasions to practice ongaeshi. Being involved in seminars and educational 
campaigns, giving testimony to the ‘greatness of transplantation’, attending 
events like Maeda-sensei’s seminars or JASOT charity concerts, and helping 
out with other patients’ fundraisings are normally decried as ways in which 
people can give back to society for what they have received.  
Parents of young patients often took upon themselves the burden of 
reciprocating the favour, as a way of protecting the children from experiences 
like the one Nagahisa-san describes. In their life trajectories, then, the idea of 
giving back overlaps with making a meaningful legacy out of their experience. 
For people like Natsuko and Yuka, who lost their child, contributing to the 
development of a treatment their loved ones couldn’t benefit from, represented 
a way of keeping their memory alive. Both the women described their 
involvement in the promotion of transplant as the legacy of what their sons had 
endured. Advocacy was to them a way to give meaning to their son’s 
experience, which in this way continued to live on and would help others almost 
as if the children had become organ donors.  
More generally, for the people who pursued or received a transplant 
overseas, giving back was considered particularly important in light of the 
exceptional help they received. If Lebra writes that bestowing a favour that 
binds the recipient can impose a burden (meiwaku), the ethnography above 
describes how meiwaku also comes from asking for favours one doesn’t feel 
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entitled too (see Chapter 4). It is precisely because asking for favours puts 
people in a precarious position, that ongaeshi becomes a powerful moral 
justification of advocacy. In a society like Japan, where a strong assertion of 
individual needs and aggressive lobbying can be counterproductive ways to 
express one’s claims, ongaeshi becomes an effective concept through which to 
mobilise advocacy.  
 
The first responsibility of a transplanted person (ishokusha) is to fulfil 
their life (inochi wo mattō suru) without wasting what they have 
received (itadaita mono). For example, one has to take care of 
oneself (jiōk kanri), avoid getting ill, and do what you can to stay 
healthy and so that the organ can live long, and you can live long 
too. That’s a first, big responsibility (sekinin); a responsibility towards 
the donor.  But then there’s another one. It might not be an important 
issue in America or Europe, but in Japan being able to receive an 
organ, whether it is from a living or a deceased donor, is very special 
(tokushū). The probabilities are not very high […] It’s very rare, really 
very rare. It might be the wrong way to put it, but it’s like being 
chosen (erabareteiru ningen). You might say chosen by God, I don’t 
know, but certainly it’s a matter of luck (kōun). You cannot make it 
happen by yourself; even if you want to receive [an organ] you 
cannot make it on your own. In this sense, I really think we’re lucky 
people (kōnna hitotachi). And as lucky people, we do have a 
responsibility to return to society the favour (onkei) we have 
received. I think that transplant recipients must (subeki) actively 
engage in making transplantation more available, for example by 
showing how receiving a transplant helped them becoming healthy 
again, so that they can make [this treatment] more appealing. I think 
it’s really up to us to take charge of this (shinakucha ikenai), because 
we’re very few […] It’s not just a wish (shitehoshii), I really think we 
must do it (subeki da). 
(Nakamichi-san) 
 
Nakamichi-san, however, is not representative of the majority of transplant 
recipients in the way he turned advocacy into a full time job. Transplant 
advocacy is profoundly different from other instances of patients’ activism, such 
as the classic example of HIV/AIDS (Epstein 1993), or the most recent case of 
autism, or chronic diseases in which the re-claiming of one’s identity as a 
person affected by a disease is construed as empowering (Orsini and Smith 
2010; Rabehariosa 201). For transplant recipients, on the other hand, 
overcoming the difference between one’s medical condition and a state of 
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‘normality’ is central to the negotiation of treatment efficacy (see Chapter 3). It 
isn’t surprising, therefore, that the ZōiRen had so little grass-roots support.  
The emergence of patients’ advocacy arguably gave space to transplant 
recipients, especially those of the first generation, to overcome the social 
stigma attached to the disease and the decision of pursuing such a contested 
treatment (see Tomomatsu 2013; cf. Hirano 2008). At the same time, however, 
there are significant limits to how transplant advocates can articulate their 
claims in the public arena. While forms of so-called ‘biological citizenship’ often 
articulate citizens’ quests for assistance from the state, through the language of 
‘health rights’ (Petryna 2002; Biehl 2003), transplant advocacy calls attention to 
needs that depend on the rights of other citizens (the brain dead persons). Like 
the fundraising, then, transplant advocacy cannot take the form of a claim to 
rights, but is about mobilising favours through mutual moral obligations.  
 
Asking for Help Once Again 
 
During the campaign for Shuichi I was never able to join the street 
fundraising. [He was very ill] so we decided that I’d stay with him at 
the hospital while my husband would take care of the street 
fundraising. For this reason, even now when there’s some new 
fundraising campaign I absolutely don't take part in it. I feel bad doing 
street fundraising for other children when I couldn’t do it for Shuichi. I 
feel like I'm betraying him (Shuichi ni taisuru mōshiwakenai). The 
Satos for example often help out with the street fundraising for other 
patients, but I absolutely don’t do that... In a way, I had the same 
feeling about going on the street (gaitō) again for the petition [to 
reform the law]. On the other hand, though, I thought that changing 
that law could help children like Shuichi. Maybe if we had had the 
chance of receiving the transplant in Japan, he would have survived, 
because the travel itself causes lots of stress and can be really 
debilitating for the children. That’s also what happened recently with 
Mai-chan, I think you know. For Shuichi it was the same [his 
condition deteriorated badly soon after arriving in the U.S.A.]. So 
even if just to spare patients this further obstacle, changing the law 
would be worthy. On the other hand, though, making transplantation 
available in Japan could also mean making it impossible to go 
overseas. Take [Sato] Aya-chan, for example. She had RCM and 
she was in very good condition when she left for the Sates. She was 
able to walk and move, and even once she got there she spent most 
of the [waiting] time in a private residence [not at the hospital]. I’m 
not saying it was a fun trip, but at least she was not on a respirator 
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and she didn’t need intensive care. For kids in such a condition going 
abroad can be the best choice, and at the time [when the Satos went 
to the U.S.A.] they could do so because in Japan it was completely 
impossible. In fact, when kids are enough to be eligible for the 
transplant but they are in a stable enough condition to undergo the 
travel overseas, then going abroad can be a better choice than 
waiting in Japan. So, in that sense, to change the law could well 
mean to destroy their chances (kodomo no mirai wo nakusu). By 
changing the law we could have a situation where there were no 
donations, and in the meantime children [would die who] might have 
benefitted from going abroad. Maybe not children with DCM, maybe 
they wouldn’t make it anyway; but at least patients with RCM could 
have been helped. And in fact it’s been like that in a sense; I mean, 
for a while there were no donations at all, only now there’s been the 
first (case of a paediatric donor). So in a way, we could end up with 
reforming the law only to make the situation of children even worse 
(chansu ga nakusaseru hōritsu ni naru kamoshirenai). In the end, 
however, even though it could turn out to be bad for some, I 
personally believe that transplantation has to be made available in 
Japan. Anyway, I was still not very happy about the street petition! I 
talked with a friend of mine. She’s a friend of mine who also lost her 
son [to tokō ishoku], and we’re still very close today. When her son 
got ill she contacted Ashida-san, but the child died before they could 
start raising the money, so now, she said, she wanted to do 
something. Well, in a way, she was in the opposite situation to mine. 
She could do nothing to try and help her child: she couldn’t do the 
street fundraising, she couldn’t try to receive the transplant, nothing. 
So now she wanted at least to contribute to the petition. It’s a weird 
way to put it, but I felt like I kind of owed it to her. If she missed this 
chance, she’d never have another occasion to do something for her 
child (kodomo no tame ni yatteageru koto ga nai mama ni icchau). 
And I know how bad that can be. So I was like:  
“Ok, let’s do it together!” 
And that’s basically how it went. For three days we went about 
collecting signatures for the petition (shoumei katsudou) in front of 
the [big department store] Takashiyama. [She laughs]. We were 
going around and asking for help [onegai shimasu to iu]. The 
initiative was reported in the news, and Endo-sensei also asked for 
the collaboration of others of his patients. We collected more than 
30,000 signatures; we didn’t think we’d get that many. We contacted 
all the people who helped with the Rescue Groups and the street 
fundraising, and I posted the advert on internet [on my blog]. 
Through that we managed to get some other 8,000 signatures. It was 
a lot as if you think we had to do it all in one month [to meet the 
schedule of the vote at the Diet]. Then we submitted the petition and 
we held a press conference. Eventually, the reform was voted in, and 
for me that wouldn’t have been possible without going through all 
that we went through. We did the fundraising and he died, and if I 
hadn’t experienced that failure, if I hadn’t had the feeling that 
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something had to be done, that I needed to give back something to 
society (shakai ni ongaeshi), well, I don’t think I would have done it.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
 
The Plight of Tokō Ishoku Children: from Minority issue to 
Social Problem 
 
In February 2009, Fujita-san, the former leader of the rescue group for Shuichi, 
contacted the Kumanos to ask for their help with the petition he was organising 
to support the law's reform. Shuichi died in the last days of 2008, and Natsuko 
and Keisuke had just returned to Japan at the peak of the debate on the reform. 
After years of delays, the vote seemed imminent at last, and the issue of tokō 
ishoku became that which moved the Diet and once again mobilised public 
interest about transplants. 
With the help of Ashida-san, who was in touch with numerous tokō ishoku 
patients, ZōiRen organised a series of press conferences with families of young 
patients who had travelled overseas for transplants, including the bereaved 
parents of those who didn’t make it back home (kizoku). These press 
conferences were intended to be an opportunity for the bereaved families of 
tokō ishoku patients to directly address MPs about the reform as part of the 
activities run by ZōiRen. They were usually held at the MHLW, and became a 
strategically important weapon to mobilise public attention through the Ministry's 
kisha kurabu. The kisha kurabu are a news corps based at the Ministry, and as 
with the press conferences that launch the fundraising campaigns, relying on 
these connections with the media establishment ensured wide coverage for the 
patients’ campaign. Journalists based at MHL who were reporting on the on-
going parliamentary activities concerning the reform, started to pick up on the 
problem of tokō ishoku, and in this way, the plight of young patients travelling 
overseas for a transplant became tightly entrenched in the debate on the law 
and the ideological controversy of brain death.  
The issuing of the Istanbul Declaration and the updated WHO principles 
on organ procurement, in 2008 and 2009 respectively, also played a crucial role 
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in upholding the public prominence of tokō ishoku. In 2008, MP Nakayama Tarō 
even organised for the WHO representative Luc Noel to give a speech at the 
Japanese Diet addressing the issue of self-sufficiency in organ procurement 
(Nakayama 2011), and in the months leading up to the vote, the constant 
reference to the changed international situation became a distinctive feature in 
media reports on the reform.  
International statistics about organ donation rates started to appear 
regularly in the media, together with data about how many Japanese patients 
travelled abroad, how many candidates were dying on the waiting lists and how 
few had received transplants in more than ten years since the legalisation of 
brain death in Japan. On the other hand, the almost obsessive mention of the 
new WHO guidelines (which in fact had no binding power) presented a scenario 
where even the last resort of a transplant overseas would be made effectively 
impossible. Equally problematically, it raised the fear of international criticism 
(kokusaitekina hihan) of Japan, by hinting at the fact that the situation would 
eventually become “unsustainable on the global stage”.70 In fact, in Japan the 
WHO recommendation for self-sufficiency was most usually discussed in terms 
of “self-restraint” (jishuku), clearly pointing to the problem of tokō ishoku 
(Yomiuri 2009a). 
Casting the national debate, traditionally framed around the issue of brain 
death, against the background of the global crisis of organ shortage, these 
discourses mobilised the perception of (presumed) implications concerning the 
international reputation of Japan. At the same time, the comparison with foreign 
countries, which at the time of the ‘brain death problem’ in the 1990s was 
framed around cultural differences in order to legitimise the Japanese position 
against the new death, now became a matter of statistics on organ donation 
rates, thus manifesting the local shortage of organs as a new social problem 
(Yamazaki 2013).  
The evolving international situation created a sort of moral panic, which, 
amplified by the media, contributed greatly to inform the public debate on the 
reform (Pharr and Krauss 1996). In particular between 2008 and 2009, the 
                                                
70 From the Fuji TV documentary Dōshite Susumanai ka: Nihon no Zōki Ishoku’ (Organ 
Transplantation in Japan: Why It Never Developed?). 
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cases of young patients travelling overseas for transplants caught the media's 
attention in a way that far outstripped the usual coverage accompanying the 
launch of new fundraising. After the press conference to announce the 
campaign for Maki, in 2008, Arai-san was contacted by two different national TV 
agencies about a documentary on his daughter’s case. The reportage, realised 
with Fuji TV, followed Arai-san during the fundraising up to Maki’s departure for 
the U.S.A. The programme, which also featured a brief interview with MP Konō 
Tarō, presented data about the broader situation of patients going abroad (or 
dying trying), and ultimately asked why transplantation was not developing in 
Japan (dōshite susumanai ka?). 
One of the stories that probably received the greatest attention was that of 
Yuka and Sosuke. Various TV specials were dedicated to the child’s fight 
against his rare disease, and to the brave attempt to save his life through the 
cutting-edge operation by Kimura-sensei. His case featured both in local and 
national news, as well as on a variety of TV shows, and even celebrities 
showed their support for the child. Perhaps because of the extraordinariness of 
both his disease and the intervention he underwent, Sosuke’s experience was 
never closely associated with the debate on the reform of the AOT. Emphasis, 
instead, was put on the personal and tragic vicissitudes of the child and his 
mother, showing even more clearly the power of children’s stories in arousing 
public interest.  
As with the fund-raising, the idea of innocent children's wasted lives 
mobilised affective and moral responses, focusing attention on the problem 
through a sort of emphatic identification with the people affected by it (cf. 
Chapter 3). Through the media, young patients' families shared their experience 
of illness and, in this case, of grief. The public plight of tokō ishoku families thus 
became more than a simple illustration of the phenomenon of organ shortage; it 
effectively contributed to redefining what was, in Sato-san’s words, a “minority 
issue” in terms of a new social problem. 
Writing about public policy in Japan, Goodman (2002b) comments that 
social problems do not ‘emerge’ from given situations but are created when a 
group of individuals identify the existence of specific conditions and define them 
as undesirable: they are 'discovered' through experts’ analyses and/or victims’ 
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access to media, and measured into practical phenomena that calls forth 
practical solutions. In such a fashion, through the public plight of tokō ishoku 
families, the low organ donation rate of Japan became a problem of organ 
scarcity that was putting the lives of people at risk, especially those of its most 
vulnerable citizens. Tokō ishoku successfully bound the issue that the ZōiRen 
had long denounced in the form of a problem that affected society at large and 
required immediate solutions.  
 
 
Resolutions and Open-Ended Solutions: ‘Japan, the 
Ambiguous’ 
 
With the petition, the Kumanos joined the activities of the ZōiRen and, with 
other patients’ families, they became the public face of the transplant 
advocates. In the months leading up to the vote, as media coverage intensified, 
the stories of people (especially young children) maintained on life-support for 
several months in a condition of brain death began to appear on the news, 
reiterating the arguments on patients rights that upheld the debate in the 1990s 
(see Chapter 1). The issue of the determination of brain death in children 
became a problem of particular concern. Paediatric patients are resilient to 
brain injuries and have an increased capacity for recovery, the determination of 
brain death in children requires stricter criteria than in adults to take into 
account these physiological variances. What is more, since age is considered a 
determinant factor affecting the patient’s survival capacity, children are said to 
be more likely to survive for long periods in a condition of so-called ‘chronic 
brain death’ (Shewmon 1998). Clinical protocols that take these factors into 
consideration were already in place in Japan, but the plan of a reform to abolish 
the age limit on organ donation raised anxieties concerning the possibilities that 
physicians could be entitled to withdraw life-support from young patients against 
their parents’ will, and the harrowing stories of families caring for chronically 
brain dead children begun to appear on the media (Yamaguchi 2011).  
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Brain death was still at the forefront of sharp ideological oppositions in the 
Diet, as well as being the gateway to practical solutions for a reform. After the 
Konō Bill had set in motion the process of deliberation, opponents of brain 
death submitted various alternatives aimed at obstructing the reform advocated 
by the ZōiRen (see Appendix 2). Although not reflecting a radical opposition to 
brain death, the alternative to the Konō Bill remained nevertheless nothing more 
than a series of political compromises. Born from the work of bureaucrats 
tinkering with legal clauses, they aimed at presenting politically palatable 
solutions that addressed the problem of paediatric donation (arguably the most 
urgent issue at stake) while leaving untouched the sensitive issue of brain 
death. Without changing the definition of death, they also left substantially 
unaltered the general conditions of organ procurement; in particular the 
requirement for a donor card and the age limit on paediatric donations, which in 
most cases was lowered but not abolished. If approved, then, these policies 
were unlikely to produce any significant effects in terms of facilitating organ 
donation.  
On the other hand, the Konō Bill met all of the transplant patients’ 
requests: abolition of the donor card and introduction of an opt-out system, 
under which families’ consent alone is sufficient to authorise donation, and 
abrogation of the age limit. The two amendments, however, rested on the 
premise that brain death is human death. Whether or not the patient was above 
the age for making a legal will or had ticked the right box on the will card 
ultimately wouldn't matter because once the diagnosis was confirmed, the 
person would be already dead and therefore had no rights to protect or exercise 
(Kuramochi 2012; Ida 2011).  
 
The most straightforward way (ichiban sukkiri) [to reform the law] 
would have been by defining brain death as human death. In fact, 
however, things got more complicated than that. […] Konō Tarō is 
very direct and outspoken, and once during a hearing session at the 
Diet, he put it very clearly (hakkiri) that brain death is human death 
and his bill was based on such premise. But the media soon picked 
up on that and argued that such a straightforward statement 
shouldn’t be included in the law, because there are people who don’t 
accept brain death as human death. Personally, I think the best way 
would have been to define brain death as death upon the law. But 
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the thing is, even if you do so, in the end the choice of whether or not 
to donate is up to the individual. So, in the end, it didn’t really matter. 
[…] Of course, a uniform definition of brain death, which is the 
international standard, would have been the simplest way. That was 
the idea of the Konō Bill. But that comment raised such a debate. It 
was evident that a law that defined brain death as human death was 
impossible. It would have ruined our chances of having the reform 
discussed altogether. […] During the deliberation, we held a meeting 
to decide our strategy at the Committee for Health and Welfare 
Affairs. […] I argued that in my opinion the law should clearly state 
that brain death is human death. But the legal experts replied that the 
reform was, and had always been, about organ transplants, so we 
had to look at the next level, not discuss whether brain death is 
human death. The law, they said, didn’t have the authority to 
deliberate so far (soko made kimeru kengen wa nai). Nakamichi-san 
was there too. And at that comment he kind of grumbled: 
“Oh, come on!” 
As if to say our chance was lost. But there was nothing else we could 
do (shōganai). It was impossible to go that far. And we still wanted to 
do something to reform this law. That’s how the story went. That’s 
the story behind the story (urabanashi).  
(Komeno-san) 
 
In 2005, the Konō Bill was amended, introducing the right for patients’ 
families to object the determination of decease following a diagnosis of brain 
death. The new bill, now renamed ‘Bill A’ to differentiate it from the alternatives 
submitted by the opposition, was intended as a compromise to intervene on the 
practical issues at stake (the out-out system and the age limit) without alienating 
the consensus of the moderates with a radical redefinition of brain death.  
With the amendment to the Konō Bill, ZōiRen too was faced with the 
question of how far they could compromise on their requests. Nakamichi-san 
put it to a vote, and one of the groups in the league officially split from ZōiRen 
as they voted down the Bill A. For some, like Ashida-san, the redefinition of 
brain death was the essential condition for achieving an increase in organ 
donations. Organ donation, they thought, should be made available as an 
option for families to consider on the basis that the patient was dead; the 
alternative solution, that required the explicit consent of the grieving family in 
order to declare the patient dead, would always affect the smoothness of any 
donation process, even with the right bureaucratic conditions in place. Put 
simply, the death of the donor should be the premise for organ donation, not the 
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other way around. With the situation of other countries in mind, Ashida-san 
regarded the redefinition of death as a necessary and non-negotiable 
requirement for an efficient system of organ procurement.  
The turn taken by the political debate on the reform forced transplant 
advocates into redefining their quests and focusing on the issue of tokō ishoku 
as a practical and politically appealing issue to mobilise the support they 
needed. With the beginning of 2009, the deliberation in the Diet entered the final 
stage and ZōiRen tightened up its lobbying activities. People described the 
months heading towards the vote as a period of cautious optimism and 
momentous anticipation. The schedule was tight (giri giri), and so was the 
margin of promised votes that ZōiRen had managed to put together. With the 
opposition submitting concurrent bills until the very day of the vote, the political 
trade-off around the reform risked eating away the ZōiRen’s support, and the 
different political majorities at the two Houses (nejire kokkai) made the situation 
even more precarious. Counting on the chart, Komeno-san and the others were 
confident they could make it through, but they knew they had no second 
chance. ZōiRen had to make sure the busy schedule of parliamentary work 
could accommodate the vote on the reform among the many issues still pending 
before the dissolution of the Diet for the general elections of August 2009. The 
prospect of having newly elected members in the two Houses risked nullifying 
the negotiations patiently carried out during the previous five years, and the 
political climate could well turn against ZōiRen’s plan if the LPD, traditionally 
their closest ally, were to lose its political majority, as eventually happened. 
Under the circumstances, if Bill A didn’t get the majority of votes at both the 
Upper and Lower Houses, the discussion of a reform would have likely been 
shelved for another few years.  
If possible, the political climate heightened people’ expectations even 
more. The vote, on July 13th 2009 was a historical moment for transplant 
medicine in Japan as well as personally a very significant event for those who 
had worked for it, particularly for Nakamichi-san, who after the vote got 
appointed as head of the JOTNW, the first transplant patient to occupy the 
position and (he remarked) the first official that was not parachuted in the role 
from the high ranks of the MHLW. According to Nakamichi-san, the transplant 
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patients’ lobby was an unprecedented case in Japan’s recent history of patients 
directly shaping political decisions. While his reading might be not historically 
accurate, it nevertheless sheds an important light on how the ZōiRen managed 
to promote change as a minority group (Kingston 2004). As Norgren argues 
with regards to abortion policy in Japan, change is not automatically 
synonymous with a victory of society over the state, and liberal over 
conservative politics, for indeed what emerges from the case of transplant 
advocacy is that the capacity of ZōiRen to forge alliances and strategically pull 
strings with those in a position of power was decisive in having their claims 
recognised (2001). It is not without reason that Feldman (2000) talks of “ritual of 
rights”, underlining the symbolic character of rights assertion that people make 
to promote their interest. In the case of transplant advocacy, both the strategy of 
the political lobbying and the undoubted impact of tokō ishoku families in 
mobilising public support and reaching for the ears of the media both 
contributed to influencing the political decision and precipitated the resolution of 
a question that had been pending for more than a decade.  
If the case of transplant patients calls attention to dynamics of change, it 
also shows how this builds up slowly, and how it takes form through 
compromises more than sudden transformation. As Allinson (1990) indicates, 
this is particularly true in the case of Japanese politics, suggesting that behind 
the seeming stagnancy of official public policy decisions are in fact long-term 
processes of negotiation. The result of how politics are negotiated in Japan, is 
therefore that resolutions rarely accommodate entirely the requests of one 
party, and policy is often open to interpretation in the way they are drafted and 
enforced (ibid.). 
 
There were two issues at stake with that law: one was brain death as 
human death, and the other was transplantation as a problem that 
concerns human life. There is no straightforward relationship 
between the process in which the two have been sorted out and the 
final outcome. The result has been different than the initial goal. But 
it works. Maybe for Europeans it is different, it is more like a 
resolution that requires a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but one thing that it is 
said to be peculiar of Japanese people is our ambiguity (aimaisa); 
that we can see the same thing in either one way or another. So you 
could argue that this law states that brain death is human death, but 
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you can also take it in the opposite way. […] The Nōshi Rinchō set 
the process of policy-making in motion, but in the end it remains 
unclear what position it actually took. What did the Nōshi Rinchō 
say? I think that in there you can really read something about the 
Japanese.  
(Shimada-san) 
 
As just seen, the passing of the reform was dependent on the compromise 
over the redefinition of death. In this way, while the reform erased the condition 
of organ donation from the legal definition of brain death, it also introduced the 
right for patients and their families to object to the legal determination of death 
on the basis of the neurological diagnosis. The position taken by the Japanese 
legislators was that the law had no authority to deliberate what constitutes the 
end of human life. In this respect, the current Japanese law remains identical to 
the former one in what is maybe its more interesting aspect and represents a 
rare case of public policy that allows the right to self-determination on death 
(Bagheri 2007; Lock 2002: 181).71 Instead of giving a normative definition of 
brain death as either equal or different to human death, the Japanese law 
describes the condition in relation to legal concepts of the body (shintai) and the 
corpse (shitai), and in this way it maintains the possibility of considering it as 
both a terminal condition or death in the proper sense.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Coming at the end of the ethnography of transplant recipients, this chapter 
illustrates how their life trajectories, so profoundly shaped by the problem of 
brain death in Japan, have come to interweave with the debate on the definition 
of death. While showing how Japanese recipients have successfully mobilised 
to assert their claims in the public arena, I have proposed looking at the process 
of legal regulation of brain death and transplantation as a site of identification 
and management of conflict. From this perspective, the experience of patients’ 
                                                71	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 self-determination	 in	 Japanese	 bioethics	 see	 Kato	 and	Sleeboom	Flaukner	(2011b).	For	an	overview	of	the	legal	implications	of	the	definition	of	death	in	Western	debate	see	Veatch	(1977).	
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lobbying activity reveals how the controversy over the definition of death was 
neither a philosophical nor a scientific question but a profoundly political one. At 
stake in the legal debate over brain death, with which Japan has grappled for 
the last decades, was the negotiation of social anxieties over the medicalisation 
of death and the conflicting imperatives to save lives by means of 
transplantation technologies. Drawing on the concept of ongaeshi and on the 
experience of tokō ihsoku families, I have illustrated how these negotiations 
were a way to configure networks of mutual obligations within a community, in 
this case defined by its national boundaries. The ways in which the plight of 
Japanese children dying for a transplant became the issue that again raised 
public concern about the brain death problem, after years of unsuccessful 
attempts by both politicians and transplant rights advocates to reform the 
national law on organ donation, shows that what is shared in the process of 
regulation of this medical technology is not just body parts but life itself, in the 
sense that the parameters of what counts as a ‘waste of life’ and a ‘good death’ 
are negotiated against each other.  
The ethnography provides refreshing insights into how policies on public 
health are negotiated in Japan, revealing important dynamics of social change 
while also complicating the interpretation of the negotiations and compromises 
these involve. From this perspective, I have shown how, despite the great 
emphasis on the reform, the current law still maintains an ambiguous definition 
of brain death. While Shimada-san rightly pointed out that in this regard the 
Japanese law is one on its own, the national policy on brain death and 
transplants raises questions of more general relevance. What role does the law 
play in the social fabrication of life and death? How much of the complexity and 
uncertainty of the debate on brain death can and should be taken into account 
by public policies (Younger et al. 1999: 115-161)? And what consequences do 
the answers to these questions produce in practice? The next chapter looks at 
these problems by exploring how the current Japanese policy is worked out in 
practice.  
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Coda 
 
Through our experience we’ve received a lot of support: during the 
fundraising campaign, and then from the medical staff, the doctors, 
and the interpreters in America. In this respect, our experience was 
really good. Then, when we came back we had this chance [of being 
involved in the lobby for the reform] through Endo-sensei, who had 
been working on this for years. Looking back now, the fact that 
Shuichi died was, of course, terrible. But among those who lost a 
child, I think we were lucky, because at least we could do something 
that helped us filling up the sadness for his loss (kanashimi wo 
umeru). When he died we couldn’t donate his organs, but even so 
we had the chance to do something, and I like to think that what we 
did in a way contributed to make this first case [of paediatric 
donation] possible.  
(Kumano Natsuko) 
 
In that situation Bill A was the only chance, so I guess there was 
nothing else we could do (shōganai). But I regret it (kuyanda). That’s 
not what we wanted. 
(Ashida-san) 
 
We sat up to do it, and we made it, even if we were just common 
people. It was not a grass-roots movement; it was just the five of us. 
But as five people we become a group, and we moved the 
Parliament (kokkai ga ugoeta). And you know what? It was really fun. 
We worked together with the MPs, and we had the support of the 
doctors [of the Transplant Association], but it was the five of us who 
started it in the first place. It was us who fought on the first line. And it 
was really fun!  
(Shimada-san)  
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SIX 
 
Brain Death in Clinical Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The vote of the reform of the Act on Organ Transplants was regarded as a 
potential turning point in the long-enduring debate on brain death in Japan. 
Despite the political compromises described in the previous chapter, the reform 
clearly aimed at promoting efficiency in organ procurement. In this sense, while 
still maintaining the right of patients and their families to refuse the 
determination of death following the neurological diagnosis, the redefinition of 
brain death as no longer dependent on the patient’s will to donate organs, 
unmistakably represented a major shift in the conceptualisation of death, and 
one that could have significant practical implications. According to Yamazaki 
(2013) the vote of the reform signalled a significant departure from the rationale 
underpinning the previous law. Compared to the debate that led to the vote on 
the law in 1997, he argues, on the occasion of the reform in 2009 the new 
discourse on organ shortage glossed over the ethical and scientific 
controversies that still remain open about the definition of death, shifting the 
attention away from the cure of the “brain dead person” (cf. Morioka 1989) and 
focusing instead the role that the determination of brain death plays in the 
broader political economy of organ procurement (Yamazaki 2013).  
From this point of view, it was not only transplant recipients and advocates 
that regarded the passing of the reform as a historical moment. The media 
unanimously emphasised that “brain death is now human death” (nōshi ha hito 
no shi) (Asahi Shinbun 2009a, 2009b; Yomiuri Shinbun 2009c). From a less 
sensationalistic perspective, academics too promptly revived the debate on 
brain death and transplantation, interrogating the legal and conceptual 
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implications of the new definition of brain death (Kuramochi et al. 2012; 
Machino et al. 2009). The question in the immediate aftermath of the reform 
was whether, and how, the new law would have changed the long-enduring 
impasse on organ transplantation in Japan (Aita 2009; Bagheri 2009).  
During my fieldwork, more than one year from the enforcement of the new 
policy, people usually expressed the confident belief that organ donation would 
become more common in Japan, but they were also clear that it would take time 
and gradual readjustments on the ground for this change to materialise. Data 
about organ donation in the aftermath of the reform showed that the removal of 
bureaucratic impediments to organ procurement had a considerable impact in 
increasing the number of donations. On the other hand, however, figures also 
indicate that most of the new cases of donations happened after cardiac arrest 
and that the rate of procurement from brain dead patients was so far only 
minimally altered, thus suggesting that clinical decisions about brain death still 
remain the crucial site of negotiation in the open dilemma of defining death.  
This chapter interrogates how these decisions are made at the level of 
clinical practice. Referring back to previous anthropological research on the 
topic (Lock 2002; Namihira 1988), and drawing on the recent work of medical 
sociologist Aita (2011), whose pioneering research provides the first 
comprehensive analysis of end-of-life care in Japanese hospitals, I illustrate the 
findings from the interviews conducted with eight neurologists and 
neurosurgeons working in intensive care. The selection of the interlocutors isn’t 
intended to be sociologically representative; on the contrary, the clinicians who 
participated in this part of the research express positions that can be 
considered relatively marginal because of their active involvement in the debate 
on end-of-life care in the ICU and/or organ donation. Drawing on their 
experience, I thus look at the determination of brain death (nōshi hantei) in 
clinical practice across the different moral and political economies of care and 
organ procurement.  
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Changing Deathscapes72 and the Medicalisation of Death in 
Japan 
 
In Japan, as in other post-industrialised societies, an increasing number of 
people end their days in a medical context, whether in a hospital ICU, a 
hospice, or supported by at-home care. As ‘the brain death problem’ shows, in 
Japan the national debate on the medicalisation of death has been especially 
focused on the right for patients and their families to continue treatment, while 
the so-called ‘right to die’ has so far been considerably less relevant than in 
North America and Europe. While Japanese associations in support of assisted 
suicide and active euthanasia (anrakushi) have been engaged in the debate on 
the right to die for a long time (Long 2005), their claims for the rights of patients 
and their families to decide when to ‘pull the plug’ have never raised the sort of 
public attention that has accompanied highly visible cases in other countries 
(Aita 2012). Even in the case of brain death, as seen, the strongest arguments 
for the legalisation of the new death came from transplant advocates rather 
than proponents of the right to die. Accordingly, public policies have traditionally 
been oriented towards the protection of the ‘right to life’, meaning the possibility 
for terminal patients and their families to continue artificial life-support 
independent of medical judgment (Williams 1996; see also Feldman 2000)  
The result is that in Japan, intensive medical intervention in the end-of-life, 
and artificial prolongation of death are especially common, even when 
therapeutically futile for the patients. Long illustrates that compared to North 
America, decisions about end-of-life in Japan are less conditioned by the 
financial constrains imposed by medical insurance coverage, and are 
deliberated through prolonged negotiations between families, patients and 
physicians (2005). Whereas in North America the prolongation of medically 
futile treatment is regarded as harmful to the patient’s dignity, Long argues that 
in Japan greater importance is given to the involvement of the patient’s 
significant others in the process of death (Long 2001, 2003). Instead of putting 
                                                72	Part of the chapter was presented at the 2013 IUAES panel ‘Disjunctions of deathscapes: 
ways of suffering, dying, and death’, from which I borrowed the concept of the deathscpape.	
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emphasis on principles of individual autonomy and dignity, the very idea of the 
patient’s self is negotiated case by case between physicians and the family, and 
end-of-life decisions are adjusted accordingly (ibid.). Lock similarly argues that 
in the late 1990s the principle of patient’s autonomy was regarded as a 
relatively recent introduction to the discourse on the ethics of clinical practice 
and was largely a family decision (Lock 2002). The medical futility of treatment 
was not a matter of concern; instead, physicians’ attitude and declared 
intentions tended to emphasise their commitment to prolonging life, and families 
were able to sustain hope for longer (ibid.).  
Recent investigations into end-of-life decisions show that Japanese 
physicians still express a particularly conservative attitude towards the 
withdrawal/withholding of life-prolonging treatment, so that even when care is 
unquestionably futile it is seldom interrupted (Aita 2006, 2011). The practice, 
however, calls attention to the problem of the allocation of scarce resources, 
especially in a country like Japan, with an especially numerous population of 
the elderly, dying of chronic diseases (Aita 2012, cf. Long 2005). Furthermore, it 
raises serious ethical questions concerning the rights of patients and families 
who object to the futile prolongation of treatment (idib.). 
Against this background, the so-called problem of ‘death with dignity’ 
(songenshi)73 seems to have increasingly become a matter of social concern in 
Japan (Aita 2011), and public polls show that the majority of the population 
opposes the prolongation of intensive life-support treatment in terminal cases. 
In 2012 a parliamentary commission was formed to draft a law authorising the 
interruption of life-support treatment for terminal patients, and in 2010 the 
Japanese Association of Acute Medicine (JAAM) issued its first official 
directives on end-of-life care to compensate for a gap in practical guidance that 
had so far made the withdrawal of life-support effectively impracticable.  
Clinical negotiation is also a question of increasing relevance to organ 
donation. The recent change in policy to allow organ donation under family 
consent alone has made the role of clinicians all the more crucial. Under the 
new system, any patient diagnosed as brain dead is now legally a potential 
                                                73 	Different from anrakushi, assisted suicide and euthanasia, songaeshi refers to the 
withdrawal/withholding of medically futile treatment (see also Long 2005). 
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organ donor, and the active cooperation of intensive care clinicians alone is that 
which can materialise the effects of the policy. In fact, efficiency in organ 
procurement is for the best part determined in the clinical setting, and the 
cooperation of intensive care physicians is crucial. The identification of potential 
donors, by means of a prompt diagnosis of brain death, and the productive 
management of the request to the next of kin, are the two most important 
phases in the donation process and in practice are largely taken care of by 
attending physicians in the ICU (Uryūhara 2012). Uryūhara shows that Japan 
ranks at the very bottom of international statistics in this respect, with 
approximately 8% of potential donations actually completed, compared with an 
average of 50% in Spain, 48% in Belgium, and 33% in Switzerland (2012: 139). 
It is estimated that around 2,000 patients become brain dead every year in 
Japanese hospitals; of these the JOTNW receives notification of roughly 100 
cases (Aruga 2010), and the number of actual brain dead donation is usually no 
higher than sixty.74  
In fact, physicians often lament that the task of cooperating with organ 
procurement overlaps with their routine work of clinical care and can become an 
extra burden for the already overstretched medical staff (Aruga 2006). One of 
the hospitals I visited was then trying to implement a transplant-support unit, 
with dedicated in-house coordinators who could step in and take care of the 
donation process. A further strategy to facilitate organ procurement was the 
introduction of new reimbursement schemes to relieve the donor’s hospital of 
the financial burden that comes with allocating internal resources to the 
management of the donation process. The crucial node, however, remains how 
to reconcile the need of procuring organs with the dilemmas surrounding the 
end-of-life, in the medical setting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
74 Data from the JOTNW.	
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The Heart Matters: the Diagnosis of Brain Death in Clinical 
Practice 
 
When I asked him to describe how he deals with brain death in clinical work, 
Yasuda-sensei immediately specified:  
 
Brain death is the end point. First, we work to rescue the patient so 
that he/she doesn’t become brain dead.  
(Yasuda-seseni) 
 
In practice, brain death is the end point of a process of care, which has its 
own logic (Mol 2008). Talking of brain death in clinical practice, physicians 
frequently underlined “the psychological burden” (seishintekina futan), or as one 
of them put it, “the problem of the heart” (kokoro no mondai). By this, they refer 
to the emotional strain of dealing with a condition that leaves no room for hope. 
While usually discussed in terms of a psychological burden, “the problem of the 
heart” is in fact deeply embedded in the practical tasks physicians are called 
upon to take care of.  
The first is disclosing the diagnosis to the family, and informing them that 
there is nothing left to do. Having ‘the talk’ with the family requires disclosing 
information in a way so that the family can fully understand that the prognosis is 
irreversible and terminal, without being left with second thoughts, doubts or 
even worse suspicions. Communicating the diagnosis also means that from that 
moment on, clinicians have to carry on their duties in a profoundly changed 
situation, one they are not trained for. The diagnosis of brain death doesn’t lead 
automatically to the interruption of treatment; in fact, it is functional to give the 
family time to accept (ukeireru) the loss. The role of physicians, therefore, 
changes from one oriented towards the provision of medical treatment, to one 
that needs to accommodate for grief care75.  
 
                                                
75 In practice, it is nurses who are closer to the family and take care of much of the work of assisting the 
bereaved, but ‘the talk’ is the responsibility of the attending physician, and it is the physician who is in 
charge of negotiating the various treatment options with the family (see more below on this point).  	
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A first thing to say is that we’re really surrounded by death. In the 
hospital, people die everyday […] It’s not that brain death brings 
about different feelings, but for sure you know [the family] have 
feelings that you cannot understand, a sadness that you cannot 
imagine. That’s the first thing: you have to deal with it knowing that 
you cannot know.  
(Shibuya-sensei) 
 
Anthropologist Namihira (1988) famously wrote that behind the resistance 
towards brain death is physicians’ discomfort in dealing with terminal diagnoses. 
Terminal diagnoses, Namihira illustrates, force intensive care physicians to 
abdicate their role to save lives; they cast doubts on clinicians’ personal drive, 
the moral obligations they owe to patients and their families, and the meanings 
they attach to and derive from their work (ibid.). Underpinning their professional 
attitude is the very character of their specialisation, for intensive care is all about 
saving lives in critical conditions, and often by means of desperate and heroic 
solutions. From this stance, brain death is the ultimate defeat.  
 
Most emergency care physicians don’t want to deal with brain 
death. Brain death is almost the end of life; emergency care 
physicians save lives, we save patients and save their families. 
Brain death is giving up (akirameru). 
(Kubota-sensei) 
 
When you disclose [a diagnosis of brain death] to the family, you're 
saying that you’re giving up. Even if [you?] continue treatment 
there’s really nothing more you can do [to help the patient], so you 
have to ask them to give up. That’s very difficult to explain. It’s like a 
drastic switch from a stance where you’re trying to provide the best 
treatment possible to just giving up. Maybe emergency care doctors 
and neurosurgeons are more used to [dealing with sudden 
traumas], while for neurologists and paediatricians it could be even 
harder. It’s like if until the morning you’ve done your best, and from 
the evening you don’t try any more. That’s difficult to explain to the 
family.  
(Abe-sensei) 
 
You take care of the patient day in day out. You do the tests, you 
see some values get better while others get worse. You discuss the 
patient’s condition with the family, you explain what improved and 
what didn’t, and since these are particularly severe cases, they are 
followed closely and things get discussed every day in detail. And 
then after you’ve been with the family every day and you’ve tried 
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hard for the patient to recover, you get to the point where there’s 
nothing more to do. And that is… is hard to explain to them if you 
think of their feelings.  
(Morinaga-sensei) 
 
As these extracts highlight, the clinical care of brain death is profoundly 
tangled up with the moral obligations of care, as well as with the routines, goals, 
and organisation of clinical work in the ICU. In practice, brain death can 
manifest through different clinical scenarios. In some cases, the person might 
be initially aware and/or responsive to treatment, only for his/her condition to 
deteriorate over time. In other situations, when the patient is admitted urgently 
to the ICU, the chances are that he/she might be already brain dead when put 
on life-support, although this is obviously impossible to tell with bare eyes. 
Whatever the scenario, brain death is always the result of a failed attempt at 
rescuing a patient. It is not a condition diagnosed ‘on the scene’ or immediately 
upon arrival at the hospital. Indeed, as Yasuda-sensei pointed out, what 
physicians do to handle brain death, is try to avoid it. Brain death materialises at 
the juncture when clinical practice has to shift from curative treatment to 
terminal care.  
This shift from treatment to end-of-life care is particularly severe in 
intensive and emergency medicine. On the one hand, this relatively young 
medical specialty has witnessed in the last decades an unequalled decrease in 
mortality rates, due to recent developments in resuscitation technologies and 
trauma medicine, challenging received knowledge about the limits of the 
irreversibility of death. On the other hand, end-of-life care is no longer confined 
to the hospice and palliative care for chronic diseases; more and more often, it 
is in the ICU that decisions are taken on when to stop resuscitation, when to 
pull the plug, or when to withhold treatment. Physicians thus emphasise that 
end-of-life care in the ICU (kyūmei shūchū shūmatsuki no iryō) has its own 
particular problems which are different to palliative care. Terminal conditions in 
the ICU, in fact, frequently result from unexpected and highly traumatic events, 
such accidents, and suddenly face families with delicate decisions that in the 
case of chronic diseases would be deliberate and processed over time. 
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As Kaufman describes in her compelling ethnography of end-of-life care in 
American ICUs, the coexistence of heroic treatment and terminal care means 
that the shift from curative to palliative medicine in the ICU is often rapid and 
fraught with problems (2006). 
 
Other than in relation to certain diseases (e.g., terminal cancer or 
end-stage AIDS) death is rarely spoken of or foreseen until shortly 
before it occurs. Medical care emphasizes the stabilization and 
normalization of organ systems and the gathering of laboratory data 
in service of that stabilization. Especially in the ICU, concrete life-
sustaining activities preclude the anticipation of death. Clinical 
medicine in the ICU is like surgery - its gaze falls only on a carefully 
circumscribed field, the analyzable interior of the body. A wanting life 
is rendered invisible, or nearly so, in the reading and the treating of 
signs of the body’s pathology. Disease is treated until there is no 
more physiological response to therapy. Only then is death expected. 
Only then does it “need” to be acknowledged by hospital staff. 
 (Kaufman 2006: 29) 
 
For these reasons, the aspect of clinical work where the emotional burden 
of dealing with brain death appears most problematically is not the provision of 
treatment but the diagnosis of the condition. Like the majority of the forms of life 
that one can find in ICUs, brain death is not a sudden event, nor a self-manifest 
condition. It is therefore in the practice of formulating a diagnosis that, in 
Kaufman’s terms, death becomes something that needs to be acknowledged.   
Acknowledging death is different than just expecting it. The lack of vital 
signs, the unresponsiveness to treatment, the state of deep coma are all 
indicators of probable brain death that physicians normally observe as they take 
care of the patient and monitor changes in his/her condition. It is on the basis of 
these clinical observations that the formal diagnosis is then conducted, so that 
in fact brain death must be anticipated in order to be diagnosed. The difference 
is that while expecting death allows people to just wait for it to happen, 
acknowledging that the process is already in motion entails the responsibility of 
taking action over it. 
Clinically speaking, brain death is an ethically ‘simple’ case, one that in 
fact spares much of the ethical dilemmas of more uncertain conditions routinely 
treated in ICUs. The certainty of the prognosis and the complete lack of 
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consciousness and responsiveness of the patient means that nothing can 
affect the patient’s chances of recovery or even his/her quality of ‘life’. On the 
other hand, however, the diagnosis and handling of brain death has enormous 
practical implications for organ donation.  
 
 
The Hearts Matter: Brain Death and Organ Donation  
 
If the co-operation of intensive care physicians is key to the success of the 
enterprise of organ donation, in practice, clinical work and the task of organ 
procurement are often described as conflicting. Dr. Kano, one of the clinicians 
anonymised in other passages of this chapter, writes in a professional journal 
about transplantation that:  
 
For patient’s families, emergency medicine and transplantation 
medicine are not tied to each other, neither [do] they want them to 
be so. For the family of the patient who arrives in A&E, emergency 
medicine is about life (sei ni mukatte); transplantation medicine 
about death (shi ni mukau)  
(Kano 2008: 35)  
 
Coupled with the problem of dealing with a terminal prognosis, the 
utilitarian function of the diagnosis of brain death puts the moral obligations of 
care under further strain.  
 
I know there are many children waiting for a new heart. I even took 
part in public events about organ donation. I know how important 
transplantation medicine is. But I also know very well the feelings of 
the family on the ‘donor side’ (donaa saido). [I know] their sorrow. 
So I think there’s a limit to what we can do to cooperate proactively 
and try to increase the number of organ donations. I think our 
priority is taking care of their feelings (kokoro no keea). 
(Yasuda-sensei) 
 
I’m a neurosurgeon and an intensive care physician; in other words, 
I’m on the ‘donor side’. In this position, I have absolutely no interest 
in pushing for the promotion of organ transplantation. Still, if a 
patient of mine has the wish to become a donor and unfortunately 
becomes brain dead, then I’ll do what I can to fulfil his/her will. I 
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don’t join initiatives to promote organ donation, but I do cooperate if 
my patient is in the situation. I think that’s the stance of most 
clinicians. I fell quite uncomfortable (iwakan) about intensive care 
physicians actively engaging in the promotion of organ donation. 
That’s weird. I first want to take care of my patients. 
(Ueda-sensei) 
 
Up to the moment when the patient becomes brain dead, all the 
treatment is for that patient. Once the person is brain dead, 
however, in some cases, she will become an organ donor, and 
that’s ultimately to help other patients. So as an IC clinician who is 
working for that patient, you’re confronted with two issues. First, 
from that moment on [your work] is about saving another patient 
you’ve never even seen. And second, there’s the fact that you 
haven’t been able to save your patient who’s there in front of you. 
For IC physicians, using the body of the patient we tried to save in 
order to help some other patient is... well, it’s difficult. It requires a 
kind of emotional switch (kimochi wo kaeru). You’ll hear that doctors 
[don’t diagnose brain death] because they’re busy, but that is 
nonsense: we’re always busy. If [diagnosing brain death] was to 
help our patients, we’d do it, even though we’re busy. When people 
say they cannot do it because they’re busy, they’re actually saying 
they don’t want to do it because that’s not for their patient’s benefit. 
Obviously when you’re busy you cut on extra-work, but the point is 
this is extra-work because it’s not aimed at helping your patient. So 
in a way, the two issues I told you actually boil down to the same 
thing. No matter if you’re busy or not, you just don’t see it as part of 
your job, because it’s not to help your patient. Logically, and 
ethically, it can be argued that it is the responsibility of IC 
physicians [to cooperate with organ donation], but in your heart you 
can’t think of it as your job.  
(Abe-sensei) 
 
As Abe-sensei’s comment illustrates, in case of donation, clinical care is 
reconfigured from the care of the patient to the task of procuring organs. 
Transplant coordinators step in, and the provision of treatment too is readjusted 
in the function of the single organs. As Hogle describes, conflicting interests 
can be at stake between what is best for the overall condition of the body and 
what is more effective to maintain the functions of the internal organs because 
tissues in different organs can deteriorate at different paces and require 
different care, and this in turn can affect physiological processes in various 
bodily systems (Hogle 1999).  
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Hogle writes that this process of so-called “donor-management” is the 
new frontier of organ preservation, as it targets single organs while they are still 
inside the donor’s body (Hogle 1995, 1999). Donor-management gives rise to 
ambiguous situations in which therapies normally provided to living patients 
(both mechanical life-support and drug therapies) are deployed to maintain a 
body that is now “reimagined as a container and life support system for the 
targeted organs” (1999: 147), while at the same time treatment that would 
never be used on less injured patients is used to maximise the condition and 
quantity of organs procured (1999: 149-151). On the other hand, to some 
intensive care physicians, the very idea of ‘donor management’ seems 
inappropriate altogether, as “it refers to the management of the organs (zōki wo 
kanri suru) instead of the care of the person (hito wo miru)” (Kano 2011: 453).  
From this perspective, clinicians emphasise the importance of carefully 
managing the interaction with the family, and whether to confute or support the 
point, they all expressed the concern that requesting the family to consider 
organ donation could cast doubt on the physician’s commitment to provide 
treatment in the best interest of the patient and undermine the relationship with 
the next of kin. As is often pointed out, clinicians in Japan have been 
traditionally reluctant to broach the issue of organ donation with the next of kin, 
considering it disrespectful and hurtful to approach the bereaved family with 
such a request (Lock 2002). In this regard, clinicians’ uncooperative, when not 
openly opposed, attitude towards organ donation is often indicated as the main 
reason behind the local low rate of organ procurement (see also Uryūhara 
2012).  
On the other hand, all the medical professionals interviewed emphasised 
that, at least in principle, the possibility of donating organs should be offered to 
families as one of the various options of care that are available for terminal 
patients, as expressed though the paradigm of so-called ‘opushon teiji’ (giving 
an option). Despite their different stance on organ transplantation (some were 
definitively more in favour than others), clinicians emphasised that discussing 
organ donation with the family isn’t just aimed at obtaining consent, but is also 
a way to fulfil the will of patients and families who desire to donate. Comparing 
the local practice with the approach in U.S.A., one physician stressed that in 
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Japan organ donation is not linked to the goal of increasing the efficiency of 
organ procurement but is part of end-of-life care, and the role of the coordinator 
is not to talk the next of kin into donating but is to provide grief care. This 
approach encourages clinicians to assume an active stance on organ donation 
as part of their ethical responsibilities towards terminal patients and their 
families, and was regarded as particularly important in light of the recent reform 
on organ donation, which makes it possible for the next of kin to decide on 
donation even when the patient doesn’t hold a donor card.  
Two of the clinicians interviewed, Abe-sensei and Morinaga-sensei, 
worked in hospitals that were implementing a protocol for ‘option giving’. 
Introduced after the recent reform of the law on transplant. The protocol aimed 
at providing information on end-of-life care and organ donation to all the 
families of patients who met the criteria of brain death. In discussing how they 
managed the protocol, both Morinaga-sensei and Abe-sensei stressed that the 
role of the attending physician ended when disclosing information to the family, 
and that while clinicians had the responsibility of providing support and 
arranging a talk with a transplant coordinator, if the family wished it, discussing 
organ donation was not their role.  When the JOTWN coordinators take over, 
physicians should step aside. Obviously, the hospital staff would still be in 
charge of the medical aspect of the work, but it would now be up to the 
transplant coordinator to conduct the consultation with the family, negotiating 
for example whether to donate after cardiac arrest or brain death and obtaining 
written consent to the pronouncement of death for transplant purposes. 
Keeping a neat separation between the clinical aspect of organ donation and 
the practical management of it was regarded in this case as a way to reconcile 
the moral obligations of care with the task of organ procurement.  
Kitanaka-sensei was of a different school of thought. As attending 
physician he felt the responsibility of being in charge throughout. He had his 
own way of dealing with ‘his’ patients and their families, one that involved 
managing both the medical treatment of the first and the psychological care of 
the second. He was all but willing to leave the reins of his ICU to transplant 
coordinators, and he was in fact quite picky about the personnel that the 
JOTNW sent over. The scepticism was mutual. Some transplant surgeons and 
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coordinators regarded Kitanaka-sensei’s stewardship, and his attitude of 
supervising every aspect of the process of donation, as paternalistic, 
unpractical and unnecessarily time-consuming. In his own view, Kitanaka-
sensei’s method was worthy of praise, for leading to a high rate of consent to 
donation, as well as good medical care. After all, he thought he knew about 
treatment better than the coordinators, who intervene halfway through the 
process.  
Whether by stepping back or by taking charge of the process of donation, 
physicians tried to reconcile their moral obligations towards the patient and the 
family with the utilitarian use of the body as a source of therapeutic goods. In 
this regard, while cooperation with organ donation still appears to be a 
problematic node in clinical work, the paradigm of ‘opushon teiji’ provides an 
important framework to subsume organ donation into the wider discourse on 
end-of-life care.  
 
 
Mitori no Iryō 
 
Kitanaka-sensei stands on a stool by the door of one of the ICU ready to 
take a picture. “Wait, did I take it?” says Kitanaka-sensei half seriously, still 
standing on the chair. Inside the room, people chuckle. The scene is from the 
TV documentary “Medicine for life and death”76, on the work of Kitanaka-sensei 
and his team. Inside the room, family and friends pose around the hospital bed 
where a young man lies attached to life-support machines. The young man was 
hospitalised a few days earlier. Kitanaka-sensei is shown during a private 
meeting with the family while he explains to the middle-aged parents that their 
son is brain dead. The day after the group picture, the entire family is again at 
the man’s bedside. In the operating theatre (OT) down the corridor, the 
transplant team is getting ready to procure the kidneys after the patient is 
disconnected from life support. The family has been waiting in the room for a 
while, as Kitanaka-sensei is going back and forth to the OT. When the moment 
comes, everyone stands. At the end of the bed a woman holds the man’s ankle 
                                                
76 Sapporo TV, first broadcasted in 2010. 
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sobbing. Kitanaka-sensei stands next to the respirator. On the other side of the 
bed, children and women rub the man’s arm and leg underneath the sheets. 
The old mother caresses his head with fast movements, turning her head back 
and forth from her son to the monitors displaying his vital signs. Kitanaka-
sensei speaks a few words. The scene goes on. Nothing happens. People are 
heard sobbing. The physician bows his head and thanks everyone once more. 
He gives a few more words of condolence and praises the family and the 
patient for having gambatta77 so hard. Everybody seems to be waiting to know 
when to leave. 
Because brain death is not equated with human death in Japan, the 
question of whether and how to withdraw life-support treatment is left to the kin 
and the attending physician to negotiate. In theory, four options are available: 
1) continue treatment without change; 2) continue artificial ventilation while 
changing other treatment (most commonly, by gradually decreasing the dose of 
drugs to stabilise blood pressure); 3) withdraw treatment altogether; 4) donate 
organs. In practice, the complete withdrawal of life-support (3) is almost never 
practiced, and organ donation (4) is scarcely given as an option.  
Aita (2011) indicates that once initiated, artificial ventilation is rarely 
discontinued. Even when medically futile, artificial ventilation is regarded as a 
form of basic care rather than advanced/extreme treatment because switching 
off the ventilator would result in the immediate death of the person and is 
therefore conceived as equivalent to causing rather than allowing death to 
happen (ibid.). The path usually preferred is therefore to continue ventilation, 
and possibly regulate drug therapy. The gradual withholding/withdrawal of 
drugs, Kitanaka-sensei explained, can be discussed with the family when the 
patient’s condition seems to require particularly intensive care, for this indicates 
that the organism’s capacity to sustain itself is weakening and physicians can 
anticipate that, if continued, heavy doses of pharmaceuticals might have 
detrimental effects on the body appearance. In this way, the patient is kept off 
artificial ventilation allowing cardiac arrest to ‘naturally’ happen through what is 
also defined as a ‘soft landing approach’ (Aita 2011).  
                                                77	See	the	discussion	on	gambaru	in	Chapter	2.	
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The whole process can take up to several days, weeks, or even months if 
the patient is stable and the family desires to continue treatment. During this 
time, families can rely on full insurance coverage for the costly expenses of a 
bed in ICU. Decisions, it appears, are thus gradually deliberated over the 
course of events, even though the medical futility of treatment is certain from 
the start. In practice, most of the time families are given only some of the 
options clinically available. But in the process they are given time.  
Physicians stressed how time is an essential part of care. Even with the 
most severe cases, physicians waited at least one day before making the 
diagnosis and disclosing the prognosis to the family. They bide their time 
before deciding what to do, gauging several factors other than clinical 
symptoms and the schedule of organ procurement. They observe the family’s 
reaction and responses in consultation with nurses, who are the closest to the 
patient’s relatives. Clinicians waited before talking about organ donation or 
treatment withdrawal, if they ever did. They mentioned options only to leave 
them for later discussion. They judged each case in its own regard on the basis 
of the family’s (presumed) preparedness to make, or just even consider, certain 
decisions. None of the interviewees expressed the concern, often mentioned in 
the bioethical literature, that this waiting could be agonising for the family. Time, 
instead, was regarded as productive.   
Rather than being given the news that the patient is dying, the family 
would gradually become accustomed to the idea that there is nothing left to do, 
figuring out the course of events through repeated exchanges with the medical 
staff and by participating in the decisions made in the clinical setting. In fact, 
these negotiations don’t translate necessarily into a wider range of choices, but 
they nevertheless provide an outlet for patients’ families to respond to the rapid 
shift from curative to palliative treatment that characterises clinical practice in 
the ICU. In this way, physicians stressed, families can fully accept (ukeireru) the 
imminent death of a loved one. In practice, it seems, leaving a margin of 
ambiguity is more important than coming up with clear-cut definitions; not 
knowing can practically be a more useful strategy (see Lock 2002; Long 2005; 
cf. Murray 1981), especially when it comes to a diagnosis so publicly debated 
and medically hard to grasp as ‘brain death’ (see more below).  
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In clinical practice, the way people try to make the most of this ambiguity 
goes by the term mitori no iryō (literally, treatment for the care of the dying). 
Mitory no iryō is the way people commonly talk of “end-of-life care”, and 
differently to the technical jargon “shūmatsuki no iryō”, it refers not just to 
treatment options but also to the creation of a supportive environment for 
terminal patients and their families. This extends past the point of death. 
Kitanaka-sensei’s hospital for example offered a service called ‘angel make-up’ 
(enzeru meekappu) to prepare the body for viewing. Washing, preparing and 
applying make-up to the body was particularly important for patients who 
suffered trauma or were treated for prolonged periods with drugs that can cause 
swelling and damage the appearance of the patient. It was also of the greatest 
importance for organ donors.  
Organ donation was a sensitive part of mitori no iryō. Kitanaka-sensei not 
only supervised the pre-operative care, many times he also joined the 
transplant team in the OT during the explant. Nurses took care to add some 
flower decorations to the chilling boxes containing the organs, and offered the 
families to write cards to send with them. The medical staff supervised the 
dispatch of the organs, in the same way as they would attend the discharge of 
the body of dead patients. Care, Kitanaka-sensei explained, doesn’t terminate 
at the point at which clinicians run out of therapeutic possibilities, but extends 
until the patient and the family leave the hospital, in whatever ways that 
happens. Organs were no exceptions, because “in the end, they’re not just 
things (yappari mono janai)”.  
Strathern argues that at stake in the detachment of body parts, is the 
relationship between the body as a person and the body as a thing (2004). 
What is reproduced through the cultural construct of body “parts” is in fact the 
“wholeness” of the body as a person who cannot be reified: thought of as “part”, 
Strathern writes, organs can be made into things, but never “whole” things on 
their own (ibid.). A similar logic seems to orient the care of the body’s 
appearance and handling in functioning to reinstate personhood at the moment 
–the end of life– when this is both most precarious and important. At the very 
juncture where treatment could reduce the body to an object-like status, 
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medical care becomes a resource to “accompany a person in the process of 
death”, as Kitanaka-sensei describes.  
“But whole bodies”, Strathern also notes, “are, in another sense, part-
persons […] for as well as being singular, persons can also be plural”, at least in 
Malaysia (2004). Similarly to what Strathern writes about Malaysia, personhood 
in Japan is not defined in relation to an intimate self, and emphasis is put 
instead on the social relationships the person is part of, particularly the inner 
circle of family members (Kondo 1990). As discussed in Chapter 1, this notion 
of the self was at the base of arguments advanced by patients’ rights advocates 
and legal scholars against the redefinition of death as human death, for this 
would have meant stripping death away from the networks of social relationship 
that makes a person, and gives the physicians alone the authority to deliberate 
over it. Physicians drew upon these ideas to stress that: “in Japan informed 
consent is the consent of the family”78, and Shibuya-sensei even argued that it 
is not just abstract interests we are talking about; the very body of the person is 
shared with his/her closest one, for the person is conceived as part of the life of 
the family (kazoku no seimei no ichibu). Aita (2011) thus argues that because 
the brain dead patient is both unconscious and terminal, clinical care is oriented 
towards the bereaved family rather than the person, although the practice of 
continuing intensive treatment raises ethical doubts about the respect of the 
person’s best interest. In this way, the right to self determination recognised by 
the law is not quite equivalent to a system of living will, and appears instead to 
be oriented to providing grief care for the family, thus reinforcing the primacy 
traditionally assigned to collective decision-making and to the role of the family 
in clinical choices (cf. Tsuji 2011).  
Kitanaka-sensei’s hospital was one of those that were working on 
implementing mitori no iryō in practice. Families of dying patients were 
encouraged to spend the remaining time with the person; they were provided 
with a private space by moving the patient into a single ICU, and offered the 
possibility of negotiating flexible visiting times. Some found it unbearable to be 
exposed to the view of a loved one in such a condition, but others used the 
chance quite creatively. Kitanaka-sensei had a vast gallery of pictures and 
                                                78	Abe-sensei,	personal	communication.	
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videos of brain dead patients and families, which he often used in his 
presentations at conferences. They show relatives as they help out the nurses; 
a mother washing the hair of a patient; a friend giving him a haircut; another 
one taking care of the manicure. One person got an extra bed in the ICU to 
sleep with the patient. Most commonly, people bring personal objects: a picture 
of a car if the person had a passion for motors, toys for young children, a book 
to read some passages from, even pets. One man was dressed up in his 
baseball uniform. Another was taken out in his bed for “a walk” in the 
ambulance drop-off area. A young couple is shown with their two-year old baby. 
The body of the child rests inert on the father’s lap, as the parents talk to the 
camera for a video together. The pictures and videos show people posing, and 
although relaxed, they also appear somewhat staged. But they are supposed to 
be, in a way.  
Like the contemporary funerals Suzuki describes (2000), mitori no iryō 
seems to centre on the positive commemoration of the person and the 
beautification of the body, rather than on rituals of separation from the spirits or 
the purification from the pollution associated with the death. The practices in the 
ICU are celebratory and commemorative experiences, and are part of what 
mitori no iryō is for: to build good memories, share sad moments, and begin to 
grieve. The mixture of clinical care and rituals of death, on the other hand, is not 
new. Lock describes for example that clinical practitioners in Japan practice 
kuyō, a ritual to appease the suffering of the dead, for the spirits of the bodies 
dissected (2002). In this way, the living continue to accompany the dead in the 
journey to the after-life, albeit through different practices, that reflect different 
conceptions of the dead (or here comatose) body as a medium of the 
individual’s presence rather than a source of impurity (Suzuki 2000). In mitori no 
iryō, the person is treated as alive, beautified and positively commemorated, 
and indeed it seems that more than appeasing the dead spirits, the care of the 
body serves to appease the bereaved.  
 The body is the means of negotiation and enactment of these practices. It 
is the medium and the agent of personhood for and though others; whose life, 
artificially sustained, allows the time for care. It can also be a site of conflict.  
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The prolongation of treatment in a condition of brain death looks like 
harming the patient. It could be painful. It could be that he, or she, 
didn’t want it. I feel very strongly about that. In fact, according to a 
large survey on end-of-life care here in Japan, 80% of people 
reportedly replied that, had they been terminally ill, they wouldn’t 
want to prolong treatment […] Even if the person cannot experience 
pain, it’s still doing something to a person that he or she doesn’t 
want. If the person was conscious, he/she wouldn’t want it, so I 
think it’s unfair to continue treatment without knowing the person’s 
will. I’m not saying that shouldn’t be possible, but that it should be 
done in accordance with the person’s will. To me it’s exactly the 
same as fulfilling the person’s will to donate organs, it’s a form of 
respect to the person’s will (ishi wo sonkei suru).  
(Ueda-sensei) 
 
Ueda-sensei’s comment draws attention to how the ‘logic of care’ is never 
fully coherent, and in practice is often fraught with conflicts and contradictions. 
On the one hand, his argument highlights how the increased public attention on 
the issue of end-of-life care seems to articulate a stronger ideal of individual 
rights and autonomy, so that the person’s own interest and that of the family 
can be perceived as conflicting (cf. Aita 2011). Further, Ueda-sensei’s point 
underlines how the privileged attention to providing grief care to the family by 
allowing them time to be with the patient can also constrain people’s choice, 
making it virtually impossible to accommodate the will of those, both patients 
and next of kin, who object to the prolongation of futile life-support treatment. 
From this perspective, it appears that structural constraints significantly 
determine what choices are made available to people (cf. Kaufman 2006). 
Further, physicians act as the ultimate gatekeepers of families’ decisions, 
judging case by case on the basis of the family’s perceived preparedness to 
discuss various options of care, they in fact decide to whether, when, and to 
whom, these options are presented.  
While presenting internal conflicts, the practice that Japanese physicians 
describe also offers insights that are relevant to the context. Ethnographic 
literature gives compelling evidence of how the brain dead body is a source of 
ambiguity everywhere, not just in Japan. Describing clinical practice in North 
America, for example, Lock reports how physicians and nurses care for brain 
dead patients as if the person still “lingers in the body” (2002). Hogle too 
indicates that physicians in the U.S.A. and Germany recognise the brain dead 
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body as a corpse only after organ procurement (1999)79. The same is true for 
patients’ families. The emphasis on the right to die in the Western debate 
shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of treatment is a response 
in and of itself (Kaufman 2006). Writing about England, Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 
for example, show that families of severely head injured patients, including 
brain dead patients, negotiate between different notions of death, both as a 
biological event and as a relational process (2014). As they navigate this phase 
of “in-between” and reconcile the loss of a loved one, families express clearly 
that the person is still present, “at least as a subject for ‘being with’ and saying 
goodbye to” (Kitzinger and Kitzinger 2014: 246). An Italian nurse similarly told 
me that in his experience the practice of ‘forcing the ICU open’ (against hospital 
regulations) for family members to view the person help the bereaved to come 
to terms with death, while also having a positive effect on consent to organ 
donation.  
In Japan, the national controversy on brain death provided clinicians with a 
rich range of social, professional and cultural resources that explicitly draw 
attention to various dimensions of the problem of care of terminal patients that 
go beyond the medical definition of brain death. The legal ambiguity over the 
definition of brain death and the possibility of relying on medical insurance for 
the costs of life-support treatment appear to be significant factors in allowing the 
space for people to negotiate delicate decisions about the end-of-life with a 
wider margin of flexibility. Whether these possibilities actually translate into 
forms of care that are able to better accommodate people’s feelings remains an 
open question, as Ueda-sensei’s comment suggests. From an anthropological 
point of view, however, the Japanese case offers important insights into the 
ethics of end-of-life. As the mention of ethnographic cases in contexts other 
than Japan indicates, however construed, brain dead bodies are brain death 
persons everywhere (Morioka 1989, 2001), and any failure to conceptualise this 
is a loss of important intellectual resources in the way we frame the bioethical 
discourse on the category of brain death (cf. Strathern 2004). In this sense, the 
Japanese experience is not just indicative of a particular social construction of 
                                                
79 See also Younger et al. 1989.  	
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the person; it is also a more sophisticated social analysis of the problem of 
brain death in clinical practice. 
 
 
(Mis)Diagnosis: Clinical and Legal Brain Death 
 
So far I have illustrated how conflicting goals and even the shifting ontologies of 
the body are at stake in the diagnosis of brain death (cf. Mol 2002). The ways in 
which people negotiate these factors depend on the questions of what needs be 
diagnosed and for what purpose.  
Because of the emotional strain associated with brain death, Japanese 
medical practitioners have traditionally been reluctant to make such diagnoses. 
In practice, many reportedly regard it an unnecessary burden to go through to 
the standard protocol for the determination of brain death given that the 
diagnosis would not lead to any therapeutic options for the patient and would 
only result in a dreadful conversation with the family (Namihira 1988; Aita 
2011). Most commonly, clinicians rely on partial/non-standardised diagnostic 
procedures to evaluate the patient’s condition and decide when to stop curative 
treatment. While putting emphasis on showing their commitment to prolonging 
life and doing everything possible to save life, physicians would often take 
charge of decreasing the administration of oxygen in order to allow death to 
occur “naturally” while still leaving space for “miracles” to happen (Lock 2002: 
271). In this way, however, families are often kept in the dark about the patient’s 
situation and informed only when death has already happened, or are given 
only partial information to suggest that death is approaching without however 
being actively involved in the deliberation of end-of-life decisions.  
The problem is not limited only to brain death, but has emerged as one of 
the most critical issues of medical practice in Japan (Feldman 1985). Until 
recently, it was widespread practice among Japanese physicians to avoid 
disclosing terminal diagnoses like cancer, brain death or other conditions 
treated in the ICU. Facing terminal patients and their families with the dreadful 
prognosis of imminent death was deemed as “unethical”, considering the public 
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perception that surrounds certain conditions (Long 1982). Because brain death 
is clearly associated in the public discourse with organ donation and the 
withdrawal of care, physicians would commonly avoid disclosing the diagnosis 
to families in order not compromise the relationship of trust with the next of kin 
by suggesting their intention to interrupt care or even take advantage of the 
patient’s imminent death to procure organs (Namihira 1988; Aita 2011).  
The definition of brain death as human death to allow organ donation 
played into this moral economy of end-of-life care. With the legalisation on 
organ donation from brain dead patients, in 1997, the Japanese criteria of brain 
death, as defined in the so-called Takeuchi code (Takeuchi kijun), were taken 
as a new legal definition of death. The Takeuchi code, approved in 1984, lays 
down the diagnostic procedure to determine brain death in clinical practice and 
prescribes the repetition, over an interval of at least six hours, of the following 
examinations: 
 
1. Evaluation of the preconditions; 
2. Ruling out of confounding factors; 
3. The determination of coma deepness; 
4. Electroencephalography 
5. Examination of fixed, dilated pupils; 
6. Brain-stem reflexes, including the apnoea test 
 
The policy on organ donation, the aim of which was to provide practical 
guidance for organ procurement, indicated that when the tests were first 
completed and gave a positive result, physicians would initiate the process of 
consultation with the family on the grounds that the patient now clinically 
qualified as a potential donor. Once consent was obtained for organs to be 
retrieved, then, the end of the second repetition of the tests would be recorded 
as the official time of the decease.  
During the debate on the law, however, opponents of brain death, 
including intensive care physicians, objected that, as it was, the policy 
theoretically enabled the lawful withdrawal of life-support without the family’s 
consent, for it equated the diagnostic procedure with the legal determination of 
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death, and at the same time demanded that the diagnosis was made before 
consulting the family. As a way out of this catch 22 situation, the last test in the 
Takeuchi code, the apnoea test, was removed from the mandatory tests for the 
first examination.  
The apnoea test (mukokyū tesuto) is the part of the test to verify the 
absence of brain-stem reflexes. These are clinical examinations that can be 
carried out at the bedside, that consist of simple manipulation of the body; they 
provide external stimuli, like exercising pressure on the eye-lid or projecting light 
into the eye, that would be sensed by a functioning brain stem and elicit 
automatic responses. The apnoea test verifies the absence of the impulse to 
breathe, which is regulated by centres located in the part of the brain stem (the 
medulla oblongata) that has the longest survival time. It is, therefore, the kernel 
of the diagnosis of brain death. To test the absence of respiratory drive in a 
patient on artificial ventilation, however, requires the temporary removal of life-
support. This produces an increase in the level of carbon dioxide, monitored 
through blood tests, that should generate the stimulus to breath detectable by 
the movement of the chest. Since it involves switching off artificial life support, 
the test was not prescribed at the level of the first clinical examination.  
This allows the diagnosis of “possible brain death” (nōshi to sareuru jōtai) 
that was sound enough for physicians to consult the family and contact a 
transplant coordinator, but also ambiguous enough to leave undecided whether 
the patient actually met the legal criteria of death and should be removed from 
artificial life-support. This difference was formalised in the policy by formally 
distinguishing between so-called ‘clinical’ (rinshōteki nōshi) and ‘legal’ (hōteki 
nōshi) brain death.  
That the determination of brain death is divided in two phases in not 
peculiar to Japan and is determined by the fact that the condition develops over 
time and therefore requires a period of observation to verify the persistence of 
symptoms and conclude that the process of death of brain tissues is indeed 
completed and irreversible. In this sense, the two phases in the determination of 
brain death are regarded as merely descriptive of the chronological unfolding of 
the diagnostic procedure through the repetition of two sets of tests, and the 
whole process is theoretically conflated into the final time of death (cf. Lynn and 
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Cranford 1999) . Distinguishing between ‘clinical’ (rinshōteki nōshi) and ‘legal’ 
(hōteki nōshi) brain death, instead, the Japanese policy shifts the focus from the 
underlying condition that the diagnosis reveals to the practical functions that this 
diagnosis fulfils as a means to assess the patient’s condition and/or to 
determine death in order to enable organ procurement.  
In this way, however, the Japanese policy created a situation of potential 
confusion (konran) in practice (Kano 2008; Aita 2011). First, it suggested that 
the complete determination of brain death, including the apnoea test, was of 
relevance only to organ donation, and that in other cases the determination of 
brain death could be left incomplete. Secondarily, it implied that (brain) death 
could be either clinical or legal and that the two could be different from each 
other; an arguably a disturbing prospect given the widespread public concern 
over this medical category.  
With the reform of the policy in 2009, therefore, the distinction between 
clinical and legal brain death was amended, and the two were renamed 
respectively diagnosis (nōshi shindan) and determination (nōshi hantei) of brain 
death. In fact, since the revised law doesn’t give a uniform definition of death 
(see Chapter 5), the policy still maintains that the diagnosis (shindan) doesn’t 
require the apnoea test, and that the final determination (hantei) is subject to 
the family’s consent and is the only one that holds legal value to withdraw 
treatment and pronounce the decease. Despite this elements of consistency 
with the previous policy, the formal amending was intended to receive the 
comments, advanced by medical professionals, that beyond the bureaucratic 
procedure concerning organ donation, the diagnosis of brain death is primarily a 
medical matter and that from such a point of view there is no ‘clinical’ or ‘legal’ 
brain death but only ‘brain death in the proper sense’ (hontō no imi nōshi). 
‘Brain death in the proper sense’ is a phrase clinicians often use to refer to the 
condition as it is determined by adhering to the standard diagnostic protocol. 
Anything less, they agree, doesn’t count as a proper diagnosis of brain death 
from a medical point of view.  
This emphasis on the correctness of the diagnosis must be understood in 
light of the debate on end-of-life care and the importance of ‘giving an option’ 
(opushon teiji). The consequence of physicians’ reluctance to disclose terminal 
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diagnoses was that, in fact, patients and their families were disenfranchised 
from exercising their rights concerning end-of-life decisions (Feldman 1985; 
Long 1982, cf. 2005; Aita 2011). The clinicians interviewed were therefore 
particularly critical of this long-established tendency. They all pointed out how it 
was unethical and contrary to the moral obligations of care for the patients and 
the family. At the same time, in the way they discussed the issue, they also 
pointed out that disclosing information to the family is not necessarily 
considered to be functional to take active decisions with regard to treatment 
withdrawal and in most cases disclosing the diagnosis serves instead to give 
time and space to the next of kin to be with the patients and take part in mitori 
no iryō. Giving options, albeit in fact these are often limited, is therefore a way 
to counter the tendency not to disclose information to families, representing a 
shift in the ethics of clinical practice towards a more active involvement of the 
family in the decisions about end-of-life, but also a more active role on the side 
of the physicians in overcoming the psychological burden of the terminal 
diagnoses and taking care of the process of dying.  
The clinicians interviewed thus expressed very clearly the stance that in 
the face of the concerns over the medicalisation of death, their commitment 
cannot be limited to saving and prolonging life at any costs and that the role of 
medical professionals is increasingly that of taking care of the process of dying, 
whether by negotiating the interruption of clinically futile treatment or giving the 
family time to participate in mitori no iryō or even by offering organ donation as 
a way to fulfil patient’s last will at the end-of-life.  
In this economy of care, the role of the diagnosis is particularly important 
to start the process of negotiations on these end-of-life options, and the 
clinicians interviewed all stressed that a sound diagnosis of the patient’s 
condition is an important tool in clinical practice, even when it has no role in 
relation to curative treatment. From this perspective, Abe-sensei stated that at 
his hospital, and in many others in the country he said, physicians always made 
the full diagnosis of brain death, including the apnoea test. When I asked him 
how they would accommodate the family’s decision not to carry out the final 
determination (hantei) and keep the person on artificial ventilation, he explained 
that:  
 265 
Even if we were asked not to do a diagnosis (shindan), our job 
as clinicians is to verify with precision (kichitto miru) the patient’s 
condition. Even if we were required not to proceed with the 
determination of brain death (nōshi hantei), there is a medical reality 
(igakutekina jijijtsu), and we check that medical reality. You can use 
the Japanese protocol for the determination of brain death (nōshi 
hantei), or the Harvard protocol, or the Danish one, each country has 
its own, with roughly the same tests. Our job is to perform a medical 
diagnosis. To not perform the ‘determination’ of brain death (nōshi 
hantei) simply means not to use those criteria.  
(Abe-sensei) 
 
In his analysis, the determination of brain death as a matter of practice 
(the act of determining the patient’s condition) is conflated with the 
determination of brain death as a standardised diagnostic procedure, and 
through it, with the biological condition that this is designed to test, what he calls 
the “medical truth”. It is this that the diagnosis attests and that, in turn, defines 
the clinical options available. 
 
The legal determination prescribes we do the tests twice over a 
six hours interval. At the level of the first examination we do the 
determination of brain death (nōshi hantei) according to the approved 
procedure. Then we do the second examination, because that’s the 
rule. That’s the rule to determine brain death legally. In a way that’s 
etiquette (sahō); it’s for performance (manaa). It’s earlier on that you 
understand you have to give up on treating the patient, and that’s 
what you’ve got to communicate to the family: the fact you have to let 
it go. Then you can also propose to donate organs, and that’s what 
the legal determination is for. But before the legal determination, 
you’ve already done the diagnosis […] and if you use [the protocol] 
then you can already know that what you diagnosed is brain death.  
(Abe-sensei) 
 
While all the clinicians interviewed agreed with Abe-sensei on the 
relevance of the diagnosis to inform the patient’s family, the way they discussed 
their work in practice suggests a very different scenario.  
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 (Mis)Diagnosis I: “We Don’t Use the Word ‘Brain Death’” 
 
Morinaga-sensei was head physician at the critical care department of a 
hospital in central Tokyo. At the time when I interviewed him, they were 
implementing a new protocol for the ‘option giving’. This was designed in the 
aftermath of the reform of the policy on organ donation and was in use in 
various centres, including Abe-sensei’s hospital. The protocol provided 
pragmatic guidance on how to discuss terminal prognoses with families of 
severely head-injured patients, in order to relieve the medical staff of the 
burden of evaluating each case on an individual basis, while also offering 
complete information to all families.  
Physicians noted down the results of the clinical examinations on a form 
that was then handed over to the family. On the back page, the form presented 
a space to fill in with a one-line explanation of the patient’s clinical record, 
followed by a pre-printed description of the prognosis that anticipated the 
patient’s imminent and inevitable death.  
The front part of the form instead consisted of a checklist of clinical tests 
for the attending physician to go through. These described exactly the 
symptoms assessed with the official brain death determination (noshi hantei): 
deep coma, dilated pupils and absence of brainstem reflexes including the lack 
of respiratory drive.  
 
From the interview with Morinaga-sensei: 
 
Me: Could you explain me how you go about informing the 
family that the person is in a condition of brain death? 
 
Morinaga-sensei: You cannot say the person is in a condition 
of brain death. 
 
Me: Why? 
 
M: You can’t say it until you have done the brain death 
determination (noshi hantei). 
 
Me: I see. [What] I noticed in fact is that in here [in the pre-
printed description of the prognosis] brain death is never 
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mentioned, but judging from the tests I guess you use this 
procedure on patients who are likely to be brain dead, right? So 
how do you discuss the patient’s condition with the family?  
 
M: Families might have a different view of brain death than 
medical professionals, for example they often confuse it with PSV, 
so we don’t use these categories. Instead we usually explain that, 
for example, ‘the person has lost brain functions (nō no kinō ha 
ushinawareta)’ or that ‘there’s nothing left to do (chiryō shitemo 
modoranai)’. As you see there’s a space to fill in here [to summarise 
the diagnostic findings]. Here we write things that the family can 
easily understand, like I just told you. If it seems they might not 
understand we’d put it for example as: ‘the person won’t wake up 
(me ga samasanai jōtai)’. In a scientifically correct way you would 
say ‘possible brain death’ (nōshi no kanōsei ga aru), but it just 
makes no sense to use the word ‘brain death’. There’s no reason to 
do so. The only case when the word ‘brain death’ is important is 
after you’ve finished the [legal] determination.  
 
Me: Does it ever happen though that relatives themselves ask 
whether the patient is brain dead? 
 
M: Yes it does in fact.  
 
Me: And what would do then? 
 
M: The thing is, brain death is not brain death unless you do 
the brain death determination (nōshi hantei). So we explain it in the 
ways I told you […] We talk of ‘brain death’ only after having 
concluded the legal determination, but we go through that only 
when they wish to donate organs. In other cases we don’t do it. 
 
Me: You don’t? 
 
M: No, absolutely not. Because the [apnoea] test is 
dangerous.  
 
[…] 
 
Me: But doesn’t this [the check of absence of respiratory drive] 
refer to the apnoea test? 
 
M: No. In the apnoea test you take blood samples and 
measure the level of carbon dioxide objectively (kyakkantekini) with 
the ventilator off. We don’t switch it off, and we observe, we kind of 
get a sense (kanshouku) of whether the person is dependent on it. 
It doesn’t make up to evidence.  
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 (Mis)Diagnosis II: “He’s Been Brain Dead for One Year” 
 
Kitanaka-sensei met me in the main hospital hall and walked me down a 
narrow corridor to the critical care department. The department was a very 
different space than the crowded hall we’d just left behind, and rather unlike 
other hospital wards too.  
Adjacent to the ambulance drop off area, at the front of the hospital, and 
separated by a shutter, was the emergency room arrival, an unfurnished space 
fitted only with technical equipment that looked like all the bits in a garage. 
Kitanaka-sensei walked to one of the pieces of equipment, a sort of metal box 
sitting on a trolley, and picked up a catheter to show me how he would attach 
the person to the machine upon arrival.  
Attached to this room was the main CCU, the largest room in the 
department. It was a wide space, with a dozen beds approximately, overlooked 
from a distance by the physicians’ desk. The dim light of the early-autumn 
morning filtered in from large curtained windows. The room was bare. Cards, 
newspapers, children’s toys and the objects that visitors normally bring to 
hospitalised patients do not fit in the CCU. It wasn’t bleak, however; just 
strangely empty, with the medical equipment barely noticeable on the walls. 
There were no patients buried under thick tangles of tubes, no rush to treat new 
emergencies, just doctors doing some routine work at their desks. A young 
man laid in a bed, the sheets rumbled in one corner as his legs stretched out in 
a twisted position. Kitanaka-sensei explained he was admitted recently after a 
car accident, and was now stable enough to be transferred to another facility. 
The man had his head bent on one shoulder, and his closed eyes were moving. 
He had no chances of improving, said Kitanaka-sensei as we stood at his 
bedside. I assumed he must have been unconscious. 
Detached from the main CCU, Kitanaka-sensei showed me the private IC 
rooms. A man in his forties occupied the first one. He laid seemingly asleep 
attached to the respirator, as the rhythmic noise of the machine somehow 
made the movement of his chest more visible beneath the sheets. His feet 
looked swollen, the skin thin and stretched. He had been moved there a couple 
of weeks earlier after being diagnosed brain dead and Kitanaka-sensei thought 
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that he didn’t have much time left. The man in the next room was brain dead 
too. Kitanaka-sensei told me he had no children, but his wife came regularly to 
visit him. He looked frail and skinny, but overall it looked like the prolonged 
treatment hadn’t taken too hard a toll on his body. Kitanaka-sensei said he 
repeatedly consulted with the wife about gradually withholding drugs, but she 
had declined to take action as long as the situation was somehow stable. “He’s 
been here for more than one year now”, said Kitanaka-sensei.  
 
Form the interview with Abe-sensei: 
 
Abe-sensei: One year is too long. I think that’s not really brain 
death. I think it’s a mistake. But if you don't do the test, then nobody 
can tell. If the physician waited one year without doing a diagnosis 
because the family didn’t want to [pronounce the death] then it’s 
misconduct. […] There are such stories because they’re kind of odd 
and curious. Nobody talks of the thousands of patients who die 
normally after a brain death diagnosis, but if one survives longer 
than a while it becomes a story. But anyway I think that was a 
misdiagnosis in the first place. You said there was no apnoea test, 
right? 
 
Me: Yes.  
 
A: And maybe they didn’t even take the brain waves.  
 
Me: No, they did. They did all the exams [in the protocol] but 
the apnoea test.  
 
From the interviews with Kitanaka-sensei: 
  
Kitanaka-sensei: According to the case, I’d do imagining tests, 
like MRI or CT scan, and check the blood flow. The absence of 
cerebral blood flow is a reliable indicator [of brain death]. These 
tests don’t cause any harm to the patient [unlike to the apnoea test]. 
But they cannot be done at bedside, you’ve got to move the patient. 
International protocols, including the Japanese one, are devised to 
be carried out at bedside, but the truth is that there are tests that 
give you a clearer picture, only they’re more laborious and not all 
facilities have the right equipment, so they’re not taken as standard 
tests. The current protocol only comprises of clinical examinations, 
that is, tests that can be done at bedside. The apnoea test is one 
such test, but it’s dangerous. So I’d rather use a test that requires 
me to move the patient but doesn’t aggravate his/her condition, and 
that gives clear results too. There are such methods, they’re just not 
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standardised. That’s how the procedure was devised, and it’s 
unlikely that it’ll change because it’s accepted internationally: no 
protocol includes these [ancillary] tests, so they’re deemed 
unnecessary. But personally I don’t think they are. I mean, if you 
want a greater degree of clarity, these tests can rule out any 
mistake. So you see, it’s not easy at all.  
 
 
The Medical and the Clinical 
 
In pathology the first word historically speaking and the last word 
logically speaking comes back to clinical practice. Clinical practice is 
not and will never be a science even when it uses means whose 
effectiveness is increasingly guaranteed scientifically […] One does 
not scientifically dictate norms to life. But life is this polarised activity 
of debate with the environment […] The physician has sided with life. 
Science serves him in fulfilling his duties arising from that choice. 
(Canguilhem 1991: 226) 
 
While everyone agrees that the apnoea test is absolutely necessary to 
have a diagnosis of brain death, in practice, physicians don’t usually carry out 
this examination unless required to determine the death of the patient for the 
purposes of procuring organs (Aita 2011: 121). As the case of Morinaga-sensei 
illustrates, the formal apnoea test is not necessary to determine that the 
prognosis is terminal and inform the family of the imminent death. The apnoea 
test serves in fact to establish that the patient meets the formal criteria of brain 
death in order to donate organs, because brain death is the only terminal 
condition under which organ procurement from heart-beating patients is allowed 
under the law. Because the preferred patterns of care involve keeping the 
person on artificial ventilation until cardiac arrest, in the majority of cases the 
test becomes in fact irrelevant when not even confounding. Morinaga-sensei’s 
comment about families who enquire whether the patient is brain dead suggests 
in this respect that maintaining a margin of ambiguity on the diagnosis allows 
people to focus on the strategies of care rather than on the underlying 
condition. Having a clear result of brain death, on the other hand, would force 
people to confront it, even if that was only to decide on the continuation of 
treatment despite the patient’s condition.  
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Physicians gave a number of practical reasons to explain why they don’t 
use the apnoea test, citing that it’s more laborious than other examinations, that 
it exposes the medical staff to the risk of legal consequences of withdrawing life 
support, and that it’s dangerous (abunai). In fact, if performed according to the 
accepted procedure, the test is considered to be safe for the patient (Wijdicks 
2011). Nevertheless, it works by producing precisely the body reactions that 
treatment is intended to avoid. In this sense, the fact that the increase of carbon 
dioxide in the blood can be monitored within a safety threshold is irrelevant. The 
effects of the test are still regarded to be against the patient’s interest, and the 
result is not related to any curative options.  
Even when physicians use the test to determine the patient’s condition for 
clinical reasons other than organ donation, they did so in order to strategise the 
patterns of care in dialogue with the family. Ueda-sensei, for example, said he 
performs the test in the majority of cases in order to be able to offer the family 
the possibility to withdraw artificial ventilation. In this case, the apnoea test was 
necessary to exclude a different result at the moment of the second 
examination which could force the family to overturn the decision taken, causing 
significant emotional distress.  
Kitanaka-sensei, on the other hand, said that to use the test when the 
results of the other examinations were unclear and the diagnosis uncertain, 
appeared to constitute an obstacle for the family to accept the prognosis and 
deliberating a decision. In this case, the apnoea test was used in the same way 
as the other ‘ancillary tests’ Kitanaka-sensei describes, such as the brain 
imagining and the blood flow test. Some of these so-called ‘ancillary tests’ are 
considered as sensitive as the standard ones: in fact, they are even more 
precise and can produce “confounding results” as they capture residual brain 
activity in clusters of cells or neurons that are not considered to contradict the 
accepted definition of brain death. For these reasons, while clinically relevant to 
understanding the patient’s condition (Sato 2003), the ancillary tests are not 
included in the official protocols for the diagnosis of brain death, which instead 
are designed to be easily performed in a standardised way, and aim at verifying 
the patient meets the defined criteria for the determination of death. 
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From the point of view of medical science, once [the person is] brain 
dead, on the withdrawal of ventilation the heart will stop immediately 
so that’s essentially death. But clinical medicine doesn’t necessarily 
base its judgment on a scientific mandate. That’s the case with all 
types of treatment. Put the case you know drug B is more effective 
than drug A. That’s not enough to say you’ll always use B over A in 
any patient. If as a physician you think that drug A works better on a 
patient’s body (karada ni au), you don’t have to use drug B at any 
costs if you think it can be not god for your patient, even if data say it’s 
the best one. Even if that’s the best from a scientific point of view, as 
a physician you always gauge what treatment is best for the patient 
through clinical interaction (rinshotekina taiou). That might not appear 
fully logical, but I don’t feel it is (kanjinai). That’s what “clinical” means. 
You’ve got to care thoroughly for the patient. There is a thing such a 
science, then there is the patient, and the doctor, and you manage the 
relationship among the three through the choices you make on the 
ground. Prioritising science…well you do somehow, but it’s not about 
science at all. 
(Ueda-sensei) 
 
In clinical practice, the usefulness of the diagnostic tests was not 
evaluated in light of their reliability to produce a diagnosis of ‘brain death in the 
proper sense’ (hontō no imi noshi). Ambiguity in the diagnosis is not always 
synonymous with a lack of reliable information about the patient’s condition, and 
people appear to have various diagnostic possibilities: they can leave out some 
tests and make a diagnosis of ‘possible brain death’ (nōshi to sareuru jotai), or 
they can corroborate the clinical examinations by means of the apnoea test or 
the ancillary tests. Whatever the scenario, they gauge their possibilities in view 
of how the diagnostic tests enable or contradict certain patterns of care.  
While medical diagnoses are usually considered to be functional, to 
determine the underlying condition in order to decide care, in this case the logic 
of care doesn’t follow from but instead inform the diagnostic process. It is 
through this process, in turn, that bodies become (brain) dead or (terminally) 
alive. From this perspective, the process of determining brain death in clinical 
practice appears to happen in ways much messier than described by Abe-
sensei, but in a way it is indeed a “permformative” practice.  
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Conclusion 
 
Despite the emphasis on the recent reform of the legal definition of death in 
relation to organ donation, the analysis of the diagnosis and care of brain death 
in practice indicates that clinical work has remained substantially unaffected. 
The ways in which end-of-life decisions are negotiated on he ground seem to 
depart only marginally from the situation during the years of the brain death 
problem (Long 2005; Lock 2002). In this respect, three important elements of 
continuity emerge. First, the role of the family is still predominant over the 
principle of individual autonomy. As the case of mitori no iryō shows the 
provision of medical treatment is not evaluated in light of the benefits and 
burdens for the individual patient, but appears to be oriented towards providing 
grief care for the family, by allowing them time to gradually process the loss and 
deliberate when and how to let the person die. Further, because the very notion 
of treatment utility/futility appears to be valued in relation to these patterns of 
care more than on a strictly medical basis, the tendency to prolong life-support 
treatment well past the point when the patient’s condition is known to be 
irreversible continue to be largely common (Aita 2009, 2011). Finally, decisions 
appear to be negotiated by privileging diagnostic ambiguity over clarity80, as this 
allows a wider margin of flexibility for people to deliberate decisions according 
to the situation on the ground (cf. Long 2005).  
While these patterns of care remain predominant, they also offer space for 
change and renegotiation. In this sense, the experiences of the physicians who 
contributed to this part of the research reveal the particular attention given to 
issues that have traditionally remained marginal in the discussion over the 
ethics of clinical practice in Japan, such as organ donation, the disclosure of 
terminal diagnoses and the withdrawal of futile life-support. Physicians thus 
construed organ donation as a form of respecting the patient’s and the family’s 
last wills at the end of life, and emphasised the importance of disclosing 
information to the family in providing them time to be with the patient while 
treatment is continued. In this way, the experiences of the physicians 
                                                80	See for example how Lock describes how she was reminded that physicians don’t use the 
word ‘brain death’ (2002: 270), much as in Morinaga-sensei’s case. 
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interviewed offer important insights into how medical professionals negotiate 
the need to reorient the ethics of their work, from the exclusive commitment to 
save life to the need to take care of the process of death, within the local moral 
economy of end-of-life care, informed by the focus on collective decisions and 
the strategic use of diagnostic ambiguity.  
In light of how it is put to work in practice, the Japanese policy on brain 
death appears to be a case on its own. While the uniform redefinition of death 
as brain death presupposes that the medical diagnosis is taken as the condition 
to authorise organ donation on the grounds that the brain dead patient is dead 
to all intents and purposes, in Japan the reverse is true: the determination of 
brain death (nōshi hantei) is carried out almost exclusively when consent to 
organ donation has already been given, and the pronouncement of the death of 
the person is still a matter of family’s choice. In this sense, Aita argues that the 
ambiguity over brain death that the policy maintains is praised by clinical 
practitioners because it allows them to reconcile the medical logic that 
underpins the diagnosis with the feelings of the people involved in the practice 
of care, including the family and physicians (2012). From an anthropological 
point of view, the case of Japan shows how the there is no logic outside the 
logic of care, and that medicine, even in its most scientifically sophisticated 
forms, such as modern intensive care, is always a therapeutic practice.  
From this perspective, the experience of the determination of brain death 
in Japan contributes a valuable practical critique to the debate on this much-
contested medical category. As discussed at the beginning of this thesis, the 
logical consistency in the formulation of concepts, standards and clinical tests of 
brain death remains a question open to dispute, and the practical function of 
this medical category at the intersections between the ethics of organ 
procurement and actual clinical work appears in many respects contradictory 
(see Chapter 1). While these controversies have prompted a heated discussion 
among neurosurgeons and bioethicists in North America and Europe, the 
debate has remained almost exclusively speculative, leaving out of sight the 
most important issue at stake: the fact that medical categories are always a 
matter of practice, and therefore have to be considered in light of the practical 
purposes that they serve and of the actual outcomes that they bring about 
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(Belkin 2014). The Japanese take on brain death and the experience of how 
this category is negotiated in practice offers a critique that is more true-to-life (or 
in this case, to death), thus providing precious intellectual resources to the 
bioethical debate on death and organ donation. On the other hand, as it follows 
from the ethnography of transplant recipients, the analysis of brain death in 
practice also problematises the practical implications of this sensibility towards 
death, casting its consequences far beyond the clinical setting within the 
broader economies of transplants.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Along with caring for terminal patients and their families, a central part of 
Kitanaka-sensei’s job is to seek new solutions to critical cases, pushing further 
at the limits of what can be done to bring back to life those who are on the brink 
of death. With this aim, he has been working for the past few years on a cutting-
edge resuscitation technique involving percutaneous cardiopulmonary support 
(PCPS). PCPS is an artificial heart-lung machine consisting of an external 
structure, roughly the size of a computer, connected to two catheters that are 
inserted into the patient’s major blood vessels. Through the first catheter, blood 
is drained out of the body and into the artificial lung where it is re-oxygenated 
before being pumped back into the patient’s circulatory system via the second 
tube. Originally developed for use in heart surgery to sustain circulation in the 
absence of cardiac activity, PCPS has been recently put to test in emergency 
and trauma care to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). The device is 
used to rescue patients who have suffered sudden cardiac arrest, stabilising 
their condition by sustaining blood flow to vital organs, and in particular to the 
brain. Compared to manual stimulation of circulation or other more basic 
reanimation techniques, PCPS provides a more efficient replacement of natural 
cardiac activity and can be continued as a treatment for days or even weeks,. It 
has been shown to greatly improve the chances of recovery in cases that were 
once considered irreversible. Its potential benefits are in fact so promising that 
PSPC actually looks like a resuscitation technology in a quite literal sense, one 
that can bring people “back from the dead.” And indeed the experience of one 
of the patients Kitanaka-sensei recently treated could easily be described in 
those terms.  
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A few months before my meeting with Kitanaka-sensei, during the frigid 
winter of northern Japan, a woman fell unconscious near her home. She was 
found the morning after, under a thick blanket of snow. When she arrived at the 
hospital she had no heartbeat and her body temperature was 13.5 degrees 
Celsius. From that, the doctors thought that she must have been lying 
unconscious in the snow for several hours –it takes seven to eight hours for 
body temperature to drop to 17 degrees– and dated the time her heart had 
stopped beating back to the night before. Treatment was promptly started, the 
body of the woman was warmed up and she was immediately put on PCPS to 
reactivate the circulation. One month later, Kitanaka-sensei told me, she left the 
hospital “on her own legs”.  
While recovering from a eight-hour long cardiac arrest is exceptional, and 
was indeed made possible only by the patient fortuitously being hypothermic, 
PCPS routinely allows medics to treat people who have shown no natural 
cardiac activity for as long as days. Put to rest as the machine takes over, the 
heart can return to its normal function even after prolonged periods of inactivity, 
a potential that was completely ignored and thus never actualised through basic 
CPR techniques and under clinical protocols that equate death with either 
cardiac arrest or brain death. The result is that patients who no longer than a 
few years ago would have been declared dead upon arrival at the hospital can 
actually make a full recovery.81 
 In this way, PCPS shakes even the seemingly safe definition of death as 
the apparent absence of signs of life in the body. “That’s no miracle, that’s 
common sense,” says Dr Kano, knowing that his words are all the more 
powerful in the face of stories like those above. The implementation of PCPS in 
emergency care rests on the counterintuitive assumption that even when the 
heart is not moving, the person, or better said, parts of the person, are still 
functioning, and if they are kept healthy and alive by means CPR, the process 
of death can actually be reversed.  
 
                                                
81 According to the documentary ‘Medicine for Life and Death’ (2010) data from 2007 indicate 
26.6% survival rate and 21.5% conscious recovery rate compared to the national average of 
10.2% and 6.1% respectively. 
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When a patient arrives at the hospital in cardiac arrest you’d 
[normally] check to see if the pupils are fixed, and if there’s 
respiratory and cardiac activity. Those are the three signs of death. 
Still, even when the patient is in such a condition, they might not be 
brain dead yet. So in a way they're not dead. [For this reason] it’s 
unthinkable to diagnose the person [dead] as soon as they are 
brought to the hospital and go ahead with [organ] donation, as 
happens in America [using the protocol for NHBD]. My thought [in 
such a circumstance] is that there’s a brain there that can be 
rescued. I know it, because I actually have experienced it.   
(Kitanaka-sensei) 
 
If brain death meant displacing and reducing the process of dying from the 
body as a whole to the brain, PCPS confronts us with the dis-assemblage of 
death and therefore of personhood. Accordingly, the challenge with the clinical 
use of PCPS is not to simply resuscitate (parts) of the body, but to produce the 
possibility of a meaningful recovery for the person. 
Crucial, in this regard, is time. According to Kitanaka-sensei, forty minutes 
is the longest that can be allowed from the moment the heart stops to when 
PCPS is started. After that, even though basic cardiopulmonary support has 
been provided throughout, the chances are that PCPS might turn out to do 
more harm than good, resulting in the patient being reanimated only to have 
suffered major and irreparable brain damage. Complicating clinical decisions 
about the use of PCPS in emergency care is the fact that the heart and the 
brain do not die at the same pace and in the same way. Kitanaka-sensei 
showed me his clinical findings represented in a graph that compares 
percentages of recovery in relation to the time of intervention for both the brain 
and the heart, respectively shown in blue and red. The image on the screen 
shows the two lines intersecting like an open scissor: with the horizontal axis of 
the graph indicating time, the two lines both decline towards the right as the 
figure indicating the minutes gets higher, but while the red line has a mild 
inclination, the blue one drops rapidly. The recovery of cardiac functions, 
Kitanaka-sensei explains to me, is correlated with but not directly proportional to 
time, also depending on the original defect that caused the cardiac arrest in the 
first place. When it comes to the brain, the odds of a full recovery are inversely 
proportional to time: the longer it takes to get the patient on PCPS, the worse 
the damage suffered by the tissues left without oxygen. As the figure for time 
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increases on Kitanaka-sensei’s graph, the blue line drastically falls until it 
reaches the point where the chances are that even if attached to the machine 
the patient might already be brain dead. 
CPR raises deep ethical dilemmas about withholding potentially life saving 
technologies from critical patients. While it can effectively restores cardiac and 
circulatory activity and thus brings back biological life to the body, CPR can do 
nothing to treat the body. In emergency and trauma care, the most daunting 
problem is the risk that in the prolonged absence of circulation the brain will 
suffer irreversible damage. This means that, if not administrated promptly and 
efficiently CPR risks resuscitating the person only to have them permanently 
impaired, the reason why many sign do-not-resuscitate orders. On the other 
hand, however, PCPS also involves another, equally dreadful prospect brought 
into being by the possibility, until recently unexplored, of artificially sustaining 
cardiac function for as long as days, during which the condition of the patient is 
constantly monitored. The problem arises when tests reveal that medical 
intervention has been rapid enough to prevent neurological damage, but time 
proves ineffective in restoring cardiac activity. Put it simply, in such cases the 
body is healthy and the person fully capable of consciousness, but the heart is 
not functioning. The only possibility of recovery would then be to substitute the 
failing organ, which ultimately means receiving a transplant. 
That was the epilogue of the complicated but fortunate story of Saya.82 
Saya was brought to Kitanaka-sensei’s hospital after she had suffered sudden 
cardiac arrest during a PE class at her junior high school. After days on PCPS 
and still showing no sign of spontaneous cardiac activity, the girl was 
transferred to a nearby centre equipped with a ventricular assistant device 
(VAD). VADs, or as they are normally referred to, artificial hearts, are portable 
devices much smaller than PCPS, which can be worn for a longer time and are 
designed to act as a bridge from a patient's terminal cardiac failure to the 
transplant. Once she received one, Saya got listed for a transplant in Japan, 
and at the same time her family contacted JASOT to start the fundraising that 
successfully brought her to the U.S.A. Saya’s case was a lucky as much as it 
                                                
82 Saya’s story is told in the documentary ‘Nonfix’ (2011) that Dr Kitanaka sent me a few months 
ahead of our meetings.   
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was a rare one. It is a story that shows what is possible, and yet most of the 
time unfeasible. 
In fact, clinical, technical as well as financial factors83 shape the use of 
PCPS in emergency care in such a way that when the patient does not regain 
normal cardiac function in two weeks, the only possibility is weaning them from 
life-sustaining treatment. Saya’s youth and good health heavily influenced the 
clinical decision that saw her referred to another hospital for further treatment, a 
choice that would have made no sense if the patient had been older or 
debilitated by a long disease. Her family was spared the burden of taking into 
consideration the financial costs of PCPS, as her treatment was paid for by the 
school's insurance.  The possibility of a transplant overseas, especially given 
her young age, might also have played a part in her family’s decision to go 
ahead with treatment, making her eligible for the artificial heart. Artificial hearts 
have limited availability, and are a temporary support, so that in order to receive 
such a treatment the patient must also be a good candidate for the next 
therapy, a transplant, which in turn is rare in Japan. The decisions in cases like 
Saya’s are therefore complex ones and involve both a clinical assessment of 
the patient’s chances of surviving; the willingness of the family to undertake 
extreme measures in the face of uncertain outcomes; as well as the finances to 
pay for treatments, such as the transplant overseas or PCPS itself, that are not 
included in standard insurance schemes. That all these factors could play their 
part in clinical success is not impossible, but in many cases all it takes is one 
thing to go awry for the whole to fall apart. In fact, in a great number of cases, 
the weaning treatment is the only choice because, as Kitanaka-sensei puts it, 
“there’s no next step.” What makes these decisions particularly difficult, 
although they are not common, is the fact that the patient, even though 
sedated, has normal or close to normal cerebral activity and is thus fully 
capable of consciousness. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 For an analysis of PCPS withdrawal and withholding in ICU see Aita (2011: 75).	
 281 
From my field-notes 
 
Kitanaka-sensei: In such cases, we have to interrupt the treatment at 
that stage, even if the person is conscious. Of course you don’t 
switch off the machine while the person is awake. We provide 
medication to sedate the patient.  
 
Me: When you say conscious, what do you mean? What level of 
consciousness? 
 
K.: [Potentially] they’re fully (jūbun) conscious.  
 
M: You’re talking of people who could reason like you and me? 
 
I remain silent but make a strange face at this point because 
Kitanaka kind of screams: “I know, I know!” 
 
K: […] That’s a recent problem. A problem we have since we’ve got 
machines for cardiopulmonary resuscitation […] It’s terrible 
(zankoku). But that’s our limit, at the moment. […]  
 
M: What about the opposite case, when the heart comes back but in 
the meantime the patient has suffered major brain damage? Will the 
person have to live the rest of their life with some form of disability? 
 
K: Those cases are relatively common […] If you don’t reduce the 
time before the patient is put on PCPS then you cannot rescue the 
brain. Currently, even here at our centre, the average time to get the 
patient to the hospital is thirty-five minutes. That’s probably even 
longer in Tokyo. According to my data, if you don’t manage to get the 
person on the machine in forty minutes there’s nothing you can do 
for the brain. In any case, sooner is always the better as you see 
[from the graph]. So you have to be fast. [On average] it takes thirty-
five minutes for the patient just to arrive, so you’re then left with five 
minutes to attach the machine. That’s a strict working time. We can 
do it in four minutes, but… 
 
M: Would you say four minutes is fast?  
 
K: It is. We have very good results at this centre. But in other 
hospitals, like in Tokyo and even abroad, it can take much longer […] 
But if you don’t do it fast, then there’ really no point in doing it at all. 
We haven’t started yet, but from next year we’re planning on trying to 
bring the device itself to the scene, so we can attach it quickly to the 
patient. As I said, you have to be fast. You can practise doing it 
pretty swiftly at the hospital, and we’ve actually mastered it quite 
well. But even so, you have [structural] limits, so we’re trying to work 
them out. It’s the opposite of this. 
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He shows me an article on a protocol under discussion in the U.S.A. 
to allow kidney retrieval at the scene from patients who suffer sudden 
cardiac arrest and carry a ‘do not resuscitate’ order. 
 
K: Our medicine is about rescuing the patient; this is to rescue the 
organs. What I want to do is to rescue the brain in order to rescue 
the patient. If we can make this bulky machine compact enough to be 
transported to the scene, we’ll increase the number of people whose 
brain can be rescued (nō wo tasukeru hito ga fuerareru) even more. 
The problem is, you can rescue the brain if you’re fast enough, but 
among those people whose brain you rescued there’ll be some 
whose heart doesn’t come back. Those too will increase. Well, I don’t 
know to what extent but… 
 
M: But it might increase (kamoshirenai)… 
 
K: That’s my dilemma.  
  
End of field-notes 
 
 
 
 ‘Developing’ Transplantation in Japan 
 
As the dispute over brain death remains open, PCPS challenges an even more 
conservative and long-accepted definition of death as cardio-circulatory arrest. 
Death is redefined (once more), this time through the relationship between 
different body systems, in a way that almost seems to run against the very logic 
that underpins the concept of death as brain death (the equation of human 
death with the death of one single organ). Kitanaka-sensei’s story thus reminds 
us of how the answers to the above questions are both based on and inform 
distinctions –between life and death, persons and body parts, good and bad– 
that are not only socially constructed, but also constantly changing. The 
situation of organ transplantation in Japan has significantly transformed since 
the years of the ‘brain death problem’. New problems have emerged, while the 
definition of death still remains contested terrain. Through the above discussion, 
I have attempted to map some of these transformations, and the human 
experiences though which they materialised. 
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For transplant patients, advocates, and professionals, the sense of this 
change translated into the optimistic hope that donation will increase in the 
future, and in the appreciation of slowly gained but solid achievements.   
 
You can’t say where we’ll be in fifty years, but you know where we 
were ten years ago. I think that, somewhere, [donations] will 
increase, hopefully. If you look forward you can’t see the path, but if 
you look back you do. I don’t know how things will be in five years, 
but since five years ago, or ten years ago, there has been a change. 
(JOTNW coordinator, Umeyara) 
 
The reform of the law on brain death and transplants in 2009, twelve years 
after the passing of what Ashida-san called ‘the traffic light without the road’, 
arguably represented the most visible instantiation of such change. The reform 
was the outcome of lengthy political negotiations, of the renewed media interest 
and public debate over the problem of transplant, as well as of the international 
pressure deriving from the growing awareness of the phenomenon of transplant 
tourism and trafficking (Chapter 5). The experience of Japanese transplant 
patients emerged throughout the discussion as the key domain underscoring 
these transformations, starting from the example of ZōiRen’s lobbying activity.  
In the midst of the notorious ‘brain death problem’, Japanese patients 
suffering from a wide range of diseases for which transplant came to represent 
the hope of a cure gave raise to new forms of social organisations –patients’ 
groups- aimed at fostering mutual help and peer-exchange. These have 
become the sites where new forms of politically charged activism emerged, 
which addressed the policy making process as a means to prompt social 
change. Patients and their families have organised to negotiate their claims in 
the public arena harnessing strategic resources. Through the plight of tokō 
ishoku families, they reached the medias’ ears to mobilise emotional response 
in the public, while lobbying MPs “one by one” to influence political decisions 
(Chapter 5).  
The study of the ZōiRen’s campaign has revealed a not very well-known 
case of socio-political activism on contemporary health-related matters. While 
patients’ contestation of brain death in Japan has been widely discussed 
(Feldman 2000; Lock 2002), the study of transplant advocacy, and of how it 
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interweaved with the long-enduring controversy on the ‘brain death problem’, 
calls attention to various aspects of the national debate on transplantation, and 
sheds some light of the dynamics through which these have emerged as ‘social 
problems’ in Japan. The analysis of how transplant recipients and their families 
came to play a prominent role as key political and social actors in the debate 
and regulation of this medical technology contributes valuable insights to the 
growing literature on patients’ organisations and health-related movements 
(Epstein 1995; Hoffman 2011; Novas 2006; Rose 2007; Landzelius 2006; cf. 
Petryna 2002; Biehl 2004). This, it seems, has overwhelmingly focused on the 
North American and European contexts, maybe unsurprisingly given the 
assumption that Japan is a harmonious and hierarchical society. Filling this gap, 
the thesis adds to the case studies of patients’ mobilisation and grass-roots 
movement in Japan (George 2001; Kingston 2004; cf. Hirano 2008), to highlight 
in particular the role of patients as policy actors.  
The validation of the worth of transplantation, however, is by no means 
confined to the ‘promotion of transplantation’ in the public arena, for the 
question of efficacy remains a question that ishokusha and their families are 
personally confronted with as they navigate their post-operative life juggling 
therapeutic expectations and the responsibilities of after-care. As ethnographies 
of transplant patients’ experience in other contexts show, becoming an organ 
recipient entails the constant negotiation of ‘normality’ (Crowley-Matoka 2005; 
Sharp 1999, 2006). In this respect, the ethnography of Japanese recipients 
shows that forms of social organisation on a health-related basis were also the 
privileged sites where people negotiate what it means to be ‘ishokusha’ 
(transplanted person) in the country of the ‘brain death problem’. This social 
panorama of care, I argue, greatly complicates the common interpretation that 
recipients are co-opted in the promotion of transplantation out of a sense of 
gratitude towards those who helped them, often at the costs of censoring their 
problems and complains so as to not contradict the positive rhetoric of 
transplant promotion (Sharp 2006; Gordon 1996). It is not my intention to 
negate that socially agreed expectations, of health and gratitude, shape 
people’s therapeutic experience of recipients and their families; at the same 
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time, however, the ethnography of Japanese patients repositions them as active 
agents who make good use of their indebtedness.  
The first patients groups, emerging in the 1990s, were formed to provide 
mutual support and practical guidance to recipients and candidates at a time 
when not only organ donation was contested on ethical grounds, but the 
therapeutic efficacy of transplantation too was disputed and the treatment was 
not commonly on offer in Japan (Chapter 5). While transplantation can be said 
to be better established within the Japanese health-care system and more 
approvingly represented in the public discourse than in the past, transplant 
recipients are still not very numerous and becoming an ‘ishokusha’ means, in 
their own terms, to belong to a ‘minority group’, albeit one that people like 
Nakamichi-san have worked hard to define in a positive light.  
The summer camp for young recipients, the transplant games, and the 
friendships born and cultivated in the waiting room are, therefore, the sites 
where patients can confront each other on the small and larger issues of life 
after the operation with people who share the same experience, and especially 
for the tokō ishoku (who are in a way a ‘minority within a minority’) these are 
often the only resource of support in the absence of hospital-based groups, or 
social worker or transplant coordinators’ assistance. Through these forms of 
sociality, therefore, people negotiate their ‘return to a normal life’ (shakai fukki) 
against normative, and almost hegemonic, assumptions of ‘normality’ as health 
and productiveness. Tomomatsu argues that for Japanese recipients 
(especially of an older generation) overcoming social stigma for their condition 
is a crucial part of the post-operative life (2013). The ethnography reflects in 
part this point, but it also indicates that there is more at stake in the dynamics 
through which patients ‘author and authorise’ (Landzelius 2006: 543) what it 
means to be ‘ishokusha’ in Japan.  
Within the Japanese landscape, where the promotion of transplant in the 
public arena and the mutual support among patients are but two sides of one 
coin, one of the things that, I believe, is strongly reasserted about being an 
organ recipient is that it is acceptable to receive. If one of the arguments 
against the redefinition of death for transplantation purposes was that it 
removes death from the circle of close ones in order to use the person’s body to 
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help strangers (Lock 2002), the ethnography shows that underpinning the 
transformation of transplantation in Japan is precisely the renegotiation of the 
networks of social and moral obligations in which death is entangled.  
As I have shown, the legacy of the Japanese impasse on transplants has 
been the emergence of the phenomenon of transplants overseas. Through tokō 
ishoku, people rely on various resources within and without the health-care 
system, including fellow recipients, patients’ rights advocacy, health care 
professionals, the media and the public, in order to pursue overseas the 
treatment they cannot receive at home (Chapters 2 and 4). In asserting these 
uninsured claims to care, Japanese recipients strategically negotiate 
relationships of indebtedness: they validate their worth as recipients of aid by 
sharing their plight with the public; they construe advocacy as a means to return 
the favour received (ongaeshi); they denounce the transplants overseas as a 
burden (meiwaku) that Japan imposes on others in order to lobby for the reform 
of national policies. It is through the negotiation of these circuits of reciprocity 
that transplant patients have legitimised and asserted the right to receive, both 
abroad and especially at home.   
The social embeddedness of Japanese practices of exchange has often 
been given as a reason behind the local uneasiness with transplantation. While 
the ‘gift of life’ is an anonymous donation to strangers, gift giving in Japan, it 
has been pointed out, entails mutual reciprocity and is in fact used to reinforce 
and consolidate codified networks of social relationships (Tomomatsu 2013; 
Sasaki 2008; Lock 2002). Throughout my analysis, I have shown, however, that 
people negotiate reciprocity across different registers adapting the technology 
to the situations on the ground, and thus give rise to new and complex circuits 
of exchange. In this respect, while the recent discussion on organ 
transplantation within anthropology and the social sciences has argued for the 
need to move beyond the paradigmatic frameworks of analysis, centred on the 
theory of the gift, in order to articulate more nuanced descriptions of the actual 
economies in which body parts are caught up (Waldby and Mitchell 2006; 
Yamazaki 2009, 2011a, 2011b), this thesis offers a valuable and rare 
ethnographic contribution to a debate that has so far remained largely 
theoretical.  
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The discussion on the management of brain death in clinical practice 
illuminates one crucial site where these economies of organs are negotiated 
(Chapter 6). The analysis of the clinical care of brain death is, to my knowledge, 
the first attempt to investigate empirically physicians’ attitudes towards the 
diagnosis of the condition and the ‘option giving’ after the enforcement of the 
new policy on organ donation, and shows that in fact nothing has changed 
compared to the past (cf. Aita 2012). Japan still hold its ‘ambiguous’ definition of 
brain death, both on paper and in practice, and this, as I have illustrated, offers 
an important space for care. While end-of-life is increasingly a matter of 
concern, and in light of the new policy on organ donation the practice of ‘giving 
an option’ has assumed a greater than ever importance to promote efficiency in 
organ donation, clinical practice emerges as the crucial site where people are 
more directly confronted with the question of how to reconcile the need to 
procure life-saving organs with the problem of making sense of the death of the 
person. I have illustrated in this regard how the moral obligations of care and 
the networks of social relationships that make the body into a person inform the 
medical categories at stake. Further, I have shown that transformations are 
always ongoing, so that the dilemma of how to define death continues to shape 
the local economies of organ transplants in ever shifting ways.  
In mapping these economies, this thesis offers fresh insights into how 
people engage with organ transplantation in a country famous for its opposition 
to brain death. In doing so, it provides relevant ethnographic knowledge to the 
existing literature on this technology in anthropology and closely related 
disciplines84, and contributes significantly to a subject so far poorly studied in 
the social sciences (cf. Tomomatsu 2013; Yamazaki 2007, 2009, 2011a, 
2011b). Deviating from Tomomatsu’s analysis (2013), which is closely focused 
on patients and their families’ personal illness experience, I have tied my 
discussion of what it means to be ‘ishokusha’ in Japan into the broader global 
and local economies of organs and revealed how they shape each other in 
significant ways. In doing so, I have weaved Yamazaki’s theoretical insights on 
                                                
84 Among others: Fox and Swazey (1978); Sharp (2006); Ben-David (2005); Gordon (2001, 
2006); Maynard (2006); Joralemon (1995); Crowley-Matoka (2005); Healy (2006), Strathern 
(2004); Ikels (2012); Shimazono (2008); Scheper-Hughes (2000, 2001, 2005); Cohen (2001, 
2003, 2005). 
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‘bioeconomies’ (2009, 2011a, 2011b) into the ethnographic description of how 
these economies are negotiated on the ground through a variety of practices, 
such as the fundraising, patients’ advocacy, and the problem of brain death at 
the juncture between public policy and clinical practice. From such a 
perspective, the thesis contributes to the still narrow body of literature on 
biotechnologies in Japan, showing how such an investigation can offer precious 
insights into the seemingly self-explanatory logic of ‘global’ technologies.  
 
 
Unfitting Parts 
 
There is a second image that emerges from Kitanaka-sensei’s account of 
advanced CPR, and is about the power of biotechnologies of disassembling the 
person into body spare parts. With PCPS the “heart can return to its normal 
function”, but the device is ultimately aimed at “rescuing the brain.” The problem 
is, that the two do not always die in the same way, hence the dilemma of how to 
adjust the use of the device to a medical practice that is aimed at “rescuing the 
person” and not just at “rescuing the organs.” The vignette about PCPS shows 
that while we might live and die as hearts, brains and kidneys, the problem is 
how to reconfigure the ways in which we live and die as whole persons.  
I chose the vignette about PCPS to wrap up my conclusions because it raises 
some of the key questions that run through the ethnography. To what extent is it 
desirable to technologically trickling with death, and where is the limit of 
attempting new ways to help those for whom “there is no next step”? Where 
does one stop in pursuing “miracles” if terrible deaths are likely to come with 
them? When does a clinical failure become tragic, and when does it leave “no 
regrets”? How to make sense of the uncertainty (kamoshirenai) that accompany 
these dilemmas? And who to whom are these decisions right or wrong, when 
close family members, unrelated patients and society s a whole partake in the 
individual’s death? At the same time, the vignette about PCPS also indicates 
that these problems are not separate from one another but are negotiated 
against each other. The description of PCPS shows how its therapeutic capacity 
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depends on both the ability of operating on organs as separate parts as well as 
the calibration of these interventions in view of the interaction of different body 
systems. Borrowing on this image, one can rethink the technology as a means 
manage individual death in relation to collective life.  
Arguably, it is when people are confronted directly with clinical decisions 
about life and death that these dilemmas emerge in the most striking and visible 
way. For families of young recipients, their children’s illness faced them not only 
with the unexpected diagnosis of a life-threatening condition but also with the 
question of how to pursue care in a regime of scarcity where the only option of 
treatment is not on offer. In a society where children are highly valued and the 
burden of death is mostly carried by the elderly, the young age of the children 
and the rareness and severity of the disease define these episodes of illness as 
particularly critical cases. The extraordinariness of this mortality, in turn elicits 
the extraordinariness of the cure that transplant offers, as a resource-intensive 
and clinically uncertain treatment that pushes everyone, physicians, families, 
and patients, to leave nothing unattempted in the emotionally charged and 
momentous effort of ‘saving lives’ (chapter 2). 
On the opposite hand, brain death faces people with forms of life that 
cannot be saved and that force medicine to reconfigure its goals: from avoiding 
death at any costs, to taking care of it (chapter 6). As the discussion on mitori 
no iryō shows, if the medicalisation of death is a problem, and one of great 
social relevance, it is medicine that is charged of reconfiguring a good death (cf. 
Kaufman). From this perspective, whether in the form of end-of-life care for the 
donor, or in the heroic enterprise of saving the lives of potential recipients, the 
high-end technology of transplantation is technique to handle situations where 
people are confronted with mortality in the form of unexpected and tragic life 
crises.  
I have argued, however, that mortality also presents itself in much more 
ordinary ways. While the experience of receiving a transplant is often 
represented as momentous and exceptional one (and in many ways it 
undoubtedly is), its legacy continues long past the surgery (chapter 3). Even for 
the families of young patients who couldn’t make it through, the life after the 
(attempted) transplant is characterised by the on-going process of reconciling 
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with those events. For healthy recipients, on the other hand, health itself 
becomes a matter of daily negotiation, as it’s both highly cherished and always 
on the verge of becoming pathological. Knowing the hopes and investments 
people invest in the process of receiving a transplant, and how these shape the 
life after the operation, I am particularly cautious in overstretching comparisons 
between experiences that are sharply different. I have argued, however, that in 
their diversity, both the existential quandaries prompted by the loss of a child, 
and the negotiation of ‘normality’ that recipients are confronted with shed some 
light on one shared aspect of the technology: the way it works as a means to 
tame the precariousness and limitedness of life. 
Bauman argues that the ever-present possibility and final certainty of death is 
productive of social life (1992). Similarly, Davis illustrates that the knowledge of 
death and the awareness of mortality signified by illness underpin the 
construction and reproduction of moral communities, as therapeutic practices 
becomes a means to mediate social life (2000, 2003). The ethnography shows 
that this is true not just for traditional therapeutic practices but for modern 
biotechnologies too. Contrary to the received argument that advanced medical 
technologies have stripped death away from the web of social relations in which 
it was construed, the discussion of how people in Japan have negotiated 
conflicting dilemmas regarding organ procurement and the redefinition of death 
shows how the technology is used as a means to collectively confront death. 
The circulation of therapeutic resources, moral sentiments and mutual favours 
through which people manage the procurement and allocation of organs for 
transplant are process of mor(t)al distribution through which the amount and 
forms of mortality that society can tolerate are collectively negotiated.  
I have thus shown that through the fundraising campaigns, people identify 
critical forms of mortality and put in place the conditions to reconfigure a space 
where possible deaths become socially acceptable, albeit tragic: when no effort 
is left unattempted to save these lives, it will be something else (a shortage or 
organs, of time, or life itself) to take upon itself the burden of death. It was 
against these unacceptable deaths that transplant patients advocated for the 
need to Japan to carry its own burden as a country and avoid putting young 
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patients at risk. Compensating a potential waste of life thus became the means 
to redefine another shortage of life as good as death.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Cadaveric Organ Donation in Japan 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Contents of the Bills of Reform 
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the Study of 
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Death 
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